共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
William L. Rowe 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2009,65(2):87-92
By taking ‘existence in reality’ to be a great-making property and ‘God’ to be the greatest possible being, Plantinga skillfully
presents Anselm’s ontological argument. However, since he proves God’s existence by virtue of a premise, “God (a maximally
great being) is a possible being”, that is true only if God actually exists; his argument begs the question of the existence
of God. 相似文献
2.
We content that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that
theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We end by
suggesting that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The
argument we discuss conflates the two. 相似文献
3.
The motif of the ‘drama of being’ is a dominant thread that spans the entirety of Levinas's six decades of authorship. As
we will see, from the start of his writing career, Levinas consciously frames the tension between ontology and ethics in a
dramatic form. A careful exposition of this motif and other related theatrical metaphors in his work–-such as ‘intrigue,’
‘plot,’ and ‘scene’–-can offer us not only a better appreciation of the evolution of Levinas's thought, but also of his proper
place within the western philosophical tradition. Levinas accuses western philosophers of being exclusively attuned to what
he calls the ‘drama of existence.’ And even then, philosophers have eluded the implications of the tragic fatalism that define
this drama. Philosophers are generally unaware of an ‘other scene’ that radically alters the fatalistic logic of the ontological
drama. Levinas calls this other scene the ‘ethical intrigue.’ 相似文献
4.
5.
This paper contributes towards a lay ethics of nanotechnology through an analysis of talk from focus groups designed to examine
how laypeople grapple with the meaning of a technology ‘in-the-making’. We describe the content of lay ethical concerns before
suggesting that this content can be understood as being structured by five archetypal narratives which underpin talk. These
we term: ‘the rich get richer and the poor get poorer’; ‘kept in the dark’; ‘opening Pandora’s box’; ‘messing with nature’;
and ‘be careful what you wish for’. We further suggest that these narratives can be understood as sharing an emphasis on the
‘giftedness’ of life, and that together they are used to resist dominant technoscientific and Enlightenment narratives of
control and mastery which are encapsulated by nanotechnology. 相似文献
6.
Michael Stöltzner 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(2):289-316
On Two Types of Realism in Quantum Theory. Current realist approaches to the foundations of quantum theory emphasize the dichotomy
between (Copenhagen) positivism and ‘beable’-realism. Recently it was even attempted to turn this picture into two (equally
possible) histories in order to legitimate Bohmian Mechanics as a viable alternative. This paper argues that this dichotomy
is philosophically inadequate and historically questionable by embedding it into the philosophical discussion on positivism
and realism that has taken place since the 1920s. Logical Empiricists back then advocated empirical realism and contrasted
it to absolutistic metaphysical realism. From this viewpoint David Bohm's ‘beable’-realism combines elements of Mach's sensualism
with a pre-Kantian metaphysics. As Wesley Salmon's position shows, empirical realism can become quite pronounced without relapsing
into Bohmian philosophy. Instead it arrives close to the GRWP-interpretation. Hence, when Bernard d'Espagnat binds both together
as ‘ontological interpretations’, he blurs the borderline between empirical and metaphysical realism that his Veiled Reality
has set out to draw, quite in concordance with Logical Empiricism.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
7.
Ghasem Kakaie 《Topoi》2007,26(2):177-189
A proper understanding of the Sufi doctrine of the unity of existence is essential for following the later developments of
Islamic philosophy. The doctrine of the unity of existence is divided into introversive and extroversive aspects, the former
dealing with the unity of the soul of the mystic with God, and the latter with the unity of the cosmos with God. Here this
latter aspect of the doctrine is explained through a comparison of the views of Ibn ‘Arabi and Meister Eckhart, both of whom
are profoundly influenced by Ibn Sina at precisely the same crucial points, although Meister Eckhart makes explicit reference
to Ibn Sina, while Ibn ‘Arabi generally avoids naming him. The theory of the extroversive unity of existence consists of four
parts, or rather, it is the product of four steps, each of which is logically based on the previous one: (1) God is the only
being or the absolute existence. (2) Everything other than God (i. e., human beings and the cosmos) is nothing or nonexistence.
(3) The existence of all things is God’s existence (All are He). (4) The cosmos does not have existence but manifests existence.
In other words, it is God’s self-disclosure.
相似文献
Ghasem KakaieEmail: |
8.
Andrew B. Irvine 《Sophia》2011,50(4):603-624
Enrique Dussel has developed a sweeping philosophical critique of the eurocentricity of Western habits of thought and action,
with the aim of articulating an ‘ethics of liberation’ that takes the part distinctively of ‘the victims’ of the world system.
The heart of Dussel’s effort is an ostensibly new method, ‘analectic’ or ‘anadialectic,’ which comes about through the ‘revelation’
of the other, and goes beyond the self-enclosure that, Dussel asserts, typifies dialectic in Western ontology. Thus, he takes
his position to have gone beyond ontology: it is a trans-ontology, a genuine meta-physics. I question whether analectic does
go beyond Western thinking of being, and propose an ontological critique that is classically Western or, as I would prefer
to say, historically Western yet (along with its analogues in other philosophical traditions) classically relevant even in
our ‘age of globalization and exclusion.’ 相似文献
9.
