A bird's eye view: biological categorization and reasoning within and across cultures

Many psychological studies of categorization and reasoning use undergraduates to make claims about human conceptualization. Generalizability of findings to other populations is often assumed but rarely tested. Even when comparative studies are conducted, it may be challenging to interpret differences. As a partial remedy, in the present studies we adopt a 'triangulation strategy' to evaluate the ways expertise and culturally different belief systems can lead to different ways of conceptualizing the biological world. We use three groups (US bird experts, US undergraduates, and ordinary Itza' Maya) and two sets of birds (North American and Central American). Categorization tasks show considerable similarity among the three groups' taxonomic sorts, but also systematic differences. Notably, US expert categorization is more similar to Itza' than to US novice categorization. The differences are magnified on inductive reasoning tasks where only undergraduates show patterns of judgment that are largely consistent with current models of category-based taxonomic inference. The Maya commonly employ causal and ecological reasoning rather than taxonomic reasoning. Experts use a mixture of strategies (including causal and ecological reasoning), only some of which current models explain. US and Itza' informants differed markedly when reasoning about passerines (songbirds), reflecting the somewhat different role that songbirds play in the two cultures. The results call into question the importance of similarity-based notions of typicality and central tendency in natural categorization and reasoning. These findings also show that relative expertise leads to a convergence of thought that transcends cultural boundaries and shared experiences.     

Theory of mind development in Chinese children: a meta-analysis of false-belief understanding across cultures and languages

Theory of mind is claimed to develop universally among humans across cultures with vastly different folk psychologies. However, in the attempt to test and confirm a claim of universality, individual studies have been limited by small sample sizes, sample specificities, and an overwhelming focus on Anglo- European children. The current meta-analysis of children's false-belief performance provides the most comprehensive examination to date of theory-of-mind development in a population of non-Western children speaking non-Indo-European languages (i.e., Mandarin and Cantonese). The meta-analysis consisted of 196 Chinese conditions (127 from mainland China and 69 from Hong Kong), representing responses from more than 3,000 children, compared with 155 similar North American conditions (83 conditions from the United States and 72 conditions from Canada). The findings show parallel developmental trajectories of false-belief understanding for children in China and North America coupled with significant differences in the timing of development across communities-children's false-belief performance varied across different locales by as much as 2 or more years. These data support the importance of both universal trajectories and specific experiential factors in the development of theory of mind.     

Inhibition and cognitive development: object,number, categorization,and reasoning

In the early 1990s, the concept of inhibition sparked a new surge of interest in cognitive psychology, both in North America and in Europe. In the framework of that research trend, it is proposed here that cognitive development cannot be reduced to the coordination–activation of structural units (as in Jean Piaget's structuralist theory and in the neo-structuralist models), but that development also often involves inhibiting a competing structure or scheme. This approach, which views the processes of selection–inhibition as age- and domain-specific, is illustrated by four experimental examples (from infancy to adulthood): object construction, number, categorization, and reasoning.     

The development of generosity and moral cognition across five cultures

Morality is an evolved aspect of human nature, yet is heavily influenced by cultural environment. This developmental study adopted an integrative approach by combining measures of socioeconomic status (SES), executive function, affective sharing, empathic concern, theory of mind, and moral judgment in predicting sharing behavior in children (N = 999) from the age of 5 to 12 in five large‐scale societies: Canada, China, Turkey, South Africa, and the USA. Results demonstrate that age, gender, SES, culture, and social cognitive mechanisms explain over 20% of the variance worldwide in children's resource allocation. These findings are discussed in reference to standard cultural comparisons (individualist/collectivist), as well as the degree of market integration, and highlight continuities and discontinuities in children's generosity across urban contexts.     

