The Effects of Framing, Reflection, Probability, and Payoff on Risk Preference in Choice Tasks

A meta-analysis of Asian-disease-like studies is presented to identify the factors which determine risk preference. First the confoundings between probability levels, payoffs, and framing conditions are clarified in a task analysis. Then the role of framing, reflection, probability, type, and size of payoff is evaluated in a meta-analysis. It is shown that bidirectional framing effects exist for gains and for losses. Presenting outcomes as gains tends to induce risk aversion, while presenting outcomes as losses tends to induce risk seeking. Risk preference is also shown to depend on the size of the payoffs, on the probability levels, and on the type of good at stake (money/property vs human lives). In general, higher payoffs lead to increasing risk aversion. Higher probabilities lead to increasing risk aversion for gains and to increasing risk seeking for losses. These findings are confirmed by a subsequent empirical test. Shortcomings of existing formal theories, such as prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory, venture theory, and Markowitz's utility theory, are identified. It is shown that it is not probabilities or payoffs, but the framing condition, which explains most variance. These findings are interpreted as showing that no linear combination of formally relevant predictors is sufficient to capture the essence of the framing phenomenon.     

Embracing Chance Tactically: A Different Perspective on Risk Taking

Although they value certainty, people are willing to take risks to avoid losses. Consequently, they are risk‐seeking in the domain of losses but risk‐avoidant in the domain of gains. This behavior, frequently demonstrated in framing experiments, is traditionally explained in terms of prospect theory. We suggest a different account whereby involving chance in one's decisions may serve a strategic impression‐formation function. In the domain of losses actors may embrace chance to distance themselves from the outcomes and deflect possible blame. Given potential gains, however, actors may avoid uncertainty to enhance their association with valued outcomes. We test this idea by manipulating the level of actors' personal responsibility for the decision outcomes. The results of four studies consistently showed that when personal responsibility is high, the original framing effect is replicated (i.e., greater risk‐taking when choices are framed in terms of losses rather than gains). However, when because of assigned role or decision circumstances, actors experience low personal responsibility for the outcomes, and the classic framing effect is eliminated. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Influencing Risk Preference in Decision Making: The Effects of Framing and Salience

Prospect theory predicts that people tend to prefer the sure option when choosing between two alternative courses of action framed in terms of gains and prefer the risky option when choosing between two alternatives framed as losses. Related research investigated the impact of emphasizing the probability of the positive outcome of a risky option versus emphasizing the probability of the negative outcome on preference. Most of these studies on the effects of "outcome salience" related their findings to prospect theory′s framing effect. It will be argued that most of these studies inaccurately applied prospect theory to explain the obtained effects and that these might be better understood in terms of salience. In four experiments we test the predictions that (1) choosing between two options in a gain problem will lead to decreased risk preference as compared to loss problems and (2) emphasizing the probability of positive outcomes of a risky option leads to increased preference for this option compared to emphasizing the probability of negative outcomes. Results confirm the impact of both prospect framing and outcome salience and indicate that these effects should be understood in terms of distinct, independent processes.     

Asymmetric Perception of Gains versus Non‐losses and Losses versus Non‐gains: The Causal Role of Regulatory Focus

Recent studies show that, while losses loom larger than equivalent non‐gains, gains loom larger than equivalent non‐losses. This finding has been interpreted within the framework of regulatory focus theory. In this study, we highlight the importance of considering the motivational focus independently of the framing and the valence of outcome, thus exploring the causal effect of regulatory focus on the asymmetric perception of gains versus non‐losses and losses versus non‐gains. In two studies, we examine the perceived effects of either actual or hypothetical changes in monetary wealth, while orthogonally manipulating framing, valence, and regulatory focus. We find a significant interaction between the three factors. The gain versus non‐loss asymmetry in perceived satisfaction is stronger in promotion focus, whereas the loss versus non‐gain asymmetry in perceived dissatisfaction is stronger in prevention focus. The results suggest that the effects of incentives framed in terms of (non)gains and (non)losses depend on their congruence with the individual's motivational state. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cheating: One common morality for gains and losses but two components of morality itself

Previous studies show that decision makers (DMs) lie more to avoid a loss than achieve a gain. Two compelling mechanisms might explain this observation. One assumes that lying is a risky activity and relates to the shape of the monetary value function described by prospect theory, which assumes (a) increased risk taking for loss frames and (b) an asymmetry between the perceived values of losses and gains. The other relates to the importance of self-esteem functions as expressed in self-concept maintenance models, self-esteem issues being weighed against monetary issues. This alternative explanation assumes that a loss frame serves as a factor lowering moral considerations. We report an experimental study presenting sets of lotteries to DMs, once in a moral context and once in a traditional probabilistic context. The results show that DMs take less risk when lotteries are presented in a moral context. It is also shown that DMs take more risk for losses than gains, this holding for both the moral and probabilistic contexts. This latter result suggests that loss/gain asymmetry can be completely explained by prospect theory factors, and framing makes no difference to the valuing of moral considerations.     

