焦循易学方法论的哲学意义

文章认为焦循通过“旁通”、“当位失道”、“时行”、“八卦相错”、“比例”五图,编织了一套表现为象数形式的逻辑类比推理的思想构架。并将自己的道德理想尽数纳入构架之中。这样。焦循一方面确立了研究易学的方法论,另一方面也具有以“旁通”为主体的哲学意义。焦循易学的方法论,标志着清代中期易学的重要转向,它已迈出象数与义理诠释易学的旧轨。然而将易学的探求严格限定在各种法则的框架之内,因而也就混淆了易学的象数系统与义理系统的各自独立性。因此,易学的哲学意义也就被逻辑推理的工具价值所取代。     

Madness strikes back

This commentary is concerned with the involvement of mental health service users in research. It will argue that research carried out by service users is one way of giving voice to a previously silenced group—the mad. It is one way in which ‘Madness Strikes Back’. The main theoretical model to be used is that of the early Foucault. I will not be concerned with what has become known as ‘Foucauldian discourse analysis’ since nowhere in Foucault's writing is there reference to conversation or talk. I will, however, be concerned with power as mental health service users are amongst the most disempowered of groups in all societies. I will also be concerned with Foucault's claim that, since the Enlightenment, madness has been positioned as the antithesis of reason, as ‘unreason’. This distinction can be argued to persist in the field of research. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Homo moralis strikes back

Restorative justice presents a morally relevant method for alternative conflict resolution. However, this potential is not always applied fully. Instead, the practice may be used in ways foreign to it. This claim comes to the fore in the practice of restorative justice in domestic violence cases. Despite the persistent feminist critique of it the practice is widely offered. This suggests that the practice can cater to needs not originally depicted in the rationale of it. This paper works out of a wittgensteinian approach and argues that there is a confusing language use going on around mediation. The argument is based on an analysis of public talk of mediation in Finland which shows that it is predominantly conducted in the light of homo economicus. This is problematic. The paper suggests that instead of referring to mediation in terms of homo economicus, the value of it should be counted in terms of homo moralis. This is what restorative justice originally intended to do. The paper establishes a new perspective on the critique of restorative justice in general and offers a fruitful way forward.     

Philosophical Idling and Philosophical Relativity

Peter Unger has challenged philosophical objectivism, the thesis that traditional philosophical problems have definite objective answers. He argues from semantic relativity for philosophical relativity, the thesis that for certain philosophical problems, there is no objective answer. I clarify, formulate and challenge Unger's argument. According to Unger, philosophical relativism explains philosophical idling, the fact that philosophical debates appear endless, philosophical disagreements seem irresolvable, and very little substantial progress seems made towards satisfactory and definite answers to philosophical problems. I argue, however, that the reality of philosophical idling is doubtful and, ironically, undermined by philosophical relativism. I then raise problems for several steps in Unger's argument for philosophical relativity. I conclude by arguing that philosophical relativism can avoid self‐defeat only by an ad hoc limitation of its scope. 1     

Philosophical Expertise and Philosophical Methodology

In recent years a new discussion on the nature of philosophical expertise has emerged: whether philosophers possess a special kind of expertise, what such expertise would entail, how to measure it, and related concerns. The aim of the present article is to clarify certain related points across these debates in the hope of paving a clearer path forward, by addressing the following. (1) The expertise defense, which seems central to many discussions on methodology and expertise, has been misconstrued at times. (2) Questions of expertise and methodology could be separated more clearly. (3) The study of expertise may be important in its own right; however, there may be good reasons to give priority to methodological concerns. (4) Finally, when viewed in light of methodological concerns, a new project emerges when engaging with recent contributions to the expertise debate. The present article attempts a brief outline of this project.     

