Hume on the Distinction of Reason

This paper concerns Hume’s treatment of the distinction of reason in the Treatise, I.i.7. Many scholars have claimed that there is a tension between his account of the distinction of reason and his commitment to his so-called separability principle. I explain why Hume’s account of the distinction of reason is fully consistent with the principle, and show how other discussions, both critical of and sympathetic to Hume, fail to appreciate the radicalness of his position. I evaluate Hume’s bold position and compare it to earlier positions (Aquinas) and current positions (Donald Davidson).     

Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity

To articulate their understanding of Hume’s discussion of ‘distinctions of reason’, commentators have often taken what I refer to as a ‘respect-first view’ on resemblance, in which they categorize resemblance as based on resembling respects. Holding this view, Donald Baxter argues that Hume’s view on the distinctions of reason leads to a contradiction. As an alternative, I offer ‘the resemblance-first view’, which is not dependent on resembling respects. I argue that this view is textually supported, and that it rescues Hume from the proposed contradiction.     

Hume and the nominalist tradition

Many of the central theses of Hume's philosophy – his rejection of real relations, universals, abstract objects and necessary causal relations – had precedents in the later medieval nominalist tradition. Hume and his medieval predecessors developed complex semantic theories to show both how ontologies are apt to become inflated and how, if we understand carefully the processes by which meaning is generated, we can achieve greater ontological parsimony. Tracing a trajectory from those medieval traditions to Hume reveals Hume to be more radical, particularly in his rejection of abstraction and abstract ideas. Hume's denial of general, abstract ideas is consistent with his philosophical principles but fails to appreciate the more sophisticated nominalist approaches to abstraction, the result of which is a theoretically impoverished account of our capacity for generalization.     

Hume and the enactive approach to mind

An important part of David Hume’s work is his attempt to put the natural sciences on a firmer foundation by introducing the scientific method into the study of human nature. This investigation resulted in a novel understanding of the mind, which in turn informed Hume’s critical evaluation of the scope and limits of the scientific method as such. However, while these latter reflections continue to influence today’s philosophy of science, his theory of mind is nowadays mainly of interest in terms of philosophical scholarship. This paper aims to show that, even though Hume’s recognition in the cognitive sciences has so far been limited, there is an opportunity to reevaluate his work in the context of more recent scientific developments. In particular, it is argued that we can gain a better understanding of his overall philosophy by tracing the ongoing establishment of the enactive approach. In return, this novel interpretation of Hume’s ‘science of man’ is used as the basis for a consideration of the current and future status of the cognitive sciences.

Memories, fantasies, archetypes: an exploration of some connections between cognitive science and analytical psychology

The value of cognitive science as a means of investigating psychodynamic theory and practice is discussed and the limitations of this approach are described. Research findings from cognitive science are drawn on to clarify the nature of memory, which is seen to be a mixture of reproduction and reconstruction and the concepts of true and false memory are explored in this light. The part played by implicit memory and internal working models in producing transference is also examined. New ways of conceptualizing fantasy, which describes it as another facet of internal working models, and the role of transgenerational transmission of attachment patterns in creating internal working models are explored. The nature of archetypes is considered in the light of cognitive science research and a minimalist model is proposed, in which they can be likened to image schemas, that is, primitive conceptual structures that exist in a form which can never be experienced directly or indirectly.     

Cognitive neuroimaging: cognitive science out of the armchair

Cognitive scientists were not quick to embrace the functional neuroimaging technologies that emerged during the late 20th century. In this new century, cognitive scientists continue to question, not unreasonably, the relevance of functional neuroimaging investigations that fail to address questions of interest to cognitive science. However, some ultra-cognitive scientists assert that these experiments can never be of relevance to the study of cognition. Their reasoning reflects an adherence to a functionalist philosophy that arbitrarily and purposefully distinguishes mental information-processing systems from brain or brain-like operations. This article addresses whether data from properly conducted functional neuroimaging studies can inform and subsequently constrain the assumptions of theoretical cognitive models. The article commences with a focus upon the functionalist philosophy espoused by the ultra-cognitive scientists, contrasting it with the materialist philosophy that motivates both cognitive neuroimaging investigations and connectionist modelling of cognitive systems. Connectionism and cognitive neuroimaging share many features, including an emphasis on unified cognitive and neural models of systems that combine localist and distributed representations. The utility of designing cognitive neuroimaging studies to test (primarily) connectionist models of cognitive phenomena is illustrated using data from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigations of language production and episodic memory.     

