Precise instructions determine participants’ memory search strategy in judgments of relative order in short lists

Memory often requires knowledge of the order of events. Previous findings about immediate judgments of relative order in short, subspan lists are variable regarding whether participants’ strategy is to search memory in the forward direction, starting from the first list item and progressing toward the end item, or in the backward direction, starting from the end item and progressing toward the start. We asked whether wording of the instructions influences participants’ search direction. Participants studied sequences of three to six consonants, and for an immediate, two-item probe of each list, judged which probe was presented earlier (“earlier” instruction) or later (“later” instruction) on the list. Forward and backward searches were supported for “earlier” and “later” instructions, respectively. Our findings suggest that participants have more than one effective strategy for order judgments in short lists, and that subtle instructional differences can bias memory search in either the forward or backward direction.     

Effects of ownership expressed by the first-person possessive pronoun

The present study examined the behavioral effects of the first-person possessive pronoun. In each trial, a noun (e.g. cup or bread) was presented to participants after visual presentation of a possessive pronoun “wo de” (Chinese for “my”) or “ta de” (Chinese for “his”), which formed ownership. Half participants were assigned to contextual encoding (CE) condition in which they were required to judge whether they liked the item expressed by a noun from the first or third-person perspective. The rest were assigned to perceptual encoding (PE) condition in which they were asked to judge what color the noun was. A subsequent recall test was performed. The results showed that there were significant memory and response advantages for nouns in “my” ownership under both conditions. The results were discussed with reference to self-specificity and other effects in the current study.     

Approaching the familiar: On the ability of mere exposure to direct approach and avoidance behavior

The mere-exposure literature has shown that familiar objects are preferred to novel objects. However, no work has definitively shown that mere exposure can direct and facilitate approach movements. In Experiment 1, participants were shown stimuli and were later re-exposed to them along with novel stimuli. Participants were directed to make an approach or avoidant motion to each and response times were recorded. As predicted, participants were quicker to approach and slower to avoid familiar relative to novel stimuli. In Experiment 2, participants were shown mere-exposed and novel symbols and were asked to “push” or “pull” a joystick in response to each, based on their intuition. Extending Experiment 1’s findings, participants freely selected an approach response more frequently for familiar compared to novel stimuli. Moreover, in this same experiment, familiar stimuli were judged as more likeable than were novel stimuli, and participants’ liking for familiar stimuli correlated with the frequency with which they were approached. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Psychophysiological components of imagery

McGuigan’s neuromuscular model of information processing (1978a, 1978b, and 1989) was investigated by electrically recording eye movements (electro-oculograms), covert lip and preferred arm responses (electromyograms), and electroencephalograms. This model predicts that codes are generated as the lips are uniquely activated when processing words beginning with bilabial sounds like “p” or “b,” as is the right arm to words like “pencil” that refer to its use. Twelve adult female participants selected for their high imagery ratings were asked to form images to three orally presented linguistic stimuli: the letter “p,” the words “pencil” and “pasture,” and to a control stimulus, the words “go blank.” The following findings were significant beyond the 0.05 level: an increased covert lip response only to the letter “p,” increased vertical eye activity to “p” and to the word “pencil,” right arm response only to the word “pencil,” and a decreased percentage of alpha waves from the right 02 lead only to the word “pasture.” Since these covert responses uniquely occurred during specific imagery processes, it is inferred that they are components of neuromuscular circuits that function in accord with the model of information processing tested.     

Conversation through actions and the changing of epistemic states in a game

When a person performs a certain action, it signifies that he is causing a certain event to occur. Therefore the action is conveying a certain true sentence. Playing a game is a mutual activity, namely the listener and the speaker undertake an exchange through a linguistic dialogue or communicate through action. Because of the peculiar nature of the action, the actions in games belong to an activity where the speaker speaks “true words” and the listener hears “true words.” A static game is a process through which the participants are simultaneously “speaking” and “listening”; and a dynamic game is a process where speaking and listening take place in turn. Each step of a dynamic game is a “speaking-listening” exchange. Through “listening” and “speaking,” changes in the epistemic states of the participants occur. Of course, the degree of change depends on the type of game being played. In a dynamic game, each participant proceeds through a process of induction, and thus forms new epistemic states.     

What “Intuitions” are Linguistic Evidence?

