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Kurt H. Wolff 《Human Studies》1995,7(2):191-210
Revision of a lecture given on November 10, 1982, in the course of a faculty seminar at Memorial University of Newfoundland. The present version owes much to the participants in the rational, undistorted discussion which followed, as well as to written comments by Erazim Kohák, his book, Idea and Experience: Edmund Husserl's Project of Phenomenology in IDEAS I (1978), discussions with Mildred Bakan, Helmut R. Wagner's response to a related paper, and a critical reading by George Psathas. I am deeply grateful. 相似文献
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Uriah Kriegel 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):357-381
To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case
M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of
ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological
merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, that there is no phenomenological evidence against self-representationalism.
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Uriah KriegelEmail: |
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Michael B. Gill 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(1):99-113
Many moral philosophers in the Western tradition have used phenomenological claims as starting points for philosophical inquiry; aspects of moral phenomenology have often been taken to be anchors to which any adequate account of morality must remain attached. This paper raises doubts about whether moral phenomena are universal and robust enough to serve the purposes to which moral philosophers have traditionally tried to put them. Persons’ experiences of morality may vary in a way that greatly limits the extent to which moral phenomenology can constitute a reason to favor one moral theory over another. Phenomenology may not be able to serve as a pre-theoretic starting point or anchor in the consideration of rival moral theories because moral phenomenology may itself be theory-laden. These doubts are illustrated through an examination of how moral phenomenology is used in the thought of Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, Joseph Butler, Francis Hutcheson, and Søren Kierkegaard. 相似文献
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Steven S. Posavac 《Journal of Consumer Psychology》2009,19(4):574-578
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Mathematizing phenomenology 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jeffrey Yoshimi 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(3):271-291
Husserl is well known for his critique of the “mathematizing tendencies” of modern science, and is particularly emphatic that
mathematics and phenomenology are distinct and in some sense incompatible. But Husserl himself uses mathematical methods in
phenomenology. In the first half of the paper I give a detailed analysis of this tension, showing how those Husserlian doctrines
which seem to speak against application of mathematics to phenomenology do not in fact do so. In the second half of the paper
I focus on a particular example of Husserl’s “mathematized phenomenology”: his use of concepts from what is today called dynamical
systems theory.
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Jeffrey YoshimiEmail: |
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Jakub Čapek 《Continental Philosophy Review》2017,50(3):359-375
Narrative identity theory in some of its influential variants (A. MacIntyre or P. Ric?ur) makes three fundamental assumptions. First, it focuses on personal identity primarily in terms of selfhood. Second, it argues that personal identity is to be understood as the unity of one’s life as it develops over time. And finally, it states that the unity of a life is articulated, by the very person itself, in the form of a story, be it explicit or implicit. The article focuses on different contemporary phenomenological appraisals of the narrative account (in the works of David Carr, Dan Zahavi and László Tengelyi). The survey of this partly critical debate is followed by concluding observations concerning a possible phenomenological theory of personal identity. 相似文献
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Continental Philosophy Review - Whereas classical Critical Theory has tended to view phenomenology as inherently uncritical, the recent upsurge of what has become known as critical phenomenology... 相似文献
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Richard Schacht 《Philosophical Studies》1972,23(5):293-314
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Matthew Ratcliffe 《Synthese》2011,178(1):121-130
This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen’s claim that empiricism is a ‘stance’. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds
of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ‘finding oneself in a world’. At least some of van Fraassen’s
claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ‘empirical stance’, he assumes the stance of
the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This
latter stance does not incorporate the attitude that van Fraassen takes to be characteristic of empiricism. Thus its possibility
serves to illustrate that empiricism as an all-encompassing philosophical orientation is untenable. I conclude by discussing the part played by feelings in philosophical stances and
propose that they contribute to philosophical conviction, commitment and critique. 相似文献
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Michelle Montague 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2016,15(2):167-181
How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing as conscious thought. So one must either accept that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology, or deny the existence of conscious thought. Once it is clear that conscious thought requires cognitive phenomenology, there is a pressing question about the exact relationship between a thought’s cognitive phenomenological properties and its content. I conclude with a discussion of the nature of this relationship. 相似文献
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