The error in the error theory

Moral error theory of the kind defended by J. L. Mackie and Richard Joyce is premised on two claims: (1) that moral judgements essentially presuppose that moral value has absolute authority, and (2) that this presupposition is false, because nothing has absolute authority. This paper accepts (2) but rejects (1). It is argued first that (1) is not the best explanation of the evidence from moral practice, and second that even if it were, the error theory would still be mistaken, because the assumption does not contaminate the meaning or truth-conditions of moral claims. These are determined by the essential application conditions for moral concepts, which are relational rather than absolute. An analogy is drawn between moral judgements and motion judgements.     

Student Agency in Literacy: Validation of the Student Agency Profile (StAP)

Abstract

There have been recent calls to support student agency in the field of literacy. Agency, which we define in the context of schooling, is a multidimensional construct where individuals exert influence and create opportunities in the learning context through intentions, decisions, and actions. We propose highlighting agency as an interconnected construct, which includes self-perception as readers and writers, intentionality, choice-making, persistence, and interactiveness. Elementary students (n?=?1,726) completed surveys of their agency along with standardized literacy assessments. Statistical analyses largely aligned with the hypothesized dimensions of agency. Relationships to student literacy achievement were stronger in grades 3^rd–5^th than in 1^st–2^nd grades. Discussion highlights how elementary students have a voice in their agency as it pertains to literacy. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.     

Looking like a criminal: Stereotypical black facial features promote face source memory error

The present studies tested whether African American face type (stereotypical or nonstereotypical) facilitated stereotype-consistent categorization, and whether that categorization influenced memory accuracy and errors. Previous studies have shown that stereotypically Black features are associated with crime and violence (e.g., Blair, Judd, & Chapleau Psychological Science 15:674?C679, 2004; Blair, Judd, & Fallman Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 87:763?C778, 2004; Blair, Judd, Sadler, & Jenkins Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83:5?C252002); here, we extended this finding to investigate whether there is a bias toward remembering and recategorizing stereotypical faces as criminals. Using category labels, consistent (or inconsistent) with race-based expectations, we tested whether face recognition and recategorization were driven by the similarity between a target??s facial features and a stereotyped category (i.e., stereotypical Black faces associated with crime/violence). The results revealed that stereotypical faces were associated more often with a stereotype-consistent label (Study 1), were remembered and correctly recategorized as criminals (Studies 2?C4), and were miscategorized as criminals when memory failed. These effects occurred regardless of race or gender. Together, these findings suggest that face types have strong category associations that can promote stereotype-motivated recognition errors. Implications for eyewitness accuracy are discussed.     

Agency and the Annunciation

Prior research has revealed that when healthy participants, who are not artists, are asked to draw a person who is performing an action, they are more likely to position the agent on the left and the person or object receiving this action, the patient, on the right. Thus, the goal of this study was to learn whether in works of art, such as those portraying the Annunciation of the angel Gabriel to the Blessed Virgin Mary, artists would be more likely to place the angel, who is the agent, on the left of Mary, who is the patient. We found that in our sample of 604 paintings of the Annunciation by different artists that the agent Gabriel is significantly more frequently portrayed to left of Mary. Whereas this result supports the left-agent, right-patient hypothesis, the reason for this spatial bias is not entirely known, but may be related to several factors such as the learned left to right direction of reading/writing in European languages, left-versus right-sided emotional facial expressive asymmetries, a left-sided spatial attentional bias and a spatial motor-action preference of upper extremity for making abductive (left to right) movements when using the right upper extremity. Additionally, biblical explanations and theological principles may have influenced the organization of this scene.     

On the Moral Agency of Computers

Can computer systems ever be considered moral agents? This paper considers two factors that are explored in the recent philosophical literature. First, there are the important domains in which computers are allowed to act, made possible by their greater functional capacities. Second, there is the claim that these functional capacities appear to embody relevant human abilities, such as autonomy and responsibility. I argue that neither the first (Doman-Function) factor nor the second (Simulacrum) factor gets at the central issue in the case for computer moral agency: whether they can have the kinds of intentional states that cause their decisions and actions. I give an account that builds on traditional action theory and allows us to conceive of computers as genuine moral agents in virtue of their own causally efficacious intentional states. These states can cause harm or benefit to moral patients, but do not depend on computer consciousness or intelligence.     

Enkratic Agency

An enkratic agent is someone who intends to do A because she believes she should do A. Being enkratic is usually understood as something rationality requires of you. However, we must distinguish between different conceptions of enkratic rationality. According to a fairly common view, enkratic rationality is solely a normative requirement on agency: it tells us how agents should think and act. However, I shall argue that this normativist conception of enkratic rationality faces serious difficulties: it makes it a mystery how an agent's thinking and acting can be guided by the enkratic requirement, which, as I shall further argue, is something that an adequate conception of enkratic rationality must be able to explain. This, I suggest, motivates exploring a different account of enkratic rationality. On this view, enkratic rationality is primarily a constitutive requirement on agency: it is a standard internal to agency, i.e., a standard that partly spells out what it is to exercise one's agential powers well.     

