Wittgenstein's picture‐theory

In a paper published in this journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1962, pp. 46–64, Mr. H. R. G. Schwyzer has argued that ‘the current view (as held by, eg., Wamock, Anscombe and Stemus) of Wittgenstein's theory of language in the Tractatus is mistaken’. The editor of the journal has asked me for a reply. My reply concerns only my own book, and it amounts to the statement that Mr. Schwyzer's attack on the book has very little to do with what is said in it.     

Can Beck's theory of depression and the response style theory be integrated?

There are obvious similarities between the cognitive constructs of A. T. Beck's (1976) cognitive theory and the response style theory (S. Nolen-Hoeksema & J. Morrow, 1991). Different propositions of J. A. Ciesla and J. E. Roberts (2007) and S. Lyubomirsky and S. Nolen-Hoeksema (1993, 1995) concerning associations of 2 response styles, brooding and reflection, with constructs of Beck's cognitive theory (schemata, cognitive errors, cognitive triad, automatic thoughts) were tested. Model comparisons were based on a 4-week study in which 397 participants completed self-report instruments at 2 time points. A model allowing schemata to influence brooding and reflection that influence the other cognitive variables of Beck's cognitive theory fits the data better than the other integrated models. However, although schemata were significant predictors of both response styles, neither response style did significantly predict other cognitive variables. A comparison of the integrated model with Beck's original cognitive theory revealed that Beck's original theory fits the data better than the integrated model, whereas both models explain about the same amount of variance. Thus, an integration of Beck's theory and the response style theory are not supported.     

Is counterpart theory inadequate?

Conclusion Counterpart theorists need not posit the counterpart relation in addition to the identity relations as an Additional relation relating objects across possible worlds. Identity can be viewed as a relation applicable to individuals within possible worlds, while the counterpart relation replaces identity in translations of ordinary utterances which correlate individuals in different possible worlds and, hence, in all modal utterances. CT is, in other words, a theory of modal discourse — it proposes a way of understanding all modal predications. As such, it is not to be seen as providing a second looser sense of identity across worlds, in addition to the narrow sense. Perhaps Lewis' original formulation encourages this misunderstanding insofar as it (see, especially, P2) denies strict identity across possible worlds. Accordingly, I have suggested a modification of CT whereby syntactic restrictions upon variables eliminates any temptation to posit two parallel relations applicable to entities existing in different possible worlds.As has been argued by Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, The Clarendon Press, (Oxford, 1974), Chapter VI.     

Kant’s virtue theory

By focusing on human virtues rather than the general morality of rational beings, Kant’s virtue theory presents systematic arguments from the perspectives of reason and experiential emotion, norms and disposition, spirituality and humanity, etc., which is of great significance to an overall understanding of Kantian ethics, thus clarifying misunderstandings from the past decades.     

The bundle theory and the substratum theory: deadly enemies or twin brothers?

In this paper, I explore several versions of the bundle theory and the substratum theory and compare them, with the surprising result that it seems to be true that they are equivalent (in a sense of ‘equivalent’ to be specified). In order to see whether this is correct or not, I go through several steps: first, I examine different versions of the bundle theory with tropes and compare them to the substratum theory with tropes by going through various standard objections and arguing for a tu quoque in all cases. Emphasizing the theoretical role of the substratum and of the relation of compresence, I defend the claim that these views are equivalent for all theoretical purposes. I then examine two different versions of the bundle theory with universals, and show that one of them is, here again, equivalent to the substratum theory with universals, by examining how both views face the famous objection from Identity of Indiscernibles in a completely parallel way. It is only the second, quite extreme and puzzling, version of the bundle theory with universals that is not equivalent to any other view; and the diagnosis of why this is so will show just how unpalatable the view is. Similarly, only a not-so-palatable version of the substratum theory is genuinely different from the other views; and here again it’s precisely what makes it different that makes it less appealing.

Test theory without true scores?

This paper traces the course of the consequences of viewing test responses as simply providing dichotomous data concerning ordinal relations. It begins by proposing that the score matrix is best considered to be items-plus-persons by items-plus-persons, and recording the wrongs as well as the rights. This shows how an underlying order is defined, and was used to provide the basis for a tailored testing procedure. It also was used to define a number of measures of test consistency. Test items provide person dominance relations, and the relations provided by one item can be in one of three relations with a second one: redundant, contradictory, or unique. Summary statistics concerning the number of relations of each kind are easy to get and provide useful information about the test, information which is related to but different from the usual statistics. These concepts can be extended to form the basis of a test theory which is based on ordinal statistics and frequency counts and which invokes the concept of true scores only in a limited sense.1979 Psychometric Society presidential address.I want to recognize the contributions which others have made to whatever I have accomplished. First to mention here are my teachers: principally Harold Gulliksen, Ledyard Tucker, and the late Edith Jay. Second, I would like to recognize the importance of my graduate students. Tom Reynolds has been especially important in developing the ideas that I will talk about here today, but at various times, the others have made major contributions in this and other topics. I would like to express also a debt to my family, primarily my wife, Rosemary, who herself has a longterm interest in the psychometric area. Finally, I must acknowledge the financial support of the NIMH some time ago, the Office of Naval Research, until about a year ago, and of the James McKeen Cattell Fund this past year.     

