When is a cognitive system embodied?

For cognitive systems, embodiment appears to be of crucial importance. Unfortunately, nobody seems to be able to define embodiment in a way that would prevent it from also covering its trivial interpretations such as mere situatedness in complex environments. The paper focuses on the definition of embodiment, especially whether physical embodiment is necessary and/or sufficient for cognitive systems. Cognition is characterized as a continuous complex process rather than ahistorical logical capability. Furthermore, the paper investigates the relationship between cognitive embodiment and the issues of understanding, representation and task specification.     

Social intelligence, a neurological system?

Social intelligence has been researched for almost 70 yr. without definitive findings. During this period almost no attempts have been made to consider the complexity of the brain's anatomy and functions responsible for social competence. An ecological model focusing on social abilities within a biopsychosocial context is discussed along with supporting literature and an hypothesis for research. This argument invokes social intelligence as an independent brain system. It is suggested that neurological structures and chemical activities controlling social skills are directly influenced by the environment, individual beliefs, personal goals, and physiology.     

Is the face-perception system human-specific at birth?

The present study investigates the human-specificity of the orienting system that allows neonates to look preferentially at faces. Three experiments were carried out to determine whether the face-perception system that is present at birth is broad enough to include both human and nonhuman primate faces. The results demonstrate that the newborns did not show any spontaneous visual preference for the human face when presented simultaneously with a monkey face that shared the same features, configuration, and low-level perceptual properties (Experiment 1). The newborns were, however, able to discriminate between the 2 faces belonging to the 2 different species (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, the newborns were found to prefer looking at an upright, compared with an inverted, monkey face, as they do for human faces. Overall, the results demonstrate that newborns perceive monkey and human faces in a similar way. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the system underlying face preference at birth is broad enough to bias newborns' attention toward both human and nonhuman primate faces.     

Protesting to challenge or defend the system? A system justification perspective on collective action

Social identity, shared grievances, and group efficacy beliefs are well-known antecedents to collective action, but existing research overlooks the fact that collective action often involves a confrontation between those who are motivated to defend the status quo and those who seek to challenge it. Using nationally representative data from New Zealand (Study 1; N = 16,147) and a large online sample from the United States (Study 2; N = 1,513), we address this oversight and demonstrate that system justification is negatively associated with system-challenging collective action, but positively associated with system-supporting collective action, for members of both low-status and high-status groups. Group identification, group-based injustice, group-based anger, and system-based dissatisfaction/anger mediated these relationships. These findings constitute the first empirical integration of system justification theory into a model of collective action that explains when people will act collectively to challenge—and, just as importantly, defend—the status quo.     

Disgust: Sensory affect or primary emotional system?

We argue in this paper for the inclusion in the primary emotional systems enumerated by Panksepp of a neural system that organises disgust responses. The DISGUST system arose phylogenetically in response to danger to the internal milieu from pathogens and their toxic products. We suggest that the primitive emotive circuit, which originally provided defence by regulating consummatory behaviours, gave rise to a primary emotional system that facilitates evaluation of reinforcers. Unlike the sensory affect of distaste from which it is experimentally dissociable, disgust responses can involve flexible learned components triggered by several modalities. The anterior insula is implicated as playing a major role in the DISGUST system both in organising disgust responses in the individual and recognising disgust responses in others.     

Is there a dual system for regular inflections?

A central question in morphological research is whether there are whole-word representations for regularly inflected forms. A series of four lexical decision experiments addressed this question by looking at whole-word frequency effects across a range of frequency values with constant stem-cluster frequencies. Frequency effects were only found for inflected forms above a threshold of about 6 per million, whereas such effects were found for morphologically simple controls in all frequency ranges. We discuss these data in the context of two kinds of dual models and in relation to competition models proposed within the connectionist literature.     

Perceptual access reasoning: developmental stage or system 1 heuristic?

In contrast with the two dominant views in Theory of Mind development, the Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues is that children don’t understand the mental state of belief until around 6 years of age. Evidence for this includes data that many children ages 4 and 5, who pass the standard 2-location false belief task, nonetheless fail the true belief task, and often fail a 3-location false belief task by choosing the irrelevant option. These findings can be explained by the PAR hypothesis but pose challenges for the two dominant views. I argue against an alternate hypothesis which is proposed by Anika Fiebich in a recent paper. According to Fiebich, PAR is not a distinct transitional stage in children’s theory of mind development, but is a fast and frugal System 1 heuristic which fades once children become fluent in social reasoning. However, I point out a number of problems with Fiebich’s proposal and argue for the superiority of the PAR hypothesis. I also present five reasons to be skeptical about the findings of Perner and Horn which purportedly show that 4- and 5-year-olds can pass the 3-location false belief task when suitably modified. This is a further difficulty for Fiebich’s proposal, since she relies on these findings in her fluency theory. Finally, I sketch a dual systems theory of mind account based upon the PAR hypothesis which is different from Fiebich’s.     

