MIND‐INDEPENDENCE DISAMBIGUATED: SEPARATING THE MEAT FROM THE STRAW IN THE REALISM/ANTI‐REALISM DEBATE

The notion of mind‐independence plays a central role in the contemporary realism/anti‐realism debate, but the notion is severely ambiguous and consequently the source of considerable misunderstanding. In this paper, four kinds of mind‐independence are distinguished: ontological, causal, structural, and individuative independence. Appreciating these distinctions entails that one can reject the individuative independence of the natural world, and still maintain that the natural world is causally and structurally independent of us. This paper argues that so‐called anti‐realists, especially Rorty, Putnam, and Goodman, are not opposed to the causal and structural independence of the natural world, as is frequently alleged, but rather its individuative independence. An acceptance of these points will hopefully put an end to the prevalence of strawmen in the debate, and focus attention on meatier issues.     

Concepts of randomness

Conclusion I have discussed a concept of random distribution of properties in classes and defined a concept of random conjunction of properties; I have also discussed measures of various kinds of randomness. In concluding, I shall only mention some further problems which await treatment. Both the concept of random conjunction and the measures of randomness rest upon the notion of probability, which was not explicitly dealt with in this paper. Since, however, assumptions of randomness are frequently brought forward as justifications for working with probabilities, the relationship of randomness and probability should be examined in detail. Another task is to show which concepts of randomness are relevant in the sciences. It seems that the concept of random distribution of properties in classes, though interesting in itself and of relevance to statistics, has no use in theories of the empirical sciences. However, the assumption of randomness in the sense of stochastic independence, very often combined with the notion of randomness in the sense of equiprobability, or maximum primitive randomness, undoubtedly plays a role in various fields of science. I do not know of any case where the measures of randomness are directly employed; the idea of stochastic dependence and that of probabilities other than equiprobabilities are, of course, widley used. Finally, some of the assumptions of random conjunction of properties made in the sciences seem to be justifiable in terms of an actual independence of the properties. This raises the question as to whether, and to what extent, the notion of an actual independence is fundamental to concepts of randomness.Presently at Monteith College, Wayne State University, Detroit, U.S.A.     

Psychological Tasks Associated with Divorce: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Eat,Pray, Love</Emphasis> (2010), <Emphasis Type="Italic">An Unmarried Woman</Emphasis> (1978), and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Kramer vs. Kramer</Emphasis> (1979)

The dependency paradox (Feeney) states that independence actually can result from being in a nurturing relationship. Those who divorce often have the opposite notion that independence will occur without a relationship. The movies Eat, Pray, Love, An Unmarried Woman, and Kramer vs. Kramer examine divorce from different angles. The protagonists in all three movies grow through the process of divorce, each achieving a level of autonomy that seemed unattainable within their marriage. This paper aims to explore the concept of divorce in light of the dependency paradox by examining the self-differentiation achieved and the consequences of such independence for both the individual and, in Kramer vs. Kramer, for the child involved.     

Moral sentiment predicts desire for Scottish independence

Scottish independence has been a topic of considerable political debate for some time, with the 2014 referendum concerning whether Scotland should remain a part of the United Kingdom testament to this fact. Numerous economic and political factors have been noted as determinants of the referendum vote. However, the role of psychological factors as a predictor of the desire for independence has not been well explored despite much work demonstrating the importance of specific traits and values on a range of socio-political attitudes. In the current study, using a sample of Scottish adults (n = 271), we sought to examine how two core constructs capturing moral sentiment – binding (reflecting concern for group cohesion and norms) and individualizing (reflecting concern over individual rights) – predicted the desire for independence during the build-up to the referendum. Results indicated that lower binding and higher individualizing predicted a desire for independence, with evidence for mediation via Scottish identification. These findings are consistent with the notion that the Scottish independence movement can be viewed as a broadly left-wing phenomenon. More generally, these results provide novel evidence in a charged political debate that moral sentiments concerning how individual and group life should be structured play a significant role in explaining individual differences in political sentiment.     

