The issue of generality in ethics

Conclusion Does ethics have adequate general theories? Our analysis shows that this question does not have a straightforward answer since the key terms are ambiguous. So we should not concentrate on the answer but on the question itself. Ethics stands for many things, but we let that pass. Adequate may refer to varied arrays of methodological principles which are seldom fully articulated in ethics. General is a notion with at least three meanings. Different kinds of generality may be at cross-purposes, so we must not expect theories to be general in sundry senses. Theory, for that matter, is itself ambiguous. Some thinkers say that ethics cannot have theories, while others deny it. We doubt whether opposing parties are talking about the same things.No wonder, then, that controversies in ethics are long-lasting and unproductive. We hope that the methodology we have presented will alleviate some of them. The examples we chose show that this is feasible. Views such as Hare's and Jonsen and Toulmin's which are seemingly wide apart, show convergence if we put them in a methodological perspective.Our analysis also suggests that many alleged differences between science and ethics could fade away if methodology is brought to bear on them. Specifically, the idea that ethics compares poorly with science in view of limited generality, or poor means of justification, is unfounded. Those who defend this view over-rate the powers of science.     

Introduction: Egoism,Altruism and Impartiality

The distinction between egoistic and altruistic motivation is firmly embedded in contemporary moral discourse, but harks back too to early modern attempts to found morality on an egoistic basis. Rejecting that latter premise means accepting that others’ interests have intrinsic value, but it remains far from clear what altruism demands of us and what its relationship is with the rest of morality. While informing our duties, altruism seems also to urge us to transcend them and embrace the other-regarding values and virtues constitutive of a good life. This rather wide conception of morality may strike us today as too demanding. At the same time, however, currently popular impartialist accounts of morality can disrupt much everyday altruism in their insistence that each person’s interests are weighed precisely equally. Having sketched this problematic of altruism, the second half of this Introduction outlines the arguments of the four papers and review essay in this collection, each of which, in a different way, negotiates the difficult relationships between egoism, altruism, morality and impartiality. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Olfactory sensitivity: reliability, generality, and association with aging.

Thirty-two Ss between 22 and 59 years of age yielded detection thresholds for 4 odorants over 4 sessions. The thresholds decreased and reliability increased over the course of testing. High intercorrelations between odorants and the stability of an S's relative position within the threshold distributions showed that a general factor of sensitivity dominated the outcome. Age contributed strongly to intersubject variation. Even among these nonelderly individuals, it accounted for up to 2 orders of magnitude in threshold performance. Other important factors included superiority of the right nostril and a negative correlation between the mean and variance of threshold distributions. Scant attention to the correlation may have contributed to overestimation of the frequency and specificity of specific anosmia. A clinically relevant outcome was that measurement of threshold for diagnostic purposes can generally rely on just 1 odorant.     

Transgression and altruism: A case for hedonism

A model to account for the positive relationship between transgression and altruism was proposed and tested against three alternative formulations—Guilt, Social Justice, and Self-esteem Bolstering. The proposed model, Negative State Relief, asserts that people in a transgression situation behave charitably in order to reduce a general, negative affective state which is induced by exposure to harm-doing and that if the negative state is relieved by some other means, benevolent activity will be rendered unnecessary. All of the experimental subjects were exposed to an act of transgression; half performed the act themselves while half only witnessed it. In one set of experimental conditions (the relief conditions), a positive event—the receipt of either money or approval—was interposed between the harmful act and a fellow-student's request for aid. In another set of experimental conditions (the norelief conditions), no such positive event occurred. It was found, as predicted, that subjects who received a positive event were significantly less helpful than those who did not, but were not different from a control group which had never been exposed to the transgression. It was also found that harm-doers and harm-witnesses were identical in benevolent tendency. The results were interpreted as favoring a hedonistic conception of the nature of altruism. Finally, it was contended that a U-shaped relationship exists between mood state and helping tendency.     

Ambiguity,generality, and indeterminacy: Tests and definitions

The problem addressed is that of finding a sound characterization of ambiguity. Two kinds of characterizations are distinguished: tests and definitions. Various definitions of ambiguity are critically examined and contrasted with definitions of generality and indeterminacy, concepts with which ambiguity is sometimes confused. One definition of ambiguity is defended as being more theoretically adequate than others which have been suggested by both philosophers and linguists. It is also shown how this definition of ambiguity obviates a problem thought to be posed by ambiguity for truth theoretical semantics. In addition, the best known test for ambiguity, namely the test by contradiction, is set out, its limitations discussed, and its connection with ambiguity's definition explained. The test is contrasted with a test for vagueness first proposed by Peirce and a test for generality propounded by Margalit.The earliest version of this paper was presented to The Logical Grammar Study Group at The University of Alberta, which included, at that time, Matthew Dryer, Bernard Linsky, Jeff Pelletier, and Len Schubert, Among others. Section 2 of the paper was presented 25 May, 1987 at the annual meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association (Hamilton, Ontario); and Section 1 was presented 22 January, 1900 to the Department of Philosophy at the University of Ottawa. I am grateful to these audiences and others who have provided helpful criticism and comments.     