Psychology strikes out: Coleman R. Griffith and the Chicago Cubs

Coleman R. Griffith is widely known as the father of sport psychology in the United States. He directed the Research in Athletics Laboratory at the University of Illinois in the late 1920s and early 1930s and produced many articles and books on the psychology of sport. In 1938, P. K. Wrigley, owner of the Chicago Cubs, hired him to help improve the team's performance. Griffith and an assistant filmed and measured the players' skills, attempting to build a "scientific" training program for the team. Many of Griffith's subjects, most notably the managers, objected to his interference (as they saw it) and attempted to undermine his work. Griffith wrote more than 600 pages of reports on his work with the Cubs between 1938 and 1940. This article examines the content of those reports and the reasons for the failure of Griffith's project.     

Formal Logic vs. Philosophical Argument

The wider topic to which the content of this paper belongs is that of the relationship between formal logic and real argumentation. Of particular potential interest in this connection are held to be substantive arguments constructed by philosophers reputed equally as authorities in logical theory. A number of characteristics are tentatively indicated by the author as likely to be encountered in such arguments. The discussion centers afterwards, by way of specification, on a remarkable piece of argument quoted in Cicero’s dialog On Divination and ascribed to Stoic thinkers. The Stoics’ formal theory of inference is summarily referred to in this context, with special emphasis on their basic deductive schemata (‘indemonstrables’), some of them recognizable as links in the overall structure of the quoted argument. The main lines of Cicero’s criticism of the Stoic argument are next commented upon, with emphasis on his implied view as to the requirements of a good argument. Towards the end of the paper, a few considerations are added on the changes in the prevailing style of argumentation conspicuous in the three famous Roman Stoics.     

从承认理论到多元正义构想——霍耐特哲学思想发展的基本轨迹

承认理论是霍氏政治哲学、道德哲学的思想核心,多元正义构想则是霍氏承认理论的进一步拓展.因而,从承认理论到多元正义构想是霍氏哲学思想发展基本轨迹.如果说,霍氏试图将承认理论从交往理论进一步发展为道德一元论,使之处于康德传统的道德理论与社群主义之间;那么,其多元正义构想及政治伦理学则试图在康德道德哲学、后现代伦理学与哈贝马斯话话伦理学之间进行调和.总起来说,霍氏承认理论已经构成了一个比较完整的框架,但多元正义构想及政治伦理学则只是处于初创阶段,还有待于进一步阐发和完善.     

医学的哲学存在与医生的哲学修养

医学的哲学存在是由人的哲学存在所决定的.医学人的哲学修养与医学责任的承担、医学价值的实现有着非常密切的关系.提高医学人的哲学修养有助于医学实践过程中许多困惑的排解.然而,良好的哲学修养不可能一蹴而就,它需要医学人长期地、有意识地、下苦功去修炼和培养.     

Philosophical Diversity and Disagreement

Widespread and lasting consensus has not been philosophy's fate. Indeed, one of philosophy's most striking features is its ability to accommodate “not only different answers to philosophical questions” but also “total disagreement on what questions are philosophical” (Rorty 1995 , 58). It is therefore hardly surprising that philosophers' responses to this metaphilosophical predicament have been similarly varied. This article considers two recent diagnoses of philosophical diversity: Kornblith and Rescher (respectively) claim that taking philosophical disagreement seriously does not lead to metaphilosophical scepticism. The article argues that their confidence is misplaced in so far as both wrongly assume that ordinary, first‐order philosophical practice and second‐order metaphilosophical reflection are separate enterprises.     

Intuition and Philosophical Methodology

Intuition serves a variety of roles in contemporary philosophy. This paper provides a historical discussion of the revival of intuition in the 1970s, untangling some of the ways that intuition has been used and offering some suggestions concerning its proper place in philosophical investigation. Contrary to some interpretations of the results of experimental philosophy, it is argued that generalized skepticism with respect to intuition is unwarranted. Intuition can continue to play an important role as part of a methodologically conservative stance towards philosophical investigation. I argue that methodological conservatism should be sharply distinguished from the process of evaluating individual propositions. Nevertheless, intuition is not always a reliable guide to truth and experimental philosophy can serve a vital ameliorative role in determining the scope and limits of our intuitive competence with respect to various areas of inquiry.