The perseverance effect in the debriefing paradigm: Replication and extension

A classic study conducted by Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) revealed a perseverance effect wherein people who received positive performance feedback on an alleged social perceptiveness test reported more favorable self-perceptions in this domain than those who received negative feedback despite the fact that they had received standard outcome debriefing (i.e., been informed about the false, predetermined, and random nature of the feedback) prior to reporting self-assessments. The present studies extend this past research by revealing that (a) there is a form of outcome debriefing (i.e., informing participants about the bogus nature of the test as well as the bogus nature of the feedback) that effectively eliminates the perseverance effect, (b) the perseverance effect that occurs after standard outcome debriefing is limited to perceptions of specific task-relevant skills rather than more global abilities, and (c) affective reactions do not underlie the perseverance effect that occurs in the false feedback paradigm.     

Self-enhancement and theory-based correction processes

Two studies examined bias correction by manipulating a perceived chronic judgmental bias (i.e., overestimator/underestimator) using a modified dot estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants corrected for this perceived estimation bias by making adjustments away from the arbitrary feedback about their personal bias tendencies. In Experiment 2, the perceived desirability of the same estimation bias was manipulated. Results indicated that self-enhancement concerns impacted perceivers’ motivation to correct, at a cost to accuracy. These studies expand our current understanding of theory-based correction by including self-enhancement motives as causes of correction, demonstrating that such corrections can decrease rather than increase judgment accuracy, and illustrating the usefulness of a new perceived bias manipulation in theory testing.     

Self-focused attention and belief perseverance

The perseverance of an erroneous belief was investigated in the debriefing paradigm as a function of self-focused attention. Subjects were given either success or failure experiences via bogus performance feedback and received this feedback under high or low mirror self-focusing. All subjects were subsequently debriefed about the false nature of the feedback, and then, before answering questions about their estimated actual performance and ability, mirror self-focus was again manipulated. The results showed that self-focus prior to debriefing increased belief perseverance while self-focus after debriefing reduced the perseverance effects. Discussion of these findings emphasized the role of self-focus in information processing before and adherence to veridical standards after debriefing.     

No good deed goes unquestioned: Cynical reconstruals maintain belief in the power of self-interest

In four studies, we examined how people maintain beliefs that self-interest is a strong determinant of behavior, even in the face of disconfirming evidence. People reflecting on selfless behavior tend to reconstrue it in terms of self-interested motives, but do not similarly scrutinize selfish behaviors for selfless motives. Study 1 found that people react to new information that selfless behavior is common by interpreting it as more reflective of self-interest. Studies 2a and 2b, applying a Bayesian analysis, demonstrated that people see “too much” self-interest in seemingly selfless actions, given their prior beliefs, but see the predicted amount of self-interest in seemingly selfish actions. This demonstrates that people do not possess internally consistent belief systems, but rather undue cynicism. In Study 3, participants read about real philanthropists whose acts of generosity had been heralded by major news outlets. As participants spent more time considering why such philanthropy was performed, they formed more cynical impressions of the philanthropists' motives. Beyond offering insight into why belief in the norm of self-interest persists, these studies introduce a novel route by which beliefs resist disconfirmation.     

When overconfidence is revealed to others: Testing the status-enhancement theory of overconfidence

The status-enhancement theory of overconfidence proposes that overconfidence pervades self-judgment because it helps people attain higher social status. Prior work has found that highly confident individuals attained higher status regardless of whether their confidence was justified by actual ability ( Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012). However, those initial findings were observed in contexts where individuals’ actual abilities were unlikely to be discovered by others. What happens to overconfident individuals when others learn how good they truly are at the task? If those individuals are penalized with status demotions, then the status costs might outweigh the status benefits of overconfidence – thereby casting doubt on the benefits of overconfidence. In three studies, we found that group members did not react negatively to individuals revealed as overconfident, and in fact still viewed them positively. Therefore, the status benefits of overconfidence outweighed any possible status costs, lending further support to the status-enhancement theory.     

