DECISION AFFECT THEORY:

Abstract— How do people feel about the outcomes of risky options? Results from two experiments demonstrate that the emotional reaction to a monetary outcome is nor a simple function of the utility of that outcome Emotional responses also depend on probabilities and unobtained outcomes Unexpected outcomes have greater emotional impact than expected outcomes Furthermore any given outcome is lets pleasant if an unobtained outcome is better We propose an account of emotional experiences associated with outcomes of decisions called decision affect theory. It incorporates utilities expectations and counterfactual companions into hedonic responses. Finally, we show that choices between risky options can be described as the maximization of expected emotional experiences as predicted by decision affect theory That is people choose the risky option for which they expect to feel better on average.     

Biased processing of emotional information in sub-clinical anxiety: Evidence from Simon effects

We tested the idea that in high trait-anxiety, behavioural responses are influenced by spatial correspondence to emotional information. It is suggested that if an emotional stimulus is preferentially processed, it may act as if presented alone and yield a Simon effect: faster responses when stimulus and response spatially correspond than when not. High-trait-anxious undergraduates indeed showed a content-specific Simon effect for social-threat (not physical-threat) words that were presented together with a neutral word for 14 ms; they showed the reverse response pattern for positive words. Low-anxious undergraduates had no bias. When presentation time was lengthened to 500 ms, the response pattern for social-threat and positive words shown by high-anxious undergraduates reversed as compared to the pattern with 14 ms, but there were no significant group differences. These results can be taken to suggest that in high trait-anxiety, the processing of social-threat is specifically prioritized; social-threat and positive information may elicit an immediate response, counteracted by mood-regulation strategies. We argue that the present approach opens up interesting avenues for investigating biased information processing and response tendencies.     

Spinning the stories of our lives

The way people talk about past events can affect the way they remember them (Tversky & Marsh, 2000). The current research explores how people naturally talk about events from their own lives. Participants recorded what, when, and how they told others about events from their lives. In general, participants talked about recent emotional events, and told them primarily to peers in order to convey facts and/or to entertain. Not all distorted retellings were regarded as ‘inaccurate.’ Participants labeled 61% of their retellings as distorted (containing exaggerations, omissions, minimizations, or additions) but only 42% of their retellings as inaccurate. Social context shaped the stories people told: they changed stories for different audiences; they exaggerated to entertain and simplified to inform. People construct stories as they retrieve and use memories in a social context. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Awe or horror: differentiating two emotional responses to schema incongruence

ABSTRACT

Experiences that contradict one's core concepts (e.g. of the world, people, the self) elicit intense emotions. Such schema incongruence can elicit awe, wherein experiences that are too vast to understand with existing cognitive schemata cause one to feel that schemata should be updated [i.e. a “need for cognitive accommodation” (NFA); Keltner & Haidt, 2003. Approaching awe, a moral, spiritual, and aesthetic emotion. Cognition and Emotion, 17(3), 297–314]. However, other emotional responses to schema incongruence, such as horror, have not been investigated. The current studies compared awe and horror to investigate if they are distinct emotional responses to schema incongruence. Study 1 observed significant differences between awe and horror in cognitive appraisals (e.g. certainty, legitimacy), indicating several areas of dissimilarity. Study 2 found evidence that awe and horror are both responses to schema incongruence, as schema incongruence and NFA were salient in awe and horror, but not a contrast emotion. However, awe and horror were elicited by different types of schema incongruence: awe by spiritual vastness, horror by extremity. Awe-eliciting experiences also appeared to be easier to assimilate than horrifying experiences, as NFA and uncertainty were significantly lower in awe than in horror. Differences in the functions of horror and awe are also discussed.     

Virtual killing

Debates that revolve around the topic of morality and fiction rarely explicitly treat virtual worlds like, for example, Second Life. The reason for this disregard cannot be that all users of virtual worlds only do the right thing while online—for they sometimes even virtually kill each other. Is it wrong to kill other people in a virtual world? It depends. This essay analyzes on what it depends, why it is that killing people in a virtual world sometimes is wrong, and how different virtual killings are wrong in different ways. I argue that killing people online is wrong if it is an instance of deliberately and non-consensually evoking disagreeable emotions in others. Establishing this conclusion requires substantial conceptual work, as virtual worlds feature new kinds of fictional agency, particular emotional responses to fiction, and unique ways in which the fiction of the virtual world relates to the wrongness of the killing.     

