Behavioral marriage therapy in the 1980's: The challenge of integration

Abstract

Only two years ago, my colleagues and I participated in a published debate over the sufficiency of a predominantly behaviorally oriented approach to marital therapy (Gurman and Kniskern, 1978c; Gurman and Knudson, 1978; Gurman et al., 1978; Jacobson and Weiss, 1978). This debate has stimulated a good deal of discussion (e.g., Colapinto, 1979; Taggart, 1979), presumably because it focused attention on a number of issues which are fundamental to how clinicians conceive of marital conflict and treatment, which had not received enough of a public airing for some time. In that debate, my colleagues and I argued that a single-minded application of behavioral principles to marriage therapy was insufficient for effective clinical practice. While behavioral marital therapy (BMT) was the focus of that particular interchange, in several other places I have taken the position that psychodynamically oriented and systems-oriented methods, when applied monolithically to marital problems, are also subject to serious criticism on both theoretical (Gurman, 1978; 1979; Gurman and Klein, 1980) and empirical (Gurman and Kniskern, 1978a; 1978b; 1980a; Kniskern and Gurman, 1980a; 1980b) grounds.     

Is the allure of self-esteem a mirage after all?

Comments on the original article "Do people's self-views matter? Self-concept and self-esteem in everyday life," by W. B. Swann, Jr., C. Chang-Schneider, and K. L. McClarty. Swann et al argued that people's self-views, and their global self-esteem in particular, yield a suite of behavioral effects that are beneficial to the individual and to society at large. The Swann et al article is the latest link in a debate on the causal utility of self-esteem. Specifically, the article is a reply to a report published by the American Psychological Society Task Force on Self-Esteem (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). As members of that task force, the current authors wish to express their broad agreement with Swann et al. At the same time, in the comment presented here, they clarify pockets of disagreement.     

Assessing the belief bias effect with ROCs: reply to Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010)

Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010) argued (a) that the so-called receiver operating characteristic is nonlinear for data on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning; (b) that their data are inconsistent with Klauer, Musch, and Naumer's (see record 2000-02818-008) model of belief bias; (c) that their data are inconsistent with any of the existing accounts of belief bias and only consistent with a theory provided by signal detection theory; and (d) that in fact, belief bias is a response bias effect. In this reply, we present reanalyses of Dube et al.'s data and of old data suggesting (a) that the receiver operating characteristic is linear for binary "valid" versus "invalid" responses, as employed by the bulk of research in this field; (b) that Klauer et al.'s model describes the old data significantly better than does Dube et al.'s model and that it describes Dube et al.'s data somewhat better than does Dube et al.'s model; (c) that Dube et al.'s data are consistent with the account of belief bias by misinterpreted necessity, whereas Dube et al.'s signal detection model does not fit their data; and (d) that belief bias is more than a response bias effect.     

Quantitative integration of single-subject studies: Methods and misinterpretations

Derenne and Baron (1999) criticized a quantitative literature review by Kollins, Newland, and Critchfield (1997) and raised several important issues with respect to the integration of single-subject data. In their criticism they argued that the quantitative integration of data across experiments conducted by Kollins et al. is a meta-analysis and, as such, is inappropriate. We reply that Kollins et al. offered behavior analysts a technique for integrating quantitative information in a way that draws from the strengths of behavior analysis. Although the quantitative technique is true to the original spirit of meta-analysis, it bears little resemblance to meta-analyses as currently conducted or defined and offers behavior analysts a potentially useful tool for comparing data from multiple sources. We also argue that other criticisms raised by Derenne and Baron were inaccurate or irrelevant to the original article. Our response highlights two main points: (a) There are meaningful quantitative techniques for examining single-subject data across studies without compromising the integrity of behavior analysis; and (b) the healthiest way to refute or question findings in any viable field of scientific inquiry is through empirical investigation.     

Reply to William R. Ferrell's paper "Calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments: A single model for both"

William R. Ferrell's paper is a reply to our article "Calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments: Two different accounts", 1993, 34, 135–148 in this journal. Ferrell's critique centres around three issues: (1) The model of sensory discrimination proposed by Björkman et al. (1993) and discussed in Winman and Juslin (1993) is not new, (2) this model does not predict underconfidence, (3) there is no need for separate models of calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments. Below we respond to each of the three issues raised by Ferrell.     

