The singularity of the cinematic object

In order to avoid the reduction of desire to demand and to produce a theory in keeping with the insights of psychoanalysis, Lacan had to move beyond Hegel’s theorization based on recognition. To do so, Lacan had to come up with a new form of object, an object irreducible to the signifier but with the power to arouse the desire of the subject. The theorization of the objet a enables Lacan to make an important advance on Hegel’s theory of desire, an advance that effectively reverses the priority that Hegel establishes between the object and the Other. Despite the widespread association of Lacan with the signifier and its laws, his one great theoretical breakthrough concerns what remains absolutely irreducible to signification. My central contention in this essay is that Lacan’s theory of desire allows us to understand how singularity appears in the cinema, despite the medium’s inherent resistance to it. I examine this appearance of singularity through two filmic occasions—Sergei Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin and Michael Mann’s Heat. It is a medium in which recognition predominates, and yet the singularity of the objet a nonetheless emerges and animates the desire of the spectator.     

“The object in the mirror of genetic transcendentalism: Lacan’s objet petit a between visibility and invisibility,”

One of the more superficially perplexing features of Lacan’s notion of objet petit a is the fact that he simultaneously characterizes it as both non-specularizable (i.e., incapable of being captured in spatio-temporal representations) and specular (i.e., incarnated in visible avatars). This assignment of the apparently contradictory attributes of visibility and invisibility to object a is a reflection of this object’s strange position at the intersection of transcendental and empirical dimensions. Indeed, this object, which Lacan holds up as his central psychoanalytic discovery, raises important philosophical questions about the transcendental-empirical distinction, arguably short-circuiting in interesting, productive ways this dichotomy and many of its permutations. This article seeks to achieve two aims: one, to clarify how and why Lacan situates object a between the specular and the non-specular; and, two, to extract from the results of this clarification a preliminary sketch of a post-Lacanian transcendentalism that is also thoroughly materialist.     

Desire and the Good in Plotinus

Plotinus calls the first principle the One and the Good. According to Plotinus, ‘Good’ is an appropriate name for the One because the One is that which all things desire. Since he says that the One is beyond knowledge, beyond language, beyond intellect, and beyond being, however, what philosophical evidence can he provide for his claim that the One is that which all desire? In this article I offer some philosophical evidence, aside from mystical union with the One, for why ‘the Good’ is an appropriate name for the One, and for why calling the One ‘Good’ is not at odds with the fact that it is beyond knowledge, but rather entails it. To this end, after an initial consideration of the relationship between the good and desire in Plato and Aristotle, I focus on the role that desire plays in relation to the Good in Plotinus' thought.     

Habermas, Pupil Voice, Rationalism, and Their Meeting with Lacan’s Objet Petit A

‘Pupil voice’ is a movement within state education in England that is associated with democracy, change, participation and the raising of educational standards. While receiving much attention from educators and policy makers, less attention has been paid to the theory behind the concept of pupil voice. An obvious point of theoretical departure is the work of Jürgen Habermas, who over a number of decades has endeavoured to develop a theory of democracy that places strong significance on language, communication and discourse. This paper is an attempt to gauge the usefulness of Habermas’ approach to understanding the theory of pupil voice, in particular how his theory of universal pragmatics lends itself to a ‘philosophy of between’, a philosophy that finds echoes in the conflicted nature of schooling that ‘pupil voice’ is supposed to rectify to some extent. The paper also explores the drawbacks of a Habermasian approach, in particular his overreliance on rationality as a way of understanding communication. Lacan’s concept of the objet petit a is introduced as an alternative way of understanding pupil voice.     

The lost cause of mourning

This paper examines the evolution of Jacques Lacan’s concept of mourning from his treatment of Hamlet in Seminar 6, “Desire and Its Interpretation,” to its transformation in the tenth Seminar on “Anxiety.” It is a transformation that occurs in tandem with Lacan’s reconception of anxiety as lack of the lack and his reshaped conception of the objet a as object/cause of desire. The key point is the way that Lacan’s renovated conception upends the common sense notion of mourning, that which assumes that suffering the death of a loved one means accommodating oneself to an absence where there was previously a presence. On the contrary, says Lacan, part of what is most deeply to be mourned is the lack in the Other around which the love relation was constructed. The paper concludes by asking to what extent Lacan’s account of mourning should be distinguished from those of both Hegel and Freud.     

