A status-enhancement account of overconfidence

In explaining the prevalence of the overconfident belief that one is better than others, prior work has focused on the motive to maintain high self-esteem, abetted by biases in attention, memory, and cognition. An additional possibility is that overconfidence enhances the person's social status. We tested this status-enhancing account of overconfidence in 6 studies. Studies 1-3 found that overconfidence leads to higher social status in both short- and longer-term groups, using naturalistic and experimental designs. Study 4 applied a Brunswikian lens analysis (Brunswik, 1956) and found that overconfidence leads to a behavioral signature that makes the individual appear competent to others. Studies 5 and 6 measured and experimentally manipulated the desire for status and found that the status motive promotes overconfidence. Together, these studies suggest that people might so often believe they are better than others because it helps them achieve higher social status. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

When overconfidence is revealed to others: Testing the status-enhancement theory of overconfidence

The status-enhancement theory of overconfidence proposes that overconfidence pervades self-judgment because it helps people attain higher social status. Prior work has found that highly confident individuals attained higher status regardless of whether their confidence was justified by actual ability ( Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012). However, those initial findings were observed in contexts where individuals’ actual abilities were unlikely to be discovered by others. What happens to overconfident individuals when others learn how good they truly are at the task? If those individuals are penalized with status demotions, then the status costs might outweigh the status benefits of overconfidence – thereby casting doubt on the benefits of overconfidence. In three studies, we found that group members did not react negatively to individuals revealed as overconfident, and in fact still viewed them positively. Therefore, the status benefits of overconfidence outweighed any possible status costs, lending further support to the status-enhancement theory.     

Two methods of reducing overconfidence

Prior research has suggested that most people are seriously overconfident in their answers to general knowledge questions. We attempted to reduce over-confidence in each of two separate experiments. In Experiment 1 half of the subjects answered five practice questions which appeared to be difficult. The remaining subjects answered practice problems which appeared to be easy but were actually just as difficult as the other group's practice questions. Within each of these two groups, half of the subjects received feedback on the accuracy of their answers to the practice questions, while the other half received no feedback. All four groups then answered 30 additional questions and indicated their confidence in these answers. The group which had received five apparently “easy” practice questions and then had been given feedback on the accuracy of their answers was underconfident on the final 30 questions. In Experiment 2 subjects who anticipated a group discussion of their answers to general knowledge questions took longer to answer the questions and expressed less overconfidence in their answers than did a control group.     

Option fixation: A cognitive contributor to overconfidence

The ASC model of choice and confidence in general knowledge proposes that respondents first Assess the familiarity of presented options, and then use the high-familiarity option as a retrieval cue to Search memory for the purposes of Constructing an explanation about why that high-familiarity option is true. The ASC process implies that overconfidence results in part from a tendency to fixate on the high-familiarity option, to the neglect of the other option. If this implication is true, then judgment tasks requiring respondents to evaluate each option independently should result in reduced overconfidence as compared with standard judgment tasks. Two experiments tested this implication, and found that confidence and overconfidence were reduced when respondents evaluated options independently. The findings support the proposal that option fixation contributes to overconfidence, and also clarify the limitations of random error explanations of overconfidence.     

Integration of the ecological and error models of overconfidence using a multiple-trace memory model.

A memory processes account of the calibration of probability judgments was examined. A multiple-trace memory model, Minerva-Decision Making (MDM; M. R. P. Dougherty, C. F. Gettys, & E. E. Ogden, 1999), used to integrate the ecological (Brunswikian) and the error (Thurstonian) models of overconfidence, is described. The model predicts that overconfidence should decrease both as a function of experience and as a function of encoding quality. Both increased experience and improved encoding quality result in lower variance in the output of the model, which in turn leads to improved calibration. Three experiments confirmed these predictions. Implications of MDM's account of overconfidence are discussed.     

