Experiencing Gendered Seeing

This paper explores the concept of “gendered seeing”: the capacity to visually perceive another person's gender and the role that one's own gender plays in that perception. Assuming that gendered properties are actually perceptible, my goal is to provide some support from the philosophy of perception on how gendered visual experiences are possible. I begin by exploring the ways in which sociologists and psychologists study how we perceive one's sex and the implications of these studies for the sex/gender distinction. I then discuss feminist philosopher Linda Alcoff's concept of “interpretative horizons,” which highlights the role that one's social and political identities play in how we understand the world around us. I also discuss Elizabeth Grosz's notion (borrowed from Merleau‐Ponty) of double sensation. I then apply some work in the philosophy of perception on perceptual learning and the cognitive penetration of perception to gendered seeing. My hypothesis is that we can explain how one's interpretative horizons are acquired through some notion of perceptual learning. I conclude by suggesting some of the epistemic and ethical implications of gendered seeing.     

Thinking about Others versus Another: Three Reasons Judgments about Collectives and Individuals Differ

In this article, we review evidence that people are more positive in assessments of specific individuals than they are about collectives of others, even when people have essentially no information about the individual or collective they are judging. We offer three explanations for this difference. First, evaluative “attacks” on individuals are more aversive than similar attacks on collectives. Second, to encourage or smooth interaction, people sometimes “assume the best” about individuals until proven wrong. Social interaction occurs between specific individuals, so such optimism does not extend to people in general. Third, in making judgments of individuals versus collectives, people naturally focus on different types of information. For an individual, people spontaneously consider influences that operate inside an individual (e.g., one's will, one's moral conscience). But for collectives, people instead contemplate influences that operate at a social level (e.g., social influence, social norms). We explore how these three proposals help predict when judgments of individuals and collectives do or do not differ.     

SECOND NATURE AND SPIRIT: HEGEL ON THE ROLE OF HABIT IN THE APPEARANCE OF PERCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Hegel's discussion of the concept of “habit” appears at a crucial point in his Encyclopedia system, namely, in the transition from the topic of “nature” to the topic of “spirit” (Geist): it is through habit that the subject both distinguishes itself from its various sensory states as an absolute unity (the I) and, at the same time, preserves those sensory states as the content of sensory consciousness. By calling habit a “second nature,” Hegel highlights the fact that incipient spirit retains a “moment” of the natural that marks a limitation compared to “pure thought” but that also makes perceptual consciousness possible. This makes Hegel's account analogous in important respects to John McDowell's “naturalism of second nature.” But Hegel's account of habit can be seen as a version of a Kantian synthesis of the productive imagination—and hence presupposes a given material that can become one's own by means of habit. This does not mean that Hegel falls into the Myth of the Given, but it does suggest that an appropriate account of second nature might be committed to something McDowell wants to deny: that nonconceptual states of consciousness play a role (even if not a justificatory role) in perception.     

Movement and Meaning

Movement analysis receives a new and useful examination in this paper. The fact (hat all of us always “read” each other's movement behavior as a matter of course is taken for granted. Our verbal language is rife with allusions to bodily behavior, suggesting that there really is such a thing as a language of the body. But one and the same movement can represent many differing aspects of behavior and is heavily dependent on its context. What we experience nonverbally vis-à-vis another person is the executive function of body language like, for instance, “wringing one's hands” or having “shaky knees.” Usually, people will convey nonverbally how they feel about the situation they find themselves in while the other—the recipient of the message—will convey understanding equally nonverbally. Thus, it is always (he representation of something that we experience—an embodiment of intent, not language itself. It therefore becomes necessary to distinguish between the implementation and movement itself. These abstractions become helpful in the understanding of many phenomena during treatment situations as demonstrated here.     

Youth and the Great Recession: Are values,achievement orientation and outlook to the future affected?

