Detection of Threats under Inattentional Blindness and Perceptual Load

Inattentional blindness refers to the failure to detect the salient unexpected stimuli in one’s visual field when performing an attention-demanding task. The present study examined the detection of threats in a static inattentional blindness paradigm. And the detection rates of evolutionary and ontogenetic threats were compared. Participants counted the number of color words from among three (low load) or six (high load) items presented in a circular array. On the last of six trials, an unexpected threatening/neutral illustration was presented in the center of the array along with the task stimuli. Participants detection of the illustration were thus measured and analyzed. The results suggested that: (1) the threatening stimuli, both evolutionary and ontogenetic, were detected more frequently than non-threatening stimuli; (2) the unexpected illustrations were identified more frequently under low-load condition than under high-load condition; (3) even under high-load situation, the threatening illustrations were more frequently identified than neutral ones. Threats are more likely to be detected under inattentional blindness and perceptual load.     

Animacy,perceptual load,and inattentional blindness

Inattentional blindness is the failure to notice unexpected objects in a visual scene while engaging in an attention-demanding task. We examined the effects of animacy and perceptual load on inattentional blindness. Participants searched for a category exemplar under low or high perceptual load. On the last trial, the participants were exposed to an unexpected object that was either animate or inanimate. Unexpected objects were detected more frequently when they were animate rather than inanimate, and more frequently with low than with high perceptual loads. We also measured working memory capacity and found that it predicted the detection of unexpected objects, but only with high perceptual loads. The results are consistent with the animate-monitoring hypothesis, which suggests that animate objects capture attention because of the importance of the detection of animate objects in ancestral hunter–gatherer environments.     

Inattentional blindness is influenced by exposure time not motion speed

Inattentional blindness is a striking phenomenon in which a salient object within the visual field goes unnoticed because it is unexpected, and attention is focused elsewhere. Several attributes of the unexpected object, such as size and animacy, have been shown to influence the probability of inattentional blindness. At present it is unclear whether or how the speed of a moving unexpected object influences inattentional blindness. We demonstrated that inattentional blindness rates are considerably lower if the unexpected object moves more slowly, suggesting that it is the mere exposure time of the object rather than a higher saliency potentially induced by higher speed that determines the likelihood of its detection. Alternative explanations could be ruled out: The effect is not based on a pop-out effect arising from different motion speeds in relation to the primary-task stimuli (Experiment 2), nor is it based on a higher saliency of slow-moving unexpected objects (Experiment 3).     

The effects of perceptual load on semantic processing under inattention

Inattentional blindness refers to a failure to consciously detect an irrelevant object that appears without any expectation when attention is engaged with another task. The perceptual load theory predicts that task-irrelevant stimuli will reach awareness only when the primary task is of low load, which allows processing resources to spill over to processing task-irrelevant stimuli as well. We studied whether perceptual load has an effect on inattentional blindness for a task-irrelevant stimulus whose meaning is or is not relevant to the attentional goals of the observer. In the critical trial, a word appeared without any expectation in the center of a display of attended pictures. The results showed that, under both high and low load, unexpected words belonging to the attended semantic category were detected more often than semantically unrelated words. These results imply that task-irrelevant stimuli, whose meanings are relevant to the observer’s task, enter awareness irrespective of perceptual load.     

What you see is what you set: sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness

This article reports a theoretical and experimental attempt to relate and contrast 2 traditionally separate research programs: inattentional blindness and attention capture. Inattentional blindness refers to failures to notice unexpected objects and events when attention is otherwise engaged. Attention capture research has traditionally used implicit indices (e.g., response times) to investigate automatic shifts of attention. Because attention capture usually measures performance whereas inattentional blindness measures awareness, the 2 fields have existed side by side with no shared theoretical framework. Here, the authors propose a theoretical unification, adapting several important effects from the attention capture literature to the context of sustained inattentional blindness. Although some stimulus properties can influence noticing of unexpected objects, the most influential factor affecting noticing is a person's own attentional goals. The authors conclude that many--but not all--aspects of attention capture apply to inattentional blindness but that these 2 classes of phenomena remain importantly distinct.     

