共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Eugen Fischer 《Synthese》2008,162(1):53-84
The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical
problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical
questions ought to be treated ‘like an illness’. Even though this ‘non-cognitivism’ about philosophy has become a focus of
debate, the specifically ‘therapeutic’ aims and ‘non-theoretical’ methods constitutive of it remain ill understood. They are
motivated by Wittgenstein’s view that the problems he addresses result from misinterpretation, driven by ‘urges to misunderstand’.
The present paper clarifies this neglected concept and analyses how such ‘urges’ give rise to pseudo-problems of one particular,
hitherto little understood, kind. This will reveal ‘therapeutic’ aims reasonable and ‘non-theoretical’ methods necessary,
in one clearly delineated and important part of philosophy. I.e.: By developing a novel account of nature and genesis of one
important class of philosophical problems, the paper explains and vindicates a revolutionary reorientation of philosophical
work, at the level of both aims and methods. 相似文献
2.
Eugen Fischer 《Synthese》2009,171(1):77-110
The paper presents a novel account of nature and genesis of some philosophical problems, which vindicates a new approach to
an arguably central and extensive class of such problems: The paper develops the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘philosophical
pictures’ with the help of some notions adapted from metaphor research in cognitive linguistics and from work on unintentional
analogical reasoning in cognitive psychology. The paper shows that adherence to such pictures systematically leads to the
formulation of unwarranted claims, ill-motivated problems, and pointless theories. To do so, the paper proceeds from a case-study
on a lastingly influential development in early modern philosophy: the adoption of the doctrine of secondary qualities, and
its principal consequences. The findings motivate a new approach to an arguably extensive and important class of philosophical
problems: to the problems we raise in the grip of philosophical pictures. 相似文献
3.
Hektor K. T. Yan 《Philosophia》2010,38(1):107-129
This paper takes a conceptual look at cosmopolitanism and the related issue of what it means to be human in order to arrive
at an alternative conceptual framework which is free from empiricist assumptions. With reference to a discussion on Homer’s
Iliad, the author develops a ‘humanist’ model of discerning humanity. This model is then compared and contrasted with Martha Nussbaum’s
version of cosmopolitanism. The notion of ‘aspect-seeing’ discussed by Wittgenstein in the second part of the Philosophical Investigations is also examined in order to shed light on what it involves to discern humanity. Finally, racism is discussed from the philosophical
perspective elaborated in order to highlight its distinctive conceptual features. It is hoped that this paper can refocus
our attention on important issues concerning the basis of what it means to see human beings as human beings. 相似文献
4.
Mark Textor 《Erkenntnis》2009,71(3):395-405
Michael Devitt has argued that a satisfactory explanation of the authority of linguistic intuitions need not assume that they
are derived from tacit knowledge of principles of grammar. Devitt’s Modest Explanation is based on a controversial construal
of linguistic intuitions as meta-linguistic central-processor judgements. I will argue that there are non-judgemental responses
to linguistic strings, linguistic seemings, which are evidence for linguistic theories. Devitt cannot account for their epistemic
authority. This spoils his ‘modest explanation’. Devitt’s opponent, the Voice of Competence View, is back in business. 相似文献
5.
Sean Crawford 《Synthese》2008,160(1):75-96
Quine introduced a famous distinction between the ‘notional’ sense and the ‘relational’ sense of certain attitude verbs. The
distinction is both intuitive and sound but is often conflated with another distinction Quine draws between ‘dyadic’ and ‘triadic’
(or higher degree) attitudes. I argue that this conflation is largely responsible for the mistaken view that Quine’s account
of attitudes is undermined by the problem of the ‘exportation’ of singular terms within attitude contexts. Quine’s system
is also supposed to suffer from the problem of ‘suspended judgement with continued belief’. I argue that this criticism fails
to take account of a crucial presupposition of Quine’s about the connection between thought and language. The aim of the paper
is to defend the spirit of Quine’s account of attitudes by offering solutions to these two problems.
