共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Hartry Field 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(2):249-290
The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative
concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in
any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative
and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to use
epistemic norms to gather the facts with which to evaluate epistemic norms; relatedly, it discusses how epistemic norms can
rationally evolve. It concludes with some discussion of the impact of this view on “ground level” epistemology.
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Hartry FieldEmail: |
2.
Timo Kajamies 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):525-534
In his topical article, Andrew Cling claims that the best extant formulation of the so-called epistemic regress problem rests
on five assumptions that are too strong. Cling offers an improved version that rests on a different set of three core epistemic
assumptions, each of which he argues for. Despite of owing a great deal to Cling’s ideas, I argue that the epistemic regress
problem surfaces from more fundamental assumptions than those offered by Cling. There are ultimately two core assumptions—in
fact two contradictory strands within the concept of epistemic support—which jointly create a powerful challenge for our pursuit
of paramount epistemic values.
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Timo KajamiesEmail: |
3.
Kelly Becker 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):353-366
Epistemic luck has been the focus of much discussion recently. Perhaps the most general knowledge-precluding type is veritic
luck, where a belief is true but might easily have been false. Veritic luck has two sources, and so eliminating it requires
two distinct conditions for a theory of knowledge. I argue that, when one sets out those conditions properly, a solution to
the generality problem for reliabilism emerges.
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Kelly BeckerEmail: |
4.
Ernest Sosa 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):137-147
Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views
on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith
focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and
how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.
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Ernest SosaEmail: |
5.
M. Oreste Fiocco 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):387-399
The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance
to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. In recent discussions, some have attempted to explicate the notion in terms of epistemic possibility. There are, however, two notions of epistemic possibility, a more familiar one and a novel one. I argue that these two notions
are independent of one another. Both are irrelevant to an account of modal knowledge on the predominant view of modal reality.
Only the novel notion is relevant and apt on the competing view of modal reality; but this latter view is problematic in light
of compelling counterexamples. Insufficient care regarding the independent notions of epistemic possibility can lead to two
problems: a gross problem of conflation and a more subtle problem of obscuring a crucial fact of modal epistemology. Either
problem needlessly hampers efforts to develop an adequate account of modal knowledge. I conclude that the familiar notion
of epistemic possibility (and the very term ‘epistemic possibility’) should be eschewed in the context of modal epistemology.
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M. Oreste FioccoEmail: |
6.
Lisa Warenski 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):403-426
This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in
a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical
indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted
in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with
the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further
conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence. The fallibilist apriorist allows that an a priori claim is revisable
in only a purely epistemic sense. This modal claim is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish
empiricism, so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position.
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Lisa WarenskiEmail: |
7.
Dorit Ganson 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):441-458
Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely
determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array
of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their
force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are sensitive
to one of the factors that secure thresholds for outright believing (namely, outright believing that p in a given circumstance
requires, at the minimum, that one’s degree of belief that p is high enough for one to be willing to act as if p in the circumstances),
we see how pragmatic considerations can be relevant to facts about whether or not an agent is justified in believing that
p—but largely as a consequence of the pragmatic constraints on outright believing.
相似文献
Dorit GansonEmail: |
8.
Anders Schinkel 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):267-277
Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed
cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only
difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue
that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of character from judgements concerning acts,
and they assume a conception of character that is untenable both from a common sense perspective and with a view to findings
from social psychology. I use especially the example of Scobie, the protagonist of Graham Greene’s novel The Heart of the Matter, to show that moral luck is real—that there are cases of moral luck that cannot be reduced to epistemic luck. The reality
of moral luck, in this example at least, lies in its impact on character and personal and moral identity.
相似文献
Anders SchinkelEmail: |
9.
Hilary Kornblith 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(1):127-136
Ernest Sosa draws a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and this distinction forms the centerpiece
of his new book, A Virtue Epistemology. This paper argues that the distinction cannot do the work which Sosa assigns to it.
相似文献
Hilary KornblithEmail: |
10.
Mark Sargent 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(2):237-252
This essay answers the “Bayesian Challenge,” which is an argument offered by Bayesians that concludes that belief is not relevant
to rational action. Patrick Maher and Mark Kaplan argued that this is so because there is no satisfactory way of making sense
of how it would matter. The two ways considered so far, acting as if a belief is true and acting as if a belief has a probability
over a threshold, do not work. Contrary to Maher and Kaplan, Keith Frankish argued that there is a way to make sense of how
belief matters by introducing a dual process theory of mind in which decisions are made at the conscious level using premising policies. I argue that Bayesian decision theory alone shows that it is sometimes rational to base decisions on beliefs; we do not
need a dual process theory of mind to solve the Bayesian Challenge. This point is made clearer when we consider decision levels: acting as if a belief is true is sometimes rational at higher decision levels.
相似文献
Mark SargentEmail: |
11.
Harold Langsam 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):79-101
In this paper, I argue that what underlies internalism about justification is a rationalist conception of justification, not
a deontological conception of justification, and I argue for the plausibility of this rationalist conception of justification.