Release of inattentional blindness by high working memory load: elucidating the relationship between working memory and selective attention

An unexpected stimulus often remains unnoticed if attention is focused elsewhere. This inattentional blindness has been shown to be increased under conditions of high memory load. Here we show that increasing working memory load can also have the opposite effect of reducing inattentional blindness (i.e., improving stimulus detection) if stimulus detection is competing for attention with a concurrent visual task. Participants were required to judge which of two lines was the longer while holding in working memory either one digit (low load) or six digits (high load). An unexpected visual stimulus was presented once alongside the line judgment task. Detection of the unexpected stimulus was significantly improved under conditions of higher working memory load. This improvement in performance prompts the striking conclusion that an effect of cognitive load is to increase attentional spread, thereby enhancing our ability to detect perceptual stimuli to which we would normally be inattentionally blind under less taxing cognitive conditions. We discuss the implications of these findings for our understanding of the relationship between working memory and selective attention.     

Inattentional blindness for ignored words: Comparison of explicit and implicit memory tasks

Inattentional blindness is described as the failure to perceive a supra-threshold stimulus when attention is directed away from that stimulus. Based on performance on an explicit recognition memory test and concurrent functional imaging data Rees, Russell, Frith, and Driver [Rees, G., Russell, C., Frith, C. D., & Driver, J. (1999). Inattentional blindness versus inattentional amnesia for fixated but ignored words. Science, 286, 2504–2507] reported inattentional blindness for word stimuli that were fixated but ignored. The present study examined both explicit and implicit memory for fixated but ignored words using a selective-attention task in which overlapping picture/word stimuli were presented at fixation. No explicit awareness of the unattended words was apparent on a recognition memory test. Analysis of an implicit memory task, however, indicated that unattended words were perceived at a perceptual level. Thus, the selective-attention task did not result in perfect filtering as suggested by Rees et al. While there was no evidence of conscious perception, subjects were not blind to the implicit perceptual properties of fixated but ignored words.     

The effects of individual differences and task difficulty on inattentional blindness

Most studies of inattentional blindness—the failure to notice an unexpected object when attention is focused elsewhere—have focused on one critical trial. For that trial, noticing the unexpected object might be a result of random variability, so that any given individual would be equally likely to notice the unexpected object. On the other hand, individual differences in the ability to perform the primary task might make noticing more likely for some individuals than for others. Increasing the difficulty of the primary task has been shown to decrease noticing rates for both brief static displays (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007) and dynamic monitoring tasks (Simons & Chabris, 1999). However, those studies did not explore whether individual differences in noticing arise from differences in the ability to perform the primary task. For our Experiment 1, we used a staircase procedure to equate primary task performance across individuals in a dynamic inattentional blindness task and found that the demands of the primary task affected noticing rates when individual differences in accuracy were minimized. In Experiment 2, we found that individual differences in primary task performance did not predict noticing of an unexpected object. Together, these findings suggest that although the demands of the primary task do affect inattentional blindness rates, individual differences in the ability to meet those demands do not.     

The role of perceptual load in inattentional blindness

Perceptual load theory offers a resolution to the long-standing early vs. late selection debate over whether task-irrelevant stimuli are perceived, suggesting that irrelevant perception depends upon the perceptual load of task-relevant processing. However, previous evidence for this theory has relied on RTs and neuroimaging. Here we tested the effects of load on conscious perception using the "inattentional blindness" paradigm. As predicted by load theory, awareness of a task-irrelevant stimulus was significantly reduced by higher perceptual load (with increased numbers of search items, or a harder discrimination vs. detection task). These results demonstrate that conscious perception of task-irrelevant stimuli critically depends upon the level of task-relevant perceptual load rather than intentions or expectations, thus enhancing the resolution to the early vs. late selection debate offered by the perceptual load theory.     

