共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 296 毫秒
1.
S. Matthew Liao 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):247-262
Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue
that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider
and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists’ challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions.
I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that
on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and the standard philosophical practice of using intuitions as evidence
can help resolve these conflicts.
相似文献
S. Matthew LiaoEmail: URL: www.smatthewliao.com |
2.
Advocates of the use of intuitions in philosophy argue that they are treated as evidence because they are evidential. Their
opponents agree that they are treated as evidence, but argue that they should not be so used, since they are the wrong kinds
of things. In contrast to both, we argue that, despite appearances, intuitions are not treated as evidence in philosophy whether
or not they should be. Our positive account is that intuitions are a subclass of inclinations to believe. Our thesis explains
why intuitions play a role in persuasion and inquiry, without conceding that they are evidential. The account also makes predictions
about the structure of intuitions that are confirmed by independent arguments.
相似文献
Bernard MolyneuxEmail: |
3.
Paul Boghossian 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):111-119
I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposition merely on the basis
of understanding it. However, I don’t think it is constitutive of them that they supply strictly foundational justification
for the propositions they justify, though I do believe that it is important that the intuition of a suitable subject be thought
of as a prima facie justification for his intuitive judgment, independently of the reliability of his underlying capacities.
I also think that we need to be able to explain how mere understanding of a proposition can confer upon us an ability to have
reliable intuitions, that we cannot simply take that idea for granted. And that when try to explain that, our best avenue
for doing so is to take the intuitions as constituting the understanding of which they are said to be a manifestation.
相似文献
Paul BoghossianEmail: |
4.
Elizabeth Brake 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):243-254
This paper develops a Kantian account of the moral assessment of institutions. The problem I address is this: while a deontological
theory may find that some legal institutions are required by justice, it is not obvious how such a theory can assess institutions
not strictly required (or prohibited) by justice. As a starting-point, I consider intuitions that in some cases it is desirable
to attribute non-consequentialist moral value to institutions not required by justice. I will argue that neither consequentialist
nor virtue-ethical accounts account for these intuitions, suggesting that a distinctive deontological account is needed. The
account I give is drawn from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals; I distinguish it from Kantian views of institutions developed by Barbara Herman and Onora O’Neill. Throughout, I use marriage
as an example.
相似文献
Elizabeth BrakeEmail: |
5.
Albert Atkin 《Philosophia》2008,36(3):313-326
This paper traces a lost genealogical connection between Charles S. Peirce’s later theory of signs and contemporary work in
the philosophy of language by John Perry. As is shown, despite some differences, both accounts offer what might be termed
a multi-level account of meaning. Moreover, it is claimed that by adopting a ‘Peircian turn’ in his theory, Perry might overcome
alleged shortcomings in his account of cognitive significance.
相似文献
Albert AtkinEmail: |
6.
Andrea Viggiano 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(2):213-224
In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral
terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes
with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions
confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about
moral terms, in order to show that this theory runs against our linguistic intuitions about such terms. My claim is that the
Horgan–Timmons argument does not work. I concede that their thought experiment is a good way to test the applicability of
the theory of direct reference to moral terms, and argue that the upshot of their experiment is not what they claim it is:
our linguistic intuitions about Moral Twin Earth are parallel to, not different from, our intuitions about Twin Earth.
相似文献
Andrea ViggianoEmail: |
7.
Yahya Yasrebi 《Topoi》2007,26(2):255-265
After the problems of epistemology, the most fundamental problem of Islamic philosophy is that of causality. Causality has
been studied from various perspectives. This paper endeavors first to analyze the issues of causality in Islamic philosophy
and then to critique them. A sketch is provided of the history of the development of theories of causality in Islamic philosophy,
with particular attention to how religious considerations came to determine the shape of the philosophical theories that were
accepted. It is suggested that outstanding philosophical and theological problems that have plagued the tradition of Islamic
philosophy require a new approach to the issue of causality.
相似文献
Yahya YasrebiEmail: |
8.
Ernest Sosa 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):137-147
Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views
on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith
focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and
how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.
相似文献
Ernest SosaEmail: |
9.
Daniel Z. Korman 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(3):319-334
Many of those who accept the universalist thesis that mereological composition is unrestricted also maintain that the folk
typically restrict their quantifiers in such a way as to exclude strange fusions when they say things that appear to conflict
with universalism. Despite its prima facie implausibility, there are powerful arguments for universalism. By contrast, there
is remarkably little evidence for the thesis that strange fusions are excluded from the ordinary domain of quantification.
Furthermore, this reconciliatory strategy seems hopeless when applied to the more fundamental conflict between universalism
and the intuitions that tell against it.
相似文献
Daniel Z. KormanEmail: |
10.