Unusual course of a status epilepticus. (Case contribution to the problem of "interparoxysmal petit-mal-status")]

This is a record of a strange course of the petit mal status which persisted for almost four days following a series of grands maux. During the status, it was possible to observe in electroencephalogram a 2-2.5/sec and, finally, 2.5-3.5/sec spike and wave pattern which could be interrupted after the administration of 100 mg of diazepam. In contrast with the normally observed twilight state, this particular course of the petit mal status ("interparoxysmal petit mal status") is characterized by a marked disturbance of consciousness. There was no response to an intravenous administration of 750 mg of diphenylhydantoin.     

Genesis and profanation of the other world: The interpretation of dreams

This paper addresses Nietzsche's reflections on the phenomenon of dreams as a crucial precedent of Freud's Die Traumdeutung. The works of Nietzsche and Freud are scrutinized to establish and compare the most relevant aspects of their understanding of dreams. The philosophical impact of both accounts is assessed in terms of the transvaluation of religious and metaphysical values, which reveals three epistemological shifts: the replacement of Metaphysics by History/Genealogy (Nietzsche) and by Metapsychology (Freud), and the expansion of rationality beyond the limits of consciousness (Nietzsche and Freud). Both authors are shown to consider dreams as figurative expressions of a postponed desire – or, more specifically, as the imaginary fulfillment (compensation) and the evocation/awakening of desire. As captured by the phrase “Memento libidines”, dreams are portrayed in both accounts as the guardians of sleep and desire. Finally, and in contrast with Assoun, a new interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is proposed, as an interpretation of the prophet's dreams reveals the presence of individual desire within the Nietzschean understanding of the phenomenon.     

Casuistic contribution to the differential diagnosis of the myoclonic syndrome]

Involuntary muscle twitches, which are accompanied by a more or less pronounced effect of motion and which may last for several hours, are a common guiding symptom of a number of neurological syndromes. This paper reports the case of a 24-year-old male who had been suffering since his sixth year from episodic muscular spasms accompanied by attacks of petit mal. These are regarded as representing a myoclonic-epileptic syndrome. In this connection, a distinction has to be made, by differential diagnosis, between the "true" myoclonic syndrome which is characterized by the absence of complications due to attacks of grand mal or petit mal, Kojewnikoff's epilepsy, and the myoclonic-epileptic dementia form of syndrome.     

Convenience in Criminal Entrepreneurship: The Case of a Norwegian Hashish Baron

The intent of this article is to study a case of criminal entrepreneurship, which reflects the key attributes of convenience theory in order to test that theory. The intent is also to show that the theory of convenience can be extended beyond white-collar crime to include criminal entrepreneurship. The theory of convenience is introduced in this article to explain why criminal entrepreneurship can be an attractive avenue for some people. Convenience theory suggests that a strong desire for financial gain to satisfy greed and solve problems, an attractive organizational opportunity to commit and conceal crime, as well as a personal willingness for deviant behavior can make criminal entrepreneurship attractive. The case of a Norwegian hashish baron illustrates convenience theory by the person’s ability to stay in the illegal drug business for two decades as a white-collar criminal.     

Alief and Explanation

This article critiques the much‐discussed notion of alief recently introduced by Tamar Gendler. The narrow goal is to show that the notion is explanatorily unnecessary; the broader goal is to demonstrate the importance of making explicit one's explanatory framework when offering a philosophical account of the mind. After introducing the concept of alief and the examples Gendler characterizes in terms of it, the article examines the explanatory framework within which appeal to such a concept can seem necessary. This framework, it argues, is a generalization of the belief‐desire account of action. Although Gendler introduces the notion of alief in an attempt to move beyond the belief‐desire account, it argues that she nevertheless works within a generalized version of its explanatory structure. Once the framework is made explicit, we find no explanatory need that requires introducing the notion of alief into our account of the mind.     