This special section brings together leading experts in psychology and sociology to examine the consequences of the Great Recession for young people's values, achievement orientation, and outlook to the future. Evidence from Europe and the United States suggests that the impact of the recession varies for distinct outcomes and by age, the latter pointing to potential sensitive periods for interventions. Although the direct effects of the recession are not strong, they accelerate pre‐existing trends towards more prolonged and precarious transitions to independence, and are likely to bring with them long‐term scarring with respect to health and well‐being. While feelings of self‐confidence and self‐worth have eroded, young people continue to subscribe to the “American Dream,” the belief that in principle it is possible to make it – even if limitations to one's own capabilities are recognised. Trust in institutions has declined, but support and concern for others have increased, suggesting that in times of economic hardship and uncertainty social relationships become more salient. Young people's response to the recession appears to be less of a “me‐first” reaction than “let's help each other”: a form of “collective agency” to counter the inadequacy of social safety nets.     

Shades of Mark Twain: Commentary on Paper by Steven H. Cooper

The author considers Cooper's notion of the pluralistic third from several angles as Cooper's use of the term covers a range of applications from that of an internal supervisor to the use of ideas from psychoanalytic traditions other than one's own in evaluating one's clinical work. The impression created of the American situation is contrasted with the institutionalized pluralism of the British Psychoanalytical Society since the Second World War. The author believes that the theoretical question of the analyst's accountability to a professional authority is overdetermined in the paper because the clinical material is dominated by the patient's problems in facing up to parental authority. A crucial enactment is seen as starting at the analyst's first contact with the patient, which seems to subvert the analyst's capacity to be an authority figure. The analyst finds a working relationship with his own psychoanalytic authority in the second session of the analysis but seems to lose it through an overextension of the ideas of “play,” self-questioning, and the seeking of agreement between patient and analyst. The author considers the clinical material from the point of view that his peer supervision group would take.     

Inscrutability and its Discontents

That reference is inscrutable is demonstrated, it is argued, not only by W. V. Quine's arguments but by Peter Unger's “Problem of the Many.” Applied to our own language, this is a paradoxical result, since nothing could be more obvious to speakers of English than that, when they use the word “rabbit,” they are talking about rabbits. The solution to this paradox is to take a disquotational view of reference for one's own language, so that “When I use ‘rabbit,’ I refer to rabbits” is made true by the meaning of the word “refer.” The reference relation is extended to other languages by translation. The explanation for this peculiarly egocentric conception of semantics—questions of others’ meanings are settled by asking what I mean by words of my language—is to be found in our practice of predicting and explaining other people's behavior by empathetic identification. I understand other people's behavior by asking what I would do in their place.     

“PURE” VERSUS “PRACTICAL” EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.     

The effects of “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” reinforcement contingencies on task behavior

In spite of a substantial number of observations to the contrary, some behavioral scientists have concluded that salient extrinsic reinforcers not only do not maintain or support task behavior, they decrease or extinguish it by somehow destroying or impairing “intrinsic motivation.” In this study it was once again demonstrated that when behavior is sustained in a task setting in the apparent absence of salient extrinsic reinforcers, quite subtle but nevertheless palpable response-produced stimulus changes are found to be involved. Moreover, when a signaled extrinsic monetary reinforcement contingency was applied, it not only did not impair the effects of the intrinsic reinforcers, it produced a significant increase in task performance during the time the extrinsic reinforcement contingency prevailed, and it did not produce a decrement in self-reports of task attractiveness nor in performance during a discretionary period in which the contingency had been deliberately withdrawn. We conclude that there is little reason to believe that the design and implementation of effective extrinsic reinforcement contingencies will destroy one's pride in one's work, the intrinsic worth or meaningfulness of the job, or one's “intrinsic motivation” to perform it.     