The rationalist conception of justification is the view that a justified belief is a belief that is held in a rational way;
since we exercise our rationality through conscious deliberation, the rationalist conception holds that a belief is justified
iff a relevant possible instance of conscious deliberation would endorse the belief. The importance of conscious deliberation
stems from its role in guiding us in acquiring true beliefs: whereas the externalist holds that if we wish to acquire true
beliefs, we have to begin by assuming that some of our usual methods of belief formation generally provide us with true beliefs, the internalist holds that if
we form beliefs by conscious deliberation, we can be conscious of reasons for thinking that our beliefs are true. Conscious deliberation can make us conscious of reasons because it proceeds via rational
intuitions. I argue that despite the fallibility of rational intuition, rational intuitions do enable us to become conscious
of reasons for belief.
相似文献
Harold LangsamEmail: |
12.
Anna Mahtani 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):171-180
Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is
unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through.
The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject
two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.
相似文献
Anna MahtaniEmail: |
13.
Michael Veber 《Sophia》2007,46(2):177-187
Recent studies provide some support for the idea that prayer has curative powers. It is argued that even if prayers are effective
in these kinds of cases it cannot be because God is answering them. While many have challenged theological explanations for
the efficacy of prayer on epistemic grounds, the argument presented here concludes that the theological explanation conflicts
with the standard conception of God. In particular, if God answers prayers in these kinds of cases then God is immoral.
相似文献
Michael VeberEmail: |
14.
Christian Piller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(4):413-428
The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism,
not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing
those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as
we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our interest in justification depends on our interest
in truth, we value believing with justification on non-instrumental grounds. A deontological understanding of justification,
thus, solves the Value of Knowledge Problem.
相似文献
Christian PillerEmail: |
15.
Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation
and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program.
This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem;
it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals
concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals have significant import regarding both the nature of moral normativity
and the human capacity for mastering moral normativity. The morals of the frame problem bode well, we argue, for the claim
that moral normativity is not fully systematizable by exceptionless general principles, and for the correlative claim that
such systematizability is not required in order for humans to master moral normativity.
相似文献
Mark TimmonsEmail: |
16.
Stephen Hetherington 《Philosophia》2006,34(3):303-310
It is not unusual for epistemologists to argue that ordinary epistemic practice is a setting within which (infallibilist) scepticism will not arise. Such scepticism is deemed to be an alien invader, impugning such epistemic practice entirely from without. But this paper argues that the suggested sort of analysis overstates the extent to which ordinary epistemic practice is antipathetic to some vital aspects of such sceptical thinking. The paper describes how a gradualist analysis of knowledge can do more justice to what sceptics seek to achieve – while also showing how sceptical thinking can even be part of (and is able to have some muted epistemic impact within) ordinary epistemic practice.
相似文献
Stephen HetheringtonEmail: |
17.
Incredible Worlds, Credible Results 总被引:3,自引:3,他引:0
Robert Sugden argues that robustness analysis cannot play an epistemic role in grounding model-world relationships because
the procedure is only a matter of comparing models with each other. We posit that this argument is based on a view of models
as being surrogate systems in too literal a sense. In contrast, the epistemic importance of robustness analysis is easy to
explicate if modelling is viewed as extended cognition, as inference from assumptions to conclusions. Robustness analysis
is about assessing the reliability of our extended inferences, and when our confidence in these inferences changes, so does
our confidence in the results. Furthermore, we argue that Sugden’s inductive account relies tacitly on robustness considerations.
相似文献
Jaakko KuorikoskiEmail: |
18.
Garry Young 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):341-360
Over recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in arguments favouring intellectualism—the view that Ryle’s epistemic
distinction is invalid because knowing how is in fact nothing but a species of knowing that. The aim of this paper is to challenge
intellectualism by introducing empirical evidence supporting a form of knowing how that resists such a reduction. In presenting
a form of visuomotor pathology known as visual agnosia, I argue that certain actions performed by patient DF can be distinguished
from a mere physical ability because they are (1) intentional and (2) knowledge-based; yet these actions fail to satisfy the
criteria for propositional knowledge. It is therefore my contention that there exists a form of intentional action that not
only constitutes a genuine claim to knowledge but, in being irreducible to knowing that, resists the intellectualist argument
for exhaustive epistemic reduction.
相似文献
Garry YoungEmail: |
19.
We develop a conceptual and formal clarification of notion of surprise as a belief-based phenomenon by exploring a rich typology. Each kind of surprise is associated with a particular phase of
cognitive processing and involves particular kinds of epistemic representations (representations and expectations under scrutiny,
implicit beliefs, presuppositions). We define two main kinds of surprise: mismatch-based surprise and astonishment. In the central part of the paper we suggest how a formal model of surprise can be integrated with a formal model of belief change. We investigate the role of surprise in triggering the process of belief reconsideration. There are a number of models of
surprise developed in the psychology of emotion. We provide several comparisons of our approach with those models.
相似文献
Cristiano Castelfranchi (Corresponding author)Email: |
20.
Robert Audi 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):43-54
This paper explores what constitutes reliability in persons, particularly intellectual reliability. It considers global reliability, the overall reliability of persons, encompassing both the theoretical and practical realms; sectorial reliability, that of a person in a subject-matter (or behavioral) domain; and focal reliability, that of a particular element, such as a belief. The paper compares reliability with predictability of the kind most akin
to it and distinguishes reliability as an intellectual virtue from reliability as an intellectual power. The paper also connects
reliability with insight, reasoning, knowledge, and trust. It is argued that insofar as reliability is an intellectual virtue,
it must meet both external standards of correctitude and internal standards of justification.
相似文献
Robert AudiEmail: |