Being there when it happens: A novel approach to sampling reflectively observed experience

Examining a number of recently developed methods for acquiring first-person data on consciousness, we detect a lack of sensitivity for distinguishing the experiential moments in which the experiencing person was reflectively attending to her ongoing experience. In order to address this gap, we introduce a novel research format for obtaining data on lived experience, combining random sampling of experience with a subsequent retrospective examination of acquired samples in the form of dialogical phenomenological inquiry. The proposed approach aims at the examination of reflectively observed experiential moments and is based on researchers’ iterative cultivation of the phenomenological attitude. Drawing upon results from a longitudinal study of the potential of meditation as a tool for examining consciousness, we address the epistemological and methodological challenges of the proposed approach, discuss its applicability and research potential, as well as examine the characteristics and validity of phenomenal data thus acquired.     

Measuring pain: an introspective look at introspection

The measurement of pain depends upon subjective reports, but we know very little about how research subjects or pain patients produce self-reported judgments. Representationalist assumptions dominate the field of pain research and lead to the critical conjecture that the person in pain examines the contents of consciousness before making a report about the sensory or affective magnitude of pain experience as well as about its nature. Most studies to date have investigated what Fechner termed "outer psychophysics": the relationship between characteristics of an external stimulus and the magnitude and nature of pain experience. In contrast, Fechner originally envisioned that "inner psychophysics" should investigate the relationship between physiological states and subjective experience. Despite the lack of established research tradition, inner psychophysics has a potential utility in elucidating underlying mechanisms for the production of phenomenal self-report. We illustrate this, using causal modeling analyses of the accuracy of self-reported pain ratings from our laboratory. We submit that the results are inconsistent with representationalist assumptions. Converging trends from several domains of consciousness studies seem to suggest that we need to abandon the unquestioned doctrine of representationalism and search for a more viable framework for understanding the generation of subjective self-report.     

急性疼痛与慢性疼痛对奖赏加工的影响及神经机制

疼痛和奖赏能够为个体提供不同的行为动机和主观价值体验,寻求奖赏和避免疼痛对于生存都很重要。疼痛可划分为急性疼痛和慢性疼痛,奖赏可区分为预期阶段的动机成分和体验阶段的享乐成分。奖赏对疼痛的抑制作用已经被广泛证实,但关于疼痛对奖赏的影响,目前的研究结果并不一致。因此需要进一步区分并探究急性疼痛与慢性疼痛对奖赏加工不同阶段的影响,分析两种疼痛对奖赏加工产生不一致影响的现象。这种现象出现的原因可能与急性疼痛向慢性疼痛转变过程中出现的奖赏加工能力缺陷有关。未来可以考虑从改善奖赏加工能力缺陷的角度进行检测和治疗,提前预防急性疼痛向慢性疼痛转变。     

意识、觉知与反思

一、引言在日常的意识体验中,体验总有特定的体验内容。然而,意识不但关指某物,它也与特定的我粘连着。例如,你正在看一本书,你一边阅读一边建构着你读到的文本的意思;但对文本的知觉和对文本意思的理解并没有涵盖你心智中发生的一切。除了这些感知和体验的内容之外,在你的心     

Consciousness as a concrete physical phenomenon

The typical empirical approach to studying consciousness holds that we can only observe the neural correlates of experiences, not the experiences themselves. In this paper we argue, in contrast, that experiences are concrete physical phenomena that can causally interact with other phenomena, including observers. Hence, experiences can be observed and scientifically modelled. We propose that the epistemic gap between an experience and a scientific model of its neural mechanisms stems from the fact that the model is merely a theoretical construct based on observations, and distinct from the concrete phenomenon it models, namely the experience itself. In this sense, there is a gap between any natural phenomenon and its scientific model. On this approach, a neuroscientific theory of the constitutive mechanisms of an experience is literally a model of the subjective experience itself. We argue that this metatheoretical framework provides a solid basis for the empirical study of consciousness.     

无意识信息引发的认知控制及其神经机制

对无意识信息引发的认知控制的研究是揭示意识的功能与局限的重要方法和步骤.在无意识认知控制研究中主要采用模式掩蔽和偏对比掩蔽创设无意识条件,使用客观测量方法对意识状态进行测量.作者从无意识抑制控制、无意识冲突控制和无意识错误加工三个方面回顾了近年对无意识认知控制及其神经机制的研究.已有研究从行为和认知神经研究两个方面强有力地证明了无意识认知控制的存在,揭示了其神经机制.这些研究拓展了人们对意识信息广度和深度的认识,也为未来进一步揭示意识的起源等问题奠定了一定的基础.未来的研究可以从无意识认知控制和有意识认知控制的相互转化等方面进行进一步研究.     

