Toddlers can adaptively change how they categorize: same objects,same session,two different categorical distinctions

Two experiments demonstrate that 14‐ to 18‐month‐old toddlers can adaptively change how they categorize a set of objects within a single session, and that this ability is related to vocabulary size. In both experiments, toddlers were presented with a sequential touching task with objects that could be categorized either according to some perceptually salient dimension corresponding to a taxonomic distinction (e.g. animals vs. vehicles) or to some less obvious dimension (e.g. rigid vs. deformable). In each experiment, children with larger productive vocabularies responded to both dimensions, showing evidence of sensitivity to each way of categorizing the items. Children with smaller productive vocabularies attended only to the taxonomically related categorical grouping. These experiments confirm that toddlers can adaptively shift the basis of their categorization and highlight the dynamic interaction between the child and the current task in early categorization.     

Detecting objects is easier than categorizing them

Two experiments compared performance in an object detection task, in which participants categorized photographs as objects and nonobject textures, and an object categorization task, in which photographs were categorized into basic-level categories. The basic-level categorization task was either easy (e.g., dogs vs. buses) or difficult (e.g., dogs vs. cats). Participants performed similarly in the detection and the easy-categorization tasks, but response times to the difficult-categorization task were slower. This latter finding is difficult to reconcile with the conclusions of Grill-Spector and Kanwisher (2005) who reported equivalent performance on detection and basic-level categorization tasks and took this as evidence that figure-ground segregation and basic-level categorization are mediated by the same mechanism.     

Visual search and the collapse of categorization

Categorization researchers typically present single objects to be categorized. But real-world categorization often involves object recognition within complex scenes. It is unknown how the processes of categorization stand up to visual complexity or why they fail facing it. The authors filled this research gap by blending the categorization and visual-search paradigms into a visual-search and categorization task in which participants searched for members of target categories in complex displays. Participants have enormous difficulty in this task. Despite intensive and ongoing category training, they detect targets at near-chance levels unless displays are extremely simple or target categories extremely focused. These results, discussed from the perspectives of categorization and visual search, might illuminate societally important instances of visual search (e.g., diagnostic medical screening).     

Effects of stimulus duration and choice delay on visual categorization in pigeons

We [Lazareva, O. F., Freiburger, K. L., & Wasserman, E. A. (2004). Pigeons concurrently categorize photographs at both basic and superordinate levels. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 11, 1111-1117] previously trained four pigeons to classify color photographs into their basic-level categories (cars, chairs, flowers, or people) or into their superordinate-level categories (natural or artificial). Here, we found that brief stimulus durations had the most detrimental effect on the basic-level discrimination of natural stimuli by the same pigeons. Increasing the delay between stimulus presentation and choice responding had greater detrimental effect on the basic-level discrimination than the superordinate-level discrimination. These results suggest that basic-level discriminations required longer stimulus durations and were more subject to forgetting than were superordinate-level discriminations. Additionally, categorization of natural stimuli required longer stimulus durations than categorization of artificial stimuli, but only at the basic level. Together, these findings suggest that basic-level categorization may not always be superior to superordinate-level categorization and provide additional evidence of a dissociation between natural and artificial stimuli in pigeons’ categorization.     

The role of functional information for infant categorization

This report examines whether knowledge about function influences the formation of artifact categories in 11-12- month old infants. Using an object-examination task, a set of artificial stimuli was presented that could either be grouped according to overall similarity or according to similarity in one functionally relevant part. Experiment 1 revealed that infants categorized the objects according to overall similarity but not part similarity under control conditions. Experiment 2 showed that after having seen the experimenter demonstrating the functional use of the critical part, infants later categorized the stimuli according to part similarity. When the same actions were performed without producing any effect, infants failed to categorize according to the critical part. This set of findings suggests that 11-12-month old infants use functional information as a cue to categorization.     

