注意、工作记忆与推理能力发展的关系

该研究以113名7、10、13岁的儿童青少年为被试,考察了注意、工作记忆与推理能力发展的关系。研究结果表明,7～13岁期间,注意与工作记忆在推理能力的发展中起十分重要的作用,然而注意与工作记忆的作用在不同年龄组之间略有差异;在儿童7岁时,注意对推理的影响显著,工作记忆对推理的影响不显著;到儿童10岁时,注意和工作记忆对推理的影响均显著,但工作记忆开始在注意与推理之间起部分中介的作用;13岁时,工作记忆对推理的影响显著,并在注意与推理之间起完全中介的作用。     

Test-Anxiety,inferential reasoning and working memory load

Abstract

Subjects high and low in test-anxiety were presented with an inferential reasoning task requiring the verification of necessary and unnecessary inferences. The task was performed whilst holding either two or six digits in memory. On the verification task, the performance of high-test-anxious subjects was slower and less accurate than that of the low-test-anxious subjects. In addition, unnecessary inferences took longer to process than necessary inferences for the high-test-anxiety group only. The high-test-anxious subjects studied the memory loads for longer than the low-test-anxious group, but their recognition accuracy did not differ. Findings support Eysenck and Calvo's (Cognition and Emotion, 6, 409–434, 1992) processing efficiency theory. The high-test-anxious group's performance on the sentence verification task was impaired overall, and was particularly impaired when performing the unnecessary inference task. However, we also demonstrated that the high-test-anxious group's performance on a secondary memory task was unimpaired as a result of increased effort.     

Age, memory load, and individual differences in working memory as determinants of class-inclusion reasoning.

We studied the effects of individual differences in speak-span scores and variations in memory demands on the class-inclusion performance of 10-, 13-, and 15-year-old children. The speak-span task was an age-appropriate modification of Daneman and Carpenter's (1980) reading-span task and was considered to be a measure of global resources. The age variable was assumed to be a global index of skill development, and some of the specific skills hypothesized to be important in class-inclusion reasoning were estimated using a mathematical model. The results from both regression analyses and the mathematical model indicated that differences in age, speak span, and memory load all affected performance. Surprisingly, the effects of speak span and memory load were independent. However, the effects of each of these variables depended on the age level of the participants. Based on these findings, we argued that (a) resources vary continuously with age, (b) both skill level and global resources should be varied in developmental studies of problem solving, and (c) resource theories (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986) should be modified to account for developmental change.     

The sound-board account of reasoning: A one-system alternative to dual-process theory

In order to explain the effects found in the heuristics and biases literature, dual-process theories of reasoning claim that human reasoning is of two kinds: Type-1 processing is fast, automatic, and associative, while Type-2 reasoning is slow, controlled, and rule based. If human reasoning is so divided, it would have important consequences for morality, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Although dual-process theorists have typically argued for their position by way of an inference to the best explanation, they have generally failed to consider alternative hypotheses. Worse still, it is unclear how we might test dual-process theories. In this article, I offer a one-system theory, which I call the Sound-Board Account of Reasoning, according to which there is one reasoning system which is flexible, allowing the properties used to distinguished Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning to cross-cut one another. I empirically distinguish my theory from the two dominant versions of dual-process theory (parallel-competitive and default-interventionist dual-process theory) and argue that my theory’s predictions are confirmed over both of these versions of dual-process theory.     

The ethic of care development: a longitudinal study of moral reasoning among practical-nursing, social-work and law-enforcement students

The study investigated changes in care-based moral reasoning, in the context of justice development over the 2-year period among practical-nursing, bachelor-degree social-work and law-enforcement students (N = 59). Main measures were Skoe's Ethic of Care Interview and Colby et al.'s Moral Judgment Interview. Of the participants 34% progressed in care reasoning, and 48% in justice reasoning. Social-work and nursing students progressed in care reasoning, and all groups progressed in justice reasoning. One participant (1.7%) regressed in care reasoning. Care and justice reasoning were parallel in terms of internal consistency, and they were positively related to each other. Findings suggest that care reasoning follows a developmental sequence, involving three main and two transitional levels, as suggested by Gilligan (1982). Main levels include self-concern (Level 1), caring for others (Level 2), and balanced caring for self and others (Level 3).     

