Further Antidotes: a Response to Gundersen

In my 'Dispositions and Antidotes', The Philosophical Quarterly , 48 (1998), I raise an objection to the conditional analysis of dispositions, both in its simple formulation and in a more sophisticated version due to David Lewis, The Philosophical Quarterly , 47 (1997). The objection suggests that a disposition may be continuously present and the appropriate stimulus occur without the manifestation occurring, because some outside influence, an antidote, interferes. Gundersen in The Philosophical Quarterly, 50 (2000), argues that my objection rests on an equivocation about which object possesses the disposition and more particularly on an equivocation about the context in which the events referred to take place, and that when the equivocation is resolved the counter-example disappears. I respond by showing that the counter-example does remain if we take contextual and mereological issues into account, and I conclude by remarking that the difference with Lewisdepends on whether certain features are seen as significant for the semanticsand metaphysics of dispositions or as merely characteristic of the pragmaticsof common usage.     

Implicit Theories of Personality: Further Evidence of Extreme Response Style

Five groups of 19 subjects made ratings on 11 personality trait scales of overlapping subsets of 59 artificial stimulus persons who were described by one to five personality trait adjectives. The data were analyzed per group of subjects (blockwise) and per type of stimulus person (questionnaire-wise) by means of three-mode principal component analyses. This yielded highly similar structures for the scales, and in the blockwise analyses, for the stimulus persons. This similarity was substantiated by external three-mode analyses, which showed that all stimulus persons can be mapped into one overall configuration. In all analyses it was found that differences between subjects consisted of differences in extremity of judgment, which suggests the operation of response style.     

Mohawk Saint, Catherine Tekakwitha and the Jesuits – Allan Greer

Book reviewed:
Mohawk Saint, Catherine Tekakwitha and the Jesuits , Allan Greer, Oxford University Press 2005 (0-19-517487-9), xiv + 249 pp., hb £18.50     

Response selection in spatial choice reaction: Further evidence against associative models

In a “consistent” spatial choice reaction task the same spatial relationship obtains between each stimulus and its correct response. In an “inconsistent” task this is not so. While Duncan (1977a) found both easy (spatially corresponding) and difficult (spatially opposite) responses to be slowed in inconsistent tasks, Smith (1977) found this only for the corresponding responses, the reverse holding for opposites. Reasons for this discrepancy are examined. The result of Smith (1977) depends on the use of different numbers of alternative responses in consistent and inconsistent tasks, a situation allowing no useful comparison between the two. Effects of consistency are related to others in the literature. The general conclusion is that, in these tasks, response selection is based not on a list of associations between individual stimuli and responses, but on operations or rules each of which will generate a set of stimulus-response pairs.     

Further routes to psychological constructionism

In this commentary, we do two things. First, we sketch two further routes to psychological constructionism. They are complementary to Lindquist et al.'s meta-analyses and have potential to add new evidence. Second, we look at a challenging kind of case for constructionism, namely, emotional anomalies where there are correlated, and probably relevant, brain anomalies. Psychopaths are our example.     

Response to Commentaries

In replying to the commentaries, I continue to explore differences between a complexity model of the mind and an intrapsychic one, and elaborate aspects of the complex negotiation process that occurred between my patient, Kerri, and me. Taking up Chefetz's notion that a “change in self-state predicts observed fluctuations in the capacity to mentalize,” I consider ways that self-states in both the patient and analyst fluctuate, influence, and reorganize the unfolding process, including the systemic capacity to mentalize.     

Response to Critics

In this “Response to Critics,” Cathleen Kaveny continues the conversation in the JRE symposium centered on her recent book, Prophecy without Contempt: Religious Discourse in the Public Square. The book's central argument is that adequate discussion of contention in the contemporary public square requires attending to matters of rhetoric, particularly the rhetoric of prophetic indictment. Kaveny engages the comments of four interlocutors: Alda Balthrop‐Lewis, James Childress, William Hart, and Martin Kavka. The first section, “Overarching Goals,” summarizes the objectives of the book. The second section, “Methodology,” engages critics regarding methodological issues, highlighting Kaveny's commitment to a version of MacIntyre's tradition theory and her indebtedness to her legal training. The third section, “Structure,” responds to particular questions her interlocutors raise about the four parts of the book. The fourth section, “Larger Questions,” ponders the next stages of the academic and political discussion about contention in the public square.