Jonathan M. Weinberg 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(3):455-464
Timothy Williamson devotes significant effort in his The Philosophy of Philosophy to arguing against skepticism about judgment. One might think that the recent “experimental philosophy” challenge to the
philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence is a possible target of those arguments. However, this is not
so. The structure of that challenge is radically dissimilar from that of traditional skeptical arguments, and the aims of
the challenge are entirely congruent with the spirit of methodological improvement that Williamson himself exemplifies in
the Afterword of his book.
相似文献
Jonathan M. WeinbergEmail: |
11.
In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this
special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology,
connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Bernd BuldtEmail: |
Benedikt L?we (Corresponding author)Email: |
Thomas MüllerEmail: |
12.
Stefano Predelli 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):293-305
This essay proposes a semantic analysis of biscuit-conditionals, such as Austin’s classic example “there are biscuits in the
cupboard if you want some”. The analysis is grounded on the ideas of contextual restrictions, and of non-character encoded
aspects of meaning, and provides a rigorous framework for the widespread intuitions that (i) the if-clause in a biscuit-conditional
is truth-conditionally idle, but (ii) it ‘qualifies’ the speech-act in question. In the concluding section of this essay,
the analysis is also applied to the importantly similar phenomenon of speech-act adverbs.
相似文献
Stefano PredelliEmail: |
13.
Evan Selinger 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(2):301-308
Harry Collins interprets Hubert Dreyfus’s philosophy of embodiment as a criticism of all possible forms of artificial intelligence.
I argue that this characterization is inaccurate and predicated upon a misunderstanding of the relevance of phenomenology
for empirical scientific research.
相似文献
Evan SelingerEmail: |
14.
Andrei A. Buckareff 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):143-152
Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.
相似文献
Andrei A. BuckareffEmail: Phone: +1-716-3533623 |
15.
16.
Mark Day 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):417-427
The approach that philosophers have taken to history has too often been one-dimensional. It is my aim in this paper to map
out a future multi-dimensional philosophy of history, by invoking the notion of a relation with the past, and by arguing for
the philosophical relevance of multiple such relations.
相似文献
Mark DayEmail: |
17.
Jonathan Webber 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(1):89-104
Gilbert Harman has argued that the common-sense characterological psychology employed in virtue ethics is rooted not in unbiased
observation of close acquaintances, but rather in the ‘fundamental attribution error’. If this is right, then philosophers
cannot rely on their intuitions for insight into characterological psychology, and it might even be that there is no such
thing as character. This supports the idea, urged by John Doris and Stephen Stich, that we should rely exclusively on experimental
psychology for our explanations of behaviour. The purported ‘fundamental attribution error’ cannot play the explanatory role
required of it, however, and anyway there is no experimental evidence that we make such an error. It is true that trait-attribution
often goes wrong, but this is best explained by a set of difficulties that beset the explanation of other people’s behaviour,
difficulties that become less acute the better we know the agent. This explanation allows that we can gain genuine insight
into character on the basis of our intuitions, though claims about the actual distribution of particular traits and the correlations
between them must be based on more objective data.
相似文献
Jonathan WebberEmail: |
18.
Bronislovas Genzelis 《Studies in East European Thought》2009,61(1):43-52
Philosophical trends such as the philosophy of religion, especially Thomism, existentialism, and phenomenology emerged in
Lithuanian philosophy during the 20th century. The article discusses the chief preconditions of the spread of existentialism,
in particular the dominant Christian existentialism, in Lithuania and its influence on Lithuanian culture. The best known
representatives of this philosophical trend were J. Girnius and A. Maceina. There are two periods of existentialism and its
development in Lithuania: the first one includes the independence years and the second covers the time of the Soviet occupation.
The author discusses its influence on Lithuanian literature and introduces the main problems of existential philosophy.
相似文献
Bronislovas GenzelisEmail: |
19.
Michael Rubin 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):307-327
A number of philosophers defend naturalistic moral realism by appeal to an externalist semantics for moral predicates. The
application of semantic externalism to moral predicates has been attacked by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons in a series of
papers that make use of their “Moral Twin Earth” thought experiment. In response, several defenders of naturalistic moral
realism have claimed that the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment is misleading and yields distorted and inaccurate semantic
intuitions. If they are right, the intuitions generated by Moral Twin Earth cannot be appealed to in arguments against externalist
moral semantics. The most developed case against the Moral Twin Earth argument that follows this strategy is found in a paper
by Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis and Angus Dawson. Here I argue that their attack on the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment
fails. Laurence, Margolis and Dawson have not shown that we have reason to distrust the semantic intuitions it generates
相似文献
Michael RubinEmail: |
20.
Evan Selinger 《Human Studies》2008,31(1):27-41
Recent debates about the Grameen Bank’s microlending practices depict participating female borrowers as having fundamentally
empowering or disempowering experiences. I argue that this discursive framework may be too reductive: it can conceal how technique
and technology simultaneously facilitate relations of dependence and independence; and it can diminish our capacity to understand
and assess innovative development initiatives.
相似文献
Evan SelingerEmail: |