The affective costs of overconfidence

Positive illusions, though often beneficial (Taylor & Brown, 1988 ), can diminish the pleasure of outcomes. This prediction follows from decision affect theory. We investigated this prediction by measuring the confidence that recreational basketball players felt while making shots and the pleasure they felt with subsequent outcomes. Results showed that most players were overconfident. Those who were more overconfident tended to experience less enjoyment with their outcomes. Using individual parameter estimates from decision affect theory, we estimated how each player would have felt if their self assessments had been accurate. For the vast majority, better calibration would have led to greater pleasure. In a second study, we randomly assigned players to a debiasing treatment condition or a control condition. Relative to the control players, debiased players were better calibrated and derived greater average pleasure from the task. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The three faces of overconfidence

Overconfidence has been studied in 3 distinct ways. Overestimation is thinking that you are better than you are. Overplacement is the exaggerated belief that you are better than others. Overprecision is the excessive faith that you know the truth. These 3 forms of overconfidence manifest themselves under different conditions, have different causes, and have widely varying consequences. It is a mistake to treat them as if they were the same or to assume that they have the same psychological origins.     

True overconfidence: The inability of rational information processing to account for apparent overconfidence

The better-than-average effect describes the tendency of people to perceive their skills and virtues as being above average. We derive a new experimental paradigm to distinguish between two possible explanations for the effect, namely rational information processing and overconfidence. Experiment participants evaluate their relative position within the population by stating their complete belief distribution. This approach sidesteps recent methodology concerns associated with previous research. We find that people hold beliefs about their abilities in different domains and tasks which are inconsistent with rational information processing. Both on an aggregated and an individual level, they show considerable overplacement. We conclude that overconfidence is not only apparent overconfidence but rather the consequence of a psychological bias.     

A telepathic phenomenon

The phenomenon of telepathy in the treatment process is explained by reference to the subliminal theory of dreams of psychoanalysis and to certain aspects of experimental dream research. The author highlights certain derivable consequences regarding the interpretive process.     

A further study of the pendulum phenomenon

A first series of experiments had demonstrated certain conditions eliciting or inhibiting a “pendulum” phenomenon in the visual perception of apparent movement. The present study consists of five further variations designed to show more clearly conditions of occurrence and non-occurrence of this type of movement. The main findings are:

(i) Altering the axis of display to vertical significantly reduces the frequency of pendular-movement perception;

(2) Altering the position of metronome from behind to the side of the visual display, gives results almost identical with those where the metronome was inaudible, but, when the metronome is illuminated in this position, all forms of movement perception are reduced, and no pendular movement is reported.

The results for all the ten conditions, including the five of the first series are summarized, and the following possible factors are discussed: past experience, physiological nystagmus, and intervening adaptation. All three may be required to account for the perceptual phenomena under investigation and the dichotomizing of explanations into “experiential,” or “physiological,” appears to be arbitrary and inconsistent with the complexity of the observed facts.     

A simple and inexpensive click-free audio switch

This paper describes a click-free audio switch that functions by controlling the rate of onset and decay of a signal. The principle component of the switch is a device whose resistance is a function of the light intensity falling upon it. Circuit diagrams and suggested applications are provided.     

Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification

Synthese - In this article, I argue that access internalism should replace preservationism, which has been called “a received view” in the epistemology of memory, as the standard...     

A possible approach for discrimination between normal and pathological signals using the WFLC algorithm

The discrimination between normal and pathological tremor is difficult when amplitude is relatively small. The WFLC algorithm, a time domain adaptive Fourier transform, is designed to control physiological tremor and to improve precision during microsurgery. We added two iterative optimization processes to initialize the following parameters: initial frequency weight (omega0), amplitude adaptation rate (mu) and frequency adaptation rate (mu0). Then, we applied the methods on data sets recorded on patients with different tremors (control, parkinsonian, cerebellar, and essential) sampled at 200 Hz. After filtering the data, the WFLC algorithm tracked the time-varying dominant frequencies and amplitudes of the transformed data sets. Our results illustrate the potential of using this algorithm as an approach to discriminate between normal and pathological signals even when amplitude is not a significant discriminating factor.