Mouse vocal communication system: Are ultrasounds learned or innate?

Mouse ultrasonic vocalizations (USVs) are often used as behavioral readouts of internal states, to measure effects of social and pharmacological manipulations, and for behavioral phenotyping of mouse models for neuropsychiatric and neurodegenerative disorders. However, little is known about the neurobiological mechanisms of rodent USV production. Here we discuss the available data to assess whether male mouse song behavior and the supporting brain circuits resemble those of known vocal non-learning or vocal learning species. Recent neurobiology studies have demonstrated that the mouse USV brain system includes motor cortex and striatal regions, and that the vocal motor cortex sends a direct sparse projection to the brainstem vocal motor nucleus ambiguous, a projection previously thought be unique to humans among mammals. Recent behavioral studies have reported opposing conclusions on mouse vocal plasticity, including vocal ontogeny changes in USVs over early development that might not be explained by innate maturation processes, evidence for and against a role for auditory feedback in developing and maintaining normal mouse USVs, and evidence for and against limited vocal imitation of song pitch. To reconcile these findings, we suggest that the trait of vocal learning may not be dichotomous but encompass a broad spectrum of behavioral and neural traits we call the continuum hypothesis, and that mice possess some of the traits associated with a capacity for limited vocal learning.     

How does the visual system distinguish between illuminance and reflectance?

The experiments in which the strengths of pattern and of fusion differing in kind from brightness were used as measures indicated that the visual system could distinguish between illuminance and reflectance. From this result and an observation of gray papers by a microscope, it is assumed that luminance has two aspects, one refers to the macroscopic density of photons and another to the proportion of the reflected microscopic areas to the absorbed microscopic areas so that brightness constancy occurs in relation to each of the patterns of the various sizes from a macroscopic pattern visible to the naked eye to a microscopic pattern not visible. It is also mentioned that the strength of fusion is rare but promising as a measure for analyzing brightness.     

Dual or unitary system? Two alternative models of decision making

In recent years, a lively debate in neuroeconomics has focused on what appears to be a fundamental question: Is the brain a unitary or a dual system? We are still far from a consensus view. The accumulating evidence supports both sides of the debate. A reason for the difficulty in reaching a convincing solution is that we do not yet have a clear theoretical model for either position. Here I review the basic elements and potential building blocks for such theories, using sources in large measure from classical decision theory and game theory.     

An evolutionary hypothesis for obsessive compulsive disorder: a~psychological immune system?

A new hypothesis is presented within the framework of evolutionary psychology that attempts to explain the origins of obsessive-compulsive disorder. It is suggested that obsessions and compulsions originate from the overactivity of a mental module that the majority of humans possess and has the function of generating risk scenarios without voluntary intervention. It is hypothesised that obsessional phenomena function as an off-line risk avoidance process, designed to lead to risk avoidance behaviour at a future time, thus distinguishing it from anxiety and related phenomena as on-line emotional states, designed to lead to the avoidance of immediate and direct risks. Finally, the hypothesis makes a number of specific predictions that are testable and refutable. It is contended that the present hypothesis if supported by empirical evidence could serve as a basis for future research on this important disorder.     

God's organism? The chick as a model system for memory studies

The young chick is a powerful model system in which to study the biochemical and morphological processes underlying memory formation. Training chicks on a one trial passive avoidance task results in a molecular cascade in a specific brain region, the intermediate medial hyperstriatum ventrale. This cascade is initiated by glutamate release and engages a series of synaptic transients including increased calcium flux, up-regulation of NMDA-glutamate receptors, membrane protein phosphorylations, and the retrograde messenger NO. Expression of immediate early genes c-fos and c-jun precedes the synthesis, glycosylation, and redistribution, >4 hr downstream, of a number of synaptic membrane proteins, notably NCAM and L1. Other membrane proteins required in the early phase of memory formation include the amyloid precursor protein (APP) and apolipoprotein E. There are concomitant increases in dendritic spine number and changes in synaptic structure. Nonsynaptic factors, including corticosterone and BDNF, can modulate retention of the avoidance response, enhancing the salience of otherwise weakly retained memory. These results are discussed in relation to general concepts of memory formation and the spatio-temporal distribution of the putative memory trace.