Individual differences in working memory capacity and resistance to belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

In two experiments, we investigated the possibility that individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) would provide resistance to belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. In Experiment 1 (N?=?157), participants showed a belief bias effect in that they had longer response times and decreased accuracy on syllogisms with conflict between the validity and believability of the conclusion than on syllogisms with no such conflict. However, this effect did not differ as a function of individual differences in WMC. Experiment 2 (N?=?122) replicated this effect with the addition of decontextualized (i.e., nonsense) syllogisms as a different means of measuring the magnitude of the belief bias effect. Although individual differences in WMC and fluid intelligence were related to better reasoning overall, the magnitude of the belief bias effect was not smaller for participants with greater WMC. The present study offers two novel findings: (a) The belief bias effect is independent of individual differences in WMC and fluid intelligence, and (b) resolving conflict in verbal reasoning is not a type of conflict resolution that correlates with individual differences in WMC, further establishing boundary conditions for the role of WMC in human cognitive processes.     

Mainland Chinese and Canadian adolescents’ judgments and reasoning about the fairness of democratic and other forms of government

This study examined the judgments and reasoning of adolescents (ages 12–19 years) from three sites in urban and rural China (n = 270) and in an urban Canadian comparison sample (n = 72), about the fairness of various forms of democratic and non-democratic government. Adolescents from both China and Canada preferred democratic forms of government, such as representative or direct democracy, to non-democratic systems, such as a meritocracy and an oligarchy of the wealthy, at all ages. Adolescents appealed to fundamental democratic principles, such as representation, voice, and majority rule, to justify their judgments. Similar age-related patterns in judgments and reasoning were found across cultures and across diverse settings within China.     

Differences in mathematical reasoning between typically achieving and gifted children

Mathematical giftedness refers to mastery in a specific mathematical domain at an earlier than expected age. The present study examined which cognitive processes accounted for differences in mathematical reasoning between gifted children (MRG) and their typically achieving peers (TA). Naming speed, phonological awareness, short-term memory, executive functioning, and working memory were examined in 51 children aged approximately 7 years. A series of stepwise regression models, using a contrast variable to capture differences in mathematical reasoning between MRG and TA children, were created to examine which cognitive domains accounted for differences in mathematical reasoning. Short-term memory (r²?=?.08) and visual-spatial working memory (r²?=?.39) emerged as the only cognitive predictors within a model that included gender, age, and fluid intelligence. This model captured all of the variance distinguishing mathematics reasoning between MRG and TA children, explaining an overall contribution of 70% of the variance in mathematical reasoning.     

Mutual influences between the implicit and explicit self-concepts: The role of memory activation and motivated reasoning

Whereas previous research has predominantly focused on dissociations between the explicit and implicit self-concepts, the current research investigates how these aspects of self-representation come into correspondence through the activation of information about the self in memory. Experiment 1 provides evidence for a “bottom-up” process of self-construal in which information activated in the implicit self-concept produces congruent changes in the explicit self-concept. Experiment 2 provides evidence for a “top-down” process of self-construal in which the motivated assertion of a propositional belief in the explicit self-concept leads, via a process of confirmatory hypothesis testing, to the activation of substantiating information in the implicit self-concept. These two processes of self-concept change are integrated within a framework that specifies how the explicit and implicit self-concepts are related within an overall, dynamic self-system. Possibilities for expanding the framework to account for self-concept dissociations are discussed.     

Confidence judgments in syllogistic reasoning: the role of consistency and response cardinality

In two experiments, we examined the resolution of confidence judgments in syllogistic reasoning and their heuristic bases. Based on the assumptions of Koriat's Self-Consistency Model of confidence, we expected the confidence judgments to be related to conclusion consensuality, reflecting the role of consistency as a heuristic cue to confidence. In Experiment 1, the participants evaluated 24 syllogisms with conclusions that varied with respect to validity and consensuality. In Experiment 2, the participants produced conclusions to 64 pairs of premises. The correlation between confidence and reasoning accuracy was low. In both experiments confidence was related to the consensuality of the responses. For consensually correct items, correlation between confidence and accuracy was positive; however, for consensually incorrect items it was negative. In Experiment 2, confidence was lower for syllogisms with higher response cardinality, or syllogisms that elicited a greater variety of conclusions.     

Moral reasoning,emotion understanding,and callous-unemotional traits in early-to-middle childhood

Relatively little is known about features of moral reasoning among young children with callous-unemotional (CU) traits (e.g., lack of guilt and empathy). This study tested associations between CU traits and emotion attributions (i.e., identification of others’ emotional states) and justifications (i.e., explanations for those emotional states), across social scenarios involving discreet versus salient distress cues. The participants were boys aged 6-to-10 years (N = 50; M_age = 7 years 7 months), who were interviewed about 12 hypothetical scenarios (eight with discreet and four with salient distress cues). Regression models indicated that CU traits, in interaction with high levels of antisocial behaviour, were associated with reduced emotion attributions of fear in discreet but not salient immoral scenarios. Higher CU traits were also associated with reduced justifications referencing others’ welfare in discreet scenarios, and increased references to action-orientated justifications in salient scenarios. These findings suggest that CU traits are associated with early moral reasoning impairments and that salience of distress may be important to these processes.     