A neurophenomenological approach to non-ordinary states of consciousness: hypnosis,meditation, and psychedelics

No contemporary unifying framework has been provided for the study of non-ordinary states of consciousness (NSCs) despite increased interest in hypnosis, meditation, and psychedelics. NSCs induce shifts in experiential contents (what appears to the experiencer) and/or structure (how it appears). This can allow the investigation of the plastic and dynamic nature of experience from a multiscale perspective that includes mind, brain, body, and context. We propose a neurophenomenological (NP) approach to the study of NSCs which highlights their role as catalysts of transformation in clinical practice by refining our understanding of the relationships between experiential (subjective) and neural dynamics. We outline the ethical implications of the NP approach for standard conceptions of health and pathology as well as the crucial role of experience-based know-how in NSC-related research and application.     

Neurodevelopmental changes in the circuits underlying empathy and sympathy from childhood to adulthood

Empathy and sympathy play crucial roles in much of human social interaction and are necessary components for healthy coexistence. Sympathy is thought to be a proxy for motivating prosocial behavior and providing the affective and motivational base for moral development. The purpose of the present study was to use functional MRI to characterize developmental changes in brain activation in the neural circuits underpinning empathy and sympathy. Fifty-seven individuals, whose age ranged from 7 to 40 years old, were presented with short animated visual stimuli depicting painful and non-painful situations. These situations involved either a person whose pain was accidentally caused or a person whose pain was intentionally inflicted by another individual to elicit empathic (feeling as the other) or sympathetic (feeling concern for the other) emotions, respectively. Results demonstrate monotonic age-related changes in the amygdala, supplementary motor area, and posterior insula when participants were exposed to painful situations that were accidentally caused. When participants observed painful situations intentionally inflicted by another individual, age-related changes were detected in the dorsolateral prefrontal and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, with a gradual shift in that latter region from its medial to its lateral portion. This pattern of activation reflects a change from a visceral emotional response critical for the analysis of the affective significance of stimuli to a more evaluative function. Further, these data provide evidence for partially distinct neural mechanisms subserving empathy and sympathy, and demonstrate the usefulness of a developmental neurobiological approach to the new emerging area of moral neuroscience.     

A passion of the soul: an introduction to pain for consciousness researchers

Pain is an important focus for consciousness research because it is an avenue for exploring somatic awareness, emotion, and the genesis of subjectivity. In principle, pain is awareness of tissue trauma, but pain can occur in the absence of identifiable injury, and sometimes substantive tissue injury produces no pain. The purpose of this paper is to help bridge pain research and consciousness studies. It reviews the basic sensory neurophysiology associated with tissue injury, including transduction, transmission, modulation, and central representation. In addition, it highlights the central mechanisms for the emotional aspects of pain, demonstrating the physiological link between tissue trauma and mechanisms of emotional arousal. Finally, we discuss several current issues in the field of pain research that bear on central issues in consciousness studies, such as sickness and sense of self.     

The neural correlates of consciousness: New experimental approaches needed?

It appears that consciousness science is progressing soundly, in particular in its search for the neural correlates of consciousness. There are two main approaches to this search, one is content-based (focusing on the contrast between conscious perception of, e.g., faces vs. houses), the other is state-based (focusing on overall conscious states, e.g., the contrast between dreamless sleep vs. the awake state). Methodological and conceptual considerations of a number of concrete studies show that both approaches are problematic: the content-based approach seems to set aside crucial aspects of consciousness; and the state-based approach seems over-inclusive in a way that is hard to rectify without losing sight of the crucial conscious–unconscious contrast. Consequently, the search for the neural correlates of consciousness is in need of new experimental paradigms.     

慢性疼痛与心理障碍

疼痛是一种复杂的心理生物学过程。疼痛的感知和情绪活动密不可分,疼痛是一种包括感觉、情绪和认知的多维性体验,人与人之间差异很大,甚至同一个体也随疼痛的背景、意义以及心理状态而异。认知因素和情感因素对疼痛感知具有非常重要的影响。本文回顾疼痛认知和情感状态调节（身心治疗的重要组成部分）潜在的神经学机制。回顾慢性疼痛本身会改变大脑环路、包括参与内源性疼痛调节的循证证据,这些证据表明随着疼痛转为慢性,控制疼痛越来越困难。     

疼痛恐惧的形成及其对疼痛知觉的影响

脑岛、杏仁核是疼痛恐惧形成的重要神经网络中心。疼痛恐惧增强了慢性疼痛患者的疼痛知觉体验, 进而加剧抑郁、焦虑情绪和功能损伤程度。脑岛、杏仁核、前额皮层和前扣带回是疼痛恐惧影响疼痛知觉的重要神经基础。通过认知方法干预疼痛恐惧可以改善患者的抑郁、焦虑情绪, 减少功能损伤。未来研究应拓展疼痛恐惧的测量工具, 采用功能磁共振成像技术进一步揭示疼痛恐惧影响慢性疼痛患者疼痛知觉的神经机制。     