John V. Canfield 《Philosophia》2009,37(4):691-712
In ‘Wittgenstein and Qualia’ Ned Block argues for the existence of inverted spectra and those ineffable things, qualia. The
essence of his discussion is a would-be proof, presented through a series of pictures, of the possible existence of an inverted
spectrum. His argument appeals to some remarks by Wittgenstein which, Block holds, commit the former to a certain ‘dangerous
scenario’ wherein inverted spectra, and consequently qualia live and breath. I hold that a key premise of this proof is incoherent.
Furthermore, Block’s dangerous scenario does not follow from Wittgenstein’s innocent one, as Block believes it does, but rather
is in conflict with it. 相似文献
10.
Brinkmann has recently put forward an integrative theory of the mind by expanding Harré’s hybrid psychology. The theory is
integrative because it establishes that in order for one to gain a full understanding of the mind—which is represented as
a set of dispositions—one has to take into account theories about the brain, the body, social practices, and technological
artifacts. All of these are said to be ‘mediators’ upon which the mind depends. An important claim underlying the theory is
that in psychology the basic ontological unit is the person. We agree with Brinkmann both on this and on the dispositional
nature of the mind. Still, he does not make a strong case for the latter. Furthermore, we believe the concept of mediation
is by no means helpful to produce an integrative view in psychology, not only because the theoretical job of such a concept
is unclear but also because qua unifying concept it may end up undermining the ontological primacy of the person (in psychology).
In this paper we refer to these issues and suggest some ideas that may help improve Brinkmann’s (and Harré’s) proposal. 相似文献
11.
Henk van den Belt 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2003,34(2):201-219
A central question in constructivist studies of science is how the analyst should deal with the material objects handled by
scientific practitioners in laboratories. Representatives of ‘radical constructivism’ such as Knorr-Cetina and Latour have
gone furthest in exploring the role of these ‘non-humans’ but have also maneuvered themselves in untenable positions due to
a fatal conflation of different meanings of the term ‘construction’. The epistemological and ontological commitments of ‘moderate
constructivism’ especially of the Strong Program defended by Barnes and Bloor, are more suitable for dealing with the task
at hand. While radical constructivists treat the domains of nature and human society as largely coterminous, an alternative
ontology stresses that natural reality is never fully absorbed into the world of culture but only interacts with the latter
at localizable interfaces such as practices and artifacts. This perspective promises a more relaxed relationship with current
forms of scientific realism.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
12.
Shane Mackinlay 《Sophia》2010,49(4):499-507
In his essay The Origin of the Work of Art, Martin Heidegger discusses three examples of artworks: a painting by Van Gogh of peasant shoes, a poem about a Roman fountain,
and a Greek temple. The new entry on Heidegger’s aesthetics in the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy, written by Iain Thomson, focuses on this essay, and Van Gogh’s painting in particular. It argues that Heidegger uses Van
Gogh’s painting to set art, as the happening of truth, in relation to ‘nothing’, which is a key term in Heidegger’s essays
leading up to The Origin of the Work of Art. This paper extends a similar analysis to the Greek temple as a way of offering an exposition of Heidegger’s concerns in
the essay. It begins by briefly outlining Thomson’s argument that Heidegger relates Van Gogh’s painting to ‘nothing’, and
indicating the way this argument can be extended to the Greek temple. It then discusses three ways in which ‘nothing’ can
open up the significance of the temple as a work of art in which truth happens: (1) it is not concerned with objective representation;
(2) it depicts the primal strife of earth and world, concealing and unconcealing; (3) it is fundamentally historical. 相似文献
13.
Graham Oppy 《Sophia》2007,46(3):295-304
Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004) claims to have detected ‘the one fatal flaw in Anselm’s ontological argument.’ I argue that there
is more than one important flaw in the position defended in Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004). First, Millican’s reconstruction of Anselm’s argument does serious violence to the original text.
Second, Millican’s generalised objection fails to diagnose any flaw in a vast range of ontological arguments. Third, there
are independent reasons for thinking that Millican’s generalised objection is unpersuasive. 相似文献
14.
Liezl van Zyl 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):405-415
Some philosophers believe that a change in motive alone is sometimes sufficient to bring about a change in the deontic status
(rightness or wrongness) of an action. I refer to this position as ‘weak motivism’, and distinguish it from ‘strong’ and ‘partial
motivism’. I examine a number of cases where our intuitive judgements appear to support the weak motivist’s thesis, and argue
that in each case an alternative explanation can be given for why a change in motive brings about (or, in some cases, appears
to bring about) a change in deontic status. 相似文献
15.
Ehlen S. J. Peter 《Studies in East European Thought》1996,48(1):83-108
A. F. Losev, one of the most important Russian philosophers and historians of ancient aesthetics and culture in the 20th century,
develops in his ‘Dialectics of the Myth’ (Dialektika mifa), 1930, a personalistic ontology by using elements of neoplatonic philosophy and Orthodox Christian belief. According to
Losev reality in all its different expressions and ontological strata must be understood as “mythical”, i.e. as “living mutual
exchange of subject and object”. The subjective and personal aspect of reality is not grounded in man’s epistemic relation
to it alone; reality in itself has to be characterized as personal and subjective. The main philosophical opponent is Descartes,
the founder of “modern rationalism and mechanism”.