Psychiatry,language and freedom

For political reasons, the social control functions of psychiatry are not openly recognized as such but are disguised as benevolent medical treatment. The roots of this disguise may be traced to the political revolutions in which the rule of man was replaced by the rule of law. This transformation generated a conflict between the desire for freedom under law and the desire for a greater degree of social control than is provided by law. Involuntary mental hospitalization is the neurotic resolution of this conflict by society. The social control functions of psychiatry are disguised and justified by the medical model which describes the moral action of both psychiatrist and patient in the ostensibly value neutral language of science and medicine. The cost of this disguise is great. It negates individuals as moral agents and obscures the moral nature of the problems that psychiatrists seek to understand which, in turn, handicaps them in helping the persons they seek to assist. The task of the philosopher in this situation is honestly and critically to analyze and evaluate psychiatric language, psychiatric practices and the moral issues involved.     

Four seasons in femininity orfour men in a woman's life

Conclusion The feminine complaint that Alex's passion echoes, raising it to a level rarely attained, is not limited to the pursuit of sexualjouissance. Nor can it be reduced to an aversion on the part of women to a morality of the signifier, as maintained by a certain reading of Freud. Very precisely, the persistent note in feminine restlessness is a certain relationship of the subject to the insufficiency of the signifier, which the quest for love registers. The fact that language lacks the very quality that would make it credible and that would guarantee that discourse corresponds to what desire attests to is what delivers femininity over to the unnameable. In love she requires from the other member of the social bond the signifier that is lacking within the structure of femininity and that causes the call tojouissance in her body that drives her to distraction. Thus, the structure at stake in femininity, to which Alex's hysterical passion bears witness, defines in writing, that is, by a mark left on the body, the limitation of the reality of ajouissance which persists beyond the signifier and the object of the fantasy. When the analyst's desire offers support to this quest for a limit tojouissance on the part of a subject, it is in desire that the reality of sex and the other is linked to the signifier that would testify to the truth of the amorous discourse in the unconscious. Thus from one man to another, from the love of the father to the loss of a son, including the desire of the lover and the law of the husband, a woman finds herself supporting, with the letter of her body, the signifier which in its words testifies tojouissance as a place to lose oneself.     

Act with authority: Romantic desire at the nexus of power possessed and power perceived

The social psychological literature and the evolutionary literature on power suggest different routes by which power might inspire romantic desire: the former highlights the appealing actions of the powerful, whereas the latter demonstrates that people desire powerful individuals upon learning of those individuals' powerful status. We predicted that, in an initial face-to-face interaction, both elements must align for the powerful to inspire romantic desire. In a live mixed-sex interaction, participants experienced the most romantic desire for an opposite-sex target who (a) actually possessed power and (b) was perceived by the participant to possess power. This interaction was mediated by observable behavior—the extent to which the target controlled the conversation and was given legitimacy by the group—indicating that the powerful do not behave powerfully around unaccommodating subordinates. Power manipulations implemented in only one person's mind may not approximate how power functions in real social interactions.     

A Rightness-Based Theory of Communicative Propriety

We express and communicate many attitudes beyond belief, such as amusement, joy, admiration, hatred, and desire. I consider whether there are any general norms that would cover all of these cases. The most obvious generalisation of the most popular norms for assertion, fittingness-based theories, fail in part because it is sometimes an intrinsic good to have certain kinds of mental states (amusement, say). I develop an alternative, rightness-based, approach, according to which it is appropriate to communicate a mental state to an interlocutor when it is right to make the interlocutor have that mental state because of the speech act. This view arises naturally from conversational participants’ common interests, and it helps to make sense of linguistic phenomena like expressives.     

Sartre, dialectic, and the problem of overcoming bad faith

InBeing and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre affirms a circle of relations between oneself and another. This circle moves between the relations of love and desire and results from the fact that both love and desire are attempts to capture the other who always remains out of reach. Sartre denies that there can be a dialectic of such relations with others: never can there be a motivated movement beyond the frustrations and failures of each of these attempts to relate to the other. The only way out of this circle is, therefore, according to Sartre, a radical conversion.Like the master in Hegel'sPhenomenology of Mind, each individual caught in this circle wants what cannot be attained: the assimilation or the negation of the freedom of the other. He is thus, like Hegel's master, impervious to any reasons that could count against what he is seeking; his failures cannot in any way motivate him to want what can be. From the point of view of such desires, any negative evaluation of these desires must seem arbitrary. Therefore, to the extent that Sartre's earlier writings indicate no other possibilities of human existence except those premised on such impossible demands, Sartre's negative evaluations concerning the bad faith of these individuals must seem arbitrary.My conclusion is not, however, simply negative since I argue that inSaint Genet Sartre presents Genet's life as a dialectical movement beyond failure to triumph. This is not a dialectic of bad faith. Rather it is a dialectic based on a very different desire from the desire for what cannot be. If Sartre thus develops another level, another fundamental desire, from which the level of bad faith can be judged to be wrong, then at least from this level the judgment is not a merely arbitrary one.For their many perceptive and helpful comments and suggestions, I am especially indebted and grateful to Dieter Turck and John Beverslius. A version of this paper is scheduled to be read at a workshop on Sartre during the 1975 meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.     