See also chapters four and five of Word and Object (Quine, 1960) and ‘Intensions Revisited’ (Quine, 1977). 相似文献
6.
John V. Canfield 《Philosophia》2009,37(4):691-712
In ‘Wittgenstein and Qualia’ Ned Block argues for the existence of inverted spectra and those ineffable things, qualia. The
essence of his discussion is a would-be proof, presented through a series of pictures, of the possible existence of an inverted
spectrum. His argument appeals to some remarks by Wittgenstein which, Block holds, commit the former to a certain ‘dangerous
scenario’ wherein inverted spectra, and consequently qualia live and breath. I hold that a key premise of this proof is incoherent.
Furthermore, Block’s dangerous scenario does not follow from Wittgenstein’s innocent one, as Block believes it does, but rather
is in conflict with it. 相似文献
7.
Stefano Predelli 《Erkenntnis》2006,65(3):385-403
In this essay, I explain how certain suggestions put forth by Frege, Wittgenstein, and Schlick regarding the interpretation
of indexical expressions may be incorporated within a systematic semantic account. I argue that the ‘hybrid’ approach they
propose is preferable to more conventional systems, in particular when it comes to the interpretation of cases of cross-contextual
ellipsis. I also explain how the hybrid view entails certain important and independently motivated distinctions among contextually
dependent expressions, for instance between ‘here’ and ‘local’. 相似文献
8.
Reese M. Heitner 《Synthese》2006,150(1):15-39
Though largely unnoticed, in “Two Dogmas” Quine (1951, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Philosophical Review 60, 20–43. Reprinted
in From a Logical Point of View, 20–46) himself invokes a distinction: a distinction between logical and analytic truths.
Unlike analytic statements equating ‘bachelor’ with ‘unmarried man’, strictly logical tautologies relating two word-tokens
of the same word-type, e.g., ‘bachelor’ and ‘bachelor’ are true merely in virtue of basic phonological form, putatively an exclusively non-semantic function of perceptual categorization
or brute stimulus behavior. Yet natural language phonemic categorization is not entirely free of interpretive semantic considerations.
“Phonemic reductionism” in both its linguistic (Bloch 1953, Contrast, Language 29, 59–61) and behavioral (Quine 1990, The
Phoneme’s Long Shadow, Emics and Etics: The Insider/Outsider Debate, T. Headland, K. Pike and M. Harris, (eds.), Newbury Park,
CA, Sage Publications, 164–167) guise is false. The semantic basis of phonological equivalence, however, has repercussions
vis-à-vis Quine’s critique of analyticity. A consistent rejection of meaning-based equivalencies eliminates not only analyticity,
but imposes a form of phonological eliminativism too. Phonological eliminativism is the reductio result of applying Quinean meaning skepticism to the phonological typing of natural language. But unlike analyticity, phonology
is presumably not subject to philosophical dismissal. The semantic basis of natural language phonology serves to neutralize
Quine’s argument against analyticity: without the semantics of meaning, more than just synonymy is lost; basic phonology must
also be forfeited.
Let’s begin with the fact that even Quine has to admit that it is possible for two tokens of the same orthographic type to
be synonymous, for that much is presupposed by his own account of logical truth. Paul Boghossian (1999, 343) 相似文献
9.
Hans-Johann Glock 《Philosophia》2009,37(4):653-668
This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in Wittgenstein’s last writings. It lists
eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings. It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is
an important difference between conceptual and factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims,
all of them revolving around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar’. I explain why Wittgenstein’s
account does not fall prey to Davidson’s animadversions against the idea of a conceptual scheme as a force operating on a
pre-conceptual content. In the sequel I deny that the distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions disappears
in the last writings: it is neither deliberately abandoned, nor willy-nilly undermined by the admission of hinge propositions
in On Certainty or by the role accorded to agreement in judgement. 相似文献
10.
Joshua Gert 《Synthese》2006,150(2):171-183
Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently presented a series of papers in which they argue against what has come to be called
the ‘new wave’ moral realism and moral semantics of David Brink, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton, and a number of other philosophers.
