Do you take credit cards? The attitudinal and behavioral effects of advergames targeted at children

Advergames are a promotional tool that confronts children with brands in an entertaining and playful setting. The present study adds to the existing knowledge by analyzing an advergame placement that is usually not targeted at children: credit cards. Based on an emotional conditioning process premised on the positive gaming experience, we argue that advergames lead to an increase in brand evaluation and brand choice. In addition to changes in brand outcomes, we investigate how playing a game promoting credit cards can impact children's spending behavior. For that purpose, children either played the traditional version of Monopoly paying with cash money or they played the banking version, promoting Visa credit cards. Results indicate that exposure to the branded game enhanced preference for Visa. In addition, children's spending behavior increased in an online shopping task. As another important contribution to the literature, we found the behavioral and attitudinal effects to be independent of children's age. In light of young consumers' high debt, our findings raise concerns about targeting children with credit card placements in advergames. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

集体问题解决中的知识、惯例和绩效

在Cohen和Bacdayan发明的两人TTT纸牌游戏的基础上开发了三人TTT游戏,并以此为实验任务,考察了三人集体问题解决活动能否形成惯例,比较了有问题图式组和无问题图式组之间在惯例和绩效上的差异。实验结果表明：（1）三人问题解决能够形成惯例;（2）有图式组的惯例化程度总体上低于无图式组,而其惯例化程度提高的速度则快于后者;（3）无图式组的绩效高于有图式组,但前期差异显著,后期不显著。这些结果将前人基于两人TTT游戏所做的惯例研究进一步拓展到三人情境,证实了三人互动中惯例的生成,为研究涉及更多人互动的真正意义上的组织惯例奠定了基础;阐明了知识,特别是前人在组织惯例研究中所忽视的陈述性知识,对于惯例形成和绩效提升的影响,并揭示了其在组织管理和决策活动中的实际意义。     

The introduction of the Video Assistant Referee supports the fairness of the game – An analysis of the home advantage in the German Bundesliga

The introduction of the video assistant referee (VAR) was a landmark in soccer history, yet it is not empirically examined whether the technology contributes to the most supreme value of the game: fair play. Because referees are said to be one driving cause of the home advantage (HA), the aim of this study was to examine whether the HA changed in the German Bundesliga since the implementation of the VAR in the season 2017/18. We examined a total of 2448 games during the four seasons before and after the implementation of the VAR with regards to the game outcomes (i.e., goals and points) as well as indicators of referee bias (i.e., fouls, yellow cards, 2nd yellow cards, red cards, and penalty kicks) for both the home and the away teams. Findings indicate that the VAR influences game outcomes to a fairer degree. Specifically, (i) we found statistical evidence for the HA before, but not after the implementation of the VAR. However, (ii) these results need to be interpreted with caution because direct assessments of the change induced by the introduction of the VAR are not statistically significant. Finally, (iii) with the implementation of the VAR, fewer fouls were committed by both the home and the away team.     

Knowing when you don't know enough: Children's judgements about ambiguous information

Two experiments were carried out to find out whether young children's failure to realise when messages are ambiguous is specific to verbally transmitted information about a person's intended meaning. In Experiment 1, children judged whether they had been told/shown enough to identify which one of a set of cards the experimenter had chosen. In one game the experimenter gave verbal messages about her chosen cards, and in a second game, she gave visual messages. With ambiguous visual messages, relevant parts of cards were physically covered. We expected that this would make it more obvious that the speaker's intended meaning was not being fully conveyed. No difference was found between verbal and visual conditions: correct judgements about message ambiguity occured with the same frequency in both.In Experiment 2, children judged in one game whether they had been told enough about the experimenter's chosen card, as in Experiment 1. In a second game, visual information about a card was not conveyed by the experimenter, Rather, the child operated a pointer, set in a disc with windows, beneath which lay cards. The child judged whether the window showed enough for him/her to tell which card the pointer indicated. Again, correct judgments about ambiguity occured with the same frequency in both games.The results implied that children's failure to realise when verbal messages are ambiguous is but one aspect of a more general failure to realise when one has insufficient information at one's disposal to guarantee a correct interpretation of what the world is like.     

Personal problem-solving scoring of the TAT: sensitivity to training

The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Murray, 1943) is one of the most frequently taught and administered projective instruments in the United States. Nevertheless, formal scoring systems are not often used when evaluating story responses; thus, the reliability and validity of response interpretations remain controversial. The sensitivity-to-training of a procedure that uses the TAT to assess personal problem-solving skills, namely the Personal Problem-Solving System (PPSS; Ronan, 1990), was evaluated. In Experiment 1, undergraduate students received either detailed (n = 30) or minimal (n = 29) training in the problem-solving skill of generating alternative solutions to personal problems and subsequently wrote responses to three TAT cards. In Experiment 2, subjects received either detailed (n = 22) or minimal (n = 22) training in a utility model of decision making and thereafter responded to the same three TAT cards. Subjects who received detailed training, when compared to their minimally trained counterparts, reported an increase in their knowledge of the relevant problem-solving skill, and this increased knowledge influenced their responses to the TAT cards as measured by the PPSS scores. Implications for the construct validity of the PPSS are discussed.     