Gender and individualistic vs. collectivist bases for notions about the self

This article provides a critique of traditional psychological theories of the self that emphasize autonomy, separation, and independence, and ignore the inherently social character of the self Evidence from an empirical investigation of selected experiences of 84 white adult women and men who evidence two different notions of the self (autonomous individualism and social individuality) suggest that the culturally dominant notion of the self, rooted in assumptions of autonomy, independence, and separation, is but one orientation to the self A contrasting notion, social individuality, reflects a dialectical understanding of individuality and sociality grounded in an experience of social relations characterized by inequalities of power Preliminary research suggests that differences between women's and men's notions of the self are grounded in their different experiences of power These findings support a larger argument that research on the self in psychology must be grounded in an analysis of material social reality and reflect the dialectical relation of individuality and sociality     

IN DEFENCE OF METAPHYSICAL ANALYTICITY

According to the so‐called metaphysical conception of analyticity, analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning (or content) alone and independently of (extralinguistic) facts. Quine and Boghossian have tried to present a conclusive argument against the metaphysical conception of analyticity. In effect, they tried to show that the metaphysical conception inevitably leads into a highly implausible view about the truthmakers of analytic truths. We would like to show that their argument fails, since it relies on an ambiguity of the notion of ‘independence of (extralinguistic) facts’. If one distinguishes between variation independence and existence independence, the unwelcome view about the truthmakers of analytic truths no longer follows. Thus, there is at best a challenge, but no conclusive argument. The door to the metaphysical conception of analyticity is still open. 1     

Freedom as Independence: Mary Wollstonecraft and the Grand Blessing of Life

Independence is a central and recurring theme in Mary Wollstonecraft's work. Independence should not be understood as an individualistic ideal that is in tension with the value of community but as an essential ingredient in successful and flourishing social relationships. I examine three aspects of this rich and complex concept that Wollstonecraft draws on as she develops her own notion of independence as a powerful feminist tool. First, independence is an egalitarian ideal that requires that all individuals, regardless of sex, be protected to a comparable extent in all areas of social, political, and economic life, no matter whether this is in the public or private sphere. Second, so long as this egalitarian condition is not compromised, independence allows for individuals to perform differentiated social roles, including along gendered lines. Finally, the ongoing and collective input of both women and men is required to ensure that the conditions necessary for social independence are maintained. In Wollstonecraft's hands, then, independence is a powerful ideal that allows her to argue that women must be able to act on their own terms as social and political equals, doing so as women whose perspectives and interests may differ from men's.     

Between Ethics and Right: Kantian Politics and Democratic Purposes

Force and Freedom insists that, ‘Freedom, understood as independence of another person's choice, is [all] that matters’. In this paper I suggest that this premise leads Ripstein to an instrumentalization of democracy that neglects a properly public and collective notion of freedom. The paper first criticizes Ripstein's key argument against any extension of public purposes beyond the upholding of persons’ ‘independence of others’ choice’. More constructively, the paper then suggests that a space of public freedom is opened up when people deliberate in order to form and pursue democratic purposes. Citizens may act together to promote ends that they think are worthwhile, without dominating one another or restricting individual freedom.     

A note on analysing substancehood

I propose an analysis of the notion of a substance. I define two ‘quasi-logical’ independence relations, and state the analysis in terms of the distribution of these relations among substances and properties generally. This analysis treats the categories of substance and property as mutually dependent. To show that it (probably) states a sufficient condition for substance, I argue that it is in a certain kind of equilibrium. This illustrates a promising general approach to analysing fundamental metaphysical notions.     

Deductively Definable Logics of Induction

A broad class of inductive logics that includes the probability calculus is defined by the conditions that the inductive strengths [A|B] are defined fully in terms of deductive relations in preferred partitions and that they are asymptotically stable. Inductive independence is shown to be generic for propositions in such logics; a notion of a scale-free inductive logic is identified; and a limit theorem is derived. If the presence of preferred partitions is not presumed, no inductive logic is definable. This no-go result precludes many possible inductive logics, including versions of hypothetico-deductivism.     