In “Intuitions in Linguistics” (2006a) and Ignorance of Language (2006b) I took it to be Chomskian orthodoxy that a speaker’s metalinguistic intuitions are provided by her linguistic competence. I argued against this view in favor of the alternative that the intuitions are empirical theory-laden central-processor responses to linguistic phenomena. The concern about these linguistic intuitions arises from their apparent role as evidence for a grammar. Mark Textor, “Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions” (2009), argues that I have picked the wrong intuitions: I should have picked non-judgmental linguistic “seemings”. These reside between metalinguistic judgments and linguistic performances and have an epistemic authority that the orthodox view may well be able to explain. Textor seems to think that the metalinguistic intuitions are not evidence at all. I argue that he is wrong about that. More importantly, I argue that there are no “in-between” linguistic seemings with epistemic authority.     

The mineness of experience

In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization. Finally I suggest that the self, though irreducible to inter-experiential relations, is not a “separately existing entity”, but should be conceived of as a dimension, namely the dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences.

Exploring the hardship of ease: Subjective and objective effort in the ease-of-processing paradigm

Numerous studies examined the role of processing effort in judgments using the “ease-of-processing” paradigm in which participants generate or retrieve few or many issue-relevant thoughts. Because earlier studies only assessed the subjective effort, it is unclear if this paradigm also mobilizes objective effort, and how such effort relates to subjective effort. These questions were addressed in two experiments modeled on standard tasks from the processing effort literature: “ease of argument generation” (Study 1) and “ease of retrieval” (Study 2). In both experiments we simultaneously measured subjective effort (via self-report) and objective effort (via cardiovascular reactivity). The results showed that processing ease manipulations (generation or retrieval of few vs. many exemplars) influence not only subjective effort, but also objective effort, as reflected especially by increases of systolic blood pressure in the many exemplars condition. However, only subjective effort was related to judgment. In the discussion, we consider the role of various forms of effort and other relevant variables in “processing ease” effects.     

Perceptual scaling of voice identity: common dimensions for different vowels and speakers

The aims of our study were: (1) to determine if the acoustical parameters used by normal subjects to discriminate between different speakers vary when comparisons are made between pairs of two of the same or different vowels, and if they are different for male and female voices; (2) to ask whether individual voices can reasonably be represented as points in a low-dimensional perceptual space such that similarly sounding voices are located close to one another. Subjects were presented with pairs of voices from 16 male and 16 female speakers uttering the three French vowels “a”, “i” and “u” and asked to give speaker similarity judgments. Multidimensional analyses of the similarity matrices were performed separately for male and female voices and for three types of comparisons: same vowels, different vowels and overall average. The resulting dimensions were then interpreted a posteriori in terms of relevant acoustical measures. For both male and female voices, a two-dimensional perceptual space was found to be most appropriate, with axes largely corresponding to contributions of the larynx (pitch) and supra-laryngeal vocal tract (formants), mirroring the two largely independent components of source and filter in voice production. These perceptual spaces of male and female voices and their corresponding voice samples are available at: section Resources.     

Transmuted Expertise: How Technical Non-Experts Can Assess Experts and Expertise

To become an expert in a technical domain means acquiring the tacit knowledge pertaining to the relevant domain of expertise, at least, according to the programme known as “Studies of Expertise and Experience” (SEE). We know only one way to acquire tacit knowledge and that is through some form of sustained social contact with the group that has it. Those who do not have such contact cannot acquire the expertise needed to make technical judgments. They can, however, use social expertise to judge between experts or expert claims. Where social expertise is used to make technical judgments we refer to it as “transmuted expertise”. The various kinds of transmuted expertise are described and analysed.     

Spatial memory in the real world: long-term representations of everyday environments

When people learn an environment, they appear to establish a principle orientation just as they would determine the “top” of a novel object. Evidence for reference orientations has largely come from observations of orientation dependence in pointing judgments: Participants are most accurate when asked to recall the space from a particular orientation. However, these investigations have used highly constrained encoding in both time-scale and navigational goals, leaving open the possibility that larger spaces experienced during navigational learning depend on a different organizational scheme. To test this possibility, we asked undergraduates to perform judgments of relative direction on familiar landmarks around their well-learned campus. Participants showed clear evidence for a single reference orientation, generally aligned along salient axes defined by the buildings and paths. This result argues that representing space involves the establishment of a reference orientation, a requirement that endures over repeated exposures and extensive experience.     

