Individual differences in the explicit power motive predict “utilitarian” choices in moral dilemmas,especially when this choice is self-beneficial

We all face moral decisions, whether we are judges, politicians, or just riding the bus. The most well studied of these involve concerns of harming or caring for other people, which have often been researched by employing hypothetical moral dilemmas. This study investigated how the explicit power motive, more precisely the hope to gain power (h_Power), predicts decisions for these types of problems. We found that h_Power was positively related to deciding that it was morally acceptable to kill one person to save multiple others (i.e., making a utilitarian choice). In an exploratory analysis, we found that the probability of making such choices as a function of h_Power was even higher when participants’ own lives were at stake as compared to only the lives of others. These findings complement previous research showing that personality variables as well as situational factors predict moral decision making. Finding biases in moral decision making is important, as only when we know these biases we can consciously counteract them.     

道德判断中的框架效应:一个新的视角

道德领域亦存在框架效应,但有关这类偏差的研究仍然存在不足。研究以600名大学生为对象,以亚洲疾病和工厂风波两类经典情境为实验情境,设置正面和负面两类属性框架,以研究道德判断的框架效应。结果发现,在面临道德判断情境时,在正面框架下被试倾向于选择确定性方案,而在负面框架下被试倾向于选择风险性方案; 在正面框架下被试倾向于评价风险性方案更违背道德,在负面框架下则认为确定性方案更违背道德; 被试对情境中人物选择确定性或风险性方案道德之可谴责性评价与确定性或风险性方案本身之道德违背性评价的判断并不一致:在正面框架下,若情境中人物选择风险性方案,被试认为其行为更应受到谴责; 但在负面框架下,被试对情境中人物选择确定性方案和风险性方案在道德上应受谴责性的评价并无显著差异。研究还发现道德判断框架效应存在性别差异,负面框架下女生更为风险寻求。     

Foreign Language Effect and Psychological Distance

Does using a foreign language result in forming different moral decisions than using our mother tongue? Two studies were conducted to investigate whether there is a relationship between foreign language effects (differences between native vs. foreign language conditions) and psychological distance. Study 1 tested four moral dilemmas adapted from Greene et al. (Cognition 107: 1144–1155, 2008). Non-fluent Korean–English bilingual participants (N = 161) indicated decisions regarding four moral dilemmas in either Korean or English languages. The study found that for personal moral conflict situations, in which emotion and automatic intuition were more important than deliberation, there were significant differences in ratios of utilitarian decisions between the native language (L1) and the foreign language (L2) conditions. The participants tended to make more utilitarian decisions in L2 than in L1, which implies reduced emotionality in L2. Study 2 examined whether the psychological distance increased using the foreign language (English) utilizing an automatic self-test. Nonproficient Korean–English bilinguals (N = 26) formed associations between three kinds of geometric shapes (ellipses, rectangles and triangles) and three kinds of labels (‘me’, ‘friends’ and ‘others’). The results of the study found the self-bias effect decreased when labels were presented in the foreign language (in English). This implies that the foreign language effect resulted from the reduced emotional response, and deliberation in decision making which may result from increased psychological distance.     

异性交友决策任务上为不同心理距离他人决策的风险偏好

使用中国文化背景下修订的Beisswanger等人的异性交友决策问卷, 采用2种方法操纵自我-他人心理距离, 考察了男女大学生在后果严重性不同的异性交友决策任务上为不同心理距离他人决策风险偏好的差异。实验1发现, 被试为具体和笼统他人决策时的风险偏好无显著差异, 在后果不严重任务上比后果严重任务上更冒险, 男性比女性更冒险。心理距离与决策者性别的交互作用显著：男性为具体他人决策更冒险, 而女性为笼统他人决策更冒险。实验2发现, 被试为不相似他人比为相似他人决策更冒险, 在后果不严重任务上比在后果严重任务上更冒险, 男性比女性更冒险。后果严重性与决策者性别交互作用显著：男性在后果严重和不严重任务上的风险偏好无显著差异, 而女性在后果不严重任务上比后果严重任务上更冒险。综合两个实验的结果, 可以得出以下结论：相对于具体和笼统他人的区分而言, 相似和不相似他人的区分是一种更加稳定和有效的区分自我-他人心理距离的方法。结合相关研究及理论对结果进行了讨论。     

A meta-analysis of response-time tests of the sequential two-systems model of moral judgment

