人类胚胎的道德地位

胚胎干细胞技术的发展带来了干细胞来源的伦理争论,提出了如何看待"胚胎道德地位"的问题。围绕这一问题,有三种观点,它们分别从生物性、理性功能以及人的潜能性来界定胚胎的道德地位。通过对三种观点的分析,本文强调坚持人的尊严原则,是推动新兴生物技术发展的核心和归宿。     

The Moral Status of Nonresponsible Threats

Most people believe that it is permissible to kill a nonresponsible threat, or someone who threatens one's life without exercising agency. Defenders of this view must show that there is a morally relevant difference between nonresponsible threats and innocent bystanders. Some philosophers, including Jonathan Quong and Helen Frowe, have attempted to do this by arguing that one who kills a bystander takes advantage of another person, while one who kills a threat does not. In this paper, I show that the proposals offered by Quong and Frowe have unacceptable implications. I then argue that those who claim that nonresponsible threats may be killed face a dilemma generated by the possibility of a stationary threat, or someone who endangers another person's life without moving. Unless we arbitrarily distinguish between stationary and moving nonresponsible threats, it is unclear how the permission to kill nonresponsible threats is to be explicated. I conclude that nonresponsible threats are not legitimate targets of self‐defence.     

The Moral and Political Status of Children

Book Information The Moral and Political Status of Children. The Moral and Political Status of Children David Archard, Colin M. Macleod, eds., Oxford and New York : Oxford University Press, 2002, viii + 296, US$60 (cloth). Edited by David Archard;, Colin M. Macleod;, eds.. Oxford University Press. Oxford and New York. Pp. viii + 296. US$60 (cloth).,     

论机器人的道德承受体地位及其规范意涵

我们应当区分机器人享有的两种不同道德地位,即作为道德行为体的道德地位与作为道德承受体的道德地位。基督教、佛教与儒家都为我们认可机器人的道德承受体地位提供了终极关怀层面的理由。在规范共识层面,我们可以为机器人的道德承受体地位提供五个重要理据,即间接义务理据、自我建构理据、行为主义理据、人机共同体理据,以及潜在道德行为体理据。区分机器人的两种不同道德地位具有重要的实践与规范意涵:我们应当尊重机器人的人性、不能把机器人当成普通商品来对待、应当把人视为机器人的道德监护人、应当持续扩展道德关怀与伦理共同体的范围。     

Confronting Deep Moral Disagreement: The President's Council on Bioethics,Moral Status,and Human Embryos

The report of the President's Council on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human Dignity, addresses the central ethical, political, and policy issue in human embryonic stem cell research: the moral status of extracorporeal human embryos. The Council members were in sharp disagreement on this issue and essentially failed to adequately engage and respectfully acknowledge each others' deepest moral concerns, despite their stated commitment to do so. This essay provides a detailed critique of the two extreme views on the Council (i.e., embryos have full moral status or they have none at all) and then gives theoretical grounding for our judgment about the intermediate moral status of embryos. It also supplies an account of how to address profound moral disagreements in the public arena, especially by way of constructing a middle ground that deliberately pays sincere respect to the views of those with whom it has deep disagreements.     

Moral Status As a Matter of Degree?

Some people contend that fetuses have moral status but less than that of paradigm persons. Many people hold views implying that sentient animals have moral status but less than that of persons. These positions suggest that moral status admits of degrees. Does it? To address this question, we must first clarify what it means to speak of degrees of moral status. The paper begins by clarifying the more basic concept of moral status and presenting two models of degrees of moral status. It then sketches several significant considerations in favor of, and several against, the assertion of degrees of moral status. The paper concludes by drawing lessons from the discussion.     

Why the Concept of Moral Status Should be Abandoned

The use of the concept of moral status is commonplace today in debates about the moral consideration of entities lacking certain special capacities, such as nonhuman animals. This concept has been typically used to defend the view that adult human beings have a status higher than all those entities. However, even those who disagree with this claim have often accepted the idea of moral status as if it were part of an undisputed received way of thinking in ethics. This paper argues that the use of this concept, however common, distorts our understanding of how to behave towards different individuals in different circumstances. When moral status is identified with the interest in living or the capacity for well-being, it becomes an arbitrary and irrelevant criterion. When it is used as a synonym of moral consideration or considerability, in a way that is compatible with the principle of equal consideration, it becomes trivial and confusing. When used, instead, to defend the unequal moral consideration of interests of equal weight, it has several implausible implications. In particular, the claim that unequal status is justified because of the value (either final or intrinsic, or instrumental) of cognitive capacities implausibly entails that our exercising those capacities should have priority over the promotion of our wellbeing. The idea of full moral status is also problematic as it implies the possibility of status monsters. In addition, its use is based in a misconceived way of what it would really entail to have a full status by virtue of having rational capacities. The paper concludes that we have strong reasons to abandon the concept of moral status altogether.     

Artificial Moral Agents: A Survey of the Current Status

Science and Engineering Ethics - One of the objectives in the field of artificial intelligence for some decades has been the development of artificial agents capable of coexisting in harmony with...     

The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts

The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—moral status is dependent on the ability to suffer—mistakenly equates the moral status of humans and most animals. (2) The concept person is widely used for justificatory purposes, but it seems that it cannot play such a role. It seems that it is either redundant or unable to play any justificatory role. I argue that we can solve the second problem by understanding person as a thick evaluative concept. This then enables us to justify assigning a higher moral status to the great apes than to simple animals: the great apes are persons. To solve the first problem, I argue that certain severely disabled infants have a higher moral status than the great apes because they are dependent upon human relationships for their well-being. Only very limited abilities are required for such relationships, and the question who is capable of them must be based on thick evaluative concepts. Thus, it turns out that to make progress in bioethics we must assign thick evaluative concepts a central role.

论道德语言在道德思维中的地位和作用

道德语言是道德思维的主要工具,其在道德思维中具有重要作用。一是对道德思维主体、道德思维对象、道德思维过程的作用：对主体而言,它提供了道德思维的动力、意义和标准;对对象而言,具有概括与抽象作用;对过程而言,它使概念得以形成,使判断和推理成为可能,并对道德思维的结果进行表述。二是对个体道德思维形成的作用：记忆贮存道德信息,形成特定心理结构,进行导向和定向。三是在道德劝服、道德态度改变和道德价值澄清中也具有重要作用。