Sigmund Freud and James Putnam: Friendship as a Form of Sublimation

This article focuses on Freud’s lectures at Clark University in 1909 and the correspondence that followed from Freud’s visit to America with the Boston neurologist James Jackson Putnam. Particular emphasis is given to the concept of sublimation, specifically to Putnam’s desire to make sublimation a goal of psychoanalysis and his view that sublimations should reflect the individual’s recognition of the interests of the community or desire for an ideal community. Against Putnam, we endorse Freud’s view that sublimation should not be a goal of psychoanalysis. However, we support Putnam’s emphasis on the social value of sublimations, but in a more limited sense than he proposes in his correspondence with Freud. We suggest that the correspondence between Putnam and Freud reflects the very fact that the lifting of sexual repressions makes possible the development of male friendships. Thus, we view the correspondence between Freud and Putnam as an instance of sublimation, and suggest that the friendship that this correspondence reflected and nurtured is an example of the ideal community to which we humans aspire but which often remains elusive and unrealized.     

KINDS, ESSENCES, POWERS

What is the new essentialist asking us to accept? Not that there are natural kinds, nor that there are intrinsic causal powers. These things could be accepted without a commitment to essentialism. They are asking us to accept something akin to the Kripke‐Putnam position: a metaphysical theory about kind‐membership in virtue of essential properties. But Salmon has shown that there is no valid argument for the Kripke‐Putnam position: no valid inference that gets us from reference to essence. Why then should we accept essentialism? A remaining reason is Ellis's argument by display: we should buy essentialism because of the benefits it will bring. But are these benefits real? The problem is that the putative benefits of essentialism – that the laws of nature are necessary, that the problem of induction is solved, and so on – look actually to be the assumptions of Ellis's theory. If that is the case, there is no real benefit to be gained from adopting the theory. The argument for essentialism is therefore underdetermined and it remains possible to accept natural kinds into one's ontology without accepting their corresponding essences.     

Putnam,realism and truth

There are several distinct components of the realist anti-realist debate. Since each side in the debate has its disadvantages, it is tempting to try to combine realist theses with anti-realist theses in order to obtain a better, more moderate position. Putnam attempts to hold a realist concept of truth, yet he rejects realist metaphysics and realist semantics. He calls this view internal realism. Truth is realist on this picture for it is objective, rather than merely intersubjective, and eternal. Putnam introduces a concept of epistemic idealization — epistemically ideal conditions, or idealized justification — to try to ground the strong objectivity of truth without sliding into metaphysical realism. I argue that the concept of ideal conditions to which Putnam appeals does not cohere with his (anti-realist) commitment to an assertability conditions account of meaning.     

Reviews

Books reviewed:
D. Z. Phillips, Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation
Alfredo Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle
Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era
Ulrich Schlösser, Das Erfassen des Einleuchtens. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1804 als Kritik an der Annahme entzogener Voraussetzungen unseres Wissens und als Philosophie des Gewißseins
Marcus Willaschek, Realismus
Marie-Luise Raters and Marcus Willaschek, Hilary Putnam und die Tradition des Pragmatismus
James Conant and Urszula M. Zeglen, Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism     

The Model Theoretic Argument, Indirect Realism, and the Causal Theory of Reference Objection

Abstract: Hilary Putnam has reformulated his model-theoretic argument as an argument against indirect realism in the philosophy of perception. This new argument is reviewed and defended. Putnam's new focus on philosophical theories of perception (instead of metaphysical realism) makes better sense of his previous responses to the objection from the causal theory of reference. It is argued that the model-theoretic argument can also be construed as an argument that holders of a causal theory of reference should adopt direct realism in the philosophy of perception.     

SENSATIONS, SWATCHES, AND SPECKLED HENS

Abstract: We argue that there is a interesting connection between the old problem of the Speckled Hen and an argument that can be traced from Russell to Armstrong to Putnam that we call the “gradation argument.” Both arguments have been used to show that there is no “Highest Common Factor” between appearances we judge the same – no such thing as “real” sensations. But, we argue, both only impugn the assumption of epistemic certainty regarding introspective reports.     