An information processing view of framing effects: The role of causal schemas in decision making

People prefer a sure gain to a probable larger gain when the two choices are presented from a gain perspective, but a probable larger loss to a sure loss when the objectively identical choices are presented from a loss perspective. Such reversals of preference due to the context of the problem are known asframing effects. In the present study, schema activation and subjects’ interpretations of the problems were examined as sources of the framing effects. Results showed that such effects could be eliminated by introducing into a problem a causal schema that provided a rationale for the reciprocal relationship between the gains and the losses. Moreover, when subjects were freed from framing they were consistently risk seeking in decisions about human life, but risk averse in decisions about property. Irrationality in choice behaviors and the ecological implication of framing effects are discussed.     

Prospects behind bars: Analyzing decisions under risk in a prison population

Criminal activity often involves considerable risks. It is therefore not surprising that criminals have been speculated to differ from noncriminals in risk attitude. Yet, few data exist to support this assumption. Moreover, the psychological underpinnings of differences in risk attitude are currently little understood. We presented prisoners and controls with sets of risky decision tasks and modeled their responses using cumulative prospect theory (CPT). The two groups showed several differences. Prisoners were more risk seeking than nonprisoners in lotteries involving losses, but they were less risk seeking in lotteries involving high-probability gains. Bestfitting CPT parameters indicated a reduced sensitivity to outcomes, for both gains and losses, and a stronger loss aversion among prisoners. In addition, prisoners showed a diminished sensitivity to the probability of gains. Our results contribute to a better understanding of prisoners’ risk attitudes and the underlying mechanisms that distinguish prisoners from nonprisoners and may thus help improve interventions designed to prevent crime.     

Experimental test of the prospect theory value function: A stochastic dominance approach

According to prospect theory, individuals are risk averse regarding gains but risk seeking regarding losses, implying an S-shaped value function. The S-shaped value function hypothesis is based on experiments in which subjects are asked to choose separately between alternatives with either only positive or only negative outcomes, alternatives which rarely exist in the capital market. In addition, the S-shaped findings may be biased by the “certainty effect” and by probability distortion. In this paper we employ the recently developed prospect stochastic dominance criterion to test the prospect theory S-shaped value function hypothesis with mixed outcomes and with no “certainty effect.” Assuming that subjects do not distort moderate probabilities, we strongly reject the prospect theory S-shaped value function, with at least 76–86% of the choices being inconsistent with such preferences. When possible subjective probability distortions are taken into account, we find that at least 50–66% of the choices are inconsistent with an S-shaped value function.     

Dissociable effects of basolateral amygdala lesions on decision making biases in rats when loss or gain is emphasized

Individuals switch from risk seeking to risk aversion when mathematically identical options are described in terms of loss versus gains, as exemplified in the reflection and framing effects. Determining the neurobiology underlying such cognitive biases could inform our understanding of decision making in health and disease. Although reports vary, data using human subjects have implicated the amygdala in such biases. Animal models enable more detailed investigation of neurobiological mechanisms. We therefore tested whether basolateral amygdala (BLA) lesions would affect risk preference for gains or losses in rats. Choices in both paradigms were always between options of equal expected value—a guaranteed outcome, or the 50:50 chance of double or nothing. In the loss-chasing task, most rats exhibited strong risk seeking preferences, gambling at the risk of incurring double the penalty, regardless of the size of the guaranteed loss. In the betting task, the majority of animals were equivocal in their choice, irrespective of bet size; however, a wager-sensitive subgroup progressively shifted away from the uncertain option as the bet size increased, which is reminiscent of risk aversion. BLA lesions increased preference for the smaller guaranteed loss in the loss-chasing task, without affecting choice on the betting task, which is indicative of reduced risk seeking for losses, but intact risk aversion for gains. These data support the hypothesis that the amygdala plays a more prominent role in choice biases related to losses. Given the importance of the amygdala in representing negative affect, the aversive emotional reaction to loss, rather than aberrant estimations of probability or loss magnitude, may underlie risk seeking for losses.     

