Religious involvement and happiness: Assessing the mediating role of compassion and helping others

Research reveals that a number of different aspects of religious involvement are associated with happiness. However, researchers have yet to provide an overarching theoretical explanation for how multiple dimensions of religion might be associated with happiness. The purpose of this study is to develop and test a conceptual model that includes the following core hypotheses: (1) people who attend worship services more often tend to be more committed to their faith; (2) people who are more committed to their faith are more likely to be compassionate; (3) compassionate individuals are more likely to provide emotional support to significant others; and (4) people who provide support to others tend to be happier. Data from a recent nationwide survey in the United States (N = 3,010) provides support for each hypothesis. The theoretical implications of these finding are discussed.     

FAITH AND DOUBT IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Abstract One of the contexts in which religion and science come into conflict is with regard to faith and doubt. Generally speaking, we associate faith with religion, which is opposed to doubt, and doubt with science, which is opposed to faith. Some critics of science have argued that science is also based on faith; others have shown that there is doubt in the religious context also. In this essay I clarify these positions by defining different types of faith and different types of doubt.     

Luther's Small and Large Catechisms: Defining and Confessing Christian Faith From the Centre in a Religiously Plural World

Abstract : In this article, the author argues that in his Small and Large Catechisms, which were both written in 1529, Martin Luther centres the Christian faith in a way that others can recognise as authentic and faithful to the Gospel vis‐à‐vis the relativism that is posited as the appropriate Christian articulation of the Gospel in a world of religious diversity. Luther's non‐negotiable centring on God for us in Jesus Christ, through whom God is uniquely and decisively revealed, speaks to the contemporary intra‐Christian and inter‐religious questions. The author finds evangelical and persuasive resonance in Lesslie Newbigin's call to indwell the Christian story and George Lindbeck's argument to attend to the grammar of the faith.     

In Search of the Self's Grounding Power: Kierkegaard's The Sickness unto Death as Dogmatics for Unbelievers

Kierkegaard's The Sickness unto Death can be read as an attempt to present the Christian message in a way that makes sense for unbelievers without violating the integrity of the Christian faith. This is done by exploring the psychological implications of the lack of faith in a way that is supposed to make sense even for those who take offence at the Christian message and do not accept the anthropological implications of the story of the incarnation as their basic point of orientation. It is argued that this attempt is successful, and that this can be demonstrated both by the consistency of the argument and the breadth of its Wirkungsgeschichte.     

Discerning the Spirits, Practicing the Faiths: Why Be Lutheran?

Some spiritual wanderers today are "unstuck" in their faith, therefore, they have many faiths; while others are securely "stuck" in their tradition. Getting stuck is desirable, and the path is through spiritual practice. One's inner life and even perception of reality become transformed through daily habits such as prayer, worship, and discipline. The Lutheran insight that a practicing Christian is simultaneously saint and sinner offers comfort and honest self–understanding.     

Belief, faith, and acceptance

Belief is a central focus of inquiry in the philosophy of religion and indeed in the field of religion itself. No one conception of belief is central in all these cases, and sometimes the term ‘belief’ is used where ‘faith’ or ‘acceptance’ would better express what is intended. This paper sketches the major concepts in the philosophy of religion that are expressed by these three terms. In doing so, it distinguishes propositional belief (belief that) from both objectual belief (believing something to have a property) and, more importantly, belief in (a trusting attitude that is illustrated by at least many paradigm cases of belief in God). Faith is shown to have a similar complexity, and even propositional faith divides into importantly different categories. Acceptance differs from both belief and faith in that at least one kind of acceptance is behavioral in a way neither of the other two elements is. Acceptance of a proposition, it is argued, does not entail believing it, nor does believing entail acceptance in any distinctive sense of the latter term. In characterizing these three notions (and related ones), the paper provides some basic materials important both for understanding a person’s religious position and for appraising its rationality. The nature of religious faith and some of the conditions for its rationality, including some deriving from elements of an ethics of belief, are explored in some detail.     