Trajectory of cognitive science and psychological assessment: current status and expectations

Salient commonalities and distinctions of the set of contributions to this special section are synthesized and discussed. The examination provides a springboard for observations on future developments in cognitive-science applications. Issues considered include imminence and nature of clinical implementation, prediction of selected client transactions outside the assessment context, integration with complementing modes of clinical assessment, and reciprocal information sharing by clinical and nonclinical cognitive scientists.     

From Cudworth to Hume: Cambridge Platonism and the Scottish Enlightenment

This paper argues that the Cambridge Platonists had stronger philosophical links to Scottish moral philosophy than the received history allows. Building on the work of Michael Gill who has demonstrated links between ethical thought of More, Cudworth and Smith and moral sentimentalism, I outline some links between the Cambridge Platonists and Scottish thinkers in both the seventeenth century (e.g., James Nairn, Henry Scougal) and the eighteenth century (e.g., Smith, Blair, Stewart). I then discuss Hume's knowledge of Cudworth, in Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, The Natural History of Religion and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion.     

Musculoskeletal pain complaints and performance on cognitive tasks over the adult life span

The present study aimed at comparing participants with and without self reported musculoskeletal pain in a normal population with regard to performance on a range of tests for episodic memory, semantic memory, and other cognitive functions and to see if expected differences interacted with age. The results showed that participants with pain performed worse on a range of tasks as compared to participants without pain, and that these differences occurred regardless of age. The most robust effects of pain were displayed on tests for vocabulary and construction ability as these were the only effects that remained significant after controlling for years of education and reported depression in separate analyses. When depression and education were controlled for in the same analysis, even these effects were eliminated, suggesting interplay between pain, depressive status, and educational level in the negative effects on cognitive functioning.     

Mencius,Hume, and the virtue of humanity: sources of benevolent moral development

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we elucidate the moral psychology and what we might call the moral sociology of Mencius and of Hume, and we argue for three claims. First, we demonstrate that there are strong similarities between Mencius and Hume concerning some of the principal psychological sources of the virtue of humanity. Second, we show that there are strong similarities between the two concerning some of the principal social sources of the virtue of humanity. Third, we argue that there are related, though weaker, similarities between Mencius and Hume concerning some of the principal cognitive sources of the virtue of humanity. We conclude by suggesting that the number and nature of these similarities demonstrate the need for future research on the conceptual connections between Confucian and Humean moral philosophy, especially on the psychological and social sources of benevolent moral development.     

The Idea of Power and Locke's Taxonomy of Ideas

Locke's account of the idea of power is thought to be seriously problematic. Commentators allege (1) that the idea of power causes problems for Locke's taxonomy of ideas, (2) that it is defined circularly, and (3) that, contrary to Locke's claims, it cannot be acquired in experience. This paper defends Locke's account. Previous commentators have assumed that there is only one idea of power. But close attention to Locke's text, combined with background features of his theory of ideas, supports the drawing of a distinction between four different ideas of power. The paper describes each idea and its role in the Essay. It then argues that this distinction can help Locke to avoid the traditional criticisms.     

The cognitive specificity of learned helplessness and depression deficits: The role of self-focused cognitions

Abstract

Four experiments assessed similarities and differences in learned helplessness and depression-related deficits in cognitive performance and self-focused cognitions. Subjects answered the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), were exposed to no-feedback or failure in unsolvable problems, and their response time in a digit comparison task (with or without a memory component, with different number of digits, and different number of mental transformations) and self-focused cognitions were assessed. Learned helplessness and depression deficits were found in a memory task, and the deficits increased with the number of digits. Depression deficits also increased with the number of transformations, and were also found in the no-memory/two transformation condition. Finally, task-related worries were related to learned helplessness deficits, and task-irrelevant thoughts were related to depression deficits. Findings were discussed in terms of the cognitive specificity of learned helplessness and depression deficits.     