Counterfactuals cannot count: a rejoinder to David Chalmers

The initial argument presented herein is not significantly original--it is a simple reflection upon a notion of computation originally developed by Putnam (Putnam 1988; see also Searle, 1990) and criticised by Chalmers et al. (Chalmers, 1994; 1996a, b; see also the special issue, What is Computation?, in Minds and Machines, 4:4, November 1994). In what follows, instead of seeking to justify Putnam's conclusion that every open system implements every Finite State Automaton (FSA) and hence that psychological states of the brain cannot be functional states of a computer, I will establish the weaker result that, over a finite time window every open system implements the trace of FSA Q, as it executes program (P) on input (I). If correct the resulting bold philosophical claim is that phenomenal states--such as feelings and visual experiences--can never be understood or explained functionally.     

Natural Realism or Transactionalism: On the Relationships between Putnam and Two Pragmatists,James and Dewey

The relationships between Hilary Putnam and the pragmatists (especially William James and John Dewey) are obvious but subtle.To shed some light on this issue,the author will explore a key issue that not only stands as Putnam's main inheritance from the pragmatists,but that also illuminates the relationships between them more clearly than any other issues.This key issue is the understanding of perception and the philosophical position that arises from this understanding.The author argues that in adopting Dewey's transactionalism (or interactionalism),Putnam advances from James' insight to Dewey's,a shift that is particularly manifest in Putnam's attempt to add another layer of meaning to what he refers to as the second na(i)veté that he detects and appreciates in James' natural realism.     

Fantasy proneness, dissociation, and DSM-IV axis II symptomatology

Scores on the Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings (S. C. Wilson & T. X. Barber, 1981) identified fantasizers and controls who were administered the Structured Interview for DSM-IV Personality (SIDP-IV; B. Pfohl, N. Blum, & M. Zimmerman, 1994) and the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; E. M. Bernstein & F. W. Putnam, 1986). Fantasizers had increased rates of Cluster A and B personality disorders but were equivalent to controls in Cluster C diagnoses. For both Clusters A and B, 55% of the fantasizers received clinical diagnoses. Fantasizers had significantly higher DES, DES-T (N. G. Waller, F. W. Putnam, & E. B. Carlson, 1996), and Normal Dissociative Index scores. Although nearly one half of the fantasizers' DES-T patterns were classified within the pathological dissociative taxon (N. G. Waller & C. A. Ross, 1997), none of the controls and only 10.03% of the original screening sample received this classification. Both Axis II pathology and pathological dissociation were associated with fantasy proneness.     

Extensionality, underdetermination and indeterminacy

I am grateful to Burton Dreben, Warren Goldfarb, Don Gustafson, Jim Higginbotham, Jerrold Katz, Joe Levine, Ted Morris, Nick Pappas, Hilary Putnam, Georges Rey and Bob Richardson for helpful discussions and comments on the issues discussed in this paper. Also I thank an anonymous reviewer for Erkenntnis for helpful comments.     

Recurrence

Standard compositionality is the doctrine that the semantic content of a compound expression is a function of the semantic contents of the contentful component expressions. In 1954 Hilary Putnam proposed that standard compositionality be replaced by a stricter version according to which even sentences that are synonymously isomorphic (in the sense of Alonzo Church) are not strictly synonymous unless they have the same logical form. On Putnam??s proposal, the semantic content of a compound expression is a function of: (i) the contentful component expressions; and (ii) the expression??s logical form. Kit Fine recently expanded and modified Putnam??s idea into a sweeping theory in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. The present paper is a detailed critique of Fine??s ??semantic relationism.?? Fine??s notion of coordination is explained in terms of the familiar pragmatic phenomenon of recognition. A serious error in Fine??s formal disproof of standard Millianism is exposed. It is demonstrated furthermore that Church??s original criticism of Putnam??s proposal can be extended to Fine??s semantic relationism. Finally, it is also demonstrated that the positive position Fine proffers to supplant standard Millianism is in fact exactly equivalent to standard Millianism, so that Fine??s overall position not only does not displace standard Millianism but is in fact inconsistent.     

Putnam's natural realism and the question of a perceptual interface

According to Hilary Putnam, natural realism is a form of direct realism in the philosophy of perception that promises to help see us past an irresolvable metaphysical dispute between realism and anti-realism. Illumination depends upon the claim that in perception that there is no interface between the cognitive powers of the mind and the causal powers of the world. In the present paper I aim to show that there is a hidden complexity in Putnam's notion of a perceptual interface. On a trivializing reading, Putnam intends only to reject a modern materialist version of the traditional ‘veil of ideas’. On a richer reading, he intends also to reject the view that the intentional content of experience is autonomous with respect to the external world. I conclude by suggesting that natural realism is not mere common sense and that its fate is tied to its ability to respond to the skeptical threats that help to motivate the traditional options of realism and antirealism.     