Faith and the practising analyst

Abstract: In this brief essay, I reflect on three questions: What is ‘faith’ in a modern and post‐modern cultural context? Do I, a Jungian analyst, have ‘faith’ or do I not? Does having ‘faith’ or not make a difference in the practice of analysis? I make reference to Jung's understanding of ‘faith’ and his frequent disclaimers about making metaphysical claims. I conclude that a post‐credal ‘faith’ is possible for contemporary Jungian analysts, that I do have such a faith personally, and that in my experience this makes a significant difference in analytic practice at least with some patients. Traditional faith statements must be translated into depth psychological terms, however, in order for them to be applicable in post‐modern, multicultural contexts.     

ENLARGING THE INTERDISCIPLINARY CIRCLE: JOAN KOSS‐CHIOINO'S AND PHILIP HEFNER'S APPROACH TO SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION AND HEALING

In the current scientific age there exists in academia a certain reservation regarding, even a fear of contact with, controversial issues such as faith healing or shamanism or even spiritual transformation. Although classical medicine, neurobiology, and possibly even social circumstances and forces are recognized, researching the controversial issues evoked may be frowned upon and even be risky for one's academic career. Fortunately, Joan Koss‐Chioino, Philip Hefner, and their colleagues (anthropologists, artists, neuroscientists, physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, theologians, and others) have not shrunk from doing so. The result, reviewed here in some detail, goes beyond what is common knowledge and points the way to further beneficial insights via open‐minded interdisciplinary research.     

Discerning the Spirits,Practicing the Faiths: Why Be Lutheran?

Some spiritual wanderers today are “unstuck” in their faith, therefore, they have many faiths; while others are securely “stuck” in their tradition. Getting stuck is desirable, and the path is through spiritual practice. One’s inner life and even perception of reality become transformed through daily habits such as prayer, worship, and discipline. The Lutheran insight that a practicing Christian is simultaneously saint and sinner offers comfort and honest self–understanding.     

MISUNDERSTOOD IN THE DIASPORA: THE EXPERIENCE OF ORTHODOX SIKHS IN VANCOUVER

Heroism and martyrdom are central values in contemporary Sikh historiography and primary symbols in their collective memory. Both are replete with the stories of numerous heroes and martyrs who faced death, unflinchingly fighting in defense of the Sikh faith and its believers (constituting the Panth or community) against overwhelming odds. Conversely, it is considered shameful for Sikhs to become mere victims, succumbing to attacks against faith and community without fighting to the death. It is also insisted that true Sikhs do not themselves attack those who are weak or harmless; on the contrary true Sikhs come to the defense of such persons even if they are not of the same faith. However, during the last half century, Sikhs have many times become victims, as well as perpetrators of violence, being unable to act in a way consistent with their central values. The consequence has been an inability to integrate their modern history successfully into a narrative consistent with those values and to find appropriate ways of memorializing what has been done to many Sikhs and what many Sikhs have done to others.     

‘Fides mater virtutum est’

Abstract

Peter Martyr Vermigli’s elevation of faith over charity displays similarities and differences with Thomas Aquinas and other medieval authors. For Thomas, faith does not perceive its object and thus denotes an uncertain assent to imperfectly revealed truths. Aquinas posits a reordering of will and intellect in order to explain how faith is more certain than ‘scientia.’ Vermigli on the other hand attempts to maintain the natural order between intellect and will in virtuous action (that is, natural law) even for the theological virtues. He likens faith to vision and practical wisdom arguing that God illuminates the mind to make the object of faith apprehensible to the judgment of reason. This perspective presents a more optimistic account of temporal, intellectual perfection via grace.     

Obama's Interfaith Service Challenge: A Call for a New Theology of Service in American Higher Education

Abstract : President Obama's recent Interfaith Service Challenge issued to colleges and universities in the United States encourages schools to commit to year‐long interfaith service projects that engage constituencies across campus, across faith traditions, and across the wider local community. While they were included in pre‐challenge planning, university chaplains and religious life staff were omitted from the list of partners. This omission challenges college chaplains and campus ministers to articulate a theology of interfaith service that represents their enduring priorities to engagement across faith lines and in service to others. For Christians, such a theology could be based on the three key principles of imago dei, theologia crucis, and faith active in love.     

