共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
K. Romdenh-Romluc 《Philosophical Studies》2006,128(2):257-283
It has traditionally been maintained that every token of ‘I’ refers to its utterer. However, certain uses of indexicals conflict
with this claim, and its counterparts with respect to ‘here’ and ‘now’, suggesting that the traditional account of indexical
reference should be abandoned. In this paper, I examine some proposed alternatives and the difficulties they face, before
offering a new account of indexical reference. I endorse Kaplan’s view that the reference of an indexical is determined on
any occasion it is used by applying its character to a particular context, arguing that the problem cases show that this is not always the context of utterance. The task facing
the semantic theorist is thus to explain what fixes the reference-determining context. I consider and reject both Predelli’s
suggestion that the reference-determining context is the one intended by the utterer, and Corazza et al.’s proposal that the relevant context is fixed by conventions delivered by the utterance setting. The discussion of these
two accounts reveals that an adequate theory of indexical reference should allow the speaker to use indexicals in novel ways,
whilst holding that what a speaker can refer to with an indexical utterance is constrained by what an audience can understand.
I develop an account based around these two requirements. 相似文献
2.
Allyson Mount 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(2):193-209
Within the class of indexicals, a distinction is often made between “pure” or “automatic” indexicals on one hand, and demonstratives
or “discretionary” indexicals on the other. The idea is supposed to be that certain indexicals refer automatically and invariably
to a particular feature of the utterance context: ‘I’ refers to the speaker, ‘now’ to the time of utterance, ‘here’ to the
place of utterance, etc. Against this view, I present cases where reference shifts from the speaker, time, or place of utterance
to some other object, time, or place. I consider and reject the claim that these counterexamples to the automatic indexical
theory all involve non-literal uses of indexicals and argue that they cannot be explained away on the grounds that they involve
conversational implicature or pretense. 相似文献
3.
Andy Egan 《Synthese》2009,166(2):251-279
It’s a presupposition of a very common way of thinking about context-sensitivity in language that the semantic contribution
made by a bit of context-sensitive vocabulary is sensitive only to features of the speaker’s situation at the time of utterance.
I argue that this is false, and that we need a theory of context-dependence that allows for content to depend not just on
the features of the utterance’s origin, but also on features of its destination. There are cases in which a single utterance
semantically conveys different propositions to different members of its audience, which force us to say that what a sentence
conveys depends not just on the context in which it is uttered, but also on the context in which it is received. 相似文献
4.
Claudia Bianchi 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(2):377-397
5.
Caj Strandberg 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(4):341-369
One of the most prevalent and influential assumptions in metaethics is that our conception of the relation between moral language
and motivation provides strong support to internalism about moral judgments. In the present paper, I argue that this supposition
is unfounded. Our responses to the type of thought experiments that internalists employ do not lend confirmation to this view
to the extent they are assumed to do. In particular, they are as readily explained by an externalist view according to which
there is a pragmatic and standardized connection between moral utterances and motivation. The pragmatic account I propose
states that a person’s utterance of a sentence according to which she ought to ϕ conveys two things: the sentence expresses,
in virtue of its conventional meaning, the belief that she ought to ϕ, and her utterance carries a generalized conversational
implicature to the effect that she is motivated to ϕ. This view also makes it possible to defend cognitivism against a well-known
internalist argument. 相似文献
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There is a common-sense view of language, which is held by Wittgenstein, Strawson Dummett, Searle, Putnam, Lewis, Wiggins,
and others. According to this view a language consists of conventions, it is rule-governed, rules are conventionalised, a
language is learnt, there are general learning mechanisms in the brain, and so on. I shall call this view the ‘ordinary language’
view of language. Chomsky’s attitude towards this view of language has been rather negative, and his rejection of it is a
major motivation for the development of his own theory. In this paper I shall review Chomsky’s long-standing criticisms. I
shall show that (1)Chomsky’s argument does not constitute a dismissal of the ‘ordinarylanguage’ view of language, (2) Chomsky’s
conclusions about language do not follow from his argument, and (3) the ‘ordinary language’ view actually points to a promising
way for us to understand the true nature of language and mind.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
9.
Joshua Gert 《The Journal of Ethics》2012,16(1):15-34
Alan Goldman’s Reasons from Within is one of the most thorough recent defenses of what might be called ‘orthodox internalism’ about practical reasons. Goldman’s
main target is an opposing view that includes a commitment to the following two theses: (O) that there are such things as
objective values, and (E) that these values give rise to external reasons. One version of this view, which we can call ‘orthodox
externalism’, also includes a commitment to the thesis (I) that rational people will be motivated by any reason they have
of which they are aware. Goldman himself embraces (I), and deploys it frequently in his criticisms of orthodox externalism.
But there is logical space for an externalist view that includes a commitment to (O) and (E), but that denies (I). The resulting
“hyperexternalist” view holds that some reasons need not motivate us, even if we are rational. In this paper I argue that
Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism leave hyperexternalism untouched, and that his specific criticisms of my own
version of hyperexternalism do not work. In light of Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism and my own criticisms of
Goldman’s view, hyperexternalism emerges as the favored option. 相似文献
10.