刺激类型及表征关系对无意视盲的影响

通过考察刺激类型以及重叠呈现的图片流和词语流的表征关系对非注意刺激的捕获差异,试图考察刺激类型和表征关系对无意视盲（Inattentional Blindness）的影响。分别有20名中学生参加了词和图片基线水平测试,52名中学生参与了无意视盲实验。研究结果表明：（1）当词与图片重叠呈现时,不管注意刺激是词还是图片,也不管词与图片的表征是否一致,与基线水平相比,被试都出现了显著的无意视盲现象。（2）当词与图片的表征意义一致时,如果注意刺激是图片,而非注意刺激是词,那么被试更容易觉察到非注意刺激。（3）非注意刺激与注意刺激表征意义一致时更容易捕获观察者的注意     

意外刺激的意义性及位置对大学生无意视盲的影响

无意视盲是指由于专注于某项任务而对视野中的其他事物视而不见的现象,它同时受意外刺激低水平的物理特性、语义相关性以及观察者自身因素的影响。无意视盲是联系知觉、意识和注意的重要桥梁。本文采用静态的无意视盲范式,随机选取80名在校大学生为被试,同时考察了意外刺激的位置和意义性对无意视盲的影响。结果表明:(1)意外刺激的呈现位置对无意视盲没有显著的影响,呈现在外周和中央的探测率无显著差异。说明无意视盲可能是受基于注意区域而不是基于注视点的位置因素的影响;(2)意外刺激的意义性对无意视盲有显著的影响,相比于无意义刺激,有意义的卡通笑脸不管呈现在中央还是外周,都更易获得探测。     

How meaning shapes seeing

Inattentional blindness refers to the failure to see an unexpected object that one may be looking at directly when one's attention is elsewhere. We studied whether a stimulus whose meaning is relevant to the attentional goals of the observer will capture attention and escape inattentional blindness. The results showed that an unexpected stimulus belonging to the attended semantic category but not sharing physical features with the attended stimuli was detected more often than a semantically unrelated stimulus. This effect was larger when the unexpected stimuli were words than when they were pictures. The results imply that the semantic relation between the observer's attentional set and the unexpected stimulus plays a crucial role in inattentional blindness: An unexpected stimulus semantically related to the observer's current interests is likely to be seen, whereas unrelated unexpected stimuli are unseen. Attentional selection may thus be driven by purely semantic features: Meaning may determine whether or not one sees a stimulus.     

Individual differences in susceptibility to inattentional blindness

Inattentional blindness refers to the finding that people do not always see what appears in their gaze. Though inattentional blindness affects large percentages of people, it is unclear if there are individual differences in susceptibility. The present study addressed whether individual differences in attentional control, as reflected by variability in working memory capacity, modulate susceptibility to inattentional blindness. Participants watched a classic inattentional blindness video (Simons & Chabris, 1999) and were instructed to count passes among basketball players, wherein 58% noticed the unexpected: a person wearing a gorilla suit. When participants were accurate with their pass counts, individuals with higher working memory capacity were more likely to report seeing the gorilla (67%) than those with lesser working memory capacity (36%). These results suggest that variability in attentional control is a potential mechanism underlying the apparent modulation of inattentional blindness across individuals.     

Distance is relative: Inattentional blindness critically depends on the breadth of the attentional focus

Inattentional blindness – the phenomenon that we sometimes miss salient stimuli in our direct view when they appear unexpectedly and attention is focused on something else - is modulated by various parameters, including distance of the unexpected stimulus from the attentional focus. In two experiments, we expanded the existing literature on spatial factors influencing inattentional blindness as well as theories on the spatial distribution of attention. Noticing rates of unexpected objects were significantly higher when they appeared outside instead of inside the bounds of primary task stimuli. Thus, our results do neither support the account that spatial attention is tuned as a spotlight that includes relevant targets and everything in between nor an account of purely object-based attentional orientation. Instead, the results speak in favor of an inhibitory area between two attended targets. Experiment 2 replicated these surprising findings and additionally demonstrated that they were not confounded by task.     

Perceptual Load Induces Inattentional Blindness in Drivers

Perceptual load theory states that the level of perceptual load in a task predicts the processing of task‐irrelevant information. High perceptual load has been shown to result in increased inattentional blindness; however, there is little evidence that this extends beyond artificial computer‐based tasks to real‐world behavior. In this study, we adapted a typical load‐blindness paradigm for use in a driving simulator. Forty‐two drivers performed a series of gap perception tasks where they judged if their vehicle could fit between two parked vehicles, with the task imposing either low or high perceptual load. Awareness for an unexpected pedestrian or animal at the side of the road was found to be significantly lower in the high perceptual load condition. This study is the first to demonstrate perceptual load effects on awareness in an applied setting and has important implications for road safety and future applied research on the perceptual load model.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Visual short-term memory load suppresses temporo-parietal junction activity and induces inattentional blindness

The right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) is critical for stimulus-driven attention and visual awareness. Here we show that as the visual short-term memory (VSTM) load of a task increases, activity in this region is increasingly suppressed. Correspondingly, increasing VSTM load impairs the ability of subjects to consciously detect the presence of a novel, unexpected object in the visual field. These results not only demonstrate that VSTM load suppresses TPJ activity and induces inattentional blindness, but also offer a plausible neural mechanism for this perceptual deficit: suppression of the stimulus-driven attentional network.     