Applying prospect theory to pilot weather-related decision-making: The impact of monetary and time considerations on risk taking behaviour

One of the key findings of prospect theory is that people tend to treat potential gains differently to potential losses. Consistent with earlier findings across a range of areas, pilots were risk averse when faced with an uncertain situation involving monetary gains and risk seeking when faced with a monetary loss. Prospect theory has largely been used to explore monetary decision-making; however, “time” is potentially a more important consideration for pilots than money. For example, how much time can be flown with the current fuel onboard. It was found that pilots' decision behaviour changed when faced with a decision involving time, with pilots risk averse for both a time gain and a time loss situation. Pilots appeared to prefer to know precisely the time required for a journey, rather than take a gamble on a potential short cut. Evidence also suggests pilots were more likely to take risks in situations that they perceive they have more control over (e.g. air traffic delays) compared to dynamic weather-related events. There was some evidence to suggest pilots do not consider a decision in terms of an end state, but rather in terms of losses and gains from their current state. The final part of the study found evidence that it may be possible to predict pilot risk taking behaviour using self-report decision frames.     

When Does Framing Influence Preferences,Risk Perceptions,and Risk Attitudes? The Explicated Valence Account

When faced with an expected loss and a choice between a sure option and a risky option, the gain–loss framing of the problem has been shown to influence option preference. According to prospect theory, this framing effect is the result of contradictory attitudes about risks involving gains and losses. This article develops and tests an alternative explicated valence account (EVA), which proposes that preference reversals are caused by differences in the explicated outcome valences of the options under consideration. EVA can account for previous findings where framing effects are observed, eliminated, or even reversed. In two experiments, EVA successfully predicted when framing effects were observed, eliminated, and reversed. The findings also showed that although framing influenced risk perception, it did not influence risk attitudes. Copyright © 2015 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada Journal of Behavioral Decision Making © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

FUZZY-TRACE THEORY AND FRAMING EFFECTS IN CHILDREN'S RISKY DECISION MAKING

Traditional theories of cognitive development predict that children progress from intuitive to computational thinking, whereas fuzzy-trace theory makes the opposite prediction To evaluate these alternatives, framing problems were administered to preschoolers, second graders, and fifth graders Consistent with fuzzy-trace theory, results indicated (a) that younger children focused on quantitative differences between outcomes and did not exhibit framing effects (risk avoidance for gains, risk seeking for losses) and (b) that older children assimilated these quantitative differences and displayed framing effects     

Looking Closer at the Effects of Framing on Risky Choice: An Item Response Theory Analysis

Item response theory (IRT) methodology allowed an in-depth examination of several issues that would be difficult to explore using traditional methodology. IRT models were estimated for 4 risky-choice items, answered by students under either a gain or loss frame. Results supported the typical framing finding of risk-aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses but also suggested that a latent construct we label preference for risk was influential in predicting risky choice. Also, the Asian Disease item, most often used in framing research, was found to have anomalous statistical properties when compared to other framing items.     

The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-analysis

In framing studies, logically equivalent choice situations are differently described and the resulting preferences are studied. A meta-analysis of framing effects is presented for risky choice problems which are framed either as gains or as losses. This evaluates the finding that highlighting the positive aspects of formally identical problems does lead to risk aversion and that highlighting their equivalent negative aspects does lead to risk seeking. Based on a data pool of 136 empirical papers that reported framing experiments with nearly 30,000 participants, we calculated 230 effect sizes. Results show that the overall framing effect between conditions is of small to moderate size and that profound differences exist between research designs. Potentially relevant characteristics were coded for each study. The most important characteristics were whether framing is manipulated by changing reference points or by manipulating outcome salience, and response mode (choice vs. rating/judgment). Further important characteristics were whether options differ qualitatively or quantitatively in risk, whether there is one or multiple risky events, whether framing is manipulated by gain/loss or by task-responsive wording, whether dependent variables are measured between- or within- subjects, and problem domains. Sample (students vs. target populations) and unit of analysis (individual vs. group) was not influential. It is concluded that framing is a reliable phenomenon, but that outcome salience manipulations, which constitute a considerable amount of work, have to be distinguished from reference point manipulations and that procedural features of experimental settings have a considerable effect on effect sizes in framing experiments.     

