An informational analysis of actors' and observers' belief attributions in a role-playing situation

An actor's belief in a proposition was inferred by both the actor himself and an observer on the basis of information concerning (a) the actor's preparation and delivery of a speech on the proposition to an unseen audience, and (b) the audience's belief in the proposition. The availability of this information to judges was systematically varied. The position advocated by the actor in his speech and the audience's opinion affected both the actor's belief in the test proposition and the belief attributed to the actor by a disinterested observer. However, neither effect depended upon whether or not other belief-relevant information was also available. These results were interpreted as more consistent with a summative model of information integration than with an averaging model. Actors' behavior had similar effects upon both actors' estimates of how the audience would judge their beliefs and observers' actual estimates of these beliefs. However, these effects were both greater than the effect of their behavior on their own estimates of their beliefs. The apparent strength of the audience's belief in the target proposition had a positive influence upon both actors' beliefs in the proposition and observers' estimates of actors' beliefs, but had a negative, or contrast effect upon actors' expectancies for how the audience would judge their beliefs. Results were more consistent with the differential perspective hypothesis of actor-observer differences proposed by Jones and Nisbett than with the hypothesis that actors and observers differentially weight the implications of their past experience in formulating their judgments. Results had additional implications for the assumptions that persons make when using their behaviors as indications of their beliefs.     

How believing in affirmative action quotas protects White men’s self-esteem

We propose that White men derive a psychological benefit from believing that affirmative action is a quota-based policy. Three studies provide evidence that quota beliefs protect White men’s self-esteem by boosting their sense of self-competence. Study 1 found a positive relationship between quota beliefs and self-esteem that was mediated by self-perceived competence. In Studies 2 and 3, the belief in affirmative action quotas—whether measured or experimentally manipulated—protected White men’s self-esteem from self-image threatening feedback. Only participants who did not believe in quotas reported a lower self-esteem after being told they had performed poorly on an intelligence test. As in Study 1, this effect was mediated by self-perceived competence. In all, these studies suggest that the belief that affirmative action is a quota policy may persist, in part, because it benefits White mens’ self-esteem.     

The effects of empathy and outcome on attribution: An examination of the divergent-perspectives hypothesis

Based on the theoretical ideas of Jones and Nisbett (Jones et al. Attribution: Perceiving the cause of behavior. New York: General Learning Press, 1971), and the recent findings of Regan and Totten (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 1975, 850–856), the present study assumed that from an attributional standpoint empathic observers and actors are functionally equivalent. On this basis it was predicted that empathic, relative to nonempathic, observers would make outcome attributions which have been typically found for actors themselves: They would attribute an actor's success to dispositional causes, but an actor's failure to situational causes. After instructions to empathize with the target, or to observe him, subjects watched a videotape of a target male attempting to make a good first impression on a female. Subjects later learned that the target had either succeeded or failed at making a good first impression, and were asked to make causal attributions for his outcome. As predicted, instructions to empathize led to dispositional attributions for success and situational attributions for failure, while standard observation instructions resulted in dispositional causal attributions regardless of outcome. The results were interpreted as supporting the contention that differential information processing may sufficiently account for the effects of outcome on causal attributions.     

Beliefs Don't Always Persevere: How Political Figures Are Punished When Positive Information about Them Is Discredited

Recent research has extended the belief‐perseverance paradigm to the political realm, showing that negative information about political figures has a persistent effect on political opinions even after it has been discredited. However, little is known about the effects of false positive information about political figures. In three experiments, we find that discrediting positive information generates a “punishment effect” that is inconsistent with the previous literature on belief perseverance. We argue people attempt to adjust for the perceived influence of the false claim when the information is discredited. In this case, when trying to account for the effects of discredited positive information about a politician, people overestimate how much correction is needed and thus end up with a more negative opinion. (By contrast, people underestimate how much correction is needed to adjust for false negative information, leading to belief perseverance.) These results suggest that bogus credit claiming or other positive misinformation can have severe repercussions for politicians.     

Perseverance in self-perception and social perception: biased attributional processes in the debriefing paradigm.

Two experiments demonstrated that self-perceptions and social perceptions may persevere after the initial basis for such perceptions has been completely discredited. In both studies subjects first received false feedback, indicating that they had either succeeded or failed on a novel discrimination task and then were thoroughly debriefed concerning the predetermined and random nature of this outcome manipulation. In experiment 2, both the initial outcome manipulation and subsequent debriefing were watched and overheard by observers. Both actors and observers showed substantial perseverance of initial impressions concerning the actors' performance and abilities following a standard "outcome" debriefing. "Process" debriefing, in which explicit discussion of the perseverance process was provided, generally proved sufficient to eliminate erroneous self-perceptions. Biased attribution processes that might underlie perserverance phenomena and the implications of the present data for the ethical conduct of deception research are discussed.     