听觉警报失聪的认知因素

无意失聪是指当人们集中精神做事时,会忽略非预期的听觉刺激。这种现象在现实生活中普遍存在,它对航空和交通安全构成巨大威胁。研究者们发现高知觉和高认知负荷条件下个体会因认知资源有限导致无意失聪,且随着负荷增加,被忽略的听觉刺激诱发的早期（N100）和晚期（P300）神经活动有所减弱。这表明非预期听觉刺激可以进入晚期加工阶段,但其能否被感知可能取决于与工作记忆相关的额顶网络的抑制控制程度。而工作记忆容量及其负荷与无意失聪关系的现有研究结果之间还存在不一致性。未来研究可以将其范式和理论拓展到其他安全生产领域,并运用认知训练等方式规避无意失聪,从而减少人因失误。     

Inattentional deafness in music

While inattentional blindness is a modern classic in attention and perception research, analogous phenomena of inattentional deafness have been widely neglected. We here present the first investigation of inattentional deafness in and with music under controlled experimental conditions. Inattentional deafness in music is defined as the inability to consciously perceive an unexpected musical stimulus when attention is focused on a certain facet of the piece. Participants listened to a modification of the first 1′50″ of Richard Strauss’ Thus Spake Zarathustra; while the control group just listened, the experimental group had to count the number of timpani beats. An e-guitar solo served as the unexpected event. In Study 1, experimental data from n = 115 participants were analyzed. Non-musicians were compared with musicians to investigate the impact of expertise. In Study 2 (n = 47), the scope of the inattentional deafness effect was investigated with a more salient unexpected stimulus. Results demonstrate an inattentional deafness effect under dynamic musical conditions. Quite unexpectedly, the effect was structurally equivalent even for musicians. Our findings clearly show that sustained inattentional deafness exists in the musical realm, in close correspondence to inattentional blindness with dynamic visual stimuli.     

Perception without attention: results of a new method.

Having found by the use of a new method for examining perception without attention that grouping and texture segregation do not seem to occur (see Mack, Tang, Tuma, Kahn, & Rock (1992) Cognitive Psychology, 24, we go on to ask what is perceived without attention using this new method. Our subjects receive only one inattention trial in a sequence of trials involving a visual distraction task. In addition to the distraction task in the inattention trial, subjects received a stimulus of which they had no prior knowledge or expectation and were questioned or tested directly afterward for their perception of that stimulus. Two subsequent trials containing test stimuli serve as within-subject controls. The results of a series of experiments indicate that the presence of one or more stimulus objects and their locations are preattentively perceived, as is their color, but shape is not. Because individual items are detected without attention, we conclude that perceptual organization is initially based on a principle in which connected regions of uniform stimulation are inferred to be discrete units (the principle of uniform connectedness). One striking, unexpected finding is that without attention many subjects have no awareness at all of the stimulus object, an effect we call inattentional blindness.     

The neural substrates associated with inattentional blindness

Inattentional blindness is the failure to perceive salient stimuli presented at unattended locations. Whereas the behavioral manifestation of inattentional blindness has been investigated, the neural basis of this phenomenon has remained elusive. In the current study, event-related fMRI was used to identify the neural substrates associated with inattentional blindness. During central fixation, participants named colored digits presented at a peripheral location. On a subset of trials, an unexpected checkerboard circle (the critical stimulus) was presented at the same eccentricity along with the colored digits (a post-scan questionnaire assessed participants’ awareness of the critical stimulus). Neural activity during inattentional blindness was observed in the prefrontal cortex. Together with previous findings, these results call into question the widespread view that activity in the prefrontal cortex reflects conscious processing.