J. Brown 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(3):407-435
11.
J. C. Pinto de Oliveira 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(1):147-157
In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed, particularly regarding Carnap’s work.
In this paper, I argue against the interpretation that Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions having been published in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, co-edited by Carnap, is evidence of the revisionist idea that Carnap “would have found Structure philosophically congenial”. I claim that Kuhn’s book, from Carnap’s point of view, is not in philosophy of science but rather
in history of science (in the context of a sharp discovery–justification distinction). It could also explain the fact that,
despite his sympathetic letters to Kuhn as editor, Carnap never refers to Kuhn’s book in his work in philosophy of science. 相似文献
12.
Namjoong Kim 《Synthese》2009,168(2):295-312
In this paper, I argue for a view largely favorable to the Thirder view: when Sleeping Beauty wakes up on Monday, her credence
in the coin’s landing heads is less than 1/2. Let’s call this “the Lesser view.” For my argument, I (i) criticize Strict Conditionalization
as the rule for changing de se credences; (ii) develop a new rule; and (iii) defend it by Gaifman’s Expert Principle. Finally, I defend the Lesser view
by making use of this new rule. 相似文献
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14.
Michael Friedman 《Synthese》2011,180(2):249-263
Both realists and instrumentalists have found it difficult to understand (much less accept) Carnap’s developed view on theoretical
terms, which attempts to stake out a neutral position between realism and instrumentalism. I argue that Carnap’s mature conception
of a scientific theory as the conjunction of its Ramsey sentence and Carnap sentence can indeed achieve this neutral position.
To see this, however, we need to see why the Newman problem raised in the context of recent work on structural realism is
no problem for Carnap’s conception; and we also need to locate Carnap’s work on theoretical terms within his wider program
of Wissenschaftslogik or the logic of science. 相似文献
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16.
Kristjan Laasik 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(4):439-459
17.
William H. Hanson 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(3):437-459
The traditional view that all logical truths are metaphysically necessary has come under attack in recent years. The contrary
claim is prominent in David Kaplan’s work on demonstratives, and Edward Zalta has argued that logical truths that are not
necessary appear in modal languages supplemented only with some device for making reference to the actual world (and thus
independently of whether demonstratives like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ are present). If this latter claim can be sustained, it
strikes close to the heart of the traditional view. I begin this paper by discussing and refuting Zalta’s argument in the
context of a language for propositional modal logic with an actuality connective (section 1). This involves showing that his
argument in favor of real world validity his preferred explication of logical truth, is fallacious. Next (section 2) I argue
for an alternative explication of logical truth called general validity. Since the rule of necessitation preserves general
validity, the argument of section 2 provides a reason for affirming the traditional view. Finally (section 3) I show that
the intuitive idea behind the discredited notion of real world validity finds legitimate expression in an object language
connective for deep necessity.
Earlier versions of this paper were read at the universities of Graz,
Maribor, and Salzburg, and at a workshop on the philosophy of logic at the
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) in Mexico City. My
thanks to those present at these events for many helpful suggestions. Thanks
are also due to an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies. 相似文献
18.
Nam-In Lee 《Husserl Studies》2010,26(2):131-145
In this paper, I will examine the possibility of first philosophy from a phenomenological point of view. I will do this by
assessing Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 1, I will delineate Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 2, I will introduce Levinas’s conception of ethics as first philosophy and sketch out his criticism of Husserl’s conception
of first philosophy. In Sect. 3, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception and show that from a phenomenological point of view, it is possible
to develop first philosophy only in a relative sense and not in an absolute sense. The possibility of first philosophy in
a relative sense implies that both Husserl’s and Levinas’s conceptions of first philosophy have some limitations and should
be revised, since in a certain way, they are each conceived from an absolute point of view. In Sect. 4, I will show that the conception of first philosophy in a relative sense is a phenomenological one and sketch out some basic
features of first philosophy in a relative sense. 相似文献
19.
Graham Stevens 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(2):213-221
In this paper I defend Kaplan’s claim that the sentence “I am here now” is logically true. A number of counter-examples to
the claim have been proposed, including occurrences of the sentence in answerphone messages, written notes left for later
decoding, etc. These counter-examples are only convincing if they can be shown to be cases where the correct context with
respect to which the utterance should be evaluated is the context in which it is decoded rather than encoded. I argue that
this is not the case, and draw on the distinction between force and content to suggest an alternative account of how information
is communicated in these cases that is consistent with Kaplan’s semantic theory.
相似文献
Graham StevensEmail: |
20.
Michael Wolff 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(2):359-371
In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 341–355) I have compared Aristotle’s syllogistic with Kant’s theory
of “pure ratiocination”. “Ratiocinia pura” („reine Vernunftschlüsse“) is Kant’s designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called ‘perfect’. In Kant’s view
they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant’s view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant’s view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle’s view concerning
perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only
the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant’s logical theory.
As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article
published in J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357–365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 199–213 (cf. Ebert’s answer
in the same issue pp. 215–231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published
in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 365–372). I shall argue, that Kant’s principle ‘nota notae est nota rei ipsius’ and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant’s logical
theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations. 相似文献