Finding and Correcting Flawed Research Literatures

Humanistic psychology has always viewed scientific psychology with skepticism. Good reasons for this skepticism continuously appear. One is then left with the choice, "Is a scientific approach to humans inherently wrongheaded?" or "Is scientific psychology an imperfect but improving enterprise?" This article reviews another domain where research in scientific psychology proves misleading. Suppose a psychologist was asked a question such as, "Is psychotherapy effective?" or "Is remote intercessory prayer effective?" or "Do humans possess psychic powers?" How might a psychologist reply? The most common strategy would be to conduct a meta-analysis over the relevant research literature and report the results. In all 3 cases (i.e., psychotherapy, efficacy of remote intercessory prayer, and telepathic powers) the answer would be a significant, positive effect size, suggesting that all 3 are real, efficacious phenomena. Unfortunately, in at least 2 of the 3 cases, the literature likely gives an incorrect answer to the question. How can one show that some literatures yield "incorrect" answers to research queries, whereas other literatures give "correct" answers? Finally, how should psychology's publication practices change to avoid flawed literatures?     

Locke and Hume on Belief, Judgment and Assent

Hume's account of belief has been much reviled, especially considered as an account of what it is to assent to or judge a proposition to be true. In fact, given that he thinks that thoughts about existence can be composed of a single idea, and that relations are just complex ideas, it might be wondered whether he has an account of judgment at all. Nonetheless, Hume was extremely proud of his account of belief, discussing it at length in the Abstract, and developing it in the Appendix. Furthermore, he claimed several times that his account was new. It was not just a new answer to an old question, but an answer to a new question as well. Why did Hume think he was raising, and answering, a new question? Is his answer really so appalling? Why did he define belief in terms of a relationship with a present impression? In this paper, I propose answers to these questions. The answers emerge by contrasting Hume with Locke. Locke thought that belief was a pale imitation of knowledge, and that the assent we give to propositions is constituted in the very same act as forming those propositions. Hume saw the problems such a theory faced concerning existential beliefs. By ceasing to treat existence as a predicate, Hume was confronted with the issue of what it was to judge something to be true, or to assent to something. This issue had to be solved independently of the question of what it was to conceive something, or understand the content of a proposition. Hume thought this problem was new. He should be looked at, not as giving a bad answer to an important question, but rather as being the first in the early modern period to recognize that there was an important question here to be answered.     

Two questions about surrogacy and exploitation

In this article I will consider two related questions about surrogacy and exploitation: (1) Is surrogacy exploitative? (2) If surrogacy is exploitative, what is the moral force of this exploitation? Briefly stated, I shall argue that whether surrogacy is exploitative depends on whether exploitation must be harmful to the exploited party or whether (as I think) there can be mutually advantageous exploitation. It also depends on some facts about surrogacy about which we have little reliable evidence and on our philosophical view on what counts as a harm to the surrogate. Our answer to the second question will turn in part on the account of exploitation we invoke in answering the first question and in part on the way in which we resolve some other questions about the justification of state interference. I shall suggest, however, that if surrogacy is a form of voluntary and mutually advantageous exploitation, then there is a strong presumption that surrogacy contracts should be permitted and even enforceable, although that presumption may be overridden on other grounds.     

I—Liberty's Chains

Is the principal concern of political philosophy the source of political authority? And, if so, can this source be located in individual consent? In this article I draw on Rousseau to answer the second question negatively; and in rejecting that answer, why we might answer the first question in the negative as well. We should be concerned with questions of legitimacy rather than with the source of authority and political obligation. Our principal concern, that is, should be with the question how well political institutions meet the needs of individuals. I pursue these issues in the context of interpreting Rousseau's distinctive contribution to political thought. I start out by asking the question 'What problem is the General Will designed to solve?' I argue that Rousseau's challenge to Hobbes represents a crucial step in the move from the source of authority and political obligation to a focus on legitimacy.     

