Religious Attributions and Proximity of Influence: An Investigation of Direct Interventions and Distal Explanations

Investigations into religious attributions have focused on attributer's immediate, proximal causes of events, paying little attention to underlying, distal explanations. In an effort to explain the relatively low incidence of religious attributions and further a new model of proximal-distal attributions, we present two experiments investigating the proximal and distal use of religious and nonreligious supernatural attributions. Participants in both studies were presented a series of sixteen vignettes that varied on several attribution-relevant dimensions. After reading each vignette, subjects gave an initial explanation for the event, and were then probed for any underlying explanations. Experiment 1 used an interview format that allowed participants maximum latitude when explaining the event's outcome. Consistent with our predictions, participants perceived God as having a greater distal than proximal influence, though this difference was not evident for attributions to Satan or nonreligious supernatural agents. Experiment 2 was performed via a microcomputer, with a participant's initial attributional response branching to a set of appropriate distal explanations. Overall, the results suggest that attributer's perceive God working through indirect influences rather than direct intervention, with this effect being moderated by the attributer's level of religiosity. This pattern was evident in the use of God as a distal explanation as well as in the distal explanations to proximal attributions to God.     

Explaining and Explaining Away in Science and Religion

Abstract

There is no good reason to think that there is a necessary conflict between science and the existence of God, but is there still some way in which science might support atheism? The most plausible strategy for atheism is to argue that scientific explanations can remove the need for God in some cases via “explaining away.” This paper proposes a number of questions to help identify whether explaining away takes place in a given context, and explores several cases where explaining away might be thought to occur, with particular attention given to the most obvious case: the theory of evolution.     

After-affects: How automatic evaluations influence the interpretation of subsequent, unrelated stimuli

Findings from three experiments suggest that participants’ automatic evaluations of subliminally presented objects influenced how they interpreted subsequent, unrelated objects. Participants defined homographs (Experiment 1), categorized objects and people (Experiment 2), and made person judgments (Experiment 3) that all could be disambiguated in either a positive or negative way. Participants’ responses to the ambiguous targets were evaluatively consistent with their automatic evaluations of preceding, semantically unrelated objects. The findings suggest that one’s automatic evaluations can influence deliberate judgments of subsequent stimuli, even when the only shared dimension between the initially evaluated objects and the judged objects is an evaluative one. The implications of these findings are discussed with regard to possible mechanisms of evaluative priming as well as previous research concerning evaluative priming effects on social judgment.     

Prejudice from thin air: The effect of emotion on automatic intergroup attitudes

Two experiments provide initial evidence that specific emotional states are capable of creating automatic prejudice toward outgroups. Specifically, we propose that anger should influence automatic evaluations of outgroups because of its functional relevance to intergroup conflict and competition, whereas other negative emotions less relevant to intergroup relations (e.g., sadness) should not. In both experiments, after minimal ingroups and outgroups were created, participants were induced to experience anger, sadness, or a neutral state. Automatic attitudes toward the in- and outgroups were then assessed using an evaluative priming measure (Experiment 1) and the Implicit Association Test (Experiment 2). As predicted, results showed that anger created automatic prejudice toward the outgroup, whereas sadness and neutrality resulted in no automatic intergroup bias. The implications of these findings for emotion-induced biases in implicit intergroup cognition in particular, and in social cognition in general, are considered.     

Perspective taking combats automatic expressions of racial bias

Five experiments investigated the hypothesis that perspective taking--actively contemplating others' psychological experiences--attenuates automatic expressions of racial bias. Across the first 3 experiments, participants who adopted the perspective of a Black target in an initial context subsequently exhibited more positive automatic interracial evaluations, with changes in automatic evaluations mediating the effect of perspective taking on more deliberate interracial evaluations. Furthermore, unlike other bias-reduction strategies, the interracial positivity resulting from perspective taking was accompanied by increased salience of racial inequalities (Experiment 3). Perspective taking also produced stronger approach-oriented action tendencies toward Blacks (but not Whites; Experiment 4). A final experiment revealed that face-to-face interactions with perspective takers were rated more positively by Black interaction partners than were interactions with nonperspective takers--a relationship that was mediated by perspective takers' increased approach-oriented nonverbal behaviors (as rated by objective, third-party observers). These findings indicate that perspective taking can combat automatic expressions of racial biases without simultaneously decreasing sensitivity to ongoing racial disparities.     

Distinguishing between learning and motivation in behavioral tests of the reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality

According to Gray's (1973) Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST), a Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and a Behavioral Activation System (BAS) mediate effects of goal conflict and reward on behavior. BIS functioning has been linked with individual differences in trait anxiety and BAS functioning with individual differences in trait impulsivity. In this article, it is argued that behavioral outputs of the BIS and BAS can be distinguished in terms of learning and motivation processes and that these can be operationalized using the Signal Detection Theory measures of response-sensitivity and response-bias. In Experiment 1, two measures of BIS-reactivity predicted increased response-sensitivity under goal conflict, whereas one measure of BAS-reactivity predicted increased response-sensitivity under reward. In Experiment 2, two measures of BIS-reactivity predicted response-bias under goal conflict, whereas a measure of BAS-reactivity predicted motivation response-bias under reward. In both experiments, impulsivity measures did not predict criteria for BAS-reactivity as traditionally predicted by RST.     