给予老年人体面的照护：为什么尊严很重要——欧洲经验

在医学哲学领域以及相关领域中,“尊严”的概念越来越受到关注。最近,在生物伦理学的国际会议中很流行这个概念。同时,在欧洲的许多国家中,“尊严”的概念也被引入到有关卫生保健的国家立法和政策制定中。本文将从检验一个在关于尊严和老年人的欧洲计划中产生的尊严理论模型开始。然后根据参与这个计划的老年人和卫生及社会保健的专业人员那里得到的经验进行研究,有6个国家参加这项研究。结果证明尊严是一个非常重要的事情,尤其是对那些弱势群体来说。本文结论认为对于虚弱的老年人,相对于那种强调自主的医学伦理,长期的保健需要注重一个范围更为广泛的伦理内容。     

Empirical indistinguishability: From the knowledge structure to the skills

Recent literature has pointed out that the basic local independence model (BLIM) when applied to some specific instances of knowledge structures presents identifiability issues. Furthermore, it has been shown that for such instances the model presents a stronger form of unidentifiability named empirical indistinguishability, which leads to the fact that the existence of certain knowledge states in such structures cannot be empirically tested. In this article the notion of indistinguishability is extended to skill maps and, more generally, to the competence-based knowledge space theory. Theoretical results are provided showing that skill maps can be empirically indistinguishable from one another. The most relevant consequence of this is that for some skills there is no empirical evidence to establish their existence. This result is strictly related to the type of probabilistic model investigated, which is essentially the BLIM. Alternative models may exist or can be developed in knowledge space theory for which this indistinguishability problem disappears.     

Counterfactuals and the fixity of the past

I argue that David Lewis’s attempt, in his ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’, to explain the fixity of the past in terms of counterfactual independence is unsuccessful. I point out that there is an ambiguity in the claim that the past is counterfactually independent of the present (or, more generally, that the earlier is counterfactually independent of the later), corresponding to two distinct theses about the relation between time and counterfactuals, both officially endorsed by Lewis. I argue that Lewis’s attempt is flawed for a variety of reasons, including the fact that his own theory about the evaluation of counterfactuals requires too many exceptions to the general rule that the past is counterfactually independent of the present. At the end of the paper, I consider a variant of Lewis’s strategy that attempts to explain the fixity of the past in terms of causal, rather than counterfactual, independence. I conclude that, although this variant avoids some of the objections that afflict Lewis’s account, it nevertheless seems to be incapable of giving a satisfactory explanation of the notion of the fixity of the past.     

Independence and Property in Kant's Rechtslehre

I argue that the freedom which is to coexist with the freedom of choice of others in accordance with a universal law mentioned in Kant's Rechtslehre is not itself freedom of choice. Rather, it is the independence which is a condition of being able to exercise genuine free choice by not having to act in accordance with the choices of others. Kant's distinction between active and passive citizenship appears, however, to undermine this idea of independence, because the possession of a certain type of property right on the part of some citizens makes it possible for them to dominate others. Kant's account of property in this way turns out to be central to the question as to whether his Rechtslehre represents an internally consistent account of how freedom can be guaranteed within a legal and political community. I go on to argue that Kant's attempt to justify a pre-political right of property cannot be viewed as a successful justification of private property, and that he should have abandoned the notion of such a right together with any presumption in favour of private property.     

A factorization procedure for finite algebras

A procedure is developed for decomposing any finite algebra into a minimal set of maximally independent simple homomorphic images, or factors, of the algebra. The definition of admissible sets of factors is made in relation to the congruence lattice of the algebra, and generalises the notion of an irredundant reduction in a modular lattice. An algorithm for determining all possible sets of factors of a given finite algebra is derived and an index for measuring the degree of independence of factors is defined. Applications of the technique to finite algebraic models within the social psychological domain are presented and include factorizations for certain semigroups of binary relations and for a class of finite semilattices.     