Semantic priming of familiar songs

We explored the functional organization of semantic memory for music by comparing priming across familiar songs both within modalities (Experiment 1, tune to tune; Experiment 3, category label to lyrics) and across modalities (Experiment 2, category label to tune; Experiment 4, tune to lyrics). Participants judged whether or not the target tune or lyrics were real (akin to lexical decision tasks). We found significant priming, analogous to linguistic associative-priming effects, in reaction times for related primes as compared to unrelated primes, but primarily for within-modality comparisons. Reaction times to tunes (e.g., “Silent Night”) were faster following related tunes (“Deck the Hall”) than following unrelated tunes (“God Bless America”). However, a category label (e.g., Christmas) did not prime tunes from within that category. Lyrics were primed by a related category label, but not by a related tune. These results support the conceptual organization of music in semantic memory, but with potentially weaker associations across modalities.     

A Smile is Just a Smile: But Only for Men. Sex Differences in Meaning of Faces Scales

This study tests psychometrics of the faces scale that is often used in organizational psychology to assess emotions, attitudes, and well-being. In analyzing 10,584 two-categorical judgments (“sad” versus “happy”) of 11 faces from 72 participants, women judged a face with a horizontal line as mouth (“neutral face”) more often sad than happy and significantly more often sad than men did. Moreover, women adapted their judgments to the range of faces under study in showing a significant contrast effect. In a range of neutral to bright smiling faces a face showing a mild smile was judged to be sad, while in a range of neutral to heavy griming faces a mild grim was judged to be happy. Sex differences in meaning of faces within faces scales and their implications for the use of the faces scale in work and organizational psychology are discussed.     

The integration of psychotherapy: Goal or utopia?

Both researchers and therapists stress the importance of integrating different forms of psychotherapy. Integration may be achieved in three ways. Supporters of the “empirical strategy” believe that more research is the solution. Followers of the “conceptual strategy” try to theorize on psychotherapy using psychological and sociological concepts. Other researchers see a “linguistic strategy” as the way to achieving a better understanding of psychotherapy. Whether any of these strategies will enable us to increase our insight into psychotherapy is questionable. All focus on technical aspects, that is, on the means to achieve effects. Yet, therapeutic effects cannot be understood unless they are interconnected with diagnostics. This paper argues that an integrated theory should be developed which includes diagnostics and treatment and which is supported by a theory on psychological (dys)functioning.     

Perceived informativeness of verbal information

When people are asked to rate verbal material (texts, statements, and statements forming part of a text) according to informativeness, their judgments will to a large extent depend upon how much they already know about the subject, and how novel the communication is to them. This will in some cases make them stress novelty and in other cases familiarity as the most important determinants for expected or perceived informativeness. It is argued that these apparently contradictory trends are reconcilable by a propositional (subject-predicate) model of information, which presupposes an identifiablesubject of the communication (“what it is all about”), as well as something to be predicated about this subject, topic, or theme. This kind of information structure allows the communication to contain both novel and familiar elements at the same time, with informativeness being at a peak when something quite new and unexpected is told about a familiar subject, or when a new subject is made familiar (i.e., satisfactorily explained) to the person. This article was written when the author was on sabbatical leave at the University of Leicester. The study was supported by a grant from the Norwegian Research Council for Science and the Humanities.     

Adjective–noun order as representational structure: Native-language grammar influences perception of similarity and recognition memory

This article describes two experiments linking native-language grammar rules with implications for perception of similarity and recognition memory. In prenominal languages (e.g., English), adjectives usually precede nouns, whereas in postnominal languages (e.g., Portuguese), nouns usually precede adjectives. We explored the influence of such rules upon similarity judgments about, and recognition of, objects with multiple category attributes (one nominal attribute and one adjectival attribute). The results supported the hypothesized primacy effect of native-language word order such that nouns generally carried more weight for Portuguese speakers than for English speakers. This pattern was observed for judgments of similarity (i.e., Portuguese speakers tended to judge objects that shared a noun-designated attribute as more similar than did English speakers), as well as for false alarms in recognition memory (i.e., Portuguese speakers tended to falsely recognize more objects if they possessed a familiar noun attribute, relative to English speakers). The implications of such linguistic effects for the cognition of similarity and memory are discussed.     