The validity and appropriateness of methods, analyses, and conclusions in Rind et al. (1998): A rebuttal of victimological critique from Ondersma et al. (2001) and Dallam et al. (2001).

The authors respond to 2 victimological critiques of their 1998 meta-analysis on child sexual abuse (CSA). S. J. Dallam et al. (2001) claimed that B. Rind, P. Tromovitch, and R. Bauserman (1998) committed numerous methodological and statistical errors, and often miscoded and misinterpreted data. The authors show all these claims to be invalid. To the contrary, they demonstrate frequent bias in Dallam et al.'s criticisms. S. J. Ondersma et al. (2001) claimed that Rind et al.'s study is part of a backlash against psychotherapists, that its suggestions regarding CSA definitions were extrascientific, and that the moral standard is needed to understand CSA scientifically. The authors show their suggestions to have been scientific and argue that it is Ondersma et al.'s issue-framing and moral standard that are extrascientific. This reply supports the original methods, analyses, recommendations, and conclusions of Rind et al.     

Personal standards and evaluative concerns dimensions of "clinical" perfectionism: a reply to Shafran et al. (2002, 2003) and Hewitt et al. (2003)

Shafran, Cooper, and Fairburn (2002, 2003) provided a cognitive-behavioral analysis of "clinical" perfectionism, a construct they considered to involve both the determined pursuit of self-imposed standards and extremely vulnerable self-evaluation. They argued against a multidimensional perspective to studying perfectionism. We respond to Shafran et al. (2002, 2003) and Hewitt, Flett, Besser, Sherry, and McGee's (2003) reply to Shafran et al. (2002) by considering the theoretical, empirical, and clinical implications of findings identifying two higher-order dimensions of perfectionism reflecting personal standards (PS) and self-critical evaluative concerns. Analyses of data from two diverse study groups, a college student sample (N = 527) and a clinical sample of patients with binge eating disorder (N = 236), revealed that self-criticism accounts for the relation between perfectionism measures and depressive, anxious, and eating disorder symptoms. We conclude that possessing high PS is not by itself maladaptive. Rather, self-critical evaluative tendencies are more relevant than PS to the critical processes Shafran et al. (2002) suggested contribute to the maintenance of clinical perfectionism.     

The importance of shared environmental influences in explaining the overlap between mother's parenting and sibling relationships: reply to Neale (1999)

This article addresses concerns raised by M. C. Neale (1999) in his commentary on the D. A. Bussell et al. (1999) Nonshared Environment in Adolescent Development (NEAD) study. These concerns fall into two categories: (a) model assumptions and sample design and (b) testing of alternative models. The validity of the assumptions of quantitative genetic models is a concern for all researchers in this area. Discussion of those assumptions in this reply is brief and focuses on those most relevant to the NEAD sample. The two alternative models proposed by Neale were designed to provide alternatives to the large shared environmental effect found in the original report of Bussell et al. Because these alternative models did not provide a better fit, the appropriateness of Bussell et al.'s basic model and the importance of shared environmental influences for explaining the association among family subsystems are supported.     

Theoretical vs. actuarial analyses of personality ratings, and other rudimentary distinctions

In their respective attempts to identify the “critical flaws” in Lamiell, Foss, Trierweiler, and Leffel's research on the role of dialectical reasoning in intuitive personology, both Conger and Woody (1983; see preceding articles) err by obscuring a crucial distinction between judgments, which are mental phenomena, and ratings, which are behavioral phenomena. By elaborating this distinction in the present article, we explain, among other things, the following: (1) Contrary to Woody's claim, Lamiell et al.'s formal representation of dialectical reasoning via interactive measurement is neither equivalent to nor reducible to Anderson's weighted averaging model of impression formation. (2) Contrary to Conger's claim, Lamiell et al.'s formal representations of demonstrative reasoning in terms of the normal-curve equivalents of z-scores did not bias their results against the normative or ipsative models, and in fact presented those models more favorably and in a manner more consistent with the extant empirical literature on rating behavior than does the alternative Conger proposes. (3) The profile dissimilarity analyses reported by Lamiell et al. were entirely adequate for their purposes. It is concluded that Lamiell et al.'s findings stand as billed: preliminary evidence for the dialectical quality of subjective personality impressions.     