The (generalized) sequential two-system (“default interventionist”) model of utilitarian moral judgment predicts that utilitarian responses often arise from a system-two correction of system-one deontological intuitions. Response-time (RT) results that seem to support this model are usually explained by the fact that low-probability responses have longer RTs. Following earlier results, we predicted response probability from each subject’s tendency to make utilitarian responses (A, “Ability”) and each dilemma’s tendency to elicit deontological responses (D, “Difficulty”), estimated from a Rasch model. At the point where A = D, the two responses are equally likely, so probability effects cannot account for any RT differences between them. The sequential two-system model still predicts that many of the utilitarian responses made at this point will result from system-two corrections of system-one intuitions, hence should take longer. However, when A = D, RT for the two responses was the same, contradicting the sequential model. Here we report a meta-analysis of 26 data sets, which replicated the earlier results of no RT difference overall at the point where A = D. The data sets used three different kinds of moral judgment items, and the RT equality at the point where A = D held for all three. In addition, we found that RT increased with A–D. This result holds for subjects (characterized by Ability) but not for items (characterized by Difficulty). We explain the main features of this unanticipated effect, and of the main results, with a drift-diffusion model.     

Moral Dilemmas in Military Situations: Proportionality Principle,Religiosity, Political Attitudes,and Authoritarian Personality

The current study focuses on a moral dilemma in military situations: the amount of force to be used in order to neutralize a “most wanted” terrorist. This study examines the association between this moral dilemma with 4 independent variables: agreement with the proportionality principle (mediating variable), level of religiosity, authoritarian personality, and political attitudes. Three equal groups of participants (together, N = 357) were included: Israeli regular army combat soldiers, Israeli reserve combat soldiers, and Israeli students. In accordance with the study hypotheses, the 4 independent variables significantly correlated with each other and with moral decisions. Structural equation modeling indicated that agreement with the proportionality principle is the best predictor of moral decision, and mediated the association between level of religiosity and political attitudes and moral decisions.     

Once a Utilitarian,Consistently a Utilitarian? Examining Principledness in Moral Judgment via the Robustness of Individual Differences

Although individual differences in the application of moral principles, such as utilitarianism, have been documented, so too have powerful context effects—effects that raise doubts about the durability of people's moral principles. In this article, we examine the robustness of individual differences in moral judgment by examining them across time and across different decision contexts. In Study 1, consistency in utilitarian judgment of 122 adult participants was examined over two different survey sessions. In Studies 2A and 2B, large samples (Ns = 130 and 327, respectively) of adult participants made a series of 32 moral judgments across eight different contexts that are known to affect utilitarian endorsement. Contrary to some contemporary theorizing, our results reveal a strong degree of consistency in moral judgment. Across time and experimental manipulations of context, individuals maintained their relative standing on utilitarianism, and aggregated moral decisions reached levels of near‐perfect consistency. Results support the view that on at least one dimension (utilitarianism), people's moral judgments are robustly consistent, with context effects tailoring the application of principles to the particulars of any given moral judgment.     

The effects of physical contact and decision type on moral decision making: A study of harm to save moral behavior

This study examined the relationship between physical contact and decision type in predicting “harm to save” behavior. Participants were assigned to making either a judgment or a choice involving moral dilemmas. All participants were presented with dilemmas that either required or did not require having physical contact with potential victims. Participants were asked to decide whether to sacrifice fewer people to save more (utilitarian responses) or not to do so and thus more people would die (deontological responses). The study sample included 345 participants who completed a set of self‐report measures. Results indicated an interaction between physical contact and decision type. In the choice condition only, participants reported significantly less utilitarian responses to the dilemmas that required having physical contact with the person to be harmed than to dilemmas that did not require physical contact. This difference was not found in the judgment condition. These results contribute to a greater understanding of the nature and potential malleability of human morality.     

Counter‐intuitive moral judgement following traumatic brain injury

Several neurological patient populations, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), appear to produce an abnormally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of judgements to moral dilemmas; they tend to make judgements that maximize the welfare of the majority, rather than deontological judgements based on the following of moral rules (e.g., do not harm others). However, this patient research has always used extreme dilemmas with highly valued moral rules (e.g., do not kill). Data from healthy participants, however, suggest that when a wider range of dilemmas are employed, involving less valued moral rules (e.g., do not lie), moral judgements demonstrate sensitivity to the psychological intuitiveness of the judgements, rather than their deontological or utilitarian content (Kahane et al., Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7, 2011, 393). We sought the moral judgements of 30 TBI participants and 30 controls on moral dilemmas where content (utilitarian/deontological) and intuition (intuitive/counter‐intuitive) were measured concurrently. Overall TBI participants made utilitarian judgements in equal proportions to controls; disproportionately favouring utilitarian judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive, and deontological judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive. These results speak against the view that TBI causes a specific utilitarian bias, suggesting instead that moral intuition is broadly disrupted following TBI.     