Indicative and counterfactual ‘only if’ conditionals

We report three experiments to test the possibilities reasoners think about when they understand a conditional of the form ‘A only if B’ compared to ‘if A then B’. The experiments examine conditionals in the indicative mood (e.g., A occurred only if B occurred) and counterfactuals in the subjunctive mood (A would have occurred only if B had occurred). The first experiment examines the conjunctions of events that reasoners judge to be consistent with conditionals, e.g., A and B, not-A and not-B. It shows that people think about one possibility to understand ‘if’ and two possibilities to understand ‘only if’; they think about two possibilities to understand counterfactual ‘if’ and ‘only if’. The second experiment shows that the possibilities people think about when they understand ‘only if’ are in a different temporal order (e.g., B and A) to the possibilities they think about for ‘if’ (A and B). The third experiment shows that people make different inferences from ‘only if’ and ‘if’ conditionals and counterfactuals. The implications of the results for theories of counterfactual conditionals are considered.     

Procrastination and Precrastination from the Perspective of Self-Control

Procrastination is defined as postponing a task, anticipating adverse consequences in the future. In contrast, D. A. Rosenbaum and colleagues introduced the concept of “precrastination” in 2014, defining it as people doing a task early even when involving physical cost because they desire to minimize their cognitive load. This study aimed to organize and expand the new concept and advance understanding of precrastination in everyday situations and of the associations between precrastination and self-control. Using the scenario assumption method, we examined whether people would precrastinate or procrastinate a task to remove cognitive load and clear their mind even if there was physical cost/burden (Study 1), and whether they would precrastinate or procrastinate a painful event to remove emotional load stemming from a fear of pain (Study 2). The results showed that (a) people start tasks early in order to remove cognitive and emotional load; (b) people do not start tasks early when they involve physical cost, burden, or fear; (c) people with high self-control start tasks early to remove cognitive load even when involving physical cost; and (d) people with high self-control and low fear start tasks earlier to remove emotional load.     

Individual Differences Associated with Emotional and Behavioral Responses to Ambiguous Social Situations in which Rejection Might be Inferred

This study sought to examine the extent to which undergraduates' experiences with and attitudes relevant to rejection may be associated with their emotional and behavioral responses to ambiguous social situations in which rejection might be inferred. Undergraduate students completed questionnaires that assessed their experiences with and attitudes relevant to being rejected. Next, each participant read six hypothetical scenarios that described various situations that could be interpreted as interpersonal rejection. Following each scenario, participants completed questionnaires that assessed their emotional and behavioral responses to the hypothetical situation. Analyses revealed that the participants' experiences with rejection (and, to a lesser extent, their rejection-relevant attitudes) were associated with a negative emotional response and some negative behavioral responses. In sum, when another individual's interpersonal behavior has an uncertain intent, undergraduates' prior experiences with rejection may be especially important in determining the extent to which they feel and act as if they have been rejected.     

Emotional responding in depression: Distinctions in the time course of emotion

The current studies were designed to investigate if the emotion context insensitivity hypothesis (ECI; Rottenberg & Gotlib, 2004) is applicable across the time course of emotion. Recent affective science research has pointed to the importance of considering anticipation and maintenance of emotion. In the current studies, we assessed emotion responses among college students with depression symptoms in anticipation of, during, and after an emotional picture using the emotion modulated startle paradigm. People with and without depression symptoms did not differ in blink magnitude in anticipation of emotional pictures suggesting that some anticipatory processes may not be impaired by depression symptoms. In contrast, individuals with depression symptoms did not exhibit blink magnitudes that varied by valence, either during viewing or after the pictures were removed from view. These findings suggest that ECI is relevant not only for those diagnosed with major depressive disorder, but also for people with depression symptoms that may not cross the diagnostic threshold. These data also point to the importance of considering the time course of emotion to better understand emotional deficits in individuals with differing levels of depression symptoms. Identifying where emotion goes awry across the time course of emotion can help inform treatment development.     