Celebrating a common finding: Riding’s CSA test is unreliable

This paper is a reply to Redmond and colleagues’ brief report that argues we (Peterson et al., 2003a) were not the first to establish the unreliability of the computerised cognitive styles analysis (CSA) test because we used a copy of the test rather than the original. We refute this suggestion and argue that we have already defended our approach to testing the CSA’s reliability (Peterson et al., 2003b) and that our method is entirely appropriate and transparent. Rather than argue over who was the first to test the CSA’s reliability, we believe we should celebrate the fact that we both found the same result, regardless of the method used.     

Celebrating a common finding: Riding’s CSA test is unreliable

This paper is a reply to Redmond and colleagues’ brief report that argues we (Peterson et al., 2003a) were not the first to establish the unreliability of the computerised cognitive styles analysis (CSA) test because we used a copy of the test rather than the original. We refute this suggestion and argue that we have already defended our approach to testing the CSA’s reliability (Peterson et al., 2003b) and that our method is entirely appropriate and transparent. Rather than argue over who was the first to test the CSA’s reliability, we believe we should celebrate the fact that we both found the same result, regardless of the method used.     

An Addendum to the 1997 Outcome Research Chart

In 1997, an article in the American Journal of Family Therapy was published that summarized the outcome research regarding the efficacy of specific approaches of Marriage and Family Therapy in treating certain disorders (Sandberg et al ., 1997). The article updated the original matrix of findings reported by Gurman, Kniskern, and Pinsof (1986) by reviewing the relevant research through 1995, and provided a summary of findings in an updated version of the original 1986 chart. Since the publication of that article (Sandberg et al ., 1997), feedback has been received from a number of MFT researchers who pointed out some omissions and oversights in the updated chart. After responding to their feedback, it has been concluded that a number of changes must be made to the 1997 summary chart to present a more complete summary of MFT outcome research up through 1995.     

META-ANALYSIS OF PERSONALITY-JOB PERFORMANCE RELATIONS: A REPLY TO ONES, MOUNT, BARRICK, AND HUNTER (1994)

Tett, Jackson, and Rothstein's (1991) meta-analysis identified higher average correlations for personality in predicting job proficiency than did Barrick and Mount's (1991). Ones et al. suggest that discrepancies between the two studies involving the Big Five personality dimensions are due to certain procedural differences. In this reply, we show that their arguments do not adequately explain the noted discrepancies. We also show that, because personality traits correlate significantly with job performance both positively and negatively beyond chance levels, use of absolute values, contrary to Ones et al., is important in meta-analyses involving personality. Addressing all of Ones et al.3 statistical concerns, re-analysis of Tett et al.k main data set results in slightly lower mean validities (e.g., .24 vs.29 for fully corrected values based on confirmatory estimates), and renders non-significant the job analysis/no job analysis distinction found to be significant in the original study. Tett et al.'s main conclusions, however, remain unchanged. We suggest that Barrick and Mount's lower mean validities may be due to their averaging signed correlations, pooling exploratory and confirmatory findings, and to the use of different inclusion criteria for selecting source studies.     

Does contextual strength modulate the subordinate bias effect? A reply to Kellas and Vu

In their reply to Binder and Rayner (1998), Kellas and Vu (1999) raised questions about the criteria we used to exclude items from the Kellas, Martin, Yehling, Herman, and Vu (1995) stimulus set. In this reply, we further document these criteria and also address the issue of local versus published norms. We continue to believe that the stimulus set used by Kellas et al. (1995) was problematic. We also address the issue of strength of context, a concept used in earlier research that dealt with the subordinate bias effect. We argue that the contexts used by Kellas et al. (1995) were no stronger than the contexts previously used that established this effect. Therefore, we continue to think that our finding that context does not eliminate the subordinate bias effect is valid.     