Sosa’s theory of knowledge

Synthese - This paper is a critical discussion of Ernest Sosa’s recent analysis of reflective knowledge.     

The status of psychoanalytic theory∗

What is the place of Psychoanalytic Theory on our map of knowledge and belief? Various alternatives are considered. Is it a scientific theory? — a myth? — or like a prescientific example of natural philosophy? — a branch of medical knowledge? — a premature empirical synthesis that is an approximation to the truth? Each of these answers runs into objections and difficulties, some of which are examined or noted. On the assumption that it is a provisional story which approximates to the truth, the question is then raised: what can we do to find out how much of an approximation to the truth the theory really is? The relevance and value of psychological studies are discussed; and the suggestion is made that the status of Psychoanalytic Theory will remain an ambiguous one for some time to come.     

A liberal theory of externalities?

Unlike exploitative exchanges, exchanges featuring externalities have never seemed to pose particular problems to liberal theories of justice. State interference with exchanges featuring externalities seems permissible, like it is for coercive or deceptive exchanges. This is because exchanges featuring negative externalities seem to be clear cases of the two exchanging parties harming a third one via the exchange—and thus of conduct violating the harm principle. This essay aims to put this idea into question. I will argue that exchanges featuring negative externalities are not unjust in this straightforward way, i.e. because they would constitute an instance of wrongfully causing or risking a bodily or material harm. In fact, unless we are subscribing to particularly demanding variants of liberalism—e.g. perfectionist liberalism—or unless we are exclusively focusing on borderline cases of externalities—i.e. of effects of exchanges hardly to be called externalities—there is no liberal theory of how exchanges featuring externalities are unjust.     

Is quantum mechanics an atomistic theory?

If quantum mechanics (QM) is to be taken as an atomistic theory with the elementary particles as atoms (an ATEP), then the elementary particlcs must be individuals. There must then be, for each elementary particle a, a property being identical with a that a alone has. But according to QM, elementary particles of the same kind share all physical properties. Thus, if QM is an ATEP, identity is a metaphysical but not a physical property. That has unpalatable consequences. Dropping the assumption that QM is an ATEP makes it possible to replace the assumption that elementary particles are individuals with the assumption that there are various kinds of elementary stuff that have smallest quantities — the smallest quantity of light, for example, is a photon. The problems about identity disappear, and the explanatory virtues of an ATEP are maintained.I would like to thank various referees for their comments, as well as David Albert, Gerald Feinberg, Isaac Levi, James Lewis, Andre Mirabelli, Sidney Morgenbesser, Sarah Stebbins, Chris Swoyer, and Steve Yablo for useful discussions, and Arthur Fine for his comments on a presentation at Stanford University of a preliminary version of this paper in 1986.     

Wittgenstein's picture‐theory of Language 1

I argue that the current view (as held by, eg., Warnock, Anscombe and Stenius) of Wittgenstein's theory of language in the Tractates is mistaken. This view maintains that Wittgenstein's theory is one of ‘isomorphism'; that, roughly, a sentence has meaning in virtue of its being a facsimile of a fact or possible fact. But a detailed study of significant passages in the Tractattis shows that Wittgenstein held no such view. His use of important terms, such as Salz, Bild, Sachverhalt, Tatsache, etc., has been crucially misunderstood. There is no isomorphism. The theory is not about sentences at all, but about talking sense.     

Arrow’s theorem and theory choice

In a recent paper (Okasha, Mind 120:83–115, 2011), Samir Okasha uses Arrow’s theorem to raise a challenge for the rationality of theory choice. He argues that, as soon as one accepts the plausibility of the assumptions leading to Arrow’s theorem, one is compelled to conclude that there are no adequate theory choice algorithms. Okasha offers a partial way out of this predicament by diagnosing the source of Arrow’s theorem and using his diagnosis to deploy an approach that circumvents it. In this paper I explain why, although Okasha is right to emphasise that Arrow’s result is the effect of an informational problem, he is not right to locate this problem at the level of the informational input of a theory choice rule. Once the informational problem is correctly located, Arrow’s theorem may be dismissed as a problem.