What Are Applied Ethics?

This paper explores the relationships that various applied ethics bear to each other, both in particular disciplines and more generally. The introductory section lays out the challenge of coming up with such an account and, drawing a parallel with the philosophy of science, offers that applied ethics may either be unified or disunified. The second section develops one simple account through which applied ethics are unified, vis-à-vis ethical theory. However, this is not taken to be a satisfying answer, for reasons explained. In the third section, specific applied ethics are explored: biomedical ethics; business ethics; environmental ethics; and neuroethics. These are chosen not to be comprehensive, but rather for their traditions or other illustrative purposes. The final section draws together the results of the preceding analysis and defends a disunity conception of applied ethics.     

Who is Authorized to Do Applied Ethics? Inherently Political Dimensions of Applied Ethics

A standard view in ethics is that ethical issues concern a different range of human concerns than does politics. This essay goes beyond the long-standing dispute about the extent to which applied ethics needs a commitment to ethical theory. It argues that regardless of the outcome of that dispute, applied ethics, because it presumes something about the nature of authority, rests upon and is implicated in political theory. After internalist and externalist accounts of applied ethics are described, “mixed” approaches are considered that contain inevitable political dimensions. A feminist alternative, Walker’s metaethic of responsibility, shows that authority is best understood as relational and that situations of unequal power are therefore often the places where applied ethics arises. Furthermore, in a democratic society, commitments to democracy should shape the account of authority, and, thus, the nature of applied ethics as well.     

Can Constructive Mathematics be Applied in Physics?

The nature of modern constructive mathematics, and its applications, actual and potential, to classical and quantum physics, are discussed.     

Caldwell University’s Department of Applied Behavior Analysis

Since 2004, faculty members at Caldwell University have developed three successful graduate programs in Applied Behavior Analysis (i.e., PhD, MA, non-degree programs), increased program faculty from two to six members, developed and operated an on-campus autism center, and begun a stand-alone Applied Behavior Analysis Department. This paper outlines a number of strategies used to advance these initiatives, including those associated with an extensive public relations campaign. We also outline challenges that have limited our programs’ growth. These strategies, along with a consideration of potential challenges, might prove useful in guiding academicians who are interested in starting their own programs in behavior analysis.     

“Applied” research can be useful: An example

an example of how a practitioner can use his research skills to help a school district evaluate one of its projects is described. The practitioner is advised to become involved in “action” research despite the limitations of such research, and the example is presented as having implications for expanding the psychologist's role to that of a consultant to administrators, teachers, and parents.     

Perelman’s Pseudo-Argument as Applied to the Creationism Controversy

If you want to challenge or at least weaken the adhesion to a system of values, you can basically adopt two radically opposed rhetorical strategies. Either you will attack the system in a frontal way: for instance, fundamentalists or fascists deny any validity to democratic values and human rights. Or you will pretend to argue from within the system (by saying that you accept some of its basic premises), while subtly distorting the process of reasoning in order to get to your conclusions. If the audience is naïve or poorly informed, you will be able to defend positions that are fundamentally at odds with liberal-democratic values while seeming to argue from inside the system. I would like to show how such a process of “perverse” translation works in the context of the Darwinism/Creationism “controversy”. The attacks on the teaching of evolutionary biology began approximately one century ago. The way Creationists have argued and changed several times their rhetorical strategies seems very interesting to me, in that it exemplifies an important contemporary phenomenon, which I call “perverse translation” or “the wolf in the sheepfold”.     

At Arm’s Length? Applied Social Science and its Sponsors

The article deals with trust in applied social science research in the light of applied researchers’ increased dependence on project funding. Taking Norway as a case study it shows how the societal organization of research funding has implications for scientific freedom and ultimately for the confidence we have in research. The article gives an account of various ways the sponsors can influence on applied social science research and discusses the legitimacy of different limitations on scientific freedom. The article concludes with proposals for how the challenges to scientific freedom posed by the research funding framework can be addressed structurally, as well as on the level of the research community.     

Applying Science and Applied Science: What’s the Difference?

Prandtl’s work on the boundary layer theory is an interesting example for illustrating several important issues in philosophy of science such as the relation between theories and models and whether it is possible to distinguish, in a principled way, between pure and applied science. In what follows I discuss several proposals by the symposium participants regarding the interpretation of Prandtl’s work and whether it should be characterized as an instance of applied science. My own interpretation of this example (1999) emphasised the degree of autonomy embedded in Prandtl’s boundary layer model and the way it became integrated in the larger theoretical context of hydrodynamics. In addition to extending that discussion here I also claim that the characterization of applied science which formed the basis for the symposium does not enable us to successfully distinguish applied science from the general practice of ‘applying’ basic scientific knowledge in a variety of contexts.     

