ACTIONS,HABITS AND CONSTITUTION

In this paper I offer a critique of the view made popular by Davidson that rationalization is a species of causal explanation, and propose instead that in many cases the explanatory relation is constitutive. Given Davidson’s conception of rationalization, which allows that a huge range of states gathered under the heading ‘pro attitude’ could rationalize an action, I argue that whilst the causal thesis may have some merit for some such ‘attitudes’, it has none for others. The problematic ‘attitudes’ are those which can be attributed to the agent only on the basis of her history of doing a certain sort of thing. In other words, they are among the agent’s habits. I argue that such temporally extended states cannot be the causes of any present occurrence. Instead, I suggest we should think of the present action as partly constituting the state in question, and give a corresponding interpretation of the explanatory relation. Such explanations invite us to abandon a conception of agency narrowly based on psychology, in favour of an enriched one which takes an agent’s habits to partly constitute the agent.     

VIRTUE, EMOTION, AND ATTENTION

Abstract: The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that there are good reasons to be sceptical about this picture of virtue. In this essay I set out these reasons, and explain the consequences this scepticism has for our understanding of the relation between virtue, emotion, and attention. In particular, I argue that our primary capacity for recognizing value is in fact a non-emotional capacity.     

IMAGINATION AND THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTION

Many writers offer accounts of our grasp of the expressive gestures of others, or of the expressive content of works of art, in terms of our imagining the experiences of another, or ourselves having certain experiences, or, in the case of works of art, a persona to have experiences. This invocation of what Kant would term, the reproductive imagination, in the perception of expressive content, is contested in this paper. In its place it is suggested that the detection of expressive content is a form of direct, but reason constituting perception. In such perception it is the Kantian productive, rather than the reproductive, imagination which plays a central role.     

INFANTS' INDIVIDUATION AND ENUMERATION OF ACTIONS

Abstract— Two experiments examined 6-month-old infantsapos; ability to individuate and enumerate physical actions—the sequential jumps of a puppet In both experiments, which employed a habituation paradigm, infants successfully discriminated two-jump from three-jump sequences The sequences of activity in the two experiments provided for an initial exploration of the cues infants use to individuate actions. Results show that (a) infants can individuate and enumerate actions in a sequence, indicating that their enumeration mechanism is quite general in the kinds of entities over which it will operate, (b) action whose temporal boundaries are characterized by a contrast between motion and absence of motion are especially easy to individuate and enumerate, but nonetheless (c) infants can individuate and enumerate actions embedded in a sequence of continuous motion, indicating that infants possess procedures for parsing an ongoing motionful scene into distinct portions of activity.     

WILLIAM JAMES AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTION

The theory of emotion was a centerpiece of William James' Principles of Psychology. It introduced the notion that complex phenomena, such as the experience of emotion, could be derived (constructed) from a combination of more basic processes or behaviors. Despite their shortcomings, James' views on emotion shaped research on emotion for the succeeding century, and laid the groundwork for constructivist approaches in psychological theory.     

ACTIONS AND AGENTS: NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL RECONSIDERED

Using a process‐oriented understanding of the relation between actions and agents, the author argues that an ontological agent is the ongoing effect or by‐product rather than the antecedent cause of actions. Applied to the relation between natural and supernatural in philosophical cosmology, this allows one to claim, first, that agents (whether natural or supernatural) are not sensibly perceived, but only inferred from the ongoing observation of empirical actions; second, that the distinction between the natural and the supernatural is then conceivably a distinction between interrelated processes rather than between independently existing agents; and third, that a higher order process of supernatural origin could be operative in a lower order empirical process without interference even though its existence and activity could only be established on the basis of a faith commitment, not empirical evidence. What Paul Ricoeur referred to as a “surplus of meaning” over and above the scientific explanation of an event would be in play with the claim of divine guidance for the cosmic process.