Sequential modulations of correspondence effects across spatial dimensions and tasks

In two experiments, we explored sequential modulations of correspondence effects in a prime-target paradigm. In Experiment 1, the participants responded to the direction of target arrows that were preceded by prime arrows with a corresponding or noncorresponding direction. This produced a prime-target correspondence effect that was reduced when the preceding trial contained a noncorresponding prime-target event. This sequential modulation of the correspondence effect was observed even when neither stimuli nor responses were repeated from one trial to the next, ruling out explanations of sequential modulations in terms of stimulus or response repetitions. Experiment 2 combined the prime-target correspondence effect with a Simon-type correspondence effect. Both effects were reduced following noncorrespondence of the same type and, to a lesser extent, following noncorrespondence of the other type. Altogether, these results suggest that part of the sequential modulation of correspondence effects reflects an adaptation to a preceding response conflict independently of the peripheral stimulus events that produced this conflict.     

God in the Hands of Future Science

There is reasonable evidence suggesting that humans have an innate tendency toward being religious. Consequently, religion is unlikely to disappear; the question then is how this feature will impact on future society. Three scenarios are discussed: One, science will dominate; two, religion will dominate; and three, the present conflict between the two is resolved. The latter scenario may happen through a realization that religion has the potential for doing more good than bad, in terms of individual quality of life and in improving society. Obtaining maximum benefit of religion will require a concept of God that is compatible with science, and that can be accepted as a common core for the various faiths. Science may help in this endeavor.     

Remembering the impressions of others as our own: how post‐experience decisions can distort autobiographical memory

The aim of this research was to investigate conditions under which memory for previous impressions and evaluations can be distorted by post‐experience information. Two experiments tested a two‐step model for autobiographical memory distortion. In the first step, the impressions overheard from another person after evaluating an experience were incorporated into experience related decisions. In the second step, the distorted decisions were used in the retrieval of the initial evaluation. The results of Experiment 1 results reveal that post‐experience comments heard before, but not after, the decisions result in memory distortion. The results of Experiment 2 results replicate the findings of Experiment 1 and eliminate possible alternative explanations. The results are discussed in the context of the Source Monitoring Framework. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When “Just Say No” is not enough: Affirmation versus negation training and the reduction of automatic stereotype activation

Previous research has shown that extended training in non-stereotypic responding (i.e., negating stereotypes and affirming counterstereotypes) can reduce automatic stereotype activation. In the present research, we claim that the effects of non-stereotypic association training on automatic stereotype activation are primarily driven by the affirmation of counterstereotypes rather than by the negation of stereotypes. In two experiments, participants received extensive training in either (a) negating stereotype-congruent information or (b) affirming stereotype-incongruent information, and then completed a measure of automatic stereotyping (Experiment 1) or automatic evaluation (Experiment 2). Consistent with our predictions, only training in the affirmation of counterstereotypes led to a reduction in the activation of stereotypes and negative evaluations. In contrast, extended training in the negation of stereotypes enhanced rather than reduced the activation of stereotypes and negative evaluations. Implications for prejudice and stereotype control are discussed.     

Explanation and Evidence in Informal Argument

A substantial body of evidence shows that people tend to rely too heavily on explanations when trying to justify an opinion. Some research suggests these errors may arise from an inability to distinguish between explanations and the evidence that bears upon them. We examine an alternative account, that many people do distinguish between explanations and evidence, but rely more heavily on unsubstantiated explanations when evidence is scarce or absent. We examine the philosophical and psychological distinctions between explanation and evidence, and show that participants use explanations as a substitute for missing evidence. Experiment 1 replicates the results of other researchers, but further shows that participants generate more evidence when they are not constrained by their lack of data. Merely mentioning a source of data can alter both their evaluation (Experiment 2) and their production (Experiment 3) of explanations and evidence. In Experiment 4, we show that participants can explicitly consider the availability of evidence and other pragmatic factors when evaluating arguments. Finally, we consider the implications of using explanations to replace missing evidence as a strategy in argument.     

What are we really priming? Cue-based versus category-based processing of facial stimuli.

Results from 5 experiments provide converging evidence that automatic evaluation of faces in sequential priming paradigms reflects affective responses to phenotypic features per se rather than evaluation of the racial categories to which the faces belong. Experiment 1 demonstrates that African American facial primes with racially prototypic physical features facilitate more automatic negative evaluations than do other Black faces that are unambiguously categorizable as African American but have less prototypic features. Experiments 2, 3, and 4 further support the hypothesis that these differences reflect direct affective responses to physical features rather than differential categorization. Experiment 5 shows that automatic responses to facial primes correlate with cue-based but not category-based explicit measures of prejudice. Overall, these results suggest the existence of 2 distinct types of prejudice.     