How has Philosophical Applied Ethics Progressed in the Past Fifty Years?

Applied ethics is relatively new on the philosophical scene, having grown out of the various civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the student demand that college courses be relevant. Even today, there are those who think that there are no philosophically interesting practical ethical questions, and that applied ethics is not a branch of philosophy at all. This article rejects that view, both because some of the most interesting and respectable philosophers in the world have worked in applied ethics and because applied ethics has been the source of many difficult conceptual questions in theoretical ethics and even metaphysics. These include the grounds for moral status, human identity, how to conceive rights in general and the right to life in particular, the question whether existence itself can be a harm (the nonidentity problem), and the nature of moral principles.     

“Pure” versus “Applied” Psychology: An Historical Conflict between Edward B. Titchener (Pure) and Ludwig R. Geissler (Applied)

The Psychological Record - There have been three significant breakaways from the American Psychological Association (APA) as a result of its emphasis on professional practice as opposed to...     

The Ethics of Accident-Algorithms for Self-Driving Cars: an Applied Trolley Problem?

Self-driving cars hold out the promise of being safer than manually driven cars. Yet they cannot be a 100 % safe. Collisions are sometimes unavoidable. So self-driving cars need to be programmed for how they should respond to scenarios where collisions are highly likely or unavoidable. The accident-scenarios self-driving cars might face have recently been likened to the key examples and dilemmas associated with the trolley problem. In this article, we critically examine this tempting analogy. We identify three important ways in which the ethics of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars and the philosophy of the trolley problem differ from each other. These concern: (i) the basic decision-making situation faced by those who decide how self-driving cars should be programmed to deal with accidents; (ii) moral and legal responsibility; and (iii) decision-making in the face of risks and uncertainty. In discussing these three areas of disanalogy, we isolate and identify a number of basic issues and complexities that arise within the ethics of the programming of self-driving cars.     

“Scatter Analysis” Techniques Applied to Anxiety Neurotics from a Restricted Culturo-Educational Environment

Hearing-impaired children were individually administered a task in which possession of accumulating candy rewards was made contingent upon the child's decision to stop any further accumulation of the candy. Hearing-impaired children, who under instruction periodically made American Sign Language (ASL) statements about the goodness of the reward, waited significantly longer before terminating the waiting period than did hearing-impaired children instructed to sign statements about the act of waiting and somewhat longer than did hearing-impaired children instructed to sign a neutral statement. Since the pattern of delay was unlike that reported in earlier investigations when nonhandicapped children verbalized similar statements and since variation in mode of communication did not influence delay in nonhandicapped children in the present investigation, the results were interpreted in terms of differences in cognitive controlling mechanisms between nonhandicapped and hearing-impaired children.     

Can a Robot Lie? Exploring the Folk Concept of Lying as Applied to Artificial Agents

The potential capacity for robots to deceive has received considerable attention recently. Many papers explore the technical possibility for a robot to engage in deception for beneficial purposes (e.g., in education or health). In this short experimental paper, I focus on a more paradigmatic case: robot lying (lying being the textbook example of deception) for nonbeneficial purposes as judged from the human point of view. More precisely, I present an empirical experiment that investigates the following three questions: (a) Are ordinary people willing to ascribe deceptive intentions to artificial agents? (b) Are they as willing to judge a robot lie as a lie as they would be when human agents engage in verbal deception? (c) Do people blame a lying artificial agent to the same extent as a lying human agent? The response to all three questions is a resounding yes. This, I argue, implies that robot deception and its normative consequences deserve considerably more attention than they presently receive.     

The Ecological Level of Analysis: Can Neogibsonian Principles be Applied Beyond Perception and Action?

Is it useful to apply ecological principles, developed to understand perception and action, in research areas such as social psychology? Charles (Integrative Psychological &; Behavioral Sciences 43(1) 53–66 2009) warns ecological psychologists interested in this question that much time and effort can be saved through a backwards extension to or rediscovery of the New Realism tradition. In response, we analyze what ecological psychology risks to lose with such a backwards extension and describe existing extensions of the approach not considered by Charles. According to Charles, New Realism holds that: (1) we experience reality, (2) relations are real, and (3) things are what you see when you see those things. Our arguments originate from a comparison of these principles with six recently described ecological ones: (1) organism-environment systems are the proper units of analysis, (2) environmental realities should be defined at the ecological scale, (3) behavior is emergent and self-organized, (4) perception and action are continuous and cyclic, (5) information is specificational, and (6) perception is of affordances (Richardson et al. 2008).