The persuasive effects of framing messages on fruit and vegetable consumption according to regulatory focus theory

According to Regulatory Focus theory (RFT), outcomes in persuasive messages can be framed in four different ways, as gains, non-gains, losses or non-losses. In study 1, the persuasiveness of all four frames was compared and the presence/absence effect that was expected on the basis of the feature-positive effect was verified: Statements about present outcomes (gain, loss) were more persuasive than those about absent outcomes (non-gain, non-loss). However, this study failed to support the prediction that a gain-framed message would be more persuasive than a loss-framed message when promoting a prevention behaviour. Study 2 was designed to examine the latter finding. It was hypothesised that the threat posed by the loss-framed message in study 1 was too low to elicit a defensive reaction. Therefore, in study 2, the personal relevance of the gain and the loss framed message was manipulated. Consistent with predictions, the gain-framed message was more persuasive than the loss-framed message, but only when the message was personalised to increase self-relevance. Moreover, the effect was due to a significant drop in persuasion in the loss condition, probably caused by a defensive reaction. These data shed a new light on the findings of past framing studies.     

The evolution of decision-making under risk: Framing effects in monkey risk preferences

When making choices between risky options, human decision-makers exhibit a number of framing effects. One of the most prominent framing effects is the tendency for decision makers to evaluate gambles relative to a reference point, and to act risk-seeking when prospects are framed as losses but risk-averse when identical prospects are framed as gains. This tendency for risk-preferences to reverse between loss and gain frames has been termed the reflection effect, and is one of the primary predictions of Prospect Theory. Here, we explore whether non-human primates exhibit a similar reflection effect. Using a token-trading task, we show that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) exhibit an analogous reversal of risk preferences depending on whether outcomes are presented as gains or losses, suggesting that similar framing effects also influence choice in non-human primates. This finding suggests that the mechanisms that drive framing effects in humans may be evolutionarily ancient, extending broadly across the primate order.     

The persuasive effects of framing messages on fruit and vegetable consumption according to regulatory focus theory

According to Regulatory Focus theory (RFT), outcomes in persuasive messages can be framed in four different ways, as gains, non-gains, losses or non-losses. In study 1, the persuasiveness of all four frames was compared and the presence/absence effect that was expected on the basis of the feature-positive effect was verified: Statements about present outcomes (gain, loss) were more persuasive than those about absent outcomes (non-gain, non-loss). However, this study failed to support the prediction that a gain-framed message would be more persuasive than a loss-framed message when promoting a prevention behaviour. Study 2 was designed to examine the latter finding. It was hypothesised that the threat posed by the loss-framed message in study 1 was too low to elicit a defensive reaction. Therefore, in study 2, the personal relevance of the gain and the loss framed message was manipulated. Consistent with predictions, the gain-framed message was more persuasive than the loss-framed message, but only when the message was personalised to increase self-relevance. Moreover, the effect was due to a significant drop in persuasion in the loss condition, probably caused by a defensive reaction. These data shed a new light on the findings of past framing studies.     

Double Reference Points: the Effects of Social and Financial Reference Points on Decisions Under Risk

The existing literature is inconsistent about how social comparison affects risk attitudes. We propose a framework where the total utility is composed of the social and financial utilities. The financial utility is consistent with prospect theory (i.e., an S‐shaped utility function with a financial reference point), whereas the social utility is affected by both social and financial reference points. Therefore, social risk attitudes are determined by interaction between gains/losses in both social and financial contexts. On the basis of safety‐first principle, we propose that when experiencing financial gains, individuals tend to seek upside potential and take social risks (i.e., a convex social utility function). In contrast, when facing financial losses, people would be more risk seeking in social gains but more risk averse in social losses to maximize security (i.e., an inverse S‐shaped utility function). We also propose that the relative importance of financial and social utilities depends on the saliency of the reference points and size of stakes. Studies 1 and 2 showed that individuals were risk seeking in both social gains and losses with social reference points alone. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that when both financial and social reference points were salient, participants were risk averse in both social gains and losses when facing financial gains, but risk seeking in social gains and risk averse in social losses when facing financial losses. The hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework were in general supported by our experiments. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Uncertainty Avoidance Influences Choices for Potential Gains but not Losses

Uncertainty of outcomes is a primary dimension underlying human judgment and decision making, and is a defining feature of risk. Even though uncertainty almost always exists in decision making contexts, individuals and cultures vary in their preference for avoiding uncertainty. This study examines how uncertainty avoidance influences judgments involving uncertain and risky alternatives. Participants were presented with problems that involve potential gains or losses and contain options reflecting uncertain or certain outcomes. Greater uncertainty avoidance predicted choices for uncertain outcomes that involved gains, which tend to promote risk aversion, but not for uncertain outcomes that led to losses, which tend to promote risk seeking. These results demonstrate that culturally-relevant dispositions such as uncertain avoidance can have complex effects on judgment.