The sociocultural movement in psychology,the role of theories in sociocultural inquiries,and the theory of sociocultural models

This special issue presents the theory of sociocultural models (TSCM) and its applications in diverse areas of psychology, including education, health care, clinical practice, gender relations, and general research. As many theories already exist in the social sciences, some readers may ask: “Why do cross‐cultural, cultural, and indigenous psychologists need another theory?” This question is comprised of two aspects: culture/cultural and theory/theoretical. Therefore, to answer it, it is important to clarify both issues. The first relates to cultural and its relation to psychological. The second, theory, considers its relation to cultural and psychological. These issues have long‐range implications for all culture and psychology disciplines as they pose many questions: What role does culture play in the mental functioning of people? How is culture constituted? Is cultural related to social? Does people’s mental functioning exert reciprocal influences on their cultural and social functioning? While working toward answering these questions, researchers quickly determine that more questions arise: What role should theories play in answering these questions? What constitutes theory in culture and psychology disciplines? How should such a theory (or such theories) address the triad of cultural, social, and mental? Consequently, in an effort to provide an overview of the TSCM and to begin to answer these questions, this introduction consists of two parts. The first part addresses the sociocultural turn in modern psychology; this part discusses its implications for research in culture and psychology disciplines. The second segment examines the topic of the theoretical backgrounds of cultural and cross‐cultural research and connects the philosophical paradigms of interpretivism and realism with the theory of sociocultural models. This introduction concludes with a brief overview of the articles included in this issue.     

Intuitions for inferences

In this paper, I explore a question about deductive reasoning: why am I in a position to immediately infer some deductive consequences of what I know, but not others? I show why the question cannot be answered in the most natural ways of answering it, in particular in Descartes’s way of answering it. I then go on to introduce a new approach to answering the question, an approach inspired by Hume’s view of inductive reasoning.     

Violence and Selfhood

Is violence senseless or is it at the origin of sense? Does its destruction of meaning disclose ourselves as the origin of meaning? Or is it the case that it leaves in its wake only a barren field? Does it result in renewal or only in a sense of dead loss? To answer these questions, I shall look at James Dodd’s, Hegel’s, and Carl Schmitt’s accounts of the creative power of violence—particularly with regard to its ability to give individuals and groups their sense of self-identity. I shall also follow up on Peg Birmingham’s suggestion that Socrates’ defense at his trial points to an alternate source of our self-identity—one that is ultimately less barren.     

Sex stereotypes and implicit personality theory: Toward a cognitive—Social psychological conceptualization

Progress in understanding sex stereotypes has been impeded by the failure of researchers to address two critical conceptual questions: What is a sex stereotype? How do sex stereotypes function in social cognition and behavior? As a step toward answering the first question, the meaning of the term “sex stereotype” was considered. On the basis of points of agreement among extant conceptual definitions of the construct “stereotype” (in both the female-male and ethnic relations literatures), a generic definition of “sex stereotypes” is proposed: the structured sets of beliefs about the personal attributes of women and of men. In order to relate sex stereotypes more closely to research and theory on “normal” psychological processes, this basic definition is recast in terms of the person perception construct, “implicit personality theory”: the structured sets of inferential relations that link personal attributes to the social categories female and male. Two studies are presented to illustrate the utility of this translation. The remainder of the article addresses the second question. Here we offer preliminary ideas regarding a more general cognitive—social psychological framework for the study of sex stereotypes. Stereotype and stereotyping are distinguished, and each is discussed in light of relevant research in cognitive and social psychology.     

Moral responsibility and agents’ histories

To what extent should an analysis of an agent’s being morally responsible for an action that he performed—especially a compatibilist analysis of this—be sensitive to the agent’s history? In this article, I give the issue a clearer focus than it tends to have in the literature, I lay some groundwork for an attempt to answer the question, and I motivate a partial but detailed answer.     