Learning strategy differentially impacts memory connections in children and adults

Even once children can accurately remember their experiences, they nevertheless struggle to use those memories in flexible new ways—as in when drawing inferences. However, it remains an open question as to whether the developmental differences observed during both memory formation and inference itself represent a fundamental limitation on children's learning mechanisms, or rather their deployment of suboptimal strategy. Here, 7–9-year-old children (N = 154) and young adults (N = 130) first formed strong memories for initial (AB) associations and then engaged in one of three learning strategies as they viewed overlapping (BC) pairs. We found that being told to integrate—combine ABC during learning—both significantly improved children's ability to explicitly relate the indirectly associated A and C items during inference and protected the underlying pair memories from forgetting. However, this finding contrasted with implicit evidence for memory-to-memory connections: Adults and children both formed A-C links prior to any knowledge of an inference test—yet for children, such links were most apparent when they were told to simply encode BC, not integrate. Moreover, the accessibility of such implicit links differed between children and adults, with adults using them to make explicit inferences but children only doing so for well-established direct AB pairs. These results suggest that while a lack of integration strategy may explain a large share of the developmental differences in explicit inference, children and adults nevertheless differ in both the circumstances under which they connect interrelated memories and their ability to later leverage those links to inform flexible behaviours.

Research Highlights

• Children and adults view AB and BC pairs related through a shared item, B. This provides an opportunity for learners to connect A–C in memory.
• Being encouraged to integrate ABC during learning boosted performance on an explicit test of A–C connections (children and adults) and protected from forgetting (children).
• Children and adults differed in when implicit A–C connections were formed—occurring primarily when told to separately encode BC (children) versus integrate (adults), respectively.
• Adults used implicit A–C connections to facilitate explicit judgments, while children did not. Our results suggest developmental differences in the learning conditions promoting memory-to-memory connections.

     

Children's reasoning about the temporal order of past and future events

Four- and five-year-olds completed two sets of tasks that involved reasoning about the temporal order in which events had occurred in the past or were to occur in the future. Four-year-olds succeeded on the tasks that involved reasoning about the order of past events but not those that involved reasoning about the order of future events, whereas 5-year-olds passed both types of tasks. Individual children who failed the past-event tasks were not particularly likely to fail the more difficult future-event tasks. However, children's performance on the reasoning tasks was predictive of their performance on a task assessing their comprehension of the terms “before” and “after.” Our results suggest that there may be a developmental change over this age range in the ability to flexibly represent and reason about the before-and-after relationships between events.     

Intrusion-based reasoning and depression: Cross-sectional and prospective relationships

Intrusion-based reasoning refers to the tendency to form interpretations about oneself or a situation based on the occurrence of a negative intrusive autobiographical memory. Intrusion-based reasoning characterises post-traumatic stress disorder, but has not yet been investigated in depression. We report two studies that aimed to investigate this. In Study 1 both high (n = 42) and low (n = 28) dysphoric participants demonstrated intrusion-based reasoning. High-dysphoric individuals engaged in self-referent intrusion-based reasoning to a greater extent than did low-dysphoric participants. In Study 2 there were no significant differences in intrusion-based reasoning between currently depressed (n = 27) and non-depressed (n = 51) participants, and intrusion-based reasoning did not predict depressive symptoms at 6-month follow-up. Interestingly, previously (n = 26) but not currently (n = 27) depressed participants engaged in intrusion-based reasoning to a greater extent than never-depressed participants (n = 25), indicating the possibility that intrusion-based reasoning may serve as a “scar” from previous episodes. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Reasoning about make-believe and hypothetical suppositions: Towards a theory of belief-contravening reasoning