Why did this happen to me? Religious believers’ and non-believers’ teleological reasoning about life events

People often believe that significant life events happen for a reason. In three studies, we examined evidence for the view that teleological beliefs reflect a general cognitive bias to view the world in terms of agency, purpose, and design. Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that individual differences in mentalizing ability predicted both the tendency to believe in fate (Study 1) and to infer purposeful causes of one’s own life events (Study 2). In addition, people’s perception of purpose in life events was correlated with their teleological beliefs about nature, but this relationship was driven primarily by individuals’ explicit religious and paranormal beliefs (Study 3). Across all three studies, we found that while people who believe in God hold stronger teleological beliefs than those who do not, there is nonetheless evidence of teleological beliefs among non-believers, confirming that the perception of purpose in life events does not rely on theistic belief. These findings suggest that the tendency to perceive design and purpose in life events—while moderated by theistic belief—is not solely a consequence of culturally transmitted religious ideas. Rather, this teleological bias has its roots in certain more general social propensities.     

Causal attributions for behaviors consistent or inconsistent with an actor's personality traits: Differences between those offered by actors and observers

The present research was designed to investigate differences in the attributions offered from the actor's perspective and the observer's perspective. It was predicted that causal attributions for behaviors inconsistent with an actor's personality traits would be more situational when offered from the actor's perspective than when offered from the observer's perspective. In contrast, it was predicted that causal attributions for behaviors consistent with an actor's personality traits would be more dispositional when offered from the actor's perspective than when offered from the observer's perspective. Consistent with these hypotheses, extraverts explained introverted behaviors and introverts explained extraverted behaviors more situationally from the actor's perspective than from the observer's perspective. Furthermore, extraverts explained extraverted behaviors and introverts explained introverted behaviors more dispositionally from the actor's perspective than from the observer's perspective. These differences in the attributions offered by actors and observers were attenuated but not eliminated when attributors had access to useful situational information with which to apply the discounting principle.     

Actors,observers, and the attribution process: Toward a reconceptualization

Jones and Nisbett hypothesize that actors attribute their actions to situational requirements whereas observers attribute the same actions to personal dispositions. This hypothesis is critically examined and a reconceptualization is proposed. Our conceptual analysis focuses on the attributional consequences of differences between actors and observers in: (a) availability of information about the contemporary and historical determinants of the actor's behavior, and (b) susceptibility to possible motivational distortions and cognitive biases. The relationship between this formulation and Jones and Nisbett's analysis of differences between self-perception and interpersonal perception is discussed.     

Blame contagion: The automatic transmission of self-serving attributions

When people blame others for their mistakes, they learn less and perform worse. This problem is magnified when blame becomes embedded in the shared culture of groups and organizations. Yet, little is known about whether—and, if so, how—the propensity to blame spreads from one person to another. Four experiments addressed this issue, demonstrating that blame is socially contagious: observing an individual make a blame attribution increased the likelihood that people would make subsequent blame attributions for their own, unrelated, failures (Experiments 1, 2, and 4). Results also indicated that this “blame contagion” is due to the transmission of goals. Blame exposure led to the inference and adoption of a self-image protection goal (Experiment 3), and blame contagion was eliminated when observers had the opportunity to alleviate this self-image protection goal via self-affirmation (Experiment 4). Implications for research on causal attributions, social contagion, and cultural transmission are discussed.     

Reflexively mindblind: Using theory of mind to interpret behavior requires effortful attention

People commonly interpret others’ behavior in terms of the actors’ underlying beliefs, knowledge, or other mental states, thereby using their “theory of mind.” Two experiments suggest that using one’s theory of mind is a relatively effortful process. In both experiments, people reflexively used their own knowledge and beliefs to follow a speaker’s instruction, but only effortfully used their theory of mind to take into account a speaker’s intention to interpret those instructions. In Experiment 1, people with lower working memory capacity were less effective than people with larger working memory capacity in applying their theory of mind to interpret behavior. In Experiment 2, an attention-demanding secondary task reduced people’s ability to apply their theory of mind. People appear to be reflexively mindblind, interpreting behavior in terms of the actor’s mental states only to the extent that they have the cognitive resources to do so.     

