Pictorial context and the recall of pronoun sentences

Summary Acting on the assumption that pictures affect the processing of sentences only when providing additional information, the authors used pictures, which in an earlier experiment had failed to influence the retention of noun sentences, as illustrations to semantically undefined pronoun sentences, thus establishing a distinct information gradient between sentence and picture. These pronoun sentences were presented to 48 subjects for recall, in four pictorial conditions: without picture, with unambiguous picture, with subject-ambiguous, and with object-ambiguous picture. As hypothesized, picture-less pronoun sentences were more poorly recalled than picture-enriched pronoun sentences. Moreover, sentences accompanied by subject-ambiguous pictures, in which the grammatical subject could not be clearly identified, scored lower than the same sentences with unambiguous or object-ambiguous pictures. The findings invite a communication-theory analysis of the experimental situation, for which Searle's theory of speech acts is invoked.The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. B. Jankowski in the translation of this paper from an original German version.     

Pictorial encoding reduces false recognition of semantic associates

High levels of false recognition can be observed after people study lists of semantic associates that all converge on a nonpresented lure word. To test the idea that encoding distinctive perceptual information would help to reduce false recognition, we presented a line drawing representing each associated word during study list presentation and later tested recognition of studied words and lure words. Two experiments revealed marked reductions in false recognition after pictorial encoding, relative after to word encoding. Results suggest that people reject related and unrelated lures because these items lack the distinctive qualities associated with remembered pictures.     

Pictorial and verbal encoding in a short-term memory task

The present research attempted to manipulate the encoding modality, pictorial or verbal, of schematic faces with well-learned names by manipulating S’s expectations of the way the material was to be used. On every trial, a single name or face was presented, followed by another one; the S was asked to respond “same” if the stimuli had the same name, and “different” otherwise. The majority of second stimuli of any session was either names or faces. It was hypothesized that if S had encoded the first stimulus in the modality of the second, his judgment would be faster than if he had not appropriately encoded the first stimulus. Significantly slower reaction times were obtained to stimulus pairs where the second stimulus modality was infrequent. Further evidence that encoding of the first stimulus was in the frequent second stimulus modality comes from the finding that “different” responses were shorter when the stimuli differed on more than one attribute in the encoding (second stimulus) modality, regardless of the modality of the stimuli. Thus, evidence is presented that not only can verbal material be pictorially encoded (and vice versa), but that whether either verbal or pictorial material is verbally or pictorially encoded depends on S’s anticipation of what he is to do with the material.     

Metamemorial influences in recognition memory: Pictorial encoding reduces conjunction errors

Two experiments are presented that explore the role of the distinctiveness heuristic (e.g., Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999) on rates of conjunction errors as a function of encoding condition. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate a reliable reduction of conjunction errors when participants study pictures relative to both reading words aloud and silently. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the nature of the pictures presented during the study phase is important for reducing conjunction errors. Collectively, the experiments demonstrate that participants can use the distinctiveness heuristic in addition to recall-to-reject strategies to avoid conjunction errors. These findings add to a growing body of literature that suggests that participants are able to use expectations for memory to guide their recognition decisions.     

Influence of motoric encoding on forgetting function of memory for action sentences in patients with Alzheimer's disease

This study assessed whether verbal encoding and motoric encoding have different effects on the forgetting function for action sentences of patients with Alzheimer's disease. Subjects were 13 healthy elderly adults and 10 patients diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease. Three tasks were used: verbal tasks, subject-performed tasks, observed tasks. On the verbal tasks, subjects only heard the action sentences as read to them. On the subject-performed tasks, subjects heard, then performed each action sentence. On the observed tasks, subjects heard the action sentences read while observing the object mentioned in each action sentence. After presentation of each task, subjects conducted immediate and 30-min. delayed recall tests, and then a recognition test. Analysis indicated recall performance for subject-performed tasks was significantly better than that for verbal tasks and observed tasks at both immediate and delayed recall in each group. On the recognition test, carrying out the action had no effect, but for both groups recognition was enhanced by observing the object. Elderly adults performed significantly better than patients on all tasks of recall and recognition. However, the results indicate that patients with Alzheimer's disease can use multimodal resources from motoric encoding even if time passes.     

Pictorial encoding effects and memory confusions in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm: evidence for the activation of spontaneous imagery

The purpose of the experiments reported in this paper was to examine the possible role of spontaneous imagery and list-specific cues on pictorial encoding effects induced by the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task. After viewing pictures and words referring to thematically related materials, by way of a picture/word source-judgement task, participants were asked to remember the way in which these materials were presented. Participants reported "seeing" pictures of items that were presented as words, an effect predicted by the imaginal activation hypothesis in its suggestion that incidental images experienced during encoding will later be mistaken as memories for pictures. Whether participants made the same picture misattributions on related lures (or non-presented related items) depended on the way in which the lures' respective thematic lists were experienced during encoding (Experiments 1 and 2), pointing to the effects of list-specific cues in picture/word judgements. These findings have intriguing implications for interpretations of picture-encoding effects induced by the DRM task. The findings also speak to the use of DRM false-memory rates when marshalling evidence against the use of imagery in applied settings.     