Personal Problem-Solving Scoring of the TAT: Sensitivity to Training

The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Murray, 1943) is one of the most frequently taught and administered projective instruments in the United States. Nevertheless, formal scoring systems are not often used when evaluating story responses; thus, the reliability and validity of response interpretations remain controversial. The sensitivity-to-training of a procedure that uses the TAT to assess personal problem-solving skills, namely the Personal Problem-Solving System (PPSS; Ronan, 1990), was evaluated. In Experiment 1, undergraduate students received either detailed (n = 30) or minimal (n = 29) training in the problem-solving skill of generating alternative solutions to personal problems and subsequently wrote responses to three TAT cards. In Experiment 2, subjects received either detailed (n = 22) or minimal (n = 22) training in a utility model of decision making and thereafter responded to the same three TAT cards. Subjects who received detailed training, when compared to their minimally trained counterparts, reported an increase in their knowledge of the relevant problem-solving skill, and this increased knowledge influenced their responses to the TAT cards as measured by the PPSS scores. Implications for the construct validity of the PPSS are discussed.     

Set recognition as a window to perceptual and cognitive processes

The Set visual perception game is a fertile research platform that allows investigation of perception, with gradual processing culminating in a momentary recognition stage, in a context that can be endlessly repeated with novel displays. Performance of the Set game task is a play-off between perceptual and conceptual processes. The task is to detect (among the 12 displayed cards) a 3-card set, defined as containing cards that are either all similar or all different along each of four dimensions with three possible values. We found preference and reduced response times (RTs) for perceiving set similarity (rather than span) and for including cards sharing the most abundant value in the display, suggesting that these are searched preferentially (perhaps by mutual enhancement). RT decreases with number of sets in the display according to a horse race model, implying independence of simultaneous searches. Central cards are included slightly more often, but set card proximity seems irrelevant. A supplementary experiment determining dimensional salience showed consistent but individual preferences, yet these seemed not to affect set identification. Training induced gradual improvement, which generalized to a new version of the game, suggesting high-level learning. We conclude that elements of perception such as similarity detection are basic for finding sets in this task, as in other real-world perceptual and cognitive tasks, suggesting the presence of basic similarity-perceiving mechanisms. The findings confirm the conclusion that conceptual processes are affected by perception.     

Game logic and its applications I

This paper provides a logic framework for investigations of game theoretical problems. We adopt an infinitary extension of classical predicate logic as the base logic of the framework. The reason for an infinitary extension is to express the common knowledge concept explicitly. Depending upon the choice of axioms on the knowledge operators, there is a hierarchy of logics. The limit case is an infinitary predicate extension of modal propositional logic KD4, and is of special interest in applications. In Part I, we develop the basic framework, and show some applications: an epistemic axiomatization of Nash equilibrium and formal undecidability on the playability of a game. To show the formal undecidability, we use a term existence theorem, which will be proved in Part II.The authors thank Hiroakira Ono for helpful discussions and encouragements from the early stage of this research project, and Philippe Mongin, Mitio Takano and a referee of this journal for comments on earlier versions of this paper. The first and second authors are partially supported, respectively, by Tokyo Center of Economic Research and Grant-in-Aids for Scientific Research 04640215, Ministry of Education, Science and Culture.Presented by H. Ono     

Intentional forgetting: Note-taking as a naturalistic example

In the present study, we examined whether note-taking as a memory aid may provide a naturalistic example of intentional forgetting. In the first experiment, participants played Concentration, a memory card game in which the identity and location of pairs of cards need to be remembered. Before the game started, half of the participants were allowed to study the cards, and the other half made notes that were then unexpectedly taken away. No significant differences emerged between the two groups for remembering identity information, but the study group remembered significantly more location information than did the note-taking group. In a second experiment, we examined whether note-takers would show signs of proactive interference while playing Concentration repeatedly. The results indicated that they did not. The findings suggest that participants adopted an intentional-forgetting strategy when using notes to store certain types of information.     

Being realistic about common knowledge: a Lewisian approach

Defined and formalized several decades ago, widely used in philosophy and game theory, the concept of common knowledge is still considered as problematic, although not always for the right reasons. I suggest that the epistemic status of a group of human agents in a state of common knowledge has not been thoroughly analyzed. In particular, every existing account of common knowledge, whether formal or not, is either too strong to fit cognitively limited individuals, or too weak to adequately describe their state. I provide a realistic definition of common knowledge, based on a formalization of David Lewis’ seminal account and show that it is formally equivalent to probabilistic common belief. This leads to a philosophical analysis of common knowledge which answers several common criticisms and sheds light on its nature.     