Theory of mind and rule-based reasoning

The hypothesis is tested that during the preschool period a particular form of reasoning is applied to theory of mind and a set of problems that do not require the understanding of mental states. Three experiments each provided a different piece of support for this hypothesis. Experiment 1 found similar age-related changes between three standard theory-of-mind tasks (false belief, appearance-reality and representational change) and two specially designed nonmental state tasks (rule-based card sorting and physical causality). Experiment 2 demonstrated that 3-year-olds' poor performance on card sorting occurred across different pairs of dimensions (color-size, shape-number, size-number, color-shape) just as it does across different pairs of perspectives in the theory-of-mind tasks (self-other, looks like-is, before-after), and that sorting performance was related to theory of mind with age partialled. Experiment 3 showed that theory of mind was related to a specific complexity of sorting—sorting by one of two dimensions and not sorting by one dimension or two dimensions simultaneously. The results indicate that advances in theory of mind, card sorting, and causality between 3 and 5 years of age depend on being able to switch judgments across conditions and that reasoning by embedded rules could account for these changes.     

Domain-general contributions to social reasoning: theory of mind and deontic reasoning re-explored

Using older adults and dual-task interference, we examined performance on two social reasoning tasks: theory of mind (ToM) tasks and versions of the deontic selection task involving social contracts and hazardous conditions. In line with performance accounts of social reasoning, evidence from both aging and the dual-task method suggested that domain-general resources contribute to performance of these tasks. Specifically, older adults were impaired relative to younger adults on all types of social reasoning tasks tested; performance varied as a function of the demands these tasks placed on domain-general resources. Moreover, in younger adults, simultaneous performance of a working memory task interfered with younger adults' performance on both types of social reasoning tasks; here too, the magnitude of the interference effect varied with the processing demands of each task. Limits placed on social reasoning by executive functions contribute a great deal to performance, even in old age and in healthy younger adults under conditions of divided attention. The role of potentially non-modular and modular contributions to social reasoning is discussed.     

The development of causal categorization

Two experiments examined the impact of causal relations between features on categorization in 5- to 6-year-old children and adults. Participants learned artificial categories containing instances with causally related features and noncausal features. They then selected the most likely category member from a series of novel test pairs. Classification patterns and logistic regression were used to diagnose the presence of independent effects of causal coherence, causal status, and relational centrality. Adult classification was driven primarily by coherence when causal links were deterministic (Experiment 1) but showed additional influences of causal status when links were probabilistic (Experiment 2). Children's classification was based primarily on causal coherence in both cases. There was no effect of relational centrality in either age group. These results suggest that the generative model (Rehder, 2003a) provides a good account of causal categorization in children as well as adults.     

The effect of social role on theory of mind reasoning

The aim of this project was to explore the effects of social status on Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning. Neurologically normal adults' ToM performance was manipulated experimentally by temporarily putting them in a higher or lower status condition. Half the participants ‘won’ a mock competition and subsequently acted as instructor and evaluator. The other half ‘lost’ and subsequently acted as learner. Participants then completed ToM and control tasks including embedded false belief tasks and cartoon comprehension tasks. The hypothesis tested was that social role manipulation could affect performance on ToM tasks independently of any effect on control tasks. Results show an interaction between assigned status and task type. That performance on theory of mind tasks can vary independently of performance on matched control tasks is consistent with the idea that ToM reasoning can change as a result of a change in social status.     

Religious cultures and gender cultures: tracing gender differences across religious cultures

This special issue of the Journal of Contemporary Religion focuses on varying empirical connections and theoretical relations between ‘religion’ and ‘gender’. The introduction to this special issue suggests a theoretical approach which is sensitive to culture by drawing on a phenomenological understanding of culture that is based on knowledge and meaning production and sense making. At first sight, this may not sound convincing because ‘culture’ is a category that is most notably used in combination with religion and gender in culturalist ways. In the migration societies of contemporary Europe, religion has become a metaphor for cultural difference and symbolic boundary-making. The core element of this approach is the conceptualisation of culture as a social web consisting of symbolic forms based on signs of meaning that shape social action, orientation, and experience in the world, including the religious sphere. This entails an understanding of religion as a distinct province of meaning that is structured by processes of social symbolisation just like any other sphere of life. This approach reveals that culturalist conceptions of both religion and gender have specific social meanings as meaningful signs in the symbolic order of secular modernity.     