Narrative Quests and Social Change

In this response to Christian Smith's What Is a Person?, I raise questions about his conception of the human life as a narrative quest and his account of change in social structures and institutions. The metaphor of life as a quest suggests a solid, isolated, and integrated moral agent. I wonder whether the experiences of most moral agents render a different picture—one where life is fragmented and characterized by complex webs of relationships. Smith provides a detailed account of how social institutions change. I pose examples of more subtle and complex types of change as a way to press him to think about whether his account of change is too linear.     

Brain transplants and possible worlds: A response to Beck

I am very grateful to Simon Beck for his thoughtful response to my paper “Transplanting Brains?” (2016). Needless to say, he raises more issues than I can hope to answer in a brief response. While Beck seemingly feels that the deck has been stacked against him, I think that the majority of his criticisms result from misconceptions and misunderstandings that I intend to straighten out in what follows. Before proceeding, I would like to draw attention to a worry that is lurking in the shadows. Perhaps Beck and I talk at cross purposes. While Beck is concerned with a metaphysical theory of personal identity that supposedly holds across all possible worlds—and as such places heavy importance on counterfactuals and intuitions—I am concerned only with the natural world with the aim of generating empirically substantiated hypotheses about how things really are when it comes to persons persisting through time. Now, here is a disclaimer: If the natural world does not exhaust reality, then my discussion is only partial. It goes without saying that most contemporary philosophers given a choice between going with science and going with intuitions, go with science.     

The artful dodger: answering the wrong question the right way

What happens when speakers try to "dodge" a question they would rather not answer by answering a different question? In 4 studies, we show that listeners can fail to detect dodges when speakers answer similar-but objectively incorrect-questions (the "artful dodge"), a detection failure that goes hand-in-hand with a failure to rate dodgers more negatively. We propose that dodges go undetected because listeners' attention is not usually directed toward a goal of dodge detection (i.e., Is this person answering the question?) but rather toward a goal of social evaluation (i.e., Do I like this person?). Listeners were not blind to all dodge attempts, however. Dodge detection increased when listeners' attention was diverted from social goals toward determining the relevance of the speaker's answers (Study 1), when speakers answered a question egregiously dissimilar to the one asked (Study 2), and when listeners' attention was directed to the question asked by keeping it visible during speakers' answers (Study 4). We also examined the interpersonal consequences of dodge attempts: When listeners were guided to detect dodges, they rated speakers more negatively (Study 2), and listeners rated speakers who answered a similar question in a fluent manner more positively than speakers who answered the actual question but disfluently (Study 3). These results add to the literatures on both Gricean conversational norms and goal-directed attention. We discuss the practical implications of our findings in the contexts of interpersonal communication and public debates.     

Rethinking the presumption of atheism

Is there—or rather, ought there to be—a presumption of atheism, as Antony Flew (1923–2010) so famously argued nearly half a century ago? It is time to revisit this issue. After clarifying the concept of a presumption of atheism (which includes clarifying the concept of a presumption), I take up the evaluative question of whether there ought to be a presumption of atheism, focusing on Flew’s arguments for an affirmative answer. I conclude that Flew’s arguments, one of which rests on an analogy with the (legal) presumption of innocence, fail.     

The generation effect extended: Memory enhancement for generation cues

The generation effect is the greater memorability of a response that is actively produced (e.g., in answering a question from memory) than one that is more passively produced (as in reading the answer). The present three experiments addressed a question that is critical to the theoretical interpretation of the generation effect: Is memory enhanced for the cues that are used to elicit generated responses? Using incidental learning procedures, Experiments 1 and 2 gave an affirmative answer (although the effect was substantially weaker than the generation effect for responses). Enhancement of memory for generation cues was observed both in a within-subject/within-list design (reading and generation items within the same trial blocks; Experiment 1) and in a between-subjects design (reading and generation tasks for different groups of subjects; Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, memory enhancement for generation cues was used to produce a previously unobtained result—a generation effect for nonsense responses under incidental learning conditions. These findings provide critical evidence required by theories that interpret the generation effect in terms of enhanced processing of the cue-response item.     