Slavoj Žižek and the Real Subject of Politics

Slavoj ?i?ek's refusal to sketch an alternative to the global liberal-capitalist order, combined with his claim that there is an urgent need for a repolitization of, most of all, the economy, raises the question of the possibility of radical political thought and action. Considering fundamentalisms and politically correct multiculturalism not as oppositional, but as correlative to the “depolitization” of post-modern societies, ?i?ek invokes the emancipatory legacy of Europe in an attempt to reinvent Marxism in a way similar to what Lenin, thrown into an open situation, had to do in 1917 between the revolutions. A single question confronts political philosophy today: is liberal-capitalist democracy the ultimate horizon of our political practice, or is it possible to open up the space for another political articulation? The key to a repolitization is to identify with the “symptom” of the existing global order's false claim to Universality, with the excluded “part of no part” who politicizes it's predicament by claiming to stand for the real universal. In order not to discard political struggle as “unrealistic”, today's cynical “realist” consensus must be broken. Taking things as they “really are” has become the dominant ideological mode that keeps people from thinking about alternatives. The remedy is to show that things never are “really” as they are.

     

Risk aversion and elite-group ignorance

Critical race theorists and standpoint epistemologists argue that agents who are members of dominant social groups are often in a state of ignorance about the extent of their social dominance, where this ignorance is explained by these agents' membership in a socially dominant group (e.g., Mills 2007). To illustrate this claim bluntly, it is argued: 1) that many white men do not know the extent of their social dominance, 2) that they remain ignorant as to the extent of their dominant social position even where this information is freely attainable, and 3) that this ignorance is due in part to the fact that they are white men. We argue that on Buchak's (2010, 2013) model of risk averse instrumental rationality, ignorance of one's privileges can be rational. This argument yields a new account of elite-group ignorance, why it may occur, and how it might be alleviated.     

Living Politically: An Irigarayan Notion of Agency as a Way of Life

This paper formulates Luce Irigaray's notion of agency as a political way of life. I argue that agency, within an Irigarayan framework, is both the outcome and the condition of a political life, aimed at creating political transformations. As Irigaray hardly addresses the topic of agency per se, I suggest understanding Irigaray's textual style as implying specific “technologies of self” in the Foucauldian sense, that is, as self‐applied social practices that reshape social reality, one's relations to oneself, and enhance one's freedom and pleasures in these relations. This interpretation aims to extract concrete transformative practices, which, by shaping one's sense of self in relation to others, create oneself as a free and active subject.     

Radical internalism

In her paper “Radical Externalism”, Amia Srinivasan argues that externalism about epistemic justification should be preferred to internalism by those who hold a “radical” worldview (according to which pernicious ideology distorts our evidence and belief-forming processes). I share Srinivasan's radical worldview, but do not agree that externalism is the preferable approach in light of the worldview we share. Here I argue that cases informed by this worldview can intuitively support precisely the internalist view that Srinivasan challenges, offer two such cases, and explain away the externalist-friendly intuitions that Srinivasan's cases solicit. I then articulate and defend a “radical” internalism, arguing that internalists’ aversion to epistemic hubris and emphasis on subjecting one's beliefs to critical scrutiny are especially attractive in realistic cases involving multiple intersecting axes of oppression—that is, precisely the sort of case that permeates our social world. I also argue that externalism's lack of interest in action-guiding principles leaves it with little to offer us in the fight against epistemic oppression.     

Transparent emotions? A critical analysis of Moran's transparency claim

I critically analyze Richard Moran's account of knowing one's own emotions, which depends on the Transparency Claim (TC) for self-knowledge. Applied to knowing one's own beliefs, TC states that when one is asked “Do you believe P?”, one can answer by referencing reasons for believing P. TC works for belief because one is justified in believing that one believes P if one can give reasons for why P is true. Emotions, however, are also conceptually related to concerns; they involve a response to something one cares about. As a consequence, acquiring self-knowledge of one's emotions requires knowledge of other mental attitudes, which falls outside the scope of TC. Hence, TC cannot be applied to emotions.     

Women,Nationalism and War: “Make Love Not War”

I analyze the relationship between women and nationalism and argue that women's identity and relationship to the “Other” is different from that of men, hence even when women participate in nationalism it is in a less violent form. I argue, further, that the structures of nationalism are fundamentally homosocial, and antagonism toward women of one's own nation is one of the first forms of attack on the “Other,” and is constitutive of “extreme nationalism.”     