Self-serving biases: The role of perspective-taking

This research explores the role of perspective taking in self-serving biases. Assisted by a confederate, 80 subjects performed an impression-formation task and were given either success or failure bogus feedback. One week later, half of the subjects watched their performance on videotape and provided causal attributions (‘observers’). The other half simply gave causal attributions (‘actors’). Thus, the experiment employed a modified version of the actor/observer paradigm with one group of subjects taking the perspective of observers (‘observers’) and one group of subjects keeping their original perspective (‘actors’). The aim of this study was to test whether the change of perspective would increase dispositional causal attributions both in success and failure conditions. Results showed that subjects gave greater causal weight to internal factors (ability, effort) and less causal weight to external factors (task characteristics, collaboration with the partner) in the success than in the failure condition. Moreover, in a direct comparison task, subjects attributed a greater percentage of responsibility to themselves than to their partner in the success than in the failure condition. However, the type of perspective produced no significant effects, but showed an attenuation of self-serving biases for observers as compared to actors. A motivational explanation of the results is proposed.     

Mind-reading in strategic interaction: The impact of perceived similarity on projection and stereotyping

In social dilemmas, negotiations, and other forms of strategic interaction, mind-reading—intuiting another party’s preferences and intentions—has an important impact on an actor’s own behavior. In this paper, we present a model of how perceivers shift between social projection (using one’s own mental states to intuit a counterpart’s mental states) and stereotyping (using general assumptions about a group to intuit a counterpart’s mental states). Study 1 extends prior work on perceptual dilemmas in arms races, examining Americans’ perceptions of Chinese attitudes toward military escalation. Study 2 adapts a prisoner’s dilemma, pairing participants with outgroup targets. Study 3 employs an ultimatum game, asking male and female participants to make judgments about opposite sex partners. Study 4 manipulates perceived similarity as well as counterpart stereotype in a principal–agent context. Across the studies, we find evidence for our central prediction: higher levels of perceived similarity are associated with increased projection and reduced stereotyping.     

Abstract and concrete data in the perseverance of social theories: When weak data lead to unshakeable beliefs

The perseverance effect—the finding that people cling to their initial beliefs more strongly than appears warranted—has been demonstrated in a wide variety of settings. The existing explanation of the effect implies that beliefs based on concrete data should be more resistant to challenges than beliefs based on abstract data. The present studies compared the amount of belief perseverance when the beliefs were initially based on either abstract or concrete data. Subjects examined either two case histories (concrete data) or a statistical summary (abstract data) suggestive of either a positive or a negative relationship between fire fighter trainees' level of preference for high risk and their subsequent success as firefighters. These data sets were equated for the initial strength of beliefs they induced. Subjects were the thoroughly debriefed about the fictitious nature of their initial data. Subsequent assessments of subjects' personal beliefs about the true relationship revealed (a) significant levels of theory perseverance both immediately and 1 week later; (b) significantly more perseverance in the concrete data conditions, both immediately and 1 week later. Experiment 2 revealed that subjects frequently engage in causal processing spontaneously, especially when examining concrete data. Overall, the data suggested that memory for initial data did not contribute to the abstract/concrete effects, but that the generation of general, causal explanations did contribute to the stronger perseverance of theories in the concrete conditions.     

“You’re Just Saying That.” Contingencies of self-worth, suspicion, and authenticity in the interpersonal affirmation process

A model of the role and costs of contingent self-worth in the partner-affirmation process was tested. Actors whose self-worth was contingent on appearance or intelligence claimed to have expressed their particular heightened sensitivity to their romantic partners. Suggesting a cost to these reactions, actors’ beliefs about having expressed heightened sensitivity, in turn, predicted their doubts about the authenticity of partners’ positive feedback in the domain of contingency, independently of whether partners claimed to deliver inauthentic feedback. Suggesting a cost for partners, partners of contingent actors appeared to detect actors’ expressions of sensitivity in the domain of contingency and respond by delivering inauthentic feedback to actors in the domain, which in turn predicted partners’ increased relationship anxiety and decreased satisfaction. Results suggest that contingent self-worth may undermine the functioning of the partner-affirmation process through actors discrediting partners’ positive feedback and partners behaving in an inauthentic and controlled manner.     

The role of perceived control in overcoming defensive self-evaluation

Two experiments investigated how perceived control over one’s abilities and one’s perceived standing on these abilities affect feedback seeking. Two aspects of perceived control were studied: Experiment 1 focused on perceived control over the expression of one’s ability in performance, whereas Experiment 2 focused on perceived changeability of the ability itself. The results of the two experiments showed that to the extent that participants’ perceived ability was low, both aspects of perceived control increased interest in negative feedback—feedback that diagnoses weaknesses—and decreased interest in positive feedback—feedback that diagnoses strengths. Mediation analyses showed that the effects of perceived ability and perceived control on feedback seeking were mediated by the subjective informational value of the feedback as well as its esteem-related affective value. These results were interpreted as evidence for pragmatic feedback seeking—a process that flexibly integrates immediate emotional value and long-term usefulness of self-relevant information.     

