Departing from Classical Logic: A Logical Analysis of Personal Construct Theory

This article draws a parallel between personal construct theory and intuitionistic logic i, in order to account for Kelly's claim to have departed from classical logic. Assuming that different theoretical paradigms correspond to different logical languages, it is argued that the constructivist paradigm is linked to intuitionism. Similarities between some key syntactic and semantic features of i logic and the underlying logic of Kelly's theory are made explicit. The strengths and limitations of such an approach are discussed in light of issues emerging from clinical observation and from the philosophy of science.     

A 21st-Century Personal Construct Psychology Upgrade

Cromwell's (2010) Being Human: Human Being. Manifesto for a New Psychology described many familiar elements of Kelly's (1955) Psychology of Personal Constructs. Cromwell regarded Kelly's theory as having a range of untapped implications, and he extended and elaborated many of these elements and links them to contemporary research in a variety of fields and subdomains. These extensions and elaborations might serve as a basis for maintaining the fundamental identity of personal construct psychology (PCP) while also modifying it in a manner that could enhance its contemporary relevance and effectiveness.     

The missing link: A reply to Joseph Rychlak

We oppose Rychlak's (1991a, 1991b) claim that the view of mind entailed in artificial intelligence (AD and cognitive psychology is fundamentally at odds with Kelly's (1955) personal construct theory. Kelly's model and Al have much in common: They both are centrally concerned with representation, cognitive processes and their structure, and are ultimately empirical in their methodology. Many Al researchers have usefully embraced personal construct theory as a working conceptual framework, in this article, we examine Rychlak's assertions and identify several mistakes.     

Emotion in Personal Construct Theory: A Controversial Question

George Kelly's personal construct theory (PCT) has been accused of disregarding the role of emotion in human life. This charge originates from a misunderstanding of PCT's basic assumptions. Kelly deals with experiences commonly called “emotional” in terms of dimensions of transition according to a genuinely constructivist epistemology. A review of the literature shows few elaborations of Kelly's original formulation of constructs relating to transitions, and even some contributions critical of Kelly's approach to emotions. This article rebuts the criticisms while making clear the epistemological and theoretical bases of Kelly's treatment of transitional experiences, its peculiarities, and its role in the diagnostic/therapeutic process.     

Personal Construct Theory and Cognitive Science

Abstract

Warren (1990) claims to have formulated an argument “that personal construct psychology is not a cognitive psychology” (p. 379). Nonetheless, he presents very little in the way of logical demonstration or empirical evidence to support this conclusion. Moreover, the theoretical significance of the question posed in the title of his essay (“Is Personal Construct Psychology a Cognitive Psychology?”) is far from obvious. He asserts that “what is at dispute here is the proper characterization of a position” however, his listing several textbooks that refer to Kelly's theory as a “cognitive” approach to the study of personality does nothing at all to either clarify the specific implications of this question or explain its importance. Interestingly, in a recent introductory personality text by one of Kelly's former students (Phares, 1988), this theory is designated as a “phenomenological approach,” which is consistent with Warren's own notion that “he [Kelly] was more phenomenological than he himself believed” Kelly vigorously resisted all such attempts to classify his model in terms of the usual textbook categories (cf. Adams-Webber & Mancuso, 1983).     

Standardized patients: A fixed-role therapy experience in normal individuals

Abstract

This article describes how standardized patients (SPs), people trained to portray a patient role in a consistent fashion, view their role-playing experiences. Focus groups with 37 SPs (63% participation rate) were used to explore what impact, if any, playing a number of fixed roles had on them and their lives. Personal insights and changes reported by SPs are examined in terms of personal construct theory. The implications of these findings for both teaching clinicians and for therapeutic work with clients are discussed. The findings illustrate continuing relevance of G. Kelly's (1955) observations about the usefulness of role-playing and enactment techniques.     

Kelly and the concept of developmental stages

Abstract

Although personal construct theory (PCT; Kelly, 1955) shares with developmental-stage theories an emphasis on process and qualitative change, the concept of developmental stages is incompatible with PCT in several ways. Building on biological analogies of maturation and evolution, developmental-stage theories posit an inevitability of content or structure in the occurrence of stages and a directionality of the developmental process toward extraspective (as opposed to introspective) definitions of psychological maturity. PCT, in contrast, lacks these features of inevitability and directionality. Kelly intended an introspective view of development based on personal choice, conceived in psychological rather than biological terms. Implications of the Choice, Fragmentation, Commonality, Dichotomy, Modulation, and Experience Corollaries for the concept of stages are discussed. Kelly's PCT is compared with the theories of Piaget, Kegan, and Erikson to illustrate these points.     