Children's understanding of belief as a normative concept

The variety of accounts of theory of mind development, arising from distinct theoretical perspectives, have focused on children's causal-explanatory views on the mind and have not developed accounts of children's normative judgments of the mental domain. This review maintains that such a focus is unfortunate and leaves our understanding of belief as a concept incomplete. First, by presenting an alternative framework that treats belief as a normative concept, this account discusses the central importance of children's understanding of epistemic justification and their appreciation of the normative significance of others’ reasons for belief. Next, this review of the relevant theory of mind literature proposes a new way of thinking about the findings of various domains in this field and gives particular attention to prior work on false belief, origins or sources of belief, and the distinctions between fantastical and epistemic states. On the basis of this review, it is concluded that in order to accurately assess the development of the concept of belief, further research is required on children's views of how beliefs ought to be formed, their evaluation of justified and unjustified believers, and the notions of duty or responsibility they associate with epistemic agents.     

The kinematics of belief and desire

Richard Jeffrey regarded the version of Bayesian decision theory he floated in ‘The Logic of Decision’ and the idea of a probability kinematics—a generalisation of Bayesian conditioning to contexts in which the evidence is ‘uncertain’—as his two most important contributions to philosophy. This paper aims to connect them by developing kinematical models for the study of preference change and practical deliberation. Preference change is treated in a manner analogous to Jeffrey’s handling of belief change: not as mechanical outputs of combinations of intrinsic desires plus information, but as a matter of judgement and of making up one’s mind. In the first section Jeffrey’s probability kinematics is motivated and extended to the treatment of changes in conditional belief. In the second, analogous kinematical models are developed for preference change and in particular belief-induced change that depends on an invariance condition for conditional preference. The two are the brought together in the last section in a tentative model of pratical deliberation. This paper is one of a pair dedicated to Richard Jeffrey and prepared for a workshop held in his memory at the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. My thanks to the organisers of, and the participants in, this workshop and to two anonymous referees for their comments.     

Probabilistic dynamic belief revision

We investigate the discrete (finite) case of the Popper–Renyi theory of conditional probability, introducing discrete conditional probabilistic models for knowledge and conditional belief, and comparing them with the more standard plausibility models. We also consider a related notion, that of safe belief, which is a weak (non-negatively introspective) type of “knowledge”. We develop a probabilistic version of this concept (“degree of safety”) and we analyze its role in games. We completely axiomatize the logic of conditional belief, knowledge and safe belief over conditional probabilistic models. We develop a theory of probabilistic dynamic belief revision, introducing probabilistic “action models” and proposing a notion of probabilistic update product, that comes together with appropriate reduction laws.     

Order effects in belief updating with consistent and inconsistent evidence

The current study tests for the presence of differential order effects in evaluation tasks with consistent and inconsistent evidence as predicted by the Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) belief-adjustment model. The results, based on both between-subjects and within-subjects experiments, demonstrate that there were significant recency effects with inconsistent evidence as predicted, larger recency effects when the inconsistent evidence was farther apart in subjective value as predicted, and significant recency effects even when subjects were given training designed to both help them understand the task as completely as possible and to be better able to assess the pieces of evidence. By including a within-subjects design, we were able to demonstrate that the difference in subjective value between two pieces of evidence is the primary factor influencing the magnitude of the recency effect, regardless of whether the evidence is consistent or inconsistent. This latter finding is unique and contrary to previous research and theory.     

Seeing and believing: perception,belief formation and the divided mind

On many of the idealized models of human cognition and behavior in use by philosophers, agents are represented as having a single corpus of beliefs which (a) is consistent and deductively closed, and (b) guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all the time. In graded-belief frameworks, agents are represented as having a single, coherent distribution of credences, which guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all of the time. It’s clear that actual human beings don’t live up to this idealization. The systems of belief that we in fact have are fragmented. Rather than having a single system of beliefs that guides all of our behavior all of the time, we have a number of distinct, compartmentalized systems of belief, different ones of which drive different aspects of our behavior in different contexts. It’s tempting to think that, while of course people are fragmented, it would be better (from the perspective of rationality) if they weren’t, and the only reason why our fragmentation is excusable is that we have limited cognitive resources, which prevents us from holding too much information before our minds at a time. Give us enough additional processing capacity, and there’d be no justification for any continued fragmentation. I argue that this is not so. There are good reasons to be fragmented rather than unified, independent of the limitations on our available processing power. In particular, there are ways our belief-forming mechanisms—including our perceptual systems—could be constructed that would make it better to be fragmented than to be unified. And there are reasons to think that some of our belief-forming mechanisms really are constructed that way.

