Knowledge as aptness

I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.

Weighing the aim of belief

The theory of belief, according to which believing that p essentially involves having as an aim or purpose to believe that p truly, has recently been criticised on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not interact with the wider aims of believers in the ways we should expect of genuine aims. I argue that this objection to the aim theory fails. When we consider a wider range of deliberative contexts concerning beliefs, it becomes obvious that the aim of belief can interact with and be weighed against the wider aims of agents in the ways required for it to be a genuine aim.     

Valuing Knowledge: A Deontological Approach

The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism, not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our interest in justification depends on our interest in truth, we value believing with justification on non-instrumental grounds. A deontological understanding of justification, thus, solves the Value of Knowledge Problem.

The Normativity of Meaning: Guidance and Justification

Abstract

The thesis that meaning is normative has come under much scrutiny of late. However, there are aspects of the view that have received comparatively little critical attention which centre on meaning’s capacity to guide and justify linguistic action. Call such a view ‘justification normativity’ (JN). I outline Zalabardo’s (1997) account of JN and his corresponding argument against reductive-naturalistic meaning-factualism and argue that the argument presents a genuine challenge to account for the guiding role of meaning in linguistic action. I then present a proposal regarding how this challenge may be met. This proposal is then compared to recent work by Ginsborg (2011; 2012), who has outlined an alternative view of the normativity of meaning that explicitly rejects the idea that meanings guide and justify linguistic use. I outline how Ginsborg utilises this notion of normativity in order to provide a positive account of what it is to mean something by an expression which is intended to serve as a response to Kripke’s semantic sceptic. Finally, I argue that Ginsborg’s response to the sceptic is unsatisfactory, and that, insofar as it is able to preserve our intuitive view of meaning’s capacity to guide linguistic action, my proposal is to be preferred.     

An experimental test of a core REBT hypothesis: evidence that irrational beliefs lead to physiological as well as psychological arousal

While numerous studies support Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy and Theory (REBT), they tend to be limited by their use of correlational designs, simulated scenarios and self-report measures. This study tested a core REBT hypothesis in an experimental design using multiple physiological as well as psychological measures. Ninety patients from a medical practice were placed in a real-life stressful situation while holding either a rational, an irrational, or an indifference belief. Those holding a rational belief reported the greatest increase in concern whereas those holding an irrational belief reported the greatest increase in anxiety. Of particular significance, those holding a rational belief showed a decrease in systolic blood pressure whereas those holding an irrational belief showed an increase (diastolic blood pressure increased in both conditions). These results not only support the core REBT hypothesis, but also suggest a way to differentiate between beliefs and emotions by measuring physiological as well as psychological changes.     

The Projective Way of Knowing: A Useful Heuristic That Sometimes Misleads

For many purposes, people need a reasonably good idea of what other people know. This article presents an argument and considers evidence that people use their own knowledge as a basis for developing models of what specific other people know in particular, that they tend to assume that other people know what they know. This is a generally useful heuristic, but the assumption is often made uncritically, with the consequence that people end up assuming that others have knowledge that they do not have.     

Knowing Versus Caring: The Role of Affect and Cognition in Political Perceptions

This paper examines the importance of political knowledge in shaping accurate perceptions of the political world—specifically, how levels of general political knowledge influence the accuracy of specific political judgments, how those judgments might also be shaped by "wishful thinking," and how political knowledge attenuates the impact of wishful thinking on political judgments. Predictions of who would win the U.S. presidential election in 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996, as surveyed in the National Election Studies conducted in those years, were used as a measure of the accuracy of political perceptions. Analysis of these data reveals that both political knowledge and wishful thinking are important determinants of the accuracy of people's perceptions; in addition, the impact of wishful thinking on perceptions is attenuated by political knowledge.     

Domain-specific identity, epistemic regulation, and intellectual ability as predictors of belief-biased reasoning: a dual-process perspective

To explore the hypothesis that domain-specific identity development predicts reasoning biases, adolescents and young adults completed measures of domain-general and domain-specific identity, epistemic regulation, and intellectual ability and evaluated arguments that either supported or threatened their occupational goals. Biases were defined as the use of sophisticated reasoning to reject goal-threatening arguments and the use of cursory reasoning to accept goal-supportive arguments. Across two measures of bias, hierarchical regression analyses showed that domain-specific vocational identity and epistemic regulation best predicted reasoning biases. Neither age nor intellectual ability predicted significant variance in biases after vocational identity and epistemic regulation scores were entered into the regression equations. The results support the thesis that biases in specific domains can be explained both by domain-specific personality attributes and by domain-general metacognitive dispositions to monitor reasoning and decontextualize problem structure from superficial contents. A dual-process framework is proposed to explain the relationships among identity, epistemic regulation, age, intellectual ability, and reasoning biases.     