Practical Perception and Intelligent Action

Perceiving things to be a certain way may in some cases lead directly to action that is intelligent (e.g., skillful, wise, clever, astute). This phenomenon has not often been discussed, though it is of broad philosophical interest. It also raises a difficult question: how can perception produce intelligent action? After clarifying the question—which I call the question of “practical perception”—and explaining what is required for an adequate answer, I critically examine two candidate answers drawn from work on related topics: the first, inspired by Hubert Dreyfus's phenomenological analysis of absorbed coping (and of a piece with James Gibson's theory of affordances), focuses on awareness of situational features; the other, suggested by Gilbert Ryle's classic treatment of knowledge‐how, focuses on possession of behavioral dispositions. I argue that neither approach is adequate. Subsequently, I develop and defend an alternative answer that emphasizes the agent's conceptual understanding.     

The Inaugural Address: Perception and Metaphysical Scepticism

In this paper I introduce and critically examine a paradox about perceiving that is in some ways analogous to the paradox about meaning which Kripke puts forward in his exegesis of Wittgenstein's views on Rule-following.
When applied to vision, the paradox of perceiving raises a metaphysical scepticism about which object a person is seeing if he looks, for example, at an apple on a tree directly in front of him. Physical objects can be seen when their appearance is distorted in various ways by illusions. The question therefore arises as to how can we answer the sceptic who suggests the following: although the viewer appears to be seeing the green apple in front of him, he is actually suffering a bizarre illusion of a blue car situated somewhere behind him. The sceptic is not concerned with epistemic problems about how we know which object, if any, the subject is seeing; the sceptic is raising the more fundamental question: what fact of the matter underlies a person's perceptual relation to the physical world, in virtue of which that person may be justified in arriving at a perceptual belief about the environment?
Among the various different issues raised by the sceptic, I focus on the question: what determines the perceiving relation? I canvass a number of possible proposals in answer to it, concentrating mainly on two opposed accounts: the Disjunctive View and the Causal Theory of Perception. I argue in particular for the following two claims:
that the paradox highlights the fact that the Disjunctive View fails to provide a coherent positive account of what perceiving is.
that the problem of 'deviant causal chains', often thought to raise particular difficulties for the Causal theorist, can also be raised against other accounts of perception, including versions of the Disjunctive View.
I conclude that unless the Causal Theory of Perception can be upheld, there will be no way of answering the sceptic.     

Free Will and Therapeutic Change

Much of psychology has minimized, or disregarded, the notion of free will. However, it remains a critical construct in most theories of behavioral and religious change. This paper briefly examines the free will/determinism debate and the construct of free will from the perspective of postmodern/narrative psychology, as well as integrating recent developments in the field of cognitive neuroscience. Finally, the implications of this analysis on personal responsibility in pastoral psychology are discussed.     

Minima sensibilia: Against the dynamic snapshot model of temporal experience

In our wakeful conscious lives, the experience of time and dynamic temporal phenomena—such as continuous motion and change—appears to be ubiquitous. How is it that temporality is woven into our conscious experience? Is it through perceptual experience presenting a series of instantaneous states of the world, which combine together—in a sense which would need to be specified—to give us experience of dynamic temporal phenomena? In this paper, I argue that this is not the case. Several authors have recently proposed dynamic snapshot models of temporal experience—such as Prosser and Arstila, building upon Le Poidevin—according to which, perceptual experience has no temporal content of a non‐zero extent. I argue that there is an absence of motivation for such a view; I develop and defend the claim that perceptual experience minimally presents something of some non‐zero temporal extent as such.     

Toward a general theory of persons.

The fundamental question I consider is the following: What is it that makes one thing a person and another thing not? I do not provide a complete answer; rather I begin to develop a framework for answering the question. In this essay I do the following: (1) distinguish between the powers possessed by persons and the constitutions of persons, and propose some metaphysical conjectures concerning the relationship between persons' powers and their constitutions; (2) propose for Christians, as well as for others, an hylomorphic soul-body alternative to Cartesianism; (3) highlight some prominent differences between the nature of human persons to problems in biomedical ethics concerning the ontological and moral status of human embryos and of the comatose.