Recognising the ageing face: the role of age in face processing.

The effect of age-induced changes on face recognition were investigated as a means of exploring the role of age in the encoding of new facial memories. The ability of participants to recognise each of six previously learnt faces was tested with versions which were either identical to the learnt faces, the same age (but different in pose and expression), or younger or older in age. Participants were able to cope well with facial changes induced by ageing: their performance with older, but not younger, versions was comparable to that with faces which differed only in pose and expression. Since the large majority of different age versions were recognised successfully, it can be concluded that the process of recognition does not require an exact match in age characteristics between the stored representation of a face and the face currently in view. As the age-related changes explored here were those that occur during the period of growth, this in turn implies that the underlying structural physical properties of the face are (in addition to pose and facial expression) invariant to a certain extent.     

Bringing the National Security Agency into the Classroom: Ethical Reflections on Academia-Intelligence Agency Partnerships

Science and Engineering Ethics - Academia-intelligence agency collaborations are on the rise for a variety of reasons. These can take many forms, one of which is in the classroom, using students to...     

Agency and communion in the structure of parental representations

We administered the revised Assessment of Qualitative and Structural Dimensions of Object Representations (Blatt, Chevron, Quinlan, Schaffer, & Wein, 1992) to 279 male and female undergraduate students and carried out independent principal components analyses of maternal and paternal ratings. Three stable factors, Agency, Communion, and Structure, were found in both sets of ratings. This factor structure differed from that reported by Quinlan, Blatt, Chevron, and Wein (1992). Results found here are consistent with contemporary interpersonal personality theory.     

Proxy Agency in Collective Action

This paper gives an account of proxy agency in the context of collective action. It takes the case of a group announcing something by way of a spokesperson as an illustration. In proxy agency, it seems that one person or subgroup's doing something counts as orconstitutes or is recognized as (tantamount to) another person or group's doing something. Proxy agency is pervasive in institutional action. It has been taken to be a straightforward counterexample to an appealing deflationary view of collective action as a matter of all members of a group making a contribution to bringing about some event. I show that this is a mistake. I give a deflationary account of constitutive rules in terms of essentially collective action types. I then give an account of one form of constitutive agency in terms of constitutive rules. I next give an account of status functions—of which being a spokesperson is one—that also draws on the concept of a constitutive rule. I then show how these materials help us to see how proxy agency is an expression of the agency of all members of the group credited with doing something when the proxy acts.     

Moral Agency in Other Animals

Some philosophers have argued that moral agency is characteristic of humans alone and that its absence from other animals justifies granting higher moral status to humans. However, human beings do not have a monopoly on moral agency, which admits of varying degrees and does not require mastery of moral principles. The view that all and only humans possess moral agency indicates our underestimation of the mental lives of other animals. Since many other animals are moral agents (to varying degrees), they are also subject to (limited) moral obligations, examples of which are provided in this paper. But, while moral agency is sufficient for significant moral status, it is by no means necessary.     

Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency

Several philosophers claim that the phenomenology of one's own agency conflicts with standard causal theories of action, couched in terms of causation by mental events or states. Others say that the phenomenology is prima facie incompatible with such a theory, even if in the end, a reconciliation can be worked out. Here, it is argued that the type of action theory in question is consistent with what can plausibly be said to be presented to us in our experience of our agency. Several routes to a claim that there is nevertheless a prima facie incompatibility are examined, and all are found wanting. The phenomenology of agency, it is argued, is no threat to a standard causal theory of action.     

Religious Agency and the Limits of Intersectionality

This article probes the relative absence of religion within discussions of intersectionality, and begins to address this absence by bringing intersectionality studies into conversation with another significant field within feminist theory: the study of religious women's agency. Although feminist literatures on intersectionality and religious women's agency have garnered a great deal of scholarly attention, these two bodies of work have rarely been engaged together. After surveying both fields, I argue that research on religious women's agency not only exposes an ambiguity at the heart of intersectionality between identity and oppression, but also challenges several aspects of intersectionality studies, especially as recent theorists increasingly turn away from identity politics in favor of a structural critique of power. These aspects of intersectionality include its often unsituated critique of power, as well as its reliance on a negatively defined consensus on anti‐oppression.     

Impure Agency and the Just War

Feminist critiques of intention challenge some aspects of traditional just war reasoning, including the criteria of right intention and discrimination (particularly as interpreted using the doctrine of double effect). I take note of these challenges and propose some directions just war reasoners might take in response. First, right intention can be evaluated more accurately by judging what actors in war actually do than by attempting to uncover inward dispositions. Assessing whether agents in war have taken due care to minimize foreseeable collateral damage, avoided intentional targeting of noncombatants, corrected previous mistakes in their later actions, and taken responsibility to repair unintended damage they cause are examples of ways in which just war reasoners can evaluate intention by looking at actions.