Generating Hypotheses After 14 Years of Marital Followup; Or,How Should One Speculate? A Reply to DeKay,Greeno, and Houck*

Gottman and Levenson (2002) for the purpose of post hoc speculation, developed a number of ordinary least squares regressions to model the length of marriage of divorcing couples in a 14-year longitudinal study. We believe that our analyses are appropriate for our purpose. We do not agree with DeKay, Greeno, and Houck (2002) that a duration-model approach would have been more appropriate, and instead argue that the analyses used are more powerful and generate more interesting speculations. When speculating, one makes an important contribution just by being interesting, not necessarily by being right. The purpose of post hoc speculation is to generate discussion, and we are pleased that even at the outset we have accomplished this goal. In this reply to DeKay et al., we argue that the two-process model for earlier versus later divorcing that we propose is both interesting and clinically useful.     

Face Naming in Dementia: A Reply to Hodges and Greene (1998)

A case study by Brennen, David, Fluchaire, and Pellat (1996) reported the case of a patient who could occasionally name celebrities with very low concurrent levels of semantic access, which is difficult to reconcile with current models of face identification. Hodges and Greene (1998) attribute Brennen et al.'s case study to artifactual explanations and provide new data, which, they claim, is evidence against the "theory of naming without semantics". This reply demonstrates that Hodges and Greene's arguments are unconvincing and that aspects of Hodges and Greene's data in fact provide support for Brennen et al.'s conclusions. It is also argued that in cases of dementia direct naming has been reported for other stimuli domains as well.     

Behavioral marriage therapy: I. A psychodynamic-systems analysis and critique

After briefly summarizing the major theoretical premises and treatment strategies of Behavioral Marriage Therapy (BMT), five major clusters of implicit assumptions in BMT are identified and critically examined: I. "The Rational Observing Ego Shall Conquer All"; II. "Behavior Should Not Mean, But Be"; III. "What's Sauce for the Goose is Sauce for the Gander"; IV. "Repression Is Good for Your Marital Mental Health"; V. "The Folly of the Therapist as Technician." Throughout this analysis, the conceptual and clinical limitations of a strictly or predominantly behavioral approach to couples therapy are described, and BMT is reconsidered in the light of object relations theory and communication theory perspectives on marital dysfunction and its treatment.     

Easing the adaptation to parenthood

Abstract

Despite the proliferation of marital adjustment studies, basic methodological problems remain unresolved. Not the least of these is the lack of a clearly defined and uniformly understood concept of what is being studied. The purpose of the present paper is to illuminate methodological problems which are specific to research in marital adjustment. Therefore, problems which would be true for all research in the behavioral studies and are not specific to marital adjustment are either not included or are discussed minimally. More detailed research is available elsewhere that relates to but is not the same as marital adjustment. Research in marital therapy would be an example of related data (Gurman, 1975).     

Behavioral Marriage Therapy. IV. Take Two Aspirin and Call Us in the Morning

The Jacobson-Weiss critique of the Gurman-Knudson and Gurman-Kniskern discussions of behavioral marriage therapy (BMT), while scholarly, derives from such a narrow conceptual set that, with only minor exceptions, Jacobson and Weiss have failed basically to comprehend the essence of our theoretical and logical criticisms of BMT. Moreover, a careful reanalysis of the research cited by our critics as evidence for the efficacy of BMT reveals the strength of the empirical foundation of this approach to have been greatly exaggerated. While few of our concerns about a preominantly behavioral approach to marriage therapy have been ameliorated by Jacobson and Weiss' commentary, some success seems to have been achieved in terms of our original purpose: to stimulate critical thinking about the premises and process of marital therapy.     

Torture in the Naked Public Square

Is torture ever ethically permissible? O’Donohue et al. (2014) argued that there are situations in which it is not only morally permissible but actually morally obligatory to torture a prisoner. Arrigo, DeBatto, Rockwood, and Mawe (2015) wrote a critical reply; O’Donohue et al. (2015) have responded. Yet to date, the specifically ethical weaknesses of the O’Donohue et al. position have not been examined; no argument against torture has been offered, nor have the lessons of the CIA’s secret program been taken into account. The present article moves the discussion forward on all three fronts. A case against torture is offered on pragmatic grounds.