Pain, dissociation and subliminal self-representations

According to recent evidence, neurophysiological processes coupled to pain are closely related to the mechanisms of consciousness. This evidence is in accordance with findings that changes in states of consciousness during hypnosis or traumatic dissociation strongly affect conscious perception and experience of pain, and markedly influence brain functions. Past research indicates that painful experience may induce dissociated state and information about the experience may be stored or processed unconsciously. Reported findings suggest common neurophysiological mechanisms of pain and dissociation and point to a hypothesis of dissociation as a defense mechanism against psychological and physical pain that substantially influences functions of consciousness. The hypothesis is also supported by findings that information can be represented in the mind/brain without the subject's awareness. The findings of unconsciously present information suggest possible binding between conscious contents and self-functions that constitute self-representational dimensions of consciousness. The self-representation means that certain inner states of own body are interpreted as mental and somatic identity, while other bodily signals, currently not accessible to the dominant interpreter's access are dissociated and may be defined as subliminal self-representations. In conclusion, the neurophysiological aspects of consciousness and its integrative role in the therapy of painful traumatic memories are discussed.     

Experiential Wisdom and Optimal Experience: Interviews with Three Distinguished Lifelong Learners

The present article suggests that lifelong learning is enhanced by the capacity to make experiential course corrections that lead back to states of interest and flow experience. The notion of experiential wisdom is introduced to describe such a capacity for navigation. A person with experiential wisdom recognizes that optimal experiences are more likely to occur when an affectively charged intuitive mode works in synchrony with a deliberative rational mode and is better able to cultivate situations where the interrelation of these two modes is optimized. The first part of the article provides a framework for understanding experiential wisdom and the regulation of optimal experience. The second part illustrates the practice of experiential wisdom by drawing on interviews with three distinguished lifelong learners—poet Mark Strand, social scientist Donald Campbell, and medical researcher Jonas Salk.     

Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness

We propose a new approach to the neuroscience of consciousness, growing out of the ‘enactive’ viewpoint in cognitive science. This approach aims to map the neural substrates of consciousness at the level of large-scale, emergent and transient dynamical patterns of brain activity (rather than at the level of particular circuits or classes of neurons), and it suggests that the processes crucial for consciousness cut across the brain–body–world divisions, rather than being brain-bound neural events. Whereas standard approaches to the neural correlates of consciousness have assumed a one-way causal-explanatory relationship between internal neural representational systems and the contents of consciousness, our approach allows for theories and hypotheses about the two-way or reciprocal relationship between embodied conscious states and local neuronal activity.     

The Self and the Phenomenal

As is widely appreciated and easily demonstrated, the notion that we are essentially experiential (or conscious) beings has a good deal of appeal; what is less obvious, and more controversial, is whether it is possible to devise a viable account of the self along such lines within the confines of a broadly naturalistic metaphysical framework. There are many avenues to explore, but here I confine myself to outlining the case for one particular approach. I suggest that we should think of ourselves (or our essential cores) as being composed of experience‐producing systems, and that such systems belong to the same self when they have the capacity to contribute to unified streams of consciousness. The viability of this proposal rests in turn on a particular conception of the structure of consciousness, both at and over time; this conception is defended in the first part of the paper     

Vector subtraction implemented neurally: a neurocomputational model of some sequential cognitive and conscious processes

Although great progress in neuroanatomy and physiology has occurred lately, we still cannot go directly to those levels to discover the neural mechanisms of higher cognition and consciousness. But we can use neurocomputational methods based on these details to push this project forward. Here we describe vector subtraction as an operation that computes sequential paths through high-dimensional vector spaces. Vector-space interpretations of network activity patterns are a fruitful resource in recent computational neuroscience. Vector subtraction also appears to be implemented neurally in primate frontal eye field activity, which computes dimensions of saccadic eye movements. We use this apparent neural implementation as a model and construct from it a general neurocomputational account of an important type of sequential cognitive and conscious process. We defend the biological plausibility of all components of the general model and show that it yields testable anatomical and physiological predictions. We close by suggesting some interesting consequences for consciousness if our model characterizes correctly the neural mechanisms producing a common type of episode in our conscious streams.     

Towards a pluralistic neurobiological understanding of consciousness

Theories of consciousness are often based on the assumption that a single, unified neurobiological account will explain different types of conscious awareness. However, recent findings show that, even within a single modality such as conscious visual perception, the anatomical location, timing, and information flow of neural activity related to conscious awareness vary depending on both external and internal factors. This suggests that the search for generic neural correlates of consciousness may not be fruitful. I argue that consciousness science requires a more pluralistic approach and propose a new framework: joint determinant theory (JDT). This theory may be capable of accommodating different brain circuit mechanisms for conscious contents as varied as percepts, wills, memories, emotions, and thoughts, as well as their integrated experience.