The present study explores how suppositions which conflict with accepted beliefs are represented and reasoned about. Two studies test the predictions regarding the nature and developmental changes in children's ability to represent and reason about hypothetical or make-believe suppositions which violate their everyday knowledge and beliefs. In Study 1, 46 4th- and 5th-graders were introduced to a hand puppet, Freddy, who made claims inconsistent with generally accepted beliefs (e.g., “all dogs meow”) because he was pretending (Make-Believe Condition) or believed them (Hypothetical Condition). Participants were asked to think like Freddy and judge whether a conclusion (“There's a dog; does it meow?”) follows logically from the claim. In Study 2, 40 kindergarten (6-year-olds), 3rd–4th grade (10-year-olds), and college students were asked to represent belief contravening make-believe (pretend in a make-believe world that dogs meow) and hypothetical (imagine what the real world would be like if dogs meow) premises, evaluate conclusions of the premises (Rover is a dog, does Rover meow?) and make judgments about the attributes (growl, wag tail, purr, and eat mice) of the entity (a meowing dog) they created. The prediction that it would be easier to represent and reason from belief-contravening suppositions in the Make-Believe than Hypothetical conditions was confirmed in each study, although the two forms of reasoning were directly correlated (Study 2). The results were discussed in terms of the similarities (compartmentalization and integration) and differences (reconciliation) of processes involved in fancifully (make-believe) or seriously (hypothetical) representing and reasoning about belief-contravening suppositions.     

The distinct contributions of cause–effect order and reasoning type in judgments of causality

ABSTRACT

People generally perceive a stronger link between smoking and cancer than between cancer and smoking. Generally, prior research on asymmetrical causal reasoning has not distinguished predictive (searching for effects) and diagnostic reasoning (searching for causes) from the order in which causes and effects are presented. Across 6 studies (overall N = 627), we show that order and reasoning have an additive influence on the causality perception: causes, spatially or temporally presented before the effect, strengthen the causality attribution associated to predictive (vs. diagnostic) frames. Moreover, we show that order and reasoning frame are bi-directionally related, as the cause-first order triggers predictive reasoning and vice versa, and people mentally maintain the cause-first order when envisaging a causal relation. Besides its methodological contribution to the causal reasoning literature, this research demonstrates the powerful role of word order in causal reasoning. Implications for the role of word order in communication and risk prevention are discussed.     

False belief understanding: The influence of person,grammatical mood,counterfactual reasoning and working memory

The present study had two major goals. The first goal was to assess the relative difficulty among different versions of the unexpected contents task by systematically varying the dimensions of grammatical mood (indicative vs. subjunctive) and person (self vs. other), and to examine the correlational pattern between these different versions of the unexpected contents task and the unexpected locations task. The second goal was to examine the specificity of the relation between false belief understanding and counterfactual reasoning after controlling for age and working memory ability. One hundred, 3‐ to 6‐year‐old, children were administered two measures of false belief understanding (two versions of the unexpected contents task and two versions of the unexpected locations task), two measures of counterfactual reasoning and a working memory measure. Results showed that performance on the unexpected contents task did not significantly differ across conditions. However, only the conditions of the unexpected contents task that concerned another person's false belief correlated significantly with the unexpected locations task. Moreover, counterfactual reasoning was found to explain a significant amount of variance in the unexpected locations task, even after controlling for age and working memory performance. Findings are discussed in the context of different accounts of the development of theory of mind, and in the context of different interpretations of the relation between false belief understanding and counterfactual reasoning.     

Children’s causal inferences from indirect evidence: Backwards blocking and Bayesian reasoning in preschoolers

Previous research suggests that children can infer causal relations from patterns of events. However, what appear to be cases of causal inference may simply reduce to children recognizing relevant associations among events, and responding based on those associations. To examine this claim, in Experiments 1 and 2, children were introduced to a “blicket detector,” a machine that lit up and played music when certain objects were placed upon it. Children observed patterns of contingency between objects and the machine’s activation that required them to use indirect evidence to make causal inferences. Critically, associative models either made no predictions, or made incorrect predictions about these inferences. In general, children were able to make these inferences, but some developmental differences between 3- and 4-year-olds were found. We suggest that children’s causal inferences are not based on recognizing associations, but rather that children develop a mechanism for Bayesian structure learning. Experiment 3 explicitly tests a prediction of this account. Children were asked to make an inference about ambiguous data based on the base rate of certain events occurring. Four-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds were able to make this inference.     

New approaches to understanding unconscious processes: Implicit and explicit memory systems

Abstract

Freud viewed the unconscious as being roughly equivalent to dynamically repressed wishes, needs, and motivations. Findings from developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, psychoanalysis, and neuroscience over the past 40 years have dramatically changed our views of unconscious processes and the human mind. It is now clear that Freud's dynamic unconscious is only a minor segment of information that is processed at subsymbolic, implicit, and automatic levels. Only a fraction of this information is further processed at explicit conscious levels. Moreover, the vast majority of the information that remains nonconscious is adaptive and has major consequences for development. We examine some clinical implications of these views.