Social epistemology and reflexivity: Two versions of how to be really useful

This essay argues that the really useful character of reflexivity is that it enables a radical critique of representation and its conventional material and rhetorical practices. It is uniquely able to produce paradox and thus disrupt discourses by undermining authorial privilege. Because Fuller's social epistemology is insensitive to its own reflexive implications, and limits itself to normative questions about knowledge policy, it is too limited — and limiting — to provide a context that can nurture reflexivity.     

Heuristics as beliefs and as behaviors: the adaptiveness of the "hot hand"

and analyzed reasoning by asking: what are the reasoner's goals? This emphasizes the adaptiveness of behavior rather than whether a belief is normative. Belief in the "hot hand" in basketball suggests that players experiencing streaks should be given more shots, but this has been seen as a fallacy due to failure to find dependencies between players' shots. Based on their findings, I demonstrate by Markov modeling and simulation that streaks are valid allocation cues for deciding who to give shots to, because this behavior achieves the team goal of scoring more. Empirically I show that this adaptive heuristic is supported by the fallacious belief in dependency, more so as skill level increases. I extend the theoretical analysis to identify general conditions under which following streaks should be beneficial. Overall, this approach illustrates the advantages of analyzing reasoning in terms of adaptiveness.     

Evidence for the role of self-priming in epistemic action: expertise and the effective use of memory

Epistemic actions are physical actions people take to simplify internal problem solving rather than to move closer to an external goal. When playing the video game Tetris, for instance, experts routinely rotate falling shapes more than is strictly needed to place the shapes. Maglio and Kirsh [Kirsh, D., & Maglio, P. (1994). On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action. Cognitive Science, 18, 513-549; Maglio, P. P. (1995). The computational basis of interactive skill. PhD thesis, University of California, San Diego] proposed that such actions might serve the purpose of priming memory by external means, reducing the need for internal computation (e.g., mental rotation), and resulting in performance improvements that exceed the cost of taking additional actions. The present study tests this priming hypothesis in a set of four experiments. The first three explored precisely the conditions under which priming produces benefits. Results showed that presentation of multiple orientations of a shape led to faster responses than did presentation of a single orientation, and that this effect depended on the interval between preview and test. The fourth explored whether the benefit of seeing shapes in multiple orientations outweighs the cost of taking the extra actions to rotate shapes physically. Benefits were measured using a novel statistical method for mapping reaction-time data onto an estimate of the increase in processing capacity afforded by seeing multiple orientations. Cost was measured using an empirical estimate of time needed to take action in Tetris. Results showed that indeed the increase in internal processing capacity obtained from seeing shapes in multiple orientations outweighed the time to take extra actions.     

Reflection-in-action as a collective process: findings from a study in teaching students of negotiation

Real-time reflection-in-action is a critical capability for effective practitioners, just as the more common reflection-on-action is critical for learning. Reflective practice is typically regarded as an individual activity. However, to be an effective negotiator involves real-time reflection-in-action. Results from a Masters-level Negotiation unit show that reflection in negotiation contexts is emergent rather than sudden, is collective, and typically occurs in a break from the negotiation action. We develop the work of Schön and Yanow and Tsoukas to propose a framework of reflection-in-action that better fits the interactive context of negotiation and explore some implications for the teaching of negotiation and other similar professional situations.     