Anger and attitudinal reactions to negative feedback: The effects of emotional instability and power

Feedback is a basic tool that is used to stimulate learning and performance at all organizational levels. However, negative feedback can sometimes evoke defensive responses such as feelings of anger or the repudiation of the feedback. In two experiments we explored whether people’s negating responses to feedback are grounded in their emotional instability, and if this effect is stronger for those who hold more power. The findings from Study 1 (N = 84) showed that in response to negative feedback more emotionally unstable individuals experienced more anger. In Study 2 (N = 47) we indicated that anger mediated the negative effects of emotional instability and power on liking of the feedback provider, perceived ability of the feedback provider, and feedback acceptance. Our findings indicate that power strengthens the influence of emotional instability on responses to negative feedback and point to the importance of anger as the underlying factor influencing crucial attitudinal feedback reactions.     

The burden of benevolent sexism: how it contributes to the maintenance of gender inequalities

This study (N = 235) examines the responses of male and female participants to information about the alleged endorsement of either hostile or benevolent sexist beliefs by a sample of either men or women. We predicted that people endorsing benevolent sexist statements would be less likely to be perceived as sexist than those endorsing hostile sexist views, and examined the judgmental process through which people fail to recognize benevolent sexism as a form of prejudice. We argue that benevolent sexists do not match the mental prototype of sexist perpetrators, because they are seen as likeable. Our results confirm that because benevolent sexists are evaluated more positively than hostile sexists, they are less likely to be seen as sexists. This judgmental process occurs relatively independently of emotional responses to hostile vs. benevolent sexism. These results are discussed in terms of their relevance to the maintenance of gender inequalities. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are irrational reactions to unfairness truly emotionally-driven? Dissociated behavioural and emotional responses in the Ultimatum Game task

The “irrational” rejections of unfair offers by people playing the Ultimatum Game (UG), a widely used laboratory model of economical decision-making, have traditionally been associated with negative emotions, such as frustration, elicited by unfairness (Sanfey et al., 2003, van’t Wout et al., 2006). We recorded skin conductance responses as a measure of emotional activation while participants performed a modified version of the UG, in which they were asked to play both for themselves and on behalf of a third-party. Our findings show that even unfair offers are rejected when participants’ payoff is not affected (third-party condition); however, they show an increase in the emotional activation specifically when they are rejecting offers directed towards themselves (myself condition). These results suggest that theories emphasizing negative emotions as the critical factor of “irrational” rejections (Pillutla & Murninghan, 1996) should be re-discussed. Psychological mechanisms other than emotions might be better candidates for explaining this behaviour.     

Emotional responding in depression: Distinctions in the time course of emotion

The current studies were designed to investigate if the emotion context insensitivity hypothesis (ECI; Rottenberg & Gotlib, 2004) is applicable across the time course of emotion. Recent affective science research has pointed to the importance of considering anticipation and maintenance of emotion. In the current studies, we assessed emotion responses among college students with depression symptoms in anticipation of, during, and after an emotional picture using the emotion modulated startle paradigm. People with and without depression symptoms did not differ in blink magnitude in anticipation of emotional pictures suggesting that some anticipatory processes may not be impaired by depression symptoms. In contrast, individuals with depression symptoms did not exhibit blink magnitudes that varied by valence, either during viewing or after the pictures were removed from view. These findings suggest that ECI is relevant not only for those diagnosed with major depressive disorder, but also for people with depression symptoms that may not cross the diagnostic threshold. These data also point to the importance of considering the time course of emotion to better understand emotional deficits in individuals with differing levels of depression symptoms. Identifying where emotion goes awry across the time course of emotion can help inform treatment development.     

Defensive physiological reactions to rejection: the effect of self-esteem and attentional control on startle responses

We examined the hypothesis that rejection automatically elicits defensive physiological reactions in people with low self-esteem (SE) but that attentional control moderates this effect. Undergraduates (N= 67) completed questionnaire measures of SE and attentional control. Their eye-blink responses to startle probes were measured while they viewed paintings related to rejection and acceptance themes. The stimuli also included positive-, negative-, and neutral-valence control paintings unrelated to rejection. As predicted, compared with people high in SE, those low in SE showed stronger startle eye-blink responses to paintings related to rejection, but not to negative paintings. Paintings related to acceptance did not attenuate their physiological reactivity. Furthermore, attentional control moderated their sensitivity to rejection, such that low SE was related to greater eye-blink responses to rejection only among individuals who were low in attentional control. Implications of the role of attentional control as a top-down process regulating emotional reactivity in people with low SE are discussed.     