George Kelly and the Concept of Construction

Abstract

A distinction is drawn between a predicational and a mediational model. Predication involves the act of affirming, denying, or qualifying broader patterns of meaning in relation to narrower or targeted patterns of meaning. Mediation occurs when something formed outside a process is taken in and comes to play a role in that process that is not intrinsic to it. Fundamental to predication is the fact that meanings under processing are oppositional. George Kelly's theoretical understanding of construction was as a predicational process. The term construction is often confounded with these two views of cognition. Kelly's interpretation of construction is contrasted with the cognitive approach of Piaget and the social constructionist views of Harre and Gergen. It is demonstrated that Kelly's clearer understanding of construction as a predicational process enables him to lend the individual a capacity for personal agency that the other theories fail to capture     

Motivation in Personal Construct Theory: A Conceptual Critique

Kelly's attempt to derive apparently motiwtional phenomena (hostility, guilt, etc.) solely from the confirmation or disconfirmation of personal constructs cannot adequately explain such phenomena. His account of hostility assumes that some beliefs are so resistant to change that the person seeks to compel confirmation of them; however, this resistance is incompatible with Kelly's own Choice Corollary. Anxiety is said to derive from the fact that disconfirmation would leave one's world in chaos, but “chaos” is shown to be an illogical concept. Humor, in turn, cannot be explained just by cognitive incongruity, since incongruity may as well lead to anxiety or hostility. Finally, guilt cannot be explained without reference to underlying fears of punishment and their rationalization in terms of supposedly objective moral concepts. Nevertheless, Kelly's Repertory Grid technique, supplemented by laddering, may be useful in indicating primary needs, moral convictions, and sources of anxiety.     

Jean piaget and george kelly: Toward a stronger constructivism

Among constructivist metatheoretical approaches, a strong version is defined as that which reveals reality to be actively and subjectively constructed rather than passively incorporated as objective environmental or innate “facts” by the subject. Given this definition, however, ambiguities arise concerning the potential and limits of construct integration over the course of development. Piaget's stronger constructivist model is offered as a means of clarifying and broadening the strong constructivist position on knowledge evolution. Piaget's genetic epistemology model places dramatic emphasis on the organizational capacity of the subject, specifying personal development as a strongly continuous and subsuming process. Discussion of commonalities between Piaget's position and Kelly's personal construct theory concludes this article.     

The two faces of hostility: The implications of personal construct theory for understanding alienation

Although Kelly did not deal with alienation directly, the theory of personal constructs makes an important contribution to a comprehensive understanding of this complex phenomenon. By relating to specific functions of the individual, personal construct psychology explains how alienation is perpetuated by the very people who are its victims. In this article, 1 point out the link of PCT with the phenomenon of alienation that confirms the implicit presence of the social in the personal construction of reality. This elaboration provides an interpretation of Kelly's theory that escapes the limitations of radical individualism and enhances our understanding of sociocultural processes.     

Dewey Between the Lines: George Kelly and the Pragmatist Tradition

In his own somewhat sly and sardonic way, George Kelly always insisted that personal construct theory could not be assimilated into any other kind of psychology. We believe this was not an example of Kelly being difficult or protecting his turf, but that he resisted such efforts at categorization because he formulated personal construct psychology from an entirely different set of assumptions than those which have traditionally guided the construction of psychological theories. We begin by looking at the unusual life path Kelly took in order to enter the field of psychology and what it reveals about the independent turn of mind he brought to creating his own theory of personality. We then examine what we believe is the single most important influence on Kelly's thinking—the tradition of American pragmatism, in general, and the philosophy and psychology of John Dewey, in particular. We argue that Kelly embraced the pragmatic epistemological assumptions that guided Dewey's work, and that he used these assumptions to develop the only pragmatic theory of personality and psychotherapy. It is, in fact, the influence of Dewey and the pragmatists that makes personal construct psychology so different from and, at times, more difficult to understand than other, more traditional, “realist” theories, but it is also this pragmatic orientation that makes Kelly's theory such an important contribution.     

PERSONAL CONSTRUCT PSYCHOLOGY AND AUTISM

There has been no significant writing within personal construct psychology about autistic spectrum disorders, despite the fact that this approach provides promising models in a number of other specific areas of human difficulty. This article outlines a PCP model of autism, based on a wide variety of recent research findings and writings, including those of autism sufferers themselves. Autism is considered in the light of Kelly's fundamental postulate and 11 corollaries as well as Procter's (1978) group and family corollaries. It is argued that Kelly's theory provides an integrative framework for considering this complex set of disorders with implications for further research in autism and the early development of social cognition as well as for therapeutic and educational intervention in helping people struggling with autistic spectrum disorders.     

