KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH: A SKEPTICAL CHALLENGE

It is widely accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive, meaning that only truths can be known. We argue that this theory creates a skeptical challenge: because many of our beliefs are only approximately true and therefore false, they do not count as knowledge. We consider several responses to this challenge and propose a new one. We propose easing the truth requirement on knowledge to allow approximately true, practically adequate representations to count as knowledge. In addition to addressing the skeptical challenge, this view also coheres with several previous theoretical proposals in epistemology.     

A TRUTHMAKING ACCOUNT OF REALISM AND ANTI‐REALISM

Realism and anti‐realism about a domain of thought are metaphysical theses that involve the natures of the truthmakers in that domain and the truthmaking relation that is operant in the domain. Truthmaker theory is not exclusive territory for realists: anti‐realist views are also best understood in terms of how they understand truthmakers and truthmaking. In particular, I explore the possibility of projectivist truthmaking, and show how it makes sense of quasi‐realism. In addition to critically examining some extant accounts of the relationship between realism and truthmaking, I offer an account that best captures the nature of the various realism debates.     

MINDS AND MORALS

In this paper, I argue that an externalist theory of thought content provides the means to resolve two debates in moral philosophy. The first—that between judgement internalism and judgement externalism—concerns the question of whether there is a conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation. The second—that between reasons internalism and reasons externalism—concerns the relationship between moral reasons and an agent's subjective motivational set. The resolutions essentially stem from the externalist claim that concepts can be grasped partially, and a new moral theory, which I call ‘moral externalism’, emerges.     

理性与文化:一个多元化世界中的道德基础争论

近来我聆听了一场有趣的晚餐桌上的辩论,它是在我十几岁的孩子们中间展开的。在我看来,他们的争论点显然提出了与多种合理性相遇这一主题密切相关的问题。在关于肯尼亚原住民发型的对话中,我的儿子本想知道为什么马萨伊人“让”他们的妇女剃光头,而年轻男子却时髦地将头发编成一种已成为非洲女性而不是男性的流行和时尚的发型。我的女儿是一个很有天赋的辩论者,她回答说这仅仅是传统,传统从不回答任何人的“为什么”问题,尤其当提问者仅仅是被期望去实践规范的局内人时。我的儿子显然被挫败了,满脸疑惑。然后,他尽力想知道如果提问的人是像…     

REALISM AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE: A PROBLEM FOR BURGE

Philosophical Studies -     

THE SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS OF MORALS NOT KNOWLEDGE

I greatly appreciate the opportunity provided by the editor of Zygon to further develop the ideas in my book Morals Not Knowledge: Recasting the Contemporary U.S. Conflict between Religion and Science in conversation with four critical commentaries. It is an honor to have one's work focused upon so intently, and I greatly appreciate the time and effort of the critics. The book was quite intentionally written as a provocation, an attempt at agenda setting, and as a call for changing the thinking of the entire religion and science academic community. In my previous writings I have kept close to the data, allowing myself at best mid‐level conclusions, but this book is a foray into the abstraction and inevitable lack of precision required for high‐level generalization. I hope that it continues to be generative of debate.     

THE LIMITS OF PRAGMATISM AND THE LIMITS OF REALISM

Abstract. I argue here for a limited version of pragmatism—called conceptual pragmatism—that recognizes that conceptual systems are to be evaluated according to their usefulness for helping us get around in the world. Once a conceptual system is in place, however, the truth of sentences is a matter of both empirical tit and coherence with the rest of our knowledge. The error of critical realists is to fail to take into account the limited conceptual relativity that is to be expected on the basis of conceptual pragmatism. The conceptual realist thesis applies equally in science and theology.     

现实主义与乌托邦

不可知的现实 现实问题在于我们认为对它非常了解,而事实上对它完全没有很好地理解.[1]过去,我们的过去,对我们来说似乎绝对清晰,但事实并非如此.如果我们反思通盘考虑起来是我们的过去的20世纪,我们逐渐认识到,作为20世纪主要标志性现象的共产主义和纳粹主义几乎未被给予系统化的思考.     

REALISM WITHOUT TRUTH: A REVIEW OF GIERE'S SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVISM

An increasingly popular view among philosophers of science is that of science as action—as the collective activity of scientists working in socially‐coordinated communities. Scientists are seen not as dispassionate pursuers of Truth, but as active participants in a social enterprise, and science is viewed on a continuum with other human activities. When taken to an extreme, the science‐as‐social‐process view can be taken to imply that science is no different from any other human activity, and therefore can make no privileged claims about its knowledge of the world. Such extreme views are normally contrasted with equally extreme views of classical science, as uncovering Universal Truth. In Science Without Laws and Scientific Perspectivism, Giere outlines an approach to understanding science that finds a middle ground between these extremes. He acknowledges that science occurs in a social and historical context, and that scientific models are constructions designed and created to serve human ends. At the same time, however, scientific models correspond to parts of the world in ways that can legitimately be termed objective. Giere's position, perspectival realism, shares important common ground with Skinner's writings on science, some of which are explored in this review. Perhaps most fundamentally, Giere shares with Skinner the view that science itself is amenable to scientific inquiry: scientific principles can and should be brought to bear on the process of science. The two approaches offer different but complementary perspectives on the nature of science, both of which are needed in a comprehensive understanding of science.