Sex and shame: the inhibition of female desires

A developmental narrative is presented that centers on bodily based narcissistic injury and sense of shame in response to unrequited oedipal longings. Through an experience of oedipal defeat in relation to both mother and father, a female sense of inadequacy and shame may be internalized and accepted as one's identity, in contrast to the male phallic-omnipotent trajectory. The demise of genital narcissism in females can underlie various expressions of pervasive inhibition and failure to actualize desire. The thesis offered goes beyond separation-individuation theory in suggesting that girls may inhibit sexuality and aggression, and themselves more generally, due to a representation of self as "not having what it takes" genitally, and then bodily and psychically. Mental representations of the self, based on positive imagery of the female body, are needed to give voice to a woman's bodily experience and sexual desire and agency in various realms. Two clinical vignettes illustrate female inhibitions in sexuality and in professional ambition as understood within the framework presented.     

“The Lost Foundation”: Kristeva's Semiotic Chora and Its Ambiguous Legacy

The aim of this essay is to reclaim Kristeva's concept of the semiotic chora by re‐inscribing it as an intervention in the context of two important postmodern debates. The first debate relates to the philosophical problem of “the beginning before the Beginning.” The second concerns the necessity and possibility of mediation between incommensurable entities: the “demonic” and the social, desire and the Law, material production and representation. I contend: (1) that the introduction of the chora in RPL is part of Kristeva's effort to restore the legacy of a materialist economy of the beginning, as this is glimpsed in Plato's Timaeus from which Kristeva borrows her controversial term; and (2) that the chora constitutes an attempt on Kristeva's part to explore a third space of ambiguous relationality in the context of which our transcendence to the “demonic” lies less “beyond us” than “in‐between.”     

Precautionary principle and normativity: brief remarks on the complex relationship between law and the risks

The precautionary principle is objet of an intense discussion in different legal orders. It is easy to understand the reason why: the regulation of risks challenges the legal thought. The positivist approach has shown its limits. It is now important to ask ourselves about the way in which we can deal with uncertainty effectively. The task is difficult, but we can point out two different aspects. Firstly, it is important to understand the complexity of the technological risks in a transdisciplinary way. This is an unavoidable step in evaluating the ability of the law to prevent them. Secondly, the precautionary principle presupposes a pluralistic conception of nature in which the economic sphere can be seen as a tool to express the relationship between man and nature.     

Reciprocating Desires: The Pursuit of Desirable East Asian Femininity in China’s Commercial Sex Industry

ABSTRACT

This article examines how socioeconomic conditions impact heteronormative sexual desires between high-tier sex workers and their non-Chinese clients in urban South China. Drawing from Hoang’s interpretation of ‘dealing in desires’, Rofel’s ‘Desiring China’, and cultural capital, the article considers how desire circulates in high-end bars and its impact on how workers and clients negotiate their relationships. I move beyond Hoang’s and Rofel’s framework to include cultural capital that help sex workers perform an East Asia femininity and develop their image as cosmopolitan tempting girls to practice ‘reciprocating desires’ with their non-Chinese clients. The article unfolds as a theoretical exercise in unearthing and understanding the underpinnings of how socioeconomic context impacts our understanding of what qualifies as desirable East Asian femininity. Drawing upon ethnographic research conducted in a high-end bar in South China from the summer of 2015 to the summer of 2017, this article first examines desire and the meanings attached to sex workers’ body capital, and cultural capital that exemplify desirable East Asian femininity. Second, cultural capital explains how desire operates within high-tier heteronormative sex work spaces to construct social identity, which can help sex workers achieve professional success and become a source of personal satisfaction.