Coherence and transituational generality in coping: the unity and the diversity

We investigated the transituational coherence of coping strategy use by collecting coping data on multiple occasions, and assessing the effects of aggregation over varying numbers of occasions. Study 1 examined the effects of aggregating daily coping reports over three- and six-day periods. Study 2 extended the results of Study 1 by assessing the extent to which aggregation increased the correlation between a dispositional coping measure and daily coping reports. Both studies strongly supported the hypothesis that aggregation would enhance the consistency of coping preferences, suggesting some degree of coherence within the domain of coping strategy used. Aggregated coping reports correlated with each other at significantly higher levels (ranging from 0.46 to 0.77 in Study 1 and from 0.65 to 0.95 in Study 2), than unaggregated coping reports (ranging from -0.12 to 0.30 in Study 1 and from 0.12 to 0.53 in Study 2). Study 2 also showed that aggregated daily reports were better predictors of subsequent coping than scores derived from a standard dispositional coping survey.     

Coherence and transituational generality in coping: The unity and the diversity

Abstract

We investigated the transituational coherence of coping strategy use by collecting coping data on multiple occasions, and assessing the effects of aggregation over varying numbers of occasions. Study 1 examined the effects of aggregating daily coping reports over three- and six-day periods. Study 2 extended the results of Study 1 by assessing the extent to which aggregation increased the correlation between a dispositional coping measure and daily coping reports. Both studies strongly supported the hypothesis that aggregation would enhance the consistency of coping preferences, suggesting some degree of coherence within the domain of coping strategy used. Aggregated coping reports correlated with each other at significantly higher levels (ranging from 0.46 to 0.77 in Study 1 and from 0.65 to 0.95 in Study 2), than unaggregated coping reports (ranging from ?0.12 to 0.30 in Study 1 and from 0.12 to 0.53 in Study 2). Study 2 also showed that aggregated daily reports were better predictors of subsequent coping than scores derived from a standard dispositional coping survey.     

Sympathy and altruism in response to disasters

Canadian students provided ratings of the degree of sympathy they felt for those involved in each of 20 world disasters. Playing the role of taxpayer, they also apportioned monies from a disaster relief fund to assist in such emergencies. A single dimension, Culpability, was found to underlie the sympathy ratings. Sympathy was related to giving aid only in the case of female subjects. Women also expressed greater sympathy and recommended more financial aid than did men.     

Equity,Egoism, and Egocentrism: The Formation of Distributive Justice Judgments

Groups of subjects watched films under two conditions of density (high and low) and number (large and small groups). After one film a confederate applauded and the reactions of the audience were observed. As predicted by an analysis based on the intensification theory of crowding, high density greatly increased the contagion of the applause, Larger numbers also had a significant, though considerably smaller effect on contagion. The findings indicate that relatively simple environmental factors such as density and number may be major determinants of whether contagion occurs in groups.     

Critical self-reflection and self-perceived altruism: when self-reward fails

Social learning theory has produced a three-step model of prosocial development: In the young child, prosocial behavior is elicited by material rewards; in the older child, it is elicited also by social rewards; and in the morally mature adult, it is elicited by self-rewards based on an internalized perception of oneself as a kind, caring, altruistic individual. Self-perception theory has complicated this social learning model by demonstrating that once the third step is reached, the continued presence of material and social rewards may undermine intrinsic prosocial motivation based on self-rewards, producing moral regression. We propose a further complication. Critical self-reflection--the desire to know thyself, warts and all--may introduce a self-deprecating attributional bias that can undermine self-perceived altruism, even following helping for which one receives only intrinsic self-rewards. Two experiments are reported in which we manipulated critical self-reflection on one's reasons for helping. Results indicated that self-reflection undermined self-perceived altruism, especially when the salience of the self-rewards for helping was high. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that, as predicted, this self-reflection effect was most apparent for individuals who valued self-knowledge more highly than concern for others. Moral consequences of critical self-reflection are discussed.