The effects of strong belief structures on information-processing evaluations and choice

This study examined the influence of the strength of belief structures on selected aspects of the decision-making process. To examine these issues, a business-acquisition decision scenario was studied in an experiment. Subjects played the role of a CEO of an electronics firm and were asked to evaluate the attractiveness of six potential acquisition candidates and to rate various aspects of the associated decision process. We presented half the subjects with information that the belief structure of their organization was extreme, agreed upon, and clear. The other half was presented with information that there was disagreement about the belief structure and that it was more ambiguous and less extreme. The results clearly showed that the decision process is different for people who were presented with an agreed-upon, extreme, and tightly constructed belief structure when compared to those who received information reflecting a weak and loosely constructed belief structure. A strong belief structure resulted in less positive evaluations, information requested, and money allocated to explore incompatible acquisition candidates (and vice versa for a highly compatible candidate) when compared to subjects using a weak belief structure. In addition, subjects in the strong-belief condition reported that their decision process would be characterized by less doubt, less time, less difficulty, and less conflict compared to subjects in the weak-belief structure condition. Implications for both decision theory and practical decision processes are discussed.     

Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription

It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as the one presented provide support for the claim that the genuine source for concept individuation is public sharable thought.     

何为成功之母? 绝对和相对反馈情境下失败和成功次数对耐挫的影响

本研究通过4个实验探讨绝对和相对结果反馈情境下, 个体经历不同失败次数后, 成功次数对其耐挫表现的影响。实验1和实验2分别采用绝对结果(1a和1b: n = 132)和相对结果(2a和2b: n = 132)创设失败和成功反馈, 以不同难度(1a和2a)和相同难度(1b和2b)的图形推理题操纵先前的失败次数(5次或10次)和成功次数(1次或5次)。研究发现: (1)绝对结果反馈情境下: 经历5次失败后, 不论何种难度任务, 5次成功的耐挫表现高于1次成功。经历10次失败后, 相同难度任务下, 5次成功的耐挫表现高于1次成功; 不同难度任务下, 5次成功和1次成功的耐挫表现无差异。(2)相对结果反馈情境下: 经历10次失败后, 不论何种难度任务, 5次成功的耐挫表现高于1次成功。经历5次失败后, 相同难度任务下, 5次成功和1次成功的耐挫表现无差异; 不同难度任务下, 5次成功的耐挫表现高于1次成功。研究结果支持“成功是成功之母”的观点。     

Knowledge of results after relatively good trials enhances self-efficacy and motor learning

Objectives

This study sought to determine whether learners’ self-efficacy and motor learning was affected by the type of feedback they were provided.

Method

Participants (N = 24, M age = 19.51 years, SD = 1.08) were randomly assigned into one of two groups: knowledge of result after good versus poor trials. The task included throwing a tennis ball with the non-dominate hand to a target while wearing vision distorting goggles. Participants completed the Self-Efficacy Scale (Bandura, 2006) before performing each block of 6 trials. A retention test without knowledge of results was conducted 24 h after the practice phase.

Results

The results demonstrated that learners’ motor learning was increased by providing knowledge of results after good rather than poor trials. Furthermore, the Self-Efficacy Scale results revealed that learners’ self-efficacy was enhanced by positive feedback.

Conclusions

The current findings indicate that positive feedback impacts learner’s self-efficacy, and enhances performance and motor learning.     

Preference-based belief revision for rule-based agents

Agents which perform inferences on the basis of unreliable information need an ability to revise their beliefs if they discover an inconsistency. Such a belief revision algorithm ideally should be rational, should respect any preference ordering over the agent’s beliefs (removing less preferred beliefs where possible) and should be fast. However, while standard approaches to rational belief revision for classical reasoners allow preferences to be taken into account, they typically have quite high complexity. In this paper, we consider belief revision for agents which reason in a simpler logic than full first-order logic, namely rule-based reasoners. We show that it is possible to define a contraction operation for rule-based reasoners, which we call McAllester contraction, which satisfies all the basic Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) postulates for contraction (apart from the recovery postulate) and at the same time can be computed in polynomial time. We prove a representation theorem for McAllester contraction with respect to the basic AGM postulates (minus recovery), and two additional postulates. We then show that our contraction operation removes a set of beliefs which is least preferred, with respect to a natural interpretation of preference. Finally, we show how McAllester contraction can be used to define a revision operation which is also polynomial time, and prove a representation theorem for the revision operation.