Pictorial rehearsal

Subjects were presented with a sequence of picture-word items. The pictures were line drawings of common objects, and the words were the names of the objects. Half of the items were followed quickly by the next item, and the other half by a 15-sec “rehearsal interval.” The subjects were told to use these intervals to rehearse the item just presented, either by saying the word over and over to themselves or by maintaining the picture before the mind’s eye. There followed a test in which each item from the study list was cued with a fragment of either the picture or the name. Consistent with previous findings, identification was more probable for fragments of items that had been followed by a rehearsal interval. In addition, this advantage was found to be greater when the type of cue matched the mode of rehearsal that the subject had been instructed to adopt; there was in fact little, if any, advantage of rehearsal when cue and mode of rehearsal mismatched. This pattern of results suggests functionally distinct pictorial and verbal modes of rehearsal that serve not only to maintain information in conscious mind but also to build up memory proper.     

Action sentences

I would like to thank Eddy Zemach, Jonathan Stavi, Julius Moravcsik and Dov Gabbay for some very good discussions on the logical form of action sentences. Also, I am indebted to an anonymous referee of Erkenntnis for some very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Framing sentences

The sentence frames formed during language production are commonly and rather uncontroversially represented as hierarchical constituent structures. There is less accord about whether the frames are pure structural configurations or limnings of meaning. We examined these alternatives with a sentence priming paradigm in which the primes and targets shared phrase structures and event structures, or only phrase structures. The results of the first and second experiments indicated that event-structure changes had no impact on a reliable tendency to replicate the phrase structures of the primes within sentence targets. The last experiment showed that this tendency could not be attributed to metrical or to closed-class lexical similarities. The implication is that sentence frames are not identifiable with metrical or conceptual information, but are comparatively independent syntactic representations.     

Pictorial representations in statistical reasoning

In an ongoing debate between two visions of statistical reasoning competency, ecological rationality proponents claim that pictorial representations help tap into the frequency coding mechanisms of the mind, whereas nested sets proponents argue that pictorial representations simply help one to appreciate general subset relationships. Advancing this knowledge into applied areas is hampered by this present disagreement. A series of experiments used Bayesian reasoning problems with different pictorial representations (Venn circles, iconic symbols and Venn circles with dots) to better understand influences on performance across these representation types. Results with various static and interactive presentations of pictures all indicate a consistent advantage for iconic representations. These results are more consistent with an ecological rationality view of how these pictorial representations achieve facilitation in statistical task performance and provide more specific guidance for applied uses. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Varieties of Pictorial Illusion

This article focuses on a potentially perplexing aspect of our interactions with pictorial representations (including film, paintings, pictures, drawings, photographs, even video games): in some cases, it seems that visual representations can play tricks on our cognitive faculties. We may either come to believe that objects represented in pictures are real or perhaps perceive them as such. The possibility of widespread pictorial illusions has been oft discussed, and discarded, in the aesthetics literature. I support this stance. However, the nature of the illusion is more complicated than is usually considered. I argue that there are five different types of potential illusions and present reasons for rejecting each. I also explore in detail the most persistent illusion: the “object recognition perceptual illusion thesis,” which states that we undergo a perceptual illusion while viewing pictorial representations simply in virtue of seeing objects in the representation. I contend that a rejection of this thesis depends on the nature of perceptual content, an issue with far‐reaching consequences in aesthetics.     

Stroop interference with response,comparison, and encoding stages in a sentence-picture comparison task

The paper discusses a Stroop variant of the word-picture comparison task analyzed by Chase and Clark (1971). The locatives above or below were printed at the center of a reference square, and Ss reported “Yes” if there was a word or an array of Xs in the location specified and “No” if there was not. Under the control (Xs) conditions, above displays were classified faster than below displays and true displays faster than false displays. These effects were unaltered when the words “yes” or “no” or “right” or “wrong” were printed in place of the Xs, although there was a small overall increase in response latency under these Stroop conditions that was independent of agreement or disagreement between the distractor and the response to be made. When the locatives up and down were printed on the display, a substantial Stroop effect was observed, and the above-below and true-false effects were eliminated. These results are discussed in relation to theories about the nature of Stroop interference and processes involved in sentence-picture comparisons.     

Semantic emphasis in causal sentences

A shift in emphasis can change the truth-value of a singular causal sentence. This poses a challenge to the view that singular sentences predicate a relation. I argue that emphasized causal sentences conjoin predication of a causal relation between events with predication of a relation of causal relevance between states of affairs (or perhaps facts). This is superior to the treatments of such sentences offered by Achinstein, Dretske, Kim, Sanford, Bennett, and Levin. My proposal affords clarity regarding logical structure, at least at a certain level of detail. It makes the relation between the content of an emphasized causal sentence and the unemphasized version clear. It answers some questions about the ontological requirements of the truth of emphasized causal sentences, without introducing new entities (as do some other accounts) or unacceptable consequences for identity and individuation of events.