Knowledge claims and context: loose use

There is abundant evidence of contextual variation in the use of “S knows p.” Contextualist theories explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses that refer to standards of justification determined by “practical” features of either the subject’s context (Hawthorne & Stanley) or the ascriber’s context (Lewis, Cohen, & DeRose). There is extensive linguistic counterevidence to both forms. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims is better explained by common pragmatic factors. I show here that one is variable strictness. “S knows p” is commonly used loosely to implicate “S is close enough to knowing p for contextually indicated purposes.” A pragmatic account may use a range of semantics, even contextualist. I use an invariant semantics on which knowledge requires complete justification. This combination meets the Moorean constraint as well as any linguistic theory should, and meets the intuition constraint much better than contextualism. There is no need for ad hoc error theories. The variation in conditions of assertability and practical rationality is better explained by variably strict constraints. It will follow that “S knows p” is used loosely to implicate that the condition for asserting “p” and using it in practical reasoning are satisfied.     

The revelation effect for autobiographical memory: A mixture-model analysis

Participants provided information about their childhood by rating their confidence about whether they had experienced various events (e.g., “broke a window playing ball”). On some trials, participants unscrambled a key word from the event phrase (e.g., wdinwo—window) or an unrelated word (e.g., gnutge—nugget) before seeing the event and giving their confidence ratings. The act of unscrambling led participants to increase their confidence that the event occurred in their childhood, but only when the confidence rating immediately followed the act of unscrambling. This increase in confidence mirrors the “revelation effect” observed in word recognition experiments. In the present article, we analyzed our data using a new signal detection mixture distribution model that does not require the researcher to know the veracity of memory judgments a priori. Our analysis reveals that unscrambling a key word or an unrelated word affects response bias and discriminability in autobiographical memory tests in ways that are very similar to those that have been previously found for word recognition tasks.     

Building the virtual city: Public participation through e-democracy

In this paper, we outline how we have developed a series of technologies that enable planning information to be disseminated to affected citizens so that professionals and politicians can engage with these stakeholders in realizing more effective plans. Our main theme is based on the generic idea of the “virtual city” which is conceived in terms of the geography and geometry of the real city. This is a digital representation using a variety of software and multimedia, made interactively available over the web. We begin with a brief comment on different types of virtual city and then summarize the key problems of using such virtualities in public participation, more recently considered as part of the e-democracy movement. We outline our previous attempts to engage in such online participation in east London for these have been an essential prerequisite to the development of “Virtual London,” the application reported here which is currently being fashioned for widespread dissemination of planning information by the Greater London Authority (GLA). We then argue that virtual cities should go well beyond the traditional conceptions of 3D GIS and CAD into virtual worlds and online design. But we also urge caution in pushing the digital message too far, showing how more conventional tangible media is always necessary in rooting such models in more realistic and familiar representations. He has pioneered various multimedia, virtual reality methods 3D GIS, and CAD for problems of public participation in planning. He is currently the director of the Greater London Authority’s Virtual London project within CASA. Amongst his recent contributions, he has published (with S. Evans, M. Batty, and S. Batty) “Community Participation in Urban Regeneration Using Internet Technologies,” in London: A Sustainable World City and “30 Days in ActiveWorlds: Community, Design, and Terrorism in a Virtual World,” in The Social Life of Avatars, Presence and Interaction in Shared Virtual Environments. Stephen Evans is also a senior research fellow at CASA. His background is in GIS and he has worked on several projects including LEO—London Environment Online, PROPOLIS—the development of GIS interfaces to urban land use transportation models, and currently on the Virtual London and Camden Panoramas projects. Amongst his recent work, he has published (with P. Steadman) “Interfacing Land-Use Transport Models with GIS: The Inverness Model,” in Advanced Spatial Analysis: The CASA Book of GIS and (with A. Hudson-Smith and M. Batty) “Homes in Hackney Point to the Future,” Planning, 12 July 2002. Michael Batty is professor of Spatial Analysis and Planning and director of CASA. He has a joint appointment between the Department of Geography and the Bartlett School of Architecture and Planning. His books range from Urban Modelling to Fractal Cities. He is editor of Environment and Planning B. The work of his group can be seen at 〈http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk〉 and in the recent book Advanced Spatial Analysis. He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 2001 and was awarded the CBE for “services to geography” in 2004.