MODES OF IDENTIFICATION: FREUD'S CONCEPTS REORGANIZED

The author examines Freud's conceptualizations of identification, Melanie Klein's projective identification, and Anna Freud's identification with the aggressor and altruistic surrender of one's own instinctual impulses. After demonstrating that Freud's concept primary identification refers not to a process but to the state of being identified, he suggests the substitution of it with Sandler's term “oneness”. He notes that hysterical identification, narcissistic identification, and introjection are unconscious processes that lead to a state of oneness and that they can be distinguished clinically in terms of the emotional meaning that an object holds for the individual. Furthermore, it is shown that the concept of identification with the aggressor represents a defense mechanism of its own and a specific mode of narcissistic identification, which together with projections and hysterical re-identification play a decisive rôle in projective identification and altruistic surrender of one's own instinctual impulses.     

Practical Reason,Sympathy and Reactive Attitudes

This paper has three aims. First, I defend, in its most radical form, Hume's scepticism about practical reason, as it applies to purely self‐regarding matters. It's not always irrational to discount the future, to be inconstant in one's preferences, to have incompatible desires, to not pursue the means to one's ends, or to fail to maximize one's own good. Second, I explain how our response to the “irrational” agent should be understood as an expression of frustrated sympathy, in Adam Smith's sense of sympathy, rather than a genuine judgement about Reason. We judge these people because we cannot imaginatively identify with their desires and attitudes, and this is frustrating. Third, compared to the standard cognitive view, my account better explains the nature of our criticism of the “irrational,” and, by portraying “irrationality” as a cause of upset to other people, provides a better normative basis for being “rational.”     

The temporality of intimacy: Promise,world, and death

This paper explores the temporal character of intimacy. I begin by examining the significance of “promise” and “habit” in intimate relationships. These themes are developed through the work of M. Merleau-Ponty and J.H. van den Berg to reveal the embedded or en-worlded character of intimacy. These analyses help to articulate and to problematize the sense we often have of “established” relationships as possessing a fixed, already determined character. The final section discusses the issues of intimacy that surround the situation of dying. Specifically, it analyses (1) ways in which the issue in death is the stripping away of one's world, but also ways in which the meaning of one's death is still something futural, and thus “to be shaped”; and, (2) ways in which the shaping of this meaning with intimate others is significant both for the one manifestly dying and for those whose death seems distant.     

Experience and the Absolute other

In Experience and the Absolute (2004) and other works, Jean‐Yves Lacoste develops a phenomenology of a way of life he calls “liturgy,” in which one refuses one's being‐in‐the‐world in favor of a more basic form of existence he calls “being‐before‐God.” In this essay I argue that if there is indeed such a thing as being‐before‐God, Lacoste has not sufficiently considered the possibility that it is characterized in part by a disturbance of one's being‐in‐the‐world similar to, or perhaps even identical with, the disruptive encounter with the human other that constitutes the self as responsible according to Levinas's unique notion of ethics. Lacoste's dismissal of Levinas, evidently based on a misunderstanding of what Levinas means by the word “ethics,” leads him to overlook the potential relevance of Levinas's ideas to his phenomenological project at a number of significant points in his work.     

Health and Well-Being in Highly Cohesive Units of the U.S. Army1

A large civilian literature on the role of social support in health and well-being suggests that military units high in unit cohesion should provide their members both significant protection from physical and mental illness and high levels of job satisfaction. This hypothesis was tested with a questionnaire survey of soldiers in Special Forces “A-teams”, generally viewed as the U.S. Army's most cohesive permanent units. As predicted, A-team soldiers reported greater physical and psychological well-being and greater satisfaction with job and career than did soldiers in conventionally organized units, be they Special Forces, airborne, or mechanized infantry. The best predictors in our battery of demographic, personality, and cohesion measures were ratings of social support from and satisfaction with one's Army unit, and relatively more “internal” scores on the Rotter locus-of-control scale. From these data and extensive participant observation we conclude that unit cohesion provides the soldier considerable protection from the stresses of military life, even in peace, and that it is organizational rather than individual variables that are primarily responsible for the very high levels of cohesion and/or social support in Special Forces A-teams.