Psychotherapy*: ‐there: Sensing,hearing, understanding

Presented here is a careful examination of George Kelly's contributions to and differences from humanistic psychology and some of his more radical challenges to mainstream psychology in general. We begin by looking at the word constructive and how various definitions help us to understand what Kelly meant by a constructive understanding of the person. We then examine how truly different Kelly's basic assumptions are from those of traditional psychology. Finally, we examine how personal construct psychology is both similar to and different from traditional humanistic psychology. We conclude that, although there are some significant differences, Kelly's vision of life as an audacious adventure, and his emphasis on hope and on the future, make him very much a humanistic psychologist.     

Personal construct theory and the argument against mental illness

An attempt is made to integrate Thomas Szasz's 0974) theory of personal conduct and George Kelly's (1955) theory of personal constructs (PCT). It is argued that PCT provides an alternative to the void left behind by Szasz's negation of mental illness. Because PCT is concerned with psychological, rather than physiological, constructions of problems in living, it is not compatible with the biological model associated with Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) diagnostic categories. Rather, it is in keeping with the views of Szasz. Kelly's and Szasz's writings are used to support this view. Kelly's transitive diagnosis approach to “mental illness”, wherein diagnosis and therapy are construed as process oriented as opposed to category driven, is described as an alternative to the biological model. A contextualist approach (Sarbin & Mancuso, 1980) is also discussed. These approaches not only empower clients and allow them to assert responsibility and control over their lives, but also provide an alternative system to the one rejected by Szasz.     

THE EFFECT OF ELICITATION METHODS ON PERSONAL CONSTRUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND VALENCE

The effect of personal construct elicitation methods on construct content and structure was addressed in two studies. In Study 1, a between-subjects design was used to compare Kelly's (1955) original Triadic Difference method of elicitation with a Dyadic Opposite method. Study 2 used a fully-crossed, mixed factorial design to compare Kelly's (1955) Triadic Difference method with Epting, Suchman, and Nickeson's (1971) Triadic Opposite method. Results showed that "difference" methods of construct elicitation produced significantly higher levels of construct differentiation, lower numbers of positive emergent construct poles, and less socially undesirable implicit construct poles than "opposite" methods (see also Caputi & Reddy, in press). Implications of these findings are discussed in relation to a critical reappraisal of repertory grid methods.     

A Constructivist Approach to Defining Human Emotion: From George Kelly to Rue Cromwell

In Being Human: Human Being, Rue Cromwell proposed that scientific knowledge does not need to converge in order to progress and that embracing diversity of knowledge domains benefits researchers more than the quest for unification. Principles from Kelly's personal construct theory and Cromwell's book are used to suggest a more meta-theoretical approach to emotion research, as well as defining emotion, by explaining how (a) various theories of emotion are not necessarily in competition with one another, as one can view various theories of emotion as simply being different (and perhaps not similar enough to one another to be compared in a clear-cut fashion); and (b) one cannot definitively claim that one theory of emotion is the correct or best account of all of emotional life, without simultaneously ignoring the difficulties that arise when considering multiple theories (or alternative constructions) that rely on different fundamental assumptions. This second point draws on Cromwell's discussion of how “unity of knowledge” is an oxymoronic concept.     

Open-minded cognition: The attitude justification effect

Abstract

Although open-mindedness is generally valued, people are not equally open-minded in all situations. Open-mindedness is viewed as socially desirable when individuals encounter viewpoints that are compatible with conventional social norms. However, open-mindedness is viewed in less desirable terms when individuals encounter viewpoints that undermine these norms. The perceived desirability of open-mindedness is also influenced by the individual’s personal attitudinal convictions. Individuals ‘inflate’ the normative appropriateness of open-mindedness when it serves to reinforce their convictions, but devalue the normative appropriateness of open-mindedness when it serves to contradict these convictions. Conversely, normative prohibition of closed-mindedness is exaggerated when a closed-minded orientation threatens the individual’s personal attitudinal convictions, but is minimized (or reversed) when a closed-minded orientation reinforces these convictions. Paradoxically, the perceived appropriateness of open-mindedness is engendered (at least in part) by the motivation to confirm one’s prior attitudinal convictions. Evidence of this attitude justification effect is obtained in two experiments.     

The Heuristic Power Of Oppositionality In An Incidental-Memory Task: In Support Of The Construing Process

From a personal construct view, construing is a top-down process in which wider meanings predicate narrower, targeted meanings. Predicate contexts are invariably oppositional, as Kelly's (1955) theory reflects. Two memory experiments using college subjects are presented. Subjects were asked to focus on a series of 30 target words to determine if they were similar in meaning to a predicating word (e.g., friendly). Ten of these target words were relevant (e.g., congenial), 10 were opposite (e.g., impolite), and 10 were irrelevant (e.g., abstract) in meaning to the predicating word. Subjects were then (unexpectedly) asked to recall as many words as possible. In line with experimental instructions, the majority of these recalled words were relevant to the predicating word. However, as predicted, in both experiments significantly more opposite than irrelevant words were recalled (p < .001). The results are in support of a personal construct view of human cognition.