The cognitive interview: Its origins,empirical support,evaluation and practical implications

This paper provides a background to current research on the cognitive interview (CI), which is a set of cognitive retrieval techniques designed to facilitate memory search (for example, via reinstatement of contextual cues). One of the principal aims of this research is to identify and develop techniques which police investigators can themselves use. A series of studies were conducted at the University of California, Los Angeles, using police officers as interviewers and students, non-students and children as witnesses to realistic crimes. In all studies the CI elicited significantly more correct information with no apparent increase in errors or confabulations. The CI has been tested in a field study involving police officers in Florida. This paper will critically review this research, as well as more recent unpublished work including CI studies conducted in Germany and the UK. Some important modifications of the original CI procedure are described, and there is a theoretical discussion and explanation of the various components of the CI procedure. Finally, we will consider applications of the CI in clinical and organizational settings.     

Relationship of cognitive strategy use to prospective memory performance in a diverse sample of nondemented older adults with varying degrees of cognitive complaints and impairment

Although older adults typically have better performance on prospective memory (PM) tasks carried out in naturalistic settings, a paucity of research directly assesses older adults’ use of compensatory strategies on such tasks. The current study investigates external memory strategy use during performance of a clinical PM test that features both short-term (in laboratory) and long-term (out of laboratory) subtasks (i.e., the Royal Prince Alfred Prospective Memory Test – RPA-ProMem. Nondemented, community-dwelling older adults (n = 214; mean age = 80.5; 68.2% female; 39.7% non-white) with mild cognitive impairment, subjective cognitive decline, and healthy controls completed the RPA-ProMem while external strategy use was permitted and recorded. Overall, participants utilized external strategies 41% of the time on the RPA-ProMem. Increased utilization of external memory strategies was significantly associated with better PM performance. Additionally, better performance on executive functioning tasks was associated with increased use of external memory strategies. Results are discussed in relation to how memory strategy use can be enhanced to improve everyday memory ability in older adults at risk for dementia.     

Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for the treatment of current depressive symptoms: a meta-analysis

ABSTRACT

Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) appears to be a promising intervention for the prevention of relapse in major depressive disorder, but its efficacy in patients with current depressive symptoms is less clear. Randomized clinical trials of MBCT for adult patients with current depressive symptoms were included (k = 13, N = 1046). Comparison conditions were coded based on whether they were intended to be therapeutic (specific active controls) or not (non-specific controls). MBCT was superior to non-specific controls at post-treatment (k = 10, d = 0.71, 95% confidence interval [CI] [0.47, 0.96]), although not at longest follow-up (k = 2, d = 1.47, [?0.71, 3.65], mean follow-up = 5.70 months across all studies with follow-up). MBCT did not differ from other active therapies at post-treatment (k = 6, d = 0.002, [?0.43, 0.44]) and longest follow-up (k = 4, d = 0.26, [?0.24, 0.75]). There was some evidence that studies with higher methodological quality showed smaller effects at post-treatment, but no evidence that effects varied by inclusion criterion. The impact of publication bias appeared minimal. MBCT seems to be efficacious for samples with current depressive symptoms at post-treatment, although a limited number of studies tested the long-term effects of this therapy.     

Exemplars in the mist: the cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic

The idea that people often make probability judgments by a heuristic short-cut, the representativeness heuristic, has been widely influential, but also criticized for being vague. The empirical trademark of the heuristic is characteristic deviations between normative probabilities and judgments (e.g., the conjunction fallacy, base-rate neglect). In this article the authors contrast two hypotheses concerning the cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic, the prototype hypothesis (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) and the exemplar hypothesis (Juslin & Persson, 2002), in a task especially designed to elicit representativeness effects. Computational modelling and an experiment reveal that representativeness effects are evident early in training and persist longer in a more complex task environment and that the data are best accounted for by a model implementing the exemplar hypothesis.