The central idea behind Horgan and Timmons’s criticism of these ‘new wave’ theories has been extended by Sean Holland to include
the sort of realism that drops out of response-dependent accounts that make use of an analogy between moral properties and
secondary qualities. This paper argues that Holland’s extension depends crucially on the fact that his target is a direct response-dependent account of moral value. His argument does not work against such accounts of more basic normative notions such as ‘harm’ or ‘benefit’. And
these more basic notions may then serve as the basic normative building blocks for an indirectly response-dependent moral
theory.
* Thanks to Mark Timmons for helpful and friendly comments on an earlier version of this paper, and also to an audience at
the 2003 Pacific APA, and to the reviewers
for this journal. 相似文献
11.
Matthew Ratcliffe 《Synthese》2011,178(1):121-130
This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen’s claim that empiricism is a ‘stance’. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds
of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ‘finding oneself in a world’. At least some of van Fraassen’s
claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ‘empirical stance’, he assumes the stance of
the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This
latter stance does not incorporate the attitude that van Fraassen takes to be characteristic of empiricism. Thus its possibility
serves to illustrate that empiricism as an all-encompassing philosophical orientation is untenable. I conclude by discussing the part played by feelings in philosophical stances and
propose that they contribute to philosophical conviction, commitment and critique. 相似文献
12.
Peter W. Hanks 《Synthese》2007,154(1):121-146
In 1913 Wittgenstein raised an objection to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment that eventually led Russell to
abandon his theory. As he put it in the Tractatus, the objection was that “the correct explanation of the form of the proposition, ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that
it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement,” (5.5422).
This objection has been widely interpreted to concern type restrictions on the constituents of judgment. I argue that this
interpretation is mistaken and that Wittgenstein’s objection is in fact a form of the problem of the unity of the proposition. 相似文献
13.
14.
Tobias Rosefeldt 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(3):301-333
This paper argues that ‘that’-clauses are not singular terms (without denying that their semantical values are propositions).
In its first part, three arguments are presented to support the thesis, two of which are defended against recent criticism.
The two good arguments are based on the observation that substitution of ‘the proposition that p’ for ‘that p’ may result
in ungrammaticality. The second part of the paper is devoted to a refutation of the main argument for the claim that ‘that’-clauses
are singular terms, namely that this claim is needed in order to account for the possibility of quantification into ‘that’-clause
position. It is shown that not all quantification in natural languages is quantification into the position of singular terms,
but that there is also so-called ‘non-nominal quantification’. A formal analysis of non-nominal quantification is given, and
it is argued that quantification into ‘that’-clause position can be treated as another kind non-nominal quantification. 相似文献
15.
David Skrbina 《Axiomathes》2006,16(4):387-423
For some two millennia, Western civilization has predominantly viewed mind and consciousness as the private domain of the
human species. Some have been willing to extend these qualities to certain animals. And there has been a small but very significant
minority of philosophers who have argued that the processes of mind are universal in extent, and resident in all material
things – the concept of panpsychism. The traditional ‘man-alone’, or ‘man-and-higher-animals’, views of mind have come under increasing criticism of late, and
their philosophical weaknesses seem increasingly insurmountable. This has caused some thinkers to reexamine the ancient and
venerable concept of panpsychism, and to apply it anew in contemporary theories of mind. The present essay reintroduces panpsychism,
and demonstrates something of its legacy in Western thought. 相似文献
16.
Eugen Fischer 《Philosophical Investigations》2011,34(1):22-54
The paper develops and addresses a major challenge for therapeutic conceptions of philosophy of the sort increasingly attributed to Wittgenstein. To be substantive and relevant, such conceptions have to identify “diseases of the understanding” from which philosophers suffer, and to explain why these “diseases” need to be cured in order to resolve or overcome important philosophical problems. The paper addresses this challenge in three steps: With the help of findings and concepts from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, it redevelops the Wittgensteinian notion of “philosophical pictures.” Through a case study on seminal versions of familiar mind‐body problems, it examines how such pictures shape philosophical reflection and generate ill‐motivated but captivating problems. Third, it shows that philosophical pictures are constitutive of “diseases of the understanding,” in a quite strict sense of the term. On this basis, the paper explains when and why philosophical therapy is required. 相似文献
17.