解释水平视角下的自己-他人决策差异

研究基于解释水平理论, 考察自己决策和为他人提供建议是否存在认知和偏好上的差异。实验一采用2(自己决策/为他人建议)×2(价值：高/低)×2(可行性：高/低)被试间设计, 165名被试代表自己或他人评价选项的吸引力。实验二采用3×2混合设计, 81名被试代表自己、相似或不相似他人, 为“高价值-低可行”和“低价值-高可行”两选项出价。结果支持了“自己-他人决策差异”：自己决策比为他人提建议在更大程度上受可行性高低的影响, 更为偏爱可行性高的选项; 人际相似性能在一定程度上缩小上述差异。     

农民工的三类社会关系对其道德脸面感受的影响

探讨三类重要关系他人在两类负向道德事件中对农民工脸面共享感受的影响。采用基于情境故事法的纸笔实验。使用2(家庭伦理,消极义务)×3 (父-子/女关系,同乡关系,工友关系)被试间设计,共6组被试,每组有效被试分别为299、296、297、296、298、292,共计1778名。结果,在关系他人违反家庭伦理时,个体只和家庭内成员产生脸面共享,对于家庭外成员则不产生脸面共享;当关系他人违反消极义务时,个体则会因关系远近和不同关系他人产生不同程度的脸面共享。结论,当关系他人违反家庭伦理或消极义务时,农民工均体验到不同程度的脸面共享感受,其脸面共享的程度随关系远近有显著差异。     

The role of emotion expectancies in adolescents' moral decision making

This study investigated the impact of emotion expectancies on adolescents’ moral decision making in hypothetical situations. The sample consisted of 160 participants from three different grade levels (mean age = 15.79 years, SD = 2.96). Participants were confronted with a set of scenarios that described various emotional outcomes of (im)moral actions and needed to decide what they would do if they were in the protagonist’s shoes. Findings demonstrate that emotion expectancies differentially influenced adolescents’ hypothetical decision making in antisocial versus prosocial behavioral contexts. Whereas negatively charged self-evaluative emotions over failing to act morally (e.g., guilt) were the strongest predictor for moral choice in antisocial behavioral contexts, positively charged self-evaluative emotions over acting morally (e.g., pride) most strongly predicted moral choice in prosocial contexts. Older adolescents paid greater attention to outcome-oriented emotions that make the decision to act morally less attractive (e.g., regret). Overall, the study suggests that emotion expectancies influence moral decision making in unique and meaningful ways.     

右侧颞顶联合区及道德加工脑网络的功能连接预测社会性框架效应：来自静息态功能磁共振的证据

社会性框架效应指个体进行社会性决策时, 描述方式(即框架)对其选择倾向的影响。采用“伤害/帮助框架”范式, 本研究在行为上发现了显著的框架效应：被试在伤害框架下比帮助框架下, 更倾向于选择利他选项, 这可能是由于伤害框架凸显了伤害他人的后果及有意性, 从而提高了道德冲突水平。在神经活动上发现(1)静息态下, 右侧颞顶联合区(TPJ)的低频振荡振幅(ALFF)与框架效应强度存在显著正相关; (2)道德加工相关脑区构成的局部脑网络内部的功能连接强度(FC)能够有效预测框架效应强度。本研究首次利用静息态功能连接探讨个体的社会性决策受到语言表述方式影响的神经机制, 为进一步揭示社会决策中的个体差异提供了神经学证据。     

心理距离与后果严重性对人身安全决策的影响

已有研究发现决策者在为自己与不同他人决策时,其风险偏好存在差异。但是当对后果严重性不同的事件进行决策时,上述结果也并不总是如此。为了探究在人身安全情境中决策者面对后果严重程度不同的任务时,为自己和为他人决策时风险偏好的差异,实验一采用人际亲密度和决策所带来消极结果的严重程度分别操纵心理距离与后果严重性,结果发现决策者在后果严重任务中的决策比后果不严重任务更保守,为自己和为陌生人决策均比为最好朋友决策更冒险。这可能是由于决策者知觉到的决策责任不同所致。因此在实验一的基础上实验二引入决策责任这一变量,考察其在心理距离对风险决策影响中的作用,研究结果证明了我们的假设。     

Methodological concerns in moral judgement research: Severity of harm shapes moral decisions

Research on moral judgement traditionally deals with scenarios involving trade-offs between saving lives and causing harm or death. In the field of moral psychology and philosophy, these specific scenarios are regularly used jointly, regardless of the severity of harm. We predicted that the confounding between distinct phrasings involving different degrees of harm will have an impact on the frequency of utilitarian judgements regardless of the mere moral value of the action (as usually investigated in the moral judgement field). In line with this prediction, a first experiment showed that utilitarian responses were less frequent for conflicting moral scenarios that involved death, as compared to scenarios that involved non-lethal harm. A second experiment showed that participants' utilitarian responses decreased as the severity of harm increased. Experimental studies on moral reasoning should take greater care to avoid potential confounds associated with this content factor.     