Exaggeration in memory: Systematic distortion of self-evaluative information under reduced accessibility

The tendency to exaggerate specific information about oneself can stem from reconstructive memory processes that are distinct from motivated self-enhancement or self-presentation. While exaggerations sometimes reflect these motives, they also result from attempts to reconstruct one’s past. Three studies examined test scores as they became less accessible in memory. Study 1 provided a real-world illustration, demonstrating reduced accessibility and increased exaggeration of SAT scores over time. Two experiments utilized test scores randomly assigned in a controlled laboratory setting. Increased exaggeration was observed following distraction (Study 2), and after a one-week delay (Study 3). Distortions in scores reported were consistent with beliefs about the self, rather than uniformly self-serving. Under reduced accessibility, exaggeration was predicted by beliefs about achievement (Study 1) and subjective perceptions of test performance (Study 2). Study 3 manipulated perceived performance. Positive performance feedback caused greater exaggeration under reduced accessibility, whereas negative feedback reduced the tendency to exaggerate.     

Self-evaluative effects of temporal and social comparison

Social and temporal comparisons are two fundamental information sources for evaluating one’s characteristics and abilities. The current study demonstrates that when social comparison (where people’s performance stood in the overall distribution) and temporal comparison (whether performance improved or deteriorated over time) information are both provided, each independently influences actors’ self-evaluations of task performance and ability. In contrast, yoked observer participants paid virtually no attention to temporal comparison information, preferring to evaluate actors based solely on their status relative to others. Furthermore, when the feedback actors received suggested that they were getting worse, their self-evaluation ratings were approximately equal to that of the observers who had access to the same information. However, when their fortunes improved over time, actors used this temporal information as a basis for evaluating themselves more favorably than observers. We argue that both egocentrism and self-enhancement account for the differences between actors’ and observers’ performance evaluations.     

The actor's behavioral history,his current role,and the divergence between actor and observer responsibility attributions

The actor's behavioral (High or Low) and role (High, Medium, or Low) respectability were varied in an actor-observer attribution study. A scenario described the actor's background combination of behavioral and role respectability and an event in which the actor participated. Subjects assigned actor and situational responsibilities to the event from their own viewpoint and from their perceptions of the actor's viewpoint. Subjects' awareness of the attributional divergence between actors and observers (Jones, E. E. & Nisbett, R. E. In Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior. New York: General Learning Press, 1971) and the information (public versus private) utilized by each were reflected in the results.     

How believing in affirmative action quotas affects White women’s self-image

Believing that affirmative action entails quotas may both help and hurt White women’s self-image - contingent on whether they perceive themselves as beneficiaries of affirmative action. Consistent with research on the affirmative action “stigma of incompetence” (Heilman, Block, & Lucas, 1992), White women who think of themselves as affirmative action beneficiaries may report a more negative self-image the more they believe that affirmative action entails quota procedures. Conversely, White women who do not think of themselves as beneficiaries of affirmative action may report a more positive self-image as a function of quota beliefs, consistent with research suggesting that non-beneficiaries can derive self-image benefits from maintaining the belief that affirmative action entails quotas (Unzueta, Lowery, & Knowles, 2008). Two studies provide evidence for the benefits of quota beliefs on White women’s self-image, but no support for the stigma of incompetence perspective. The lack of support for the stigma of incompetence perspective suggests that self-stigmatization may occur only under operationalizations of affirmative action that explicitly inform beneficiaries that they were selected on the basis of demographics and not merit. Absent such an operationalization, the affirmative action self-stigma may not emerge.     

Self-efficacy and interest: Experimental studies of optimal incompetence

How does self-efficacy affect interest? The interest-and-interests model assumes that factors that induce interest—novelty, complexity, conflict, and uncertainty—do so non-linearly. Self-efficacy should thus affect interest quadratically, because it reflects uncertainty about an activity’s outcome. When self-efficacy is low, interest is low because the activity’s outcome is certain. When self-efficacy is moderate, the person’s success on the task seems likely, but not inevitable. But as self-efficacy becomes very high, success seems completely certain, and the task is thus uninteresting. Two experiments tested these predictions. Experiment 1 asked people to rate the interestingness of differentially difficult activities; Experiment 2 manipulated self-efficacy regarding a fuzzy dart game. In both experiments, interest was a quadratic function of self-efficacy. Implications for theories of vocational interest development and change are considered.