The development of children's preferences for equality and equity across 13 individualistic and collectivist cultures

A concern for fairness is a fundamental and universal element of morality. To examine the extent to which cultural norms are integrated into fairness cognitions and influence social preferences regarding equality and equity, a large sample of children (N 2,163) aged 4–11 were tested in 13 diverse countries. Children participated in three versions of a third‐party, contextualized distributive justice game between two hypothetical recipients differing in terms of wealth, merit, and empathy. Social decision‐making in these games revealed universal age‐related shifts from equality‐based to equity‐based distribution motivations across cultures. However, differences in levels of individualism and collectivism between the 13 countries predicted the age and extent to which children favor equity in each condition. Children from the most individualistic cultures endorsed equitable distributions to a greater degree than children from more collectivist cultures when recipients differed in regards to wealth and merit. However, in an empathy context where recipients differed in injury, children from the most collectivist cultures exhibited greater preferences to distribute resource equitably compared to children from more individualistic cultures. Children from the more individualistic cultures also favored equitable distributions at an earlier age than children from more collectivist cultures overall. These results demonstrate aspects of both cross‐cultural similarity and divergence in the development of fairness preferences.     

The cultural mind: environmental decision making and cultural modeling within and across populations

This article describes cross-cultural research on the relation between how people conceptualize nature and how they act in it. Mental models of nature differ dramatically among populations living in the same area and engaged in similar activities. This has novel implications for environmental decision making and management, including common problems. The research offers a distinct perspective on cultural modeling and a unified approach to studies of culture and cognition. The authors argue that cultural transmission and formation consist primarily not in shared rules or norms but in complex distributions of causally connected representations across minds interacting with the environment. The cultural stability and diversity of these representations often derive from rich, biologically prepared mental mechanisms that limit variation to readily transmissible psychological forms. This framework addresses several methodological issues, such as limitations on conceiving culture to be a well-defined system, bounded entity, independent variable, or an internalized component of minds.     

The role of similarity in the development of categorization

Early in development, humans exhibit the ability to form categories and overlook differences for the sake of generality. This ability poses several important questions: How does categorization arise? What processes underlie category formation? And how are categories mentally represented? We argue that the development of categorization is grounded in perceptual and attentional mechanisms capable of detecting multiple correspondences or similarities in the environment. We present evidence that: (a) similarity can drive categorization early in development; and (b) early in development, humans have powerful learning mechanisms that enable them to extract regularities in the environment. We conclude that, despite remaining challenges, the similarity-based approach offers a promising account of the development of categorization.     

Dual-process theories of reasoning: The test of development

Dual-process theories have become increasingly influential in the psychology of reasoning. Though the distinction they introduced between intuitive and reflective thinking should have strong developmental implications, the developmental approach has rarely been used to refine or test these theories. In this article, I review several contemporary dual-process accounts of conditional reasoning that theorize the distinction between the two systems of reasoning as a contrast between heuristic and analytic processes, probabilistic and mental model reasoning, or emphasize the role of metacognitive processes in reflective reasoning. These theories are evaluated in the light of the main developmental findings. It is argued that a proper account of developmental phenomena requires the integration of the main strengths of these three approaches. I propose such an integrative theory of conditional understanding and argue that the modern dual-process framework could benefit from earlier contributions that made the same distinction between intuition and reflective thinking, such as Piaget’s theory.     

The development of linear syllogistic reasoning

Between 24 and 26 children in each of grades 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 (with mean ages of 8.5, 10.2, 13.0, 15.0, and 16.6 years, respectively) were tested in their ability to solve linear syllogisms, problems such as “John is taller than Mary. Mary is taller than Pete. Who is tallest? John, Mary, Pete.” Response latencies and error rates decreased across grade levels and sessions. Component latencies also generally decreased with increasing age. Four alternative information-processing models were fit to the group latency data at each grade level. These models were (a) a spatial model, according to which people represent the terms of a linear syllogism in the form of a linear spatial array; (b) a linguistic model, according to which linear syllogisms are solved via inferences on functional relations represented by linguistic deep structures; (c) an algorithmic model, according to which people solve linear syllogisms by applying a series of simple, essentially mechanical steps, and (d) a mixed model, which combines selected features of the spatial and linguistic models, and adds new features of its own. The latency data supported the mixed model at each grade level, although in grade 9 the model was not the preferred one until the second session of testing.     