Structure versus process: Mach, Hertz, and the Normative Aspect of Science

In the end of the nineteenth century, there was a remarkable ‘empiricist attitude’ found among certain philosopher-scientists, an attitude which arguably emerged in the main as a reaction to the anti-scientific mood prevalent in the culture that time. Those philosopher-scientists, such as Mach and Hertz, were particularly anxious to emphasize and laud the privileged status of the empirical dimension ofour scientific knowledge, distinguishing it carefully from the theoretical constructions and hypothetical entities that are ordinarily posited by scientists. Yet, as I exhibit in this article, there were certain crucial philosophical differences between these two thinkers with respect to their general conception of scientific theories and scientific norms guiding the activity. I suggest further that the most central difference in this context between Mach and Hertz can justifiably (and, perhaps, more fruitfully) be articulated and reckoned in traditional andcontemporary epistemological terms. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Seeing is Knowing: On the Predictive Accuracy of Self‐ and Informant Reports for Prosocial and Moral Behaviours

Under certain circumstances, well‐known others (so‐called informants) may possess unique insights into targets' personality traits beyond the targets' self‐views. Specifically, as proposed by the self–other knowledge asymmetry model, an incremental predictive ability of informants is most likely for traits and corresponding behaviours that are clearly visible to others and highly evaluative in nature. In two studies, we provide an empirical test of this proposition and extend prior research to one of the most important domains of interpersonal interaction: prosocial and moral behaviours. Specifically, we investigate the unique predictive power of informant reports in trait Honesty–Humility for fairness in the dictator game and dishonesty in a cheating paradigm. Importantly, while both these classes of behaviour are highly evaluative in nature, only fairness is clearly visible to others. Correspondingly, in line with the self–other knowledge asymmetry model, our results reveal unique predictive accuracy of informant reports for fairness. For dishonesty, by contrast, there was no conclusive evidence for incremental predictive power of informant reports. This implies that informants may indeed provide valuable information beyond targets' self‐reports on trait aspects driving fair behaviour, but that targets themselves are their own best experts when it comes to judging trait aspects driving dishonest behaviour. Copyright © 2017 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Case Study Evidence for an Irreducible Form of Knowing How to: An Argument Against a Reductive Epistemology

Over recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in arguments favouring intellectualism—the view that Ryle’s epistemic distinction is invalid because knowing how is in fact nothing but a species of knowing that. The aim of this paper is to challenge intellectualism by introducing empirical evidence supporting a form of knowing how that resists such a reduction. In presenting a form of visuomotor pathology known as visual agnosia, I argue that certain actions performed by patient DF can be distinguished from a mere physical ability because they are (1) intentional and (2) knowledge-based; yet these actions fail to satisfy the criteria for propositional knowledge. It is therefore my contention that there exists a form of intentional action that not only constitutes a genuine claim to knowledge but, in being irreducible to knowing that, resists the intellectualist argument for exhaustive epistemic reduction.

Knowing is half the battle: teaching stereotype threat as a means of improving women's math performance

We tested whether informing women about stereotype threat is a useful intervention to improve their performance in a threatening testing situation. Men and women completed difficult math problems described either as a problem-solving task or as a math test. In a third (teaching-intervention) condition, the test was also described as a math test, but participants were additionally informed that stereotype threat could interfere with women's math performance. Results showed that women performed worse than men when the problems were described as a math test (and stereotype threat was not discussed), but did not differ from men in the problem-solving condition or in the condition in which they learned about stereotype threat. For women, attributing anxiety to gender stereotypes was associated with lower performance in the math-test condition but improved performance in the teaching-intervention condition. The results suggest that teaching about stereotype threat might offer a practical means of reducing its detrimental effects.     

Reason and Love: A Non-Reductive Analysis of the Normativity of Agent-Relative Reasons

Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like ‘having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children’. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural complexity of practical reasoning in general. Christine Korsgaard relates the rational binding force of practical reasons to the various identities or self-conceptions under which we value ourselves. The problem is that it is not clear why such self-conceptions would necessitate us rationally, given the fact that most of our identities are simply given. Perhaps, Harry Frankfurt is right in arguing that we are not only necessitated by reason, but also, and predominantly by what we love. I argue, however, that “the necessities of love” (in Frankfurt’s phrase) are not to be separated from, but should be seen as belonging to the necessities of reason. Our loves, concerns and related identities provide for a specific and important structure to practical reflection. They function on the background of reasoning, having a specific default role: they would lose their character as concerns, if there was a need for them to be cited on the foreground of deliberation or if there was a need to justify them. This does not mean that our deep concerns cannot be scrutinised. They can only be scrutinised in an indirect way, however, which explains their role in grounding the normativity of agent-relative reasons. It appears that this account can provide for a viable interpretation of Korsgaard’s argument about the foundational role of practical identities.