Revisiting the God/World Difference

On what basis do we distinguish God from the world? I argue that the doctrine of creation, more specifically the analogical notion of causa , supplies a salutary foundation. My conversation partners are Karl Barth and Thomas Aquinas. I take up the former's five conditions for a right theological use of causa , demonstrating that despite his basic misreading of Thomas, both theologians share some basic convictions regarding God's independence. I argue, moreover, that Thomas provides a more theologically satisfying anchor for what distinguishes God from what is not God. I conclude by reflecting on the importance of experience in articulating the distinction.     

On The Computational Consequences of Independence in Propositional Logic

Sandu and Pietarinen [Partiality and Games: Propositional Logic. Logic J. IGPL 9 (2001) 101] study independence friendly propositional logics. That is, traditional propositional logic extended by means of syntax that allow connectives to be independent of each other, although the one may be subordinate to the other. Sandu and Pietarinen observe that the IF propositional logics have exotic properties, like functional completeness for three-valued functions. In this paper we focus on one of their IF propositional logics and study its properties, by means of notions from computational complexity. This approach enables us to compare propositional logic before and after the IF make-over. We observe that all but one of the best-known decision problems experience a complexity jump, provided that the complexity classes at hand are not equal. Our results concern every discipline that incorporates some notion of independence such as computer science, natural language semantics, and game theory. A corollary of one of our theorems illustrates this claim with respect to the latter discipline.     

Antecedents and consequences of salesperson identification with the brand and company

To date, little research has investigated the antecedents and implications of salespersons' identification with the brands and the companies they represent. As the nature of the selling job is unique from other inside employee positions, with increased independence of the firm and loyalty that may be expanded to the customers rather than the firm itself, an investigation of this phenomenon within the sales context holds significant implication for sales force management. The salesperson also represents an extension of the marketing communication programme of the firm and thus has direct bearing on how the company and brand image are communicated to the customer. Therefore, the purpose of our paper is to hypothesize and empirically test the notion that higher levels of perceived congruence between a salesperson's own values and those values of the brand and company he or she represents will lead to higher brand identification and company identification which in turn should create higher job satisfaction, commitment and performance. We discuss our results and offer practical insights to sales managers. Further, we discuss limitations of our study and provide directions for future research.     

The role of supervenience and constitution in neuroscientific research

This paper is concerned with the notions of supervenience and mechanistic constitution as they have been discussed in the philosophy of neuroscience. Since both notions essentially involve specific dependence and determination relations among properties and sets of properties, the question arises whether the notions are systematically connected and how they connect to science. In a first step, some definitions of supervenience and mechanistic constitution are presented and tested for logical independence. Afterwards, certain assumptions fundamental to neuroscientific inquiry are made explicit in order to show that the presented definitions of supervenience are virtually uninteresting for theory construction in this field. In a third step, a new formulation of supervenience is developed that makes explicit reference to the notion of constitution and that bridges the gap between the philosophical concepts and explanatory practice in neuroscience.     

Perceptual and decisional factors influencing the discrimination of inversion in the Thatcher illusion

The Thatcher illusion (Thompson, 1980) is considered to be a prototypical illustration of the notion that face perception is dependent on configural processes and representations. We explored this idea by examining the relative contributions of perceptual and decisional processes to the ability of observers to identify the orientation of two classes of forms-faces and churches-and a set of their component features. Observers were presented with upright and inverted images of faces and churches in which the components (eyes, mouth, windows, doors) were presented either upright or inverted. Observers first rated the subjective grotesqueness of all of the images and then performed a complete identification task in which they had to identify the orientation of the overall form and the orientation of each of the interior features. Grotesqueness ratings for both classes of image showed the standard modulation of rated grotesqueness as a function of orientation. The complete identification results revealed violations of both perceptual and decisional separability but failed to reveal any violations of within-stimulus (perceptual) independence. In addition, exploration of a simple bivariate Gaussian signal detection model of the relationship between identification performance and judged grotesqueness suggests that within-stimulus violations of perceptual independence on their own are insufficient for producing the illusion. This lack of evidence for within-stimulus configurality suggests the need for a critical reevaluation of the role of configural processing in the Thatcher illusion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).