Many moral buttons or just one? Evidence from emotional facial expressions

We investigated whether moral violations involving harm selectively elicit anger, whereas purity violations selectively elicit disgust, as predicted by the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). We analysed participants’ spontaneous facial expressions as they listened to scenarios depicting moral violations of harm and purity. As predicted by MFT, anger reactions were elicited more frequently by harmful than by impure actions. However, violations of purity elicited more smiling reactions and expressions of anger than of disgust. This effect was found both in a classic set of scenarios and in a new set in which the different kinds of violations were matched on weirdness. Overall, these findings are at odds with predictions derived from MFT and provide support for “monist” accounts that posit harm at the basis of all moral violations. However, we found that smiles were differentially linked to purity violations, which leaves open the possibility of distinct moral modules.     

Moral Utilitarianism and Attitudes Toward Animals

The majority of studies investigating attitudes toward animals have underscored the role of demographic and personality factors. The study of the role of general moral worldviews on attitudes toward animals represents an important complementary perspective. In the current study, we analyzed the relationship between moral utilitarianism toward humans and attitudes toward animals. In psychological and neuroscientific studies, moral utilitarianism has been shown to be related to empathy deficits. We expected that utilitarian decision making would be related to the endorsement of an instrumental representation of animals. We measured utilitarianism with the trolley problem, a hypothetical moral dilemma widely used in the psychological study of moral reasoning. A sample of 20,474 French adults answered an online survey measuring attitudes toward animals and moral decision making involving human beings. Results showed that irrespective of participants’ age and gender, there was a slight relationship between utilitarianism measured by the trolley dilemma and the endorsement of an instrumental representation of animal. Limitations and implications for future research are considered.     

道德文本阅读中预期推理的许可效应的眼动研究

元分析表明道德许可效应具有一定的普遍性。为了直接检验这种效应作为认知偏差是否影响道德信息预期推理,本研究结合眼动追踪技术,比较了高/低善良被试在启动积极道德自我前后,阅读道德主题故事结果句的差异。阅读速度的眼动指标表明,启动主效应显著,积极道德结果的预期显著减弱,消极道德结果的预期显著增强,而且善良特质不能抑制这些倾向。这表明启动积极道德自我,会导致道德材料阅读加工速度产生许可效应。     

损失规避源于得失程数多于获得？——损失规避的得失程数变化视角的再检验

刘欢、梁竹苑 和 李纾（2009a）在证明损失规避的得失程数变化视角时所取的损益值取值范围、对安于现状偏差影响的控制以及所选取的得两程失一程和得三程失两程的决策对象这四个方面存在的缺陷。本研究通过弥补上述缺陷并设计无关变量得到更严格控制的得三程失两程的决策情景,对得失程数变化视角重新进行了检验。结果发现,寿命“得一程失一程”的属性并未导致损失规避消失;在广泛的损益值范围内以自由为对象的决策同样表现为损失规避;将自由感知为生而拥有和后天获得的人数大致相当;因而得失程数变化视角需作出重要修正,同时前景理论与情绪预测误差理论亦不可完全预测损失规避出现的条件。     

Moral Realism,Social Construction,and Realism,Social Construction,and Communal Ontology

The paper examines two forms of naturalistic moral realism, “Microstructure realism” (MSR) and “Reason realism” (RR). The latter, as we defend it, locates the objectivity of moral facts in socially constructed reality, but the former, as exemplified by David Brink’s model of naturalistic moral realism, secures the objectivity of moral facts in their micro-structure and a nomic supervenience relationship. We find MSR’s parity argument for this account of moral facts implausible; it yields a relationship between moral facts and their natural-scientific constitution that has a queer, slapped-together quality. We argue that the relationship needs to be spelled out by a process of social construction, involving collective intentionality and constitutive rules. We explain how our constructivist model of RR differs from a form of it defended by Michael Smith (1994), which analyzes moral facts by reference not to construction but rather to a hypothetical situation of full rationality. We agree with Smith, as against Bernard Williams, that a rational agent may have reasons for acting that go beyond the agent’s “subjective motivational set,” but we locate such reasons by reference to the agent’s membership in an actual community, and we explore the prospects for moral objectivity given this constraint on moral reasons.