The normative bond between Kantian autonomy and Sartrean authenticity: A critical existentialist perspective

Sartre and Kant are not often compared, especially because the former is frequently considered a theorist of a totally arbitrary free will. Nevertheless, this is not a fair interpretation of Sartre. Starting already from Being and Nothingness, he conceived an ethical difference between bad faith and authenticity. More unequivocally, in Notebooks for an Ethics he developed an existentialist ethics, which is more Kantian than expected. In that text, the ethical ideal of authenticity is not so different from the ethical ideal of autonomy in Kant. The aim of this article is to characterize Sartrean authenticity as a radicalization of Kantian autonomy. In both cases, there is a normative criterion, which implies a correct exercise of freedom towards oneself and others. This correct exercise of freedom implies for Kant the exclusion of the will determined by material conditions. For Sartre, this correct exercise means the rejection of bad faith. There is also a similar connection between autonomy and respect in Kant, and between authenticity and generosity in Sartre. Highlighting this little‐known affinity between the two most radical philosophers of freedom could also reveal a non‐ideological Sartre, ready to dialogue with contemporary ethical debate.     

From the Story of Jesus to the Faith of the Readers

The author analyzes the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke regarding the stories that tell of the death and resurrection of Jesus to determine how these works attempt to deal with such issues as unmerited suffering and the relationships among faith, knowledge, and experience. The author shows that the Gospels use different literary strategies in their discussions of these issues even as they try to encourage their readers toward faith and the corresponding behavior required by that faith.     

Argumentation,Adversariality, and Social Norms

Janice Moulton's “The Adversary Method: A Philosophical Paradigm” articulated several criticisms of the popular idea of philosophy as adversarial debate. Moulton criticizes it on epistemic grounds, arguing that philosophy's overreliance on adversarial debate is to the detriment of its goals. Some, notably Trudy Govier, have argued in favor of at least a minimal adversariality, governed by norms of respectful argumentation. This paper suggests that Govier's faith in these norms is misplaced, because it neglects the social circumstances of the arguers. While some authors have argued that politeness and aggression apply differently to those of different genders, this paper extends that analysis to social identities other than gender. In fact, given certain assumptions about the philosophy of language, engagement in polite adversarial debate may not even be possible for people occupying certain social locations.     

“Like sheep for the slaughter”

The primary objective of this article is to investigate how a Lutheran theology supports the soldier’s vocation in war. First, the analysis is made in relation to the concept of larva Dei, second, in relation to “the pastorate” and “technology of power”. By the interaction, I show how Luther’s theology can be used as a critique towards Foucault and vice versa. Through this narrative method, structures of power and liberation are unveiled. The interaction illuminates their diverse views on secular and non-secular order, as well as an immanent and transcendental order. Luther points towards eternity, while Foucault points towards society and its powers. The main outcome is firstly: faith for Foucault is never an explanation of “reality”, but a result of social relations. For Luther, faith is to experience the world as reality; and secondly: larva Dei creates a possibility to overcome suffering by faith, whereas by Foucault’s immanent structure, suffering is understood as “empty” or “meaningless”. Foucault contributes with an important critique of misusing vocation in war. An area for further research is to continue developing critiques of vocation and power in relation to contemporary soldiers’, terrorists’ and anarchists’ masks, since some are used to protect life and others to protect identities.     