Nature and nurture: Williams syndrome across cultures

This study is concerned with ways in which children with Williams syndrome (WS), a rare neurodevelopmental disorder arising from a hemizygous deletion in chromosome band 7q11.23 including the gene for elastin (ELN) and approximately 20 surrounding genes, are affected by social mores of vastly differing cultures: the United States and Japan. WS presents a compelling model for the investigation because its genetic phenotype is well defined and results in an uneven cognitive profile as well as a social phenotype typical of the syndrome including overt over-friendliness toward strangers. While a number of research groups have been studying the cognitive strengths and weaknesses of individuals with WS in various countries, there have not been studies to date that explore the social phenotype in WS across different cultures. This study examines the ways in which social behavior in WS, stemming from specific genetic underpinnings, might be mediated by cultural expectations. We conducted a cross-cultural study using an instrument that measures aspects of sociability commonly found among people with WS. Quantitative analyses revealed a significant effect of diagnostic category in that in both countries, children with WS were rated as significantly higher in global sociability and more likely to approach strangers than were their normal counterparts. There was also an effect of culture, in that regardless of category, WS and normal children in Japan were rated lower than their counterparts in the US. We suggest that the excessively social phenotype of children with Williams syndrome, although markedly present across cultures, appears to vary in its intensity by culture. This is an intriguing illustration of interactions between nature and nurture.     

Mind over grammar: reasoning in aphasia and development

Research on propositional reasoning (involving ‘theory of mind’ understanding) in adult patients with aphasia reveals that reasoning can proceed in the absence of explicit grammatical knowledge. Conversely, evidence from studies with deaf children shows that the presence of such knowledge is not sufficient to account for reasoning. These findings are in keeping with recent research on the development of naming, categorization and imitation, indicating that children's reasoning about objects and actions is guided by inferences about others’ communicative intentions. We discuss the extent to which reasoning is supported by, and tied to, language in the form of conversational awareness and experience rather than grammar.     

Analogical reasoning in 2-year-olds: The development of access and relational inference

Eighty-four 24- and 30-month-old children were tested with two analogy tasks: formal and problem solving. Experiment 1 included three Groups: relations specified, relations unspecified, and associative control (no exposure to base relations). In Experiment 2 the relation that linked that a- and b-terms in formal problems was explicitly shown in order to reduce relational inference demands. In Experiment 1, children responded systematically to the formal problems when given two chances to answer each question. In Experiment 2, children were systematic on their first responses. In the problem-solving task the rates of spontaneous analogies produced were similar to those seen in older children. However, unlike older children, 2-year-olds benefited minimally from prompts. We believe this may indicate that 2-year-olds have difficulty explicitly controlling their analogical activity. We conclude early analogical abilities may be limited by weak relational inference abilities and difficulty intentionally initiating access.     

Labels and object categorization in six- and nine-month-olds: tracking labels across varying carrier phrases

Language shapes object categorization in infants. This starts as a general enhanced attentional effect of language, which narrows to a specific link between labels and categories by twelve months. The current experiments examined this narrowing effect by investigating when infants track a consistent label across varied input. Six-month-old infants (N = 48) were familiarized to category exemplars, each presented with the exact same labeling phrase or the same label in different phrases. Evidence of object categorization at test was only found with the same phrase, suggesting that infants were not tracking the label’s consistency, but rather that of the entire input. Nine-month-olds (N = 24) did show evidence of categorization across the varied phrases, suggesting that they were tracking the consistent label across the varied input.