When seeing is knowing: the role of visual cues in the dissociation between children's rule knowledge and rule use

The Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task requires children to switch from sorting cards based on shape or color to sorting based on the other dimension. Typically, 3-year-olds perseverate, whereas 4-year-olds flexibly sort by different dimensions. Zelazo and colleagues (1996, Cognitive Development, 11, 37-63) asked children questions about the postswitch rules and found an apparent dissociation between rule knowledge and rule use, namely that 3-year-olds demonstrate accurate knowledge of the postswitch rules despite sorting cards incorrectly. Here, we show that children's success with these questions is grounded in their use of available visual cues; children who fail sorting use the target cards to correctly answer questions, and when the cards are unavailable they guess. This suggests that there might not be a dissociation between children's rule knowledge and rule use in the DCCS.     

The Soritical Centipede

Two philosophical questions arise about rationality in centipede games that are logically prior to attempts to apply the formal tools of game theory to this topic. First, given that the players have common knowledge of mutual rationality and common knowledge that they are each motivated solely to maximize their own profits, is there a backwards‐induction argument that (i) employs only familiar non‐technical concepts about rationality, (ii) leads to the conclusion that the first player is rationally obligated to end the game at the first step, (iii) is deductively valid, (iv) employs premises all of which are prima facie highly plausible, and (v) is prima facie sound (in virtue of features (iii) and (iv))? Second, if there is such an argument, then is it actually sound, or is it instead defective somehow despite being prima facie sound? Addressing these two questions is our project. We present a backwards‐induction argument that is prima facie sound; we argue that it is an instance of the notorious sorites paradox, and hence that the concepts of rational obligatoriness and rational permissibility are vague; and we briefly address the potential consequences of all this for the foundations of game theory and decision theory.     

Using temporal logics of knowledge for specification and verification—a case study

Temporal logics of knowledge are useful for reasoning about situations where the knowledge of an agent or component is important, and where change in this knowledge may occur over time. Here we use temporal logics of knowledge to reason about the game Cluedo. We show how to specify Cluedo using temporal logics of knowledge and prove statements about the knowledge of the players using a clausal resolution calculus for this logic. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using this logic to specify and verify the game Cluedo and describe related implementations.     

Retardation in Human Discrimination Learning as a Consequence of Pre-exposure: Latent Inhibition or Negative Priming?

A series of experiments with human subjects, using black-and-white chequerboard patterns, demonstrated that non-reinforced pre-exposure could impair performance in a subsequent learning task. Subjects were invited to take part in a scenario similar to that of a computer simulated card game. Their task was to turn over a series of cards by mouse-clicking on a pack of cards lying face-down, and then to classify these cards intoone of twocategories. In a subsequent task, subjects were asked todiscriminate betweenpairs ofchequerboards, some of which had previously appeared in the initialcategorizationphase: either directly ('fronts') or incidentally ('backs') involved in categorization. In Experiment 1, for those stimuli used as the backs ofthe cards (thatis,those visible ontopof the packof cards), there was asignificant impairment in performance relative to non-pre-exposed control stimuli. Although the impairment appeared to be specific to the stimuli pre-exposed, when the pre-exposed 'backs' were minimally distorted in the discrimination task of Experiment 2, performance was still significantly impaired relative to non-pre-exposed control stimuli. The results of Experiment 2 donot support the interpretation that retardation in learning following masked pre-exposure in human experiments is comparable to latent inhibition following simple preexposure in other animals. Whilst the impairment in performance appears to be similar to that of latent inhibition, the results may, instead, be better understood in terms of the inhibitory processes involved in negative priming. If this is so, then serious doubt is cast on whether latent inhibition has ever been reliably demonstrated in adult humans.     

Spatial separation of target and competitor cues enhances blocking of human causality judgements

Three experiments were carried out. Each required subjects to make judgements about the causal status of cues following a two-stage blocking procedure. In Stage 1 a competitor cue was consistently paired with an outcome, and in Stage 2 the competitor continued to be paired with the outcome but was accompanied by a target cue. It was predicted that causal judgements for the target would be reduced by the presence of the competitor. In Experiments 1 and 2 the blocking procedure was implemented as a computer simulation of a card game during which subjects had to learn which cards produced the best payouts. The cues that subjects used to make their judgement were colours and symbols that appeared on the backs of the cards. When the target and competitor cues appeared on the same card blocking effects did not emerge, but when they appeared as part of different cards blocking effects were found. Thus, spatial separation of target and competitor cues appeared to facilitate blocking. Experiment 3 replicated the blocking result using spatially separated target and competitor cues.