Toward pastoral counseling integration: one Bowen oriented approach

Integration between the resources of faith and of the behavioral sciences in pastoral counseling is a challenging endeavor. The two domains have points of contact and many shared values. Yet, their fundamental presuppositions are quite different. The multiplicity of faith positions and of behavioral science positions complicates the effort enormously. This article presents one application of a comprehensive model of integration in one composite case. Based on an understanding of Bowen Theory, such a model (1) treats the relationship between the client and God in a way similar to the client's other significant relationships, (2) involves religious community and sacred texts as "God's available next of kin," and (3) considers "I positions" (which include the idea of therapist neutrality) as a framework for therapist authentic expression of faith without an authoritarian attempt to dictate the faith of the client. This case illustrates how one intervention based on this model made a positive contribution to the well being of a representative client. Therapists with other faith positions and other behavioral science positions would develop different models of integration, of course. This small slice of one case example is offered to further the discussion as others take positions of their own.     

Freedom and Respect in a Multicultural Society

ABSTRACT Martin Hollis, in Market Equality and Social Freedom [1], used the Dewsbury case to illustrate the tension between individual freedom and the public good. Like others engaged in the public debate on multicultural education in general, and Dewsbury in particular, Hollis avoided the main issue: “What should be the curriculum in a school attended by pupils from different cultural backgrounds?’’Rational debate in this highly controversial area requires an analysis of two fundamental concepts—multicultural education and respect. The former can take three forms, each corresponding with a distinctive curriculum model. One—the Equality option—is inimical to parental rights as guaranteed under the European Convention, but it attracts support because of a widespread failure to recognise that one can respect someone's right to hold and propagate a particular faith (or opinion) without necessarily respecting that faith (or opinion). It is shown that this failure has come about through very lax usage of ‘respect’. It is argued that by respecting persons whatever their values the potential conflict between liberty and equality can be resolved in a free society.     

Aesthetic Testimony: What Can We Learn from Others about Beauty and Art?1

The thesis that aesthetic testimony cannot provide aesthetic justification or knowledge is widely accepted–even by realists about aesthetic properties and values. This Kantian position is mistaken. Some testimony about beauty and artistic value can provide a degree of aesthetic justification and, perhaps, even knowledge. That is, there are cases in which one can be justified in making an aesthetic judgment purely on the basis of someone else's testimony. But widespread aesthetic unreliability creates a problem for much aesthetic testimony. Hence, most testimony about art does not have much epistemic value. The situation is somewhat different with respect to aesthetic testimony about nature, proofs, and theories. And yet he realizes clearly that other people's approval in no way provides him with a valid proof by which to judge beauty; even though others may perhaps see and observe for him, and even though what many have seen the same way may serve him, who believes he saw it differently, as a sufficient basis of proof for a theoretical and hence logical judgment, yet the fact that others have liked something can never serve him as a basis for an aesthetic judgment. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment     

Sartre, dialectic, and the problem of overcoming bad faith

InBeing and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre affirms a circle of relations between oneself and another. This circle moves between the relations of love and desire and results from the fact that both love and desire are attempts to capture the other who always remains out of reach. Sartre denies that there can be a dialectic of such relations with others: never can there be a motivated movement beyond the frustrations and failures of each of these attempts to relate to the other. The only way out of this circle is, therefore, according to Sartre, a radical conversion.Like the master in Hegel'sPhenomenology of Mind, each individual caught in this circle wants what cannot be attained: the assimilation or the negation of the freedom of the other. He is thus, like Hegel's master, impervious to any reasons that could count against what he is seeking; his failures cannot in any way motivate him to want what can be. From the point of view of such desires, any negative evaluation of these desires must seem arbitrary. Therefore, to the extent that Sartre's earlier writings indicate no other possibilities of human existence except those premised on such impossible demands, Sartre's negative evaluations concerning the bad faith of these individuals must seem arbitrary.My conclusion is not, however, simply negative since I argue that inSaint Genet Sartre presents Genet's life as a dialectical movement beyond failure to triumph. This is not a dialectic of bad faith. Rather it is a dialectic based on a very different desire from the desire for what cannot be. If Sartre thus develops another level, another fundamental desire, from which the level of bad faith can be judged to be wrong, then at least from this level the judgment is not a merely arbitrary one.For their many perceptive and helpful comments and suggestions, I am especially indebted and grateful to Dieter Turck and John Beverslius. A version of this paper is scheduled to be read at a workshop on Sartre during the 1975 meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.