Agreeableness and brain activity during emotion attribution decisions

Within the Big 5 model of personality, Agreeableness is a trait-dimension associated with the tendency to behave prosocially; highly agreeable people tend to be highly cooperative and altruistic. This study was designed to test for associations between Agreeableness and the way people decide the cause of another person’s emotional reaction (emotion attribution). Behavioral and neuroimaging (fMRI) data were collected while participants (n = 72) performed an emotional attribution task. During the emotion attribution task, participants decided which of two social–emotional scenes they believed caused another person’s emotional reaction. Converging evidence indicated that highly agreeable people tend to make emotional attribution decisions more quickly and exhibit greater temporoparietal junction activity during emotion attribution decisions, compared to low agreeable people.     

Mental illness disclosure in organizations: defining and predicting (un)supportive responses

Employees with a mental illness regularly encounter situations where they must make decisions regarding the extent to which they discuss their stigma. Past research has found links between positive disclosure experiences and positive well-being and job-related outcomes for the individual disclosing. However, research on stigma disclosure has not yet defined what differentiates a supportive response from an unsupportive one, and there is evidence to suggest that people are unsure of how to best respond to a disclosure. In a series of three studies, we sought to develop a better understanding of mental illness disclosure at work. First, we created a typology of supportive and unsupportive responses to disclosure via critical incidents gathered from working adults with a mental illness. Second, we surveyed working adults with and without a mental illness to examine if they perceive the supportiveness of responses differently. Third, in an experimental study, we examined which methods of disclosure are most effective in eliciting a supportive response. This work identifies several types of supportive (e.g., providing emotional support) and unsupportive (e.g., denial of symptoms) responses to mental illness disclosure and finds that individuals without a mental illness have a reasonable understanding of what an individual with a mental illness would also identify as supportive/unsupportive responses. We also find that downplaying one’s mental illness will likely lead to a less supportive response.

     

The deliberate control of emotional experience through control of expressions

Recent research suggests that deliberate manipulation of expressive behaviours might self-regulate emotional experiences. Eighty people were first induced to adopt emotional expressions in a successfully disguised procedure that identified whether their feelings were affected by their expressive behaviour when they were unaware of the nature and purpose of that behaviour. They then deliberately attempted to change emotional feelings by adopting or inhibiting emotional behaviours, or by focusing on or being distracted from situational cues for emotion. Participants more responsive to their own behaviour in the disguised procedure felt more intensely when they adopted emotional behaviours, and less intensely when they inhibited those behaviours. In contrast, people identified as unresponsive to their own emotional behaviour were most affected by deliberate focus on or distraction from emotional thoughts. The effectiveness of techniques for emotional self-regulation depends on a match with characteristics of the person.     

Talking about others: Emotionality and the dissemination of social information

There is evidence that we may be more likely to share stories about other people to the extent that they arouse emotion. If so, this emotional social talk may have important social consequences, providing the basis for many of our social beliefs and mobilising people to engage or disengage with the targets of the talk. Across three studies, we tested the situated communicability of emotional social information by examining if the ability of emotionality to increase communicability would depend on the emotion that was aroused and the identity of the audience. Study 1 showed that participants were more willing to share social anecdotes that aroused interest, surprise, disgust and happiness with an unspecified audience. Study 2 provided a behavioural replication of these findings. Study 3 showed that the communicability of emotional social talk did vary with audience identity (friend or stranger). Together, these findings suggest that emotional social events (particularly those that arouse disgust and happiness) are likely to become part of a society's social beliefs, with important consequences for the structure of social relationships. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotional valence modulates the preference for curved objects

Previous studies have shown that people prefer objects with curved contours over objects with sharp contours. However, those studies used stimuli that were mainly neutral in emotional valence. We tested here the interplay between visual features and general valence as positive or negative. After replicating curvature preferences for neutral objects, we used positive (cake, chocolate) and negative (snake, bomb) stimuli to examine if emotional valence-through response prioritisation-modulates the preference for curved objects. We found that people indeed preferred the curved versions of objects to the sharp versions of the same objects, but only if the objects were neutral or positive in emotional valence. There were no difference in liking for objects with negative emotional valence. This is evidence that the aesthetic response is adaptive, in this case prioritising valence over contour as demanded by the general semantic classification.