Like a camera in the sky? Thinking about God increases public self-awareness and socially desirable responding

Believers describe God as a strategic social agent who perceives human thoughts and actions. Thinking about God therefore might make believers feel as if their behavior is being monitored, a possibility we call the supernatural monitoring hypothesis. Three studies offered new and converging empirical support for this hypothesis using two variables that are sensitive to perceived social surveillance: public self-awareness and socially desirable responding. For believers, the effect of an explicit God prime on public self-awareness was comparable to the effect of thinking about how other people view oneself (Experiment 1). An implicit God concepts prime increased public self-awareness (Experiment 2) and socially desirable responding (Experiment 3) among believers. These studies offer the first direct evidence that thinking of God triggers perceived social surveillance.     

Three indications for the existence of God in causal metaphysics

With the emergence of modern physics a conflict became apparent between the Principle of Sufficient Cause and the Principle of Physical Causal Closure. Though these principles are not logically incompatible, they could no longer be considered to be both true; one of them had to be false. The present paper makes use of this seldom noticed conflict to argue on the basis of considerations of comparative rationality for the truth of causal statements that have at least some degree of philosophico-theological relevance and can be taken to indicate (not prove) the existence of God. The paper’s comparatively modest aim is to establish belief in the existence of God as a rational metaphysical option, not as a rational obligation. In its final section, enriched causal considerations lead to an indication (not proof) of God as that which guarantees the unified continuance of the physical world.     

Congruency sequence effect without feature integration and contingency learning

The magnitude of congruency effects, such as the flanker-compatibility effects, has been found to vary as a function of the congruency of the previous trial. Some studies have suggested that this congruency sequence effect is attributable to stimulus and/or response priming, and/or contingency learning, whereas other studies have suggested that the control process triggered by conflict modulates the congruency effect. The present study examined whether sequential modulation can occur without stimulus and response repetitions and contingency learning. Participants were asked to perform two color flanker-compatibility tasks alternately in a trial-by-trial manner, with four fingers of one hand in Experiment 1 and with the index and middle fingers of two hands in Experiment 2, to avoid stimulus and response repetitions and contingency learning. A significant congruency sequence effect was obtained between the congruencies of the two tasks in Experiment 1 but not in Experiment 2. These results provide evidence for the idea that the sequential modulation is, at least in part, an outcome of the top-down control process triggered by conflict, which is specific to response mode.     

Reward modulates adaptations to conflict

Both cognitive conflict (e.g. Verguts & Notebaert, 2009) and reward signals (e.g. Waszak & Pholulamdeth, 2009) have been proposed to enhance task-relevant associations. Bringing these two notions together, we predicted that reward modulates conflict-based sequential adaptations in cognitive control. This was tested combining either a single flanker task (Experiment 1) or a task-switch paradigm (Experiment 2) with performance-related rewards. Both experiments confirmed that adaptations after conflict were modulated by reward. In the flanker task, this resulted in increased conflict adaptation after rewarded trials. In the task-switching experiment, reward increased the conflict-modulated switch cost. Interestingly, both adaptations to conflict disappeared after no-reward trials. Moreover, individual differences in participants' sensitivity to reward predicted these reward modulations of trial-to-trial adaptations. These findings shed new light on the exact role of cognitive conflict in shaping subsequent behavior.     

No face is an island: How implicit bias operates in social scenes

Social psychologists have mainly studied implicit attitudes toward faces presented one at a time, whereas, in real life, we often encounter people in the presence of others. These surrounding individuals may alter attitudes toward the focal target of attention. We employed a flanker-IAT task and found that, when black and white targets were presented in racially diverse contexts, bias was decreased. This decrease in bias occurred even when targets previously seen in diverse contexts were presented on their own, suggesting context-free evaluations of the targets had been formed. Experiment 2 showed that the effect of diverse contexts does not affect bias toward a racial category as a whole, but only the specific targets previously seen in the diverse contexts. Quad model analysis (Sherman et al., 2008) revealed that these effects were related to changes in automatic evaluations, and not to changes in inhibition. Implications for implicit bias change and prejudice reduction strategies are discussed.     

Perceiving an exclusive cause of affect prevents misattribution

Affect misattribution occurs when affective cues color subsequent unrelated evaluations. Research suggests that affect misattribution decreases when one is aware that affective cues are unrelated to the evaluation at hand. We propose that affect misattribution may even occur when one is aware that affective cues are irrelevant, as long as the source of these cues seems ambiguous. When source ambiguity exists, affective cues may freely influence upcoming unrelated evaluations. We examined this using an adapted affect misattribution procedure where pleasant and unpleasant responses served as affective cues that could influence later evaluations of unrelated targets. These affective cues were either perceived as reflecting a single source (i.e., a subliminal affective picture in Experiment 1; one's internal affective state in Experiment 2), or as reflecting two sources (i.e., both) suggesting source ambiguity. Results show that misattribution of affect decreased when participants perceived affective cues as representing one source rather than two.