The inconsistency of inconsistency scales: a comparison of two widely used measures

This study compared the inconsistent responding validity scales of the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) and the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI)/PPI-Revised (PPI-R) in two correctional samples to determine the extent to which they overlap in identifying invalid profiles. Results revealed substantial differences in the way the inconsistent responding validity scales of these measures performed. In particular, the PAI identified far fewer participants as having responded inconsistently compared with the PPI/PPI-R. We discuss the implications of our findings for clinical practice, and potential concerns with the use of a single measure to identify inconsistent responding in clinical practice and research.     

The ignorance behind inconsistency toleration

Synthese - Inconsistency toleration is the phenomenon of working with inconsistent information without threatening one’s rationality. Here I address the role that ignorance plays for the...     

Incommensurability and inconsistency of languages

Incommensurable theories are said to be both incompatible and incomparable. This is paradoxical, because, being incompatible, these theories must have the same subject-matter, yet incomparability implies that their subject-matter is different. This paper's proposed resolution of the paradox makes use of the distinction between internal subject-matter and external subject-matter for languages (frameworks) as outlined by W. Sellars. Incommensurability arises when two languages share the same external subject-matter but differ in internal subject-matter. When they share the same external subject-matter, they can be inconsistent (hence incompatible), and yet incomparable (because they are about distinct internal subject-matter). A substantial part of the paper is devoted to the technical development of the notion of inconsistency as a relationship between languages in contrast to the traditional notion of inconsistency between statements.An earlier abridged version of this paper was read to the 1983 Annual Conference of New Zealand Division of the Australasian Association of Philosophy. I owe my gratitude to various people for their criticisms, especially to Andrew Holster.     

Reasoning from inconsistency to consistency

This article presents a theory of how individuals reason from inconsistency to consistency. The theory is based on 3 main principles. First, individuals try to construct a single mental model of a possibility that satisfies a current set of propositions, and if the task is impossible, they infer that the set is inconsistent. Second, when an inconsistency arises from an incontrovertible fact, they retract any singularly dubious proposition or any proposition that is inconsistent with the fact; otherwise, they retract whichever proposition mismatches the fact. A mismatch can arise from a proposition that has only mental models that conflict with the fact or fail to represent it. Third, individuals use their causal knowledge-in the form of models of possibilities-to create explanations of what led to the inconsistency. A computer program implements the theory, and experimental results support each of its principles.     

Personality variables and cognitive inconsistency

The present research studied the relationships between personality variables and cognitive inconsistency. Cognitive inconsistency was defined on the basis of the cognitive orientation theory of Kreitler and Kreitler (1972, 1976) as inconsistency and three personality variables: Extraversion, Cattell's factor “Independence” and Cattell's factor “Radicalism- Conservatism”. The implications of these results to Eysenck's and Cattell's theories were discussed.     

Tolerance for inconsistency in foreign-accented speech

Are listeners able to adapt to a foreign-accented speaker who has, as is often the case, an inconsistent accent? Two groups of native Dutch listeners participated in a cross-modal priming experiment, either in a consistent-accent condition (German-accented items only) or in an inconsistent-accent condition (German-accented and nativelike pronunciations intermixed). The experimental words were identical for both groups (words with vowel substitutions characteristic of German-accented speech); additional contextual words differed in accentedness (German-accented or nativelike words). All items were spoken by the same speaker: a German native who could produce the accented forms but could also pass for a Dutch native speaker. Listeners in the consistent-accent group were able to adapt quickly to the speaker (i.e., showed facilitatory priming for words with vocalic substitutions). Listeners in the inconsistent-accent condition showed adaptation to words with vocalic substitutions only in the second half of the experiment. These results indicate that adaptation to foreign-accented speech is rapid. Accent inconsistency slows listeners down initially, but a short period of additional exposure is enough for them to adapt to the speaker. Listeners can therefore tolerate inconsistency in foreign-accented speech.     

Extraversion and reactions to cognitive inconsistency

Two studies are reported which test the hypothesis that extraverts are more tolerant of cognitive inconsistency than are introverts. The first study tested this prediction in the context of Heider's balance model. While degree of extraversion did not moderate reactions to imbalance, extraverts did show less aversion to interpersonal disagreement than introverts. When coupled with other recently published data this suggests that extraverts find arousing social situations less aversive than introverts. In support of the main hypothesis, the second experiment showed that extraverts changed their attitudes less than introverts as a result of writing an essay which was counter to their own attitude under conditions where they had high perceived freedom of choice.     

The inconsistency with which raters weight and combine information across targets

To assign an overall performance rating to a target, a rater must weight and combine various pieces of specific performance information about that target. Policy‐capturing research has demonstrated that individual differences in raters can influence the way raters combine specific performance information. The current study examined information processing from a different perspective by exploring the possibility that target differences may also influence the way raters weight and combine performance information. Raters (N = 146) rated each of six targets on six specific performance dimensions and on overall performance. Sequential moderation analyses indicated that targets influenced the way raters, as a group, combined information across targets. These results lend support to the inference that overall performance ratings may not be comparable across targets, that is, they may not reflect the same underlying performance across targets.     

Physics,inconsistency, and quasi-truth

In this work, the first of a series, we study the nature of informal inconsistency in physics, focusing mainly on the foundations of quantum theory, and appealing to the concept of quasi-truth. We defend a pluralistic view of the philosophy of science, grounded on the existence of inconsistencies and on quasi-truth. Here, we treat only the ‘classical aspects’ of the subject, leaving for a forthcoming paper the ‘non-classical’ part.