相似文献
16.
Dermot Moran 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(4):401-425
Throughout his career, Husserl identifies naturalism as the greatest threat to both the sciences and philosophy. In this paper, I explicate Husserl’s overall diagnosis and critique
of naturalism and then examine the specific transcendental aspect of his critique. Husserl agreed with the Neo-Kantians in rejecting naturalism. He has three major critiques of naturalism:
First, it (like psychologism and for the same reasons) is ‘countersensical’ in that it denies the very ideal laws that it needs for its own justification.
Second, naturalism essentially misconstrues consciousness by treating it as a part of the world. Third, naturalism is the
inevitable consequence of a certain rigidification of the ‘natural attitude’ into what Husserl calls the ‘naturalistic attitude’.
This naturalistic attitude ‘reifies’ and it ‘absolutizes’ the world such that it is treated as taken-for-granted and ‘obvious’.
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological analysis, however, discloses that the natural attitude is, despite its omnipresence
in everyday life, not primary, but in fact is relative to the ‘absolute’ transcendental attitude. The mature Husserl’s critique
of naturalism is therefore based on his acceptance of the absolute priority of the transcendental attitude. The paradox remains that we must start from and, in a sense, return to the natural attitude, while, at the same time, restricting
this attitude through the on-going transcendental vigilance of the universal epoché.
相似文献
Dermot MoranEmail: |
17.
Ömer Faruk Şimşek 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2009,10(5):505-522
The current model of subjective well-being (SWB) has been operationalized as the unity of affective and cognitive dimensions
concerning the evaluation of one’s life, called emotional well-being and life satisfaction, respectively. There has been no
theoretical framework, however, by which the unity is explained. The present paper offers a new construct of subjective well-being
in an attempt to show that the cognitive and affective dimensions of SWB can be unified using the concept of goal. The concept
of goal refers to the life as a project when the concern is the evaluation of life as a whole. The evaluation of the whole
life, moreover, should take a whole-time perspective into account if it is supposed to be ‘whole’. Ontological well-being
(OWB) construct is structured in a theoretical framework by which the cognitive and affective components of the current conceptualization
of SWB are reframed and interpreted in a whole time perspective. By taking as base the historical and philosophical resources
of the affective and cognitive dimensions of subjective well-being, this new construct defines subjective well-being as one’s
evaluation of life in both past and future time perspectives in addition to the present. 相似文献
18.
Neil Edward Williams 《Synthese》2009,170(1):7-19
Arguing against the claim that every dispositional property is grounded in some property other than itself, Stephen Mumford
presents what he calls the ‘Ungrounded Argument’. If successful, the Ungrounded Argument would represent a major victory for
anti-Humean metaphysics over its Humean rivals, as it would allow for the existence of primitive modality. Unfortunately,
Humeans need not yet be worried, as the Ungrounded Argument is itself lacking in grounding. I indicate where Mumford’s argument
falls down, claiming that even the dispositions of the simplest particles can have categorical bases. 相似文献
19.
Mark Moyer 《Synthese》2006,148(2):401-423
Puzzles about persistence and change through time, i.e., about identity across time, have foundered on confusion about what it is for ‘two things’ to be have ‘the same thing’ at a time. This is most directly seen in the dispute over whether material objects can occupy exactly the same place at the
same time. This paper defends the possibility of such coincidence against several arguments to the contrary. Distinguishing
a temporally relative from an absolute sense of ‘the same’, we see that the intuition, ‘this is only one thing’, and the dictum,
‘two things cannot occupy the same place at the same time’, are individuating things at a time rather than absolutely and are therefore compatible with coincidence. Several other objections philosophers have raised ride
on this same ambiguity. Burke, originating what has become the most popular objection to coincidence, argues that if coincidence
is possible there would be no explanation of how objects that are qualitatively the same at a time could belong to different
sorts. But we can explain an object’s sort by appealing to its properties at other times. Burke’s argument to the contrary
equivocates on different notions of ‘cross-time identity’ and ‘the statue’. From a largely negative series of arguments emerges
a positive picture of what it means to say multiple things coincide and of why an object’s historical properties explain its
sort rather than vice versa – in short, of how coincidence is possible. 相似文献
20.
Diane Antonio 《Sophia》2001,40(2):47-65
Julian of Norwich (b. 1342) anticipated the ontological and epistemological work on sexed embodiment pioneered in the work
of Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray in the 20th century. Her epistemology of sensual ‘showings’ helped reconfigure women’s embodiment
and speech acts (‘bodytalk’): by recognizing cognitive emotions and the knowledge-producing body; and by envisioning the intertwining
of human flesh with All That Is. The paper next examines Merleau-Ponty’s somatic discourse on the chiasmic flesh, which leads
to a discussion of Irigaray’s work on poetic mimesis. 相似文献