Hilary Putnam And Immanuel Kant: Two `Internal Realists'?

Since 1976 Hilary Putnam has drawn parallels between his `internal',`pragmatic', `natural' or `common-sense' realism and Kant's transcendentalidealism. Putnam reads Kant as rejecting the then current metaphysicalpicture with its in-built assumptions of a unique, mind-independent world,and truth understood as correspondence between the mind and that ready-madeworld. Putnam reads Kant as overcoming the false dichotomies inherent inthat picture and even finds some glimmerings of conceptual relativity inKant's proposed solution. Furthermore, Putnam reads Kant as overcoming thepernicious scientific realist distinction between primary and secondaryqualities, between things that really exist and their projections, adistinction that haunts modern philosophy. Putnam's revitalisation of Kantis not just of historical interest, but challenges contemporary versions ofscientific realism. Furthermore, Putnam has highlighted themes which havenot received the attention they deserve in Kantian exegesis, namely, theproblematic role of primary and secondary qualities in Kant's empiricalrealism, and the extent of Kant's commitment to conceptual pluralism.However, I argue that Putnam's qualified allegiance to Kant exposes him tosome of the same metaphysical problems that affected Kant, namely, thefamiliar problem of postulating an absolute reality (Ding an sich), while atthe same time disavowing the meaningfulness of so doing. In conclusion Isuggest that Putnam might consider Hegel's attempts to solve this problem inKant as a way of furthering his own natural realism.     

How Old Are These Bones? Putnam, Wittgenstein and Verification: Cora Diamond

Hilary Putnam has argued against philosophical theories which tie the content of truth-claims closely to the available methods of investigation and verification. Such theories, he argues, threaten our idea of human communication, which we take to be possible between people of different cultures and across periods of time during which methods of investigation change dramatically. Putnam rejects any reading of Wittgenstein which takes him to make a close tie between meaning and method of verification. What strands in Wittgenstein's thought appear to lend support to such a reading? Can we do justice to the role which method of verification does have for Wittgenstein while retaining our hold on the idea that communication between people is possible despite substantial differences in methods of verification and investigation?
Thus it is as if the proof did not determine the sense of the proposition proved; and yet as if it did determine it.
But isn't it like that with any verification of any proposition?     

REVIEWS

Book reviewed in this article:
Hilary Putnam, Words and Life, ed. James Conant.
R.J. Hankinson, The Sceptics. London: Routledge.
Allen, Diogenes and Springstead, Eric O., Spirit.
Dieter Henrich, Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of the World.     

Kind terms and semantic uniformity

Philosophia - Since Saul Kripke’s and Hilary Putnam’s groundbreaking work in the Seventies, the idea has emerged that natural kind terms are semantically special among common nouns....     

Kant's transcendental idealism and contemporary anti‐realism

This paper compares Kant's transcendental idealism with three main groups of contemporary anti‐realism, associated with Wittgenstein, Putnam, and Dummett, respectively. The kind of anti‐realism associated with Wittgenstein has it that there is no deep sense in which our concepts are answerable to reality. Associated with Putnam is the rejection of four main ideas: theoryindependent reality, the idea of a uniquely true theory, a correspondence theory of truth, and bivalence. While there are superficial similarities between both views and Kant's, I find more significant differences. Dummettian anti‐realism, too, clearly differs from Kant's position: Kant believes in verification‐transcendent reality, and transcendental idealism is not a theory of meaning or truth. However, I argue that part of the Dummettian position is extremely useful for understanding part of Kant's position – his idealism about the appearances of things. I argue that Kant's idealism about appearances can be expressed as the rejection of experiencetranscendent reality with respect to appearances.     

Aging,Agency, and Activism: Older Women as Social Change Agents

Current cohorts of older women are potential social activists, and their potential to contribute to social change is examined. It is argued that engagement in social action is positive and empowering for aging women. Older women both contribute to and benefit from social capital, connections among individuals in social networks, and norms of reciprocity (Putnam, 2000 Putnam , R. ( 2000 ). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community . New York : Simon & Schuster .[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). Recommendations are offered for organizations that wish to recruit and engage older women as members. A feminist therapy perspective is consistent with the empowerment of older women as social agents.