Pietro Costa 《Res Publica》2011,17(4):317-325
This paper illustrates the main features of Luigi Ferrajoli’s theoretical approach to law, as they are developed in his Principia Juris. These include his opposition to the traditional perspective of natural law; his anti-cognitivist orientation; and, finally,
his fundamentally normative approach. Among the numerous problems discussed in Ferrajoli’s compendious book, the paper focuses
on his definition of constitutional democracy. In particular, the paper discusses the way in which Ferrajoli defines the complementarity
between democracy and rights; Ferrajoli’s own criticism of T. H. Marshall’s idea of citizenship; and the importance that the
distinction between ‘decidable’ and ‘non-decidable’ rights have in Ferrajoli’s own system. Other issues of interests that
are briefly discussed include the constitutionalisation of private law, and the defence of different kinds of liberty-rights. 相似文献
18.
Ingvar Johansson 《Synthese》2008,163(2):217-225
The paper argues, that a direct formalization of the way common sense thinks about the numerical identity of enduring entities,
requires that traditional predicate logic is developed. If everyday language mirrors the world, then persons, organisms, organs,
cells, and ordinary material things can lose some parts but nonetheless remain numerically exactly the same entity. In order
to formalize this view, two new logical operators are introduced; and they bring with them some non-standard syntax. One of
the operators is called ‘the instantiation operator’; it is needed because the existential quantifier and its traditional relatives cannot do the job required. The other operator
is called ‘the form-on-matter operator’, and it allows an individual (an instance of a form) to stay the same even though some of its parts (its constituting matter)
is taken away from it. Also, a certain kind of predicates, called ‘nature terms’, is needed in order to represent what gives a particular its kind of identity. Both the operators and the nature terms introduced can be used in constructions of formal languages and formal systems,
but no such constructions are made in the paper. The paper is structured as a comment on the philosophical problem called
‘the problem of the cats Tibbles and Tib’. 相似文献
19.
Slobodanka Vladiv-Glover 《Studies in East European Thought》2006,58(3):205-238
Mamardašvili’s ‘classical’ paradigm of knowledge is seen to be minimally based on extrapolations from Descartes’ classical
philosophy to which Mamardašvili attributes features that rather anticipate his own post-classical ontology. The latter is
oriented towards the primacy of perception as a subjective process, in which the self-conscious subject constructs the world,
not as illusion, but as a ‘picture’ or ‘model’ (Wittgenstein’s Bild). By examining Mamardašvili’s definition of the ‘phenomenon’ against the␣background of Husserl’s ‘reduction’, Wittgenstein’s
‘object’ and the Freudian and post-structuralist psychoanalytic model of subjectivity, the paper arrives at the inference
that Mamardašvili is essentially a post-Structuralist thinker who appropriates concepts from various critical and philosophical
disciplines to construct his own multi-disciplinary theory of consciousness and perception. 相似文献
20.
N. Ángel Pinillos 《Philosophical Studies》2011,154(2):301-324
Sometimes two expressions in a discourse can be about the same thing in a way that makes that very fact evident to the participants.
Consider, for example, ‘he’ and ‘John’ in ‘John went to the store and he bought some milk’. Let us call this ‘de jure’ coreference.
Other times, coreference is ‘de facto’ as with ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ in a sincere use of ‘Mark Twain is not Samuel
Clemens’. Here, agents can understand the speech without knowing that the names refer to the same person. After surveying
many available linguistic and pragmatic tools (intentions to corefer, presuppositions, meanings, indexing, discourse referents,
binding etc.) I conclude that we must posit a new semantic primitive to account for de jure coreference. 相似文献