Bolzanian knowing: infallibility,virtue and foundational truth

The paper discusses Bernard Bolzano’s epistemological approach to believing and knowing with regard to the epistemic requirements of an axiomatic model of science. It relates Bolzano’s notions of believing, knowing and evaluation to notions of infallibility, immediacy and foundational truth. If axiomatic systems require their foundational truths to be infallibly known, this knowledge involves both evaluation of the infallibility of the asserted truth and evaluation of its being foundational. The twofold attempt to examine one’s assertions and to do so by searching for the objective grounds of the truths asserted lies at the heart of Bolzano’s notion of knowledge. However, the explanatory task of searching for grounds requires methods that cannot warrant infallibility. Hence, its constitutive role in a conception of knowledge seems to imply the fallibility of such knowledge. I argue that the explanatory task contained in Bolzanian knowing involves a high degree of epistemic virtues, and that it is only through some salient virtue that the credit of infallibility can distinguish Bolzanian knowing from a high degree of Bolzanian believing.     

Knowing that, knowing how, and knowing to do

Ryle’s distinction between knowing that and knowing how has recently been challenged. The paper first briefly defends the distinction and then proceeds to address the question of classifying moral knowledge. Moral knowledge is special in that it is practical, that is, it is essentially a motive. Hence the way we understand moral knowledge crucially depends on the way we understand motivation. The Humean theory of motivation is wrong in saying that reason cannot be a motive, but right in saying that desire is essential for motivating us. The right response to the Humean theory of motivation is to see that moral knowledge is desire-related rationality or thought-related desire. Moral knowledge is neither knowing that nor knowing how but rather a third species of knowledge which we may call “knowing to do.” Knowing to do is to be rationally disposed to do the right thing. This understanding of moral knowledge is exactly what we can learn from Aristotle’s ethics.     

Two dissociable aspects of feeling-of-knowing: knowing that you know and knowing that you do not know

Feeling-of-knowing judgement is traditionally regarded as a unitary cognitive process. However, recent research suggests that knowing that you know (positive feeling-of-knowing) and knowing that you do not know (negative feeling-of-knowing) have different neural substrates (Luo, Niki, Ying, & Luo, 2004). In the present study, we used a paradigm adapted from Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) to examine whether positive feeling-of-knowing and negative feeling-of-knowing were mediated by distinct cognitive processes. We found that positive and negative feeling-of-knowing were dissociated during immediate feeling-of-knowing judgements (i.e., preliminary feeling-of-knowing) and delayed feeling-of-knowing judgements (i.e., postretrieval feeling-of-knowing). At the judgement intervals, positive feeling-of-knowing was based on partial recovery of the nonrecalled targets, whereas negative feeling-of-knowing was determined by familiarity with the retrieval cues. Our results suggest that feeling-of-knowing is a heterogeneous process.     

On dreams,imaginative knowing and not knowing: Appearance,identity, and shame

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis - This paper explores the relation of concepts of the unconscious to notions of the imagination, and both to the dynamics of shame. In this discussion dreams...     

Paradox,truth and logic part I: Paradox and truth

Conclusion The discussion of the semantics of inconsistent truth theories now comes to a pause. The preceding is of course but a sketch; many interesting questions remain to be answered. The second part of this essay, however, will not seek to answer them. Rather, I will turn to the discussion of the proof theory of truth theory: the local and global logic of truth.Under the first heading, I show how to replace the inductive construction of models with an appropriate infinitary proof theory, and relate this on the one hand to the so-called dependence approach to inductive truth theories (Davis, 1979; Yablo, 1982) and on the other to van Fraassen's fact semantics for relevance logic.Under the second heading, I offer formals systems which capture the inferences valid in all approximate models. Not surprisingly, these turn out to be relevant logics.With formalism in hand, I discuss finally the extent to which the gap and/or glut approach can in fact be said to solve the paradoxes; that is, to allow us to say that the very language we are speaking is of the sort described in our theory.     

Relativism,truth, and incoherence

Conclusion There are many contemporary sources and defenders of epistemological relativism which have not been considered thus far. I have, for example, barely touched on the voluminous literature regarding frameworks, conceptual schemes, and Wittgensteinian forms of life. Davidson's challenge to the scheme/content distinction and thereby to conceptual relativism, Rorty's acceptance of the Davidsonian argument and his use of it to defend a relativistic position, Winchian and other sociological and anthropological arguments for relativism, recent work in the sociology of science, and Goodman's novel articulation of a relativism of worlds and of worldmaking, to mention just some of the contemporary loci of debate, all need to be addressed. So also do the plethora of relativistic arguments spawned by Kuhn and related literature in recent philosophy of science. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no more to be said on behalf of epistemological relativism. Moreover, the positive task of delineating a defensible version of absolutism remains to be accomplished.Nevertheless, the defenses of relativism considered above do seem to have been successfully undercut. More specifically, the arguments for the incoherence of relativism are as compelling as ever, and have manifestly not been laid to rest by contemporary relativists. The basic Socratic insight that relativism is self-refuting, and so incoherent, remains a fundamental difficulty for those who would resuscitate and defend the ancient Protagorean doctrine or a modern variant of it.     

Autism, hypersystemizing, and truth

Evidence is reviewed suggesting that, in the general population, empathizing and systemizing show strong sex differences. The function of systemizing is to predict lawful events, including lawful change, or patterns in data. Also reviewed is the evidence that individuals on the autistic spectrum have degrees of empathizing difficulties alongside hypersystemizing. The hypersystemizing theory of autism spectrum conditions (ASC) proposes that people with ASC have an unusually strong drive to systemize. This can explain their preference for systems that change in highly lawful or predictable ways; why they become disabled when faced with systems characterized by less lawful change; and their "need for sameness" or "resistance to change". If "truth" is defined as lawful patterns in data then, according to the hypersystemizing theory, people with ASC are strongly driven to discover the "truth".     

Scientific naturalism: a great truth that got distorted

Scientific naturalism in the generic sense is the doctrine that there can be no supernatural interruptions of the world’s causal processes. This idea, which emerged in Greece in the 6th century BCE, was formulated most adequately in Plato’s theistic version. However, in appropriating Greek philosophy, Christian thinkers first modified and then rejected its naturalism. Scientific naturalism emerged again in the 18th and 19th centuries, but because of ideas retained from the supernaturalistic mechanism that became associated with science in the 17th century, naturalism appeared in a distorted version, one that is inadequate for science itself as well as incompatible with Christian faith or any other significantly religious view. The great truth of scientific naturalism needs to be rescued from this distorted version of it.     

Propositions,representation, and truth

Synthese - Theories of propositions as sets of truth-supporting circumstances are committed to the thesis that sentences or other representations true in all and only the same circumstances express...     

Transference, taboo and truth

The author re-examines the development of the concept of transference in Freud's work. He gives special attention to Totem and Taboo published in 1912-13. He notes that Freud's totally unsupported hypotheses within this model become illuminating and intelligible if "totem" is translated as "psychoanalyst" and "taboo" as "transference (neurosis)".     

Language, truth and logic

Ohne Zusammenfassung

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Language, truth and logic Alfred J. Ayer: 254 S. London 1936. Victor Gollancz Ltd.