Imprinted numbers: newborn chicks’ sensitivity to number vs. continuous extent of objects they have been reared with

Newborn chicks were tested for their sensitivity to number vs. continuous physical extent of artificial objects they had been reared with soon after hatching. Because of the imprinting process, such objects were treated by chicks as social companions. We found that when the objects were similar, chicks faced with choices between 1 vs. 2 or 2 vs. 3 objects chose the set of objects of larger numerosity, irrespective of the number of objects they had been reared with. Moreover, when volume, surface or contour length were controlled for using sets of 1 vs. 4, 1 vs. 6 or 1 vs. 3 objects, chicks resorted to choosing the larger object, rather than the familiar numerosity. When, however, chicks were reared with objects differing in their aspect (colour, size, and shape) and then tested with completely novel objects (of different colour and shape but controlled for continuous extent), they chose to associate with the same number of objects they had been reared with. These results suggest that identification of objects as different and separate individuals is crucial for the computation of number rather than continuous extent in numerical representation of small numerosities and provide a striking parallel with results obtained in human infants. Early availability of small numerosity discrimination by chicks strongly suggests that these abilities are in place at birth.     

Categorization and abstraction abilities in 3-year-old children: a comparison with monkey data

Three-year-old children were tested on three categorization tasks of increasing levels of abstraction (used with adult baboons in an earlier study): the first was a conceptual categorization task (food vs toys), the second a perceptual matching task (same vs different objects), and the third a relational matching task in which the children had to sort pairs according to whether or not the two items belonged to the same or different categories. The children were tested using two different procedures, the first a replication of the procedure used with the baboons (pulling one rope for a category or a relationship between two objects, and another rope for the other category or relationship), the second a task based upon childrens prior experiences with sorting objects (putting in the same box objects belonging to the same category or a pair of objects exemplifying the same relation). The children were able to solve the first task (conceptual categorization) when tested with the sorting into boxes procedure, and the second task (perceptual matching) when tested with both procedures. The children were able to master the third task (relational matching) only when the rules were clearly explained to them, but not when they could only watch sorting examples. In fact, the relational matching task without explanation requires analogy abilities that do not seem to be fully developed at 3 years of age. The discrepancies in performances between children tested with the two procedures, with the task explained or not, and the discrepancies observed between children and baboons are discussed in relation to differences between species and/or problem-solving strategies.     

Development of categorization in infancy: advancing forward to the animate/inanimate level

Three experiments are reported on the development of object categorization skills during the second year of life. Experiment 1 examined whether 14- and 18-month-old infants were capable of performing categorization at the animate/inanimate (A/I) level using a sequential touching task. The 18-month-olds were significantly above chance and the 14-month-olds were also approaching above-chance significance, which is the highest level of inclusiveness ever tested in infancy. In Experiments 2 and 3, 14-month-old infants participated in a sequential touching task in which the part features of animate and inanimate objects were modified, allowing for a test of partonomic (i.e., legs and wheels) vs. taxonomic (i.e., animates and inanimates) categorization. Infants did not favor partonomic categorization, suggesting that A/I categories are not formed solely based on object parts such as legs and wheels.     

Similarity and categorization: from vision to touch

Even though human perceptual development relies on combining multiple modalities, most categorization studies so far have focused on the visual modality. To better understand the mechanisms underlying multisensory categorization, we analyzed visual and haptic perceptual spaces and compared them with human categorization behavior. As stimuli we used a three-dimensional object space of complex, parametrically-defined objects. First, we gathered similarity ratings for all objects and analyzed the perceptual spaces of both modalities using multidimensional scaling analysis. Next, we performed three different categorization tasks which are representative of every-day learning scenarios: in a fully unconstrained task, objects were freely categorized, in a semi-constrained task, exactly three groups had to be created, whereas in a constrained task, participants received three prototype objects and had to assign all other objects accordingly. We found that the haptic modality was on par with the visual modality both in recovering the topology of the physical space and in solving the categorization tasks. We also found that within-category similarity was consistently higher than across-category similarity for all categorization tasks and thus show how perceptual spaces based on similarity can explain visual and haptic object categorization. Our results suggest that both modalities employ similar processes in forming categories of complex objects.     

Late talkers show no shape bias in a novel name extension task

By 2½ years of age, children typically show a shape bias in object naming – that is, they extend object names mostly to new instances with the same shape. The acquisition of a shape bias is related to a marked increase in the rate of object name learning. This study asks whether, conversely, children who do not readily acquire new object names lack a shape bias. Twelve 2- to 3-year-old ‘late talkers’– children whose total vocabularies rank below the 30th percentile for their age – were compared with age-matched children with larger vocabularies in a novel object name extension task. The controls extended novel names across novel objects with the same shape. The late talkers showed no group perceptual bias, but many individuals extended novel names across objects with the same surface texture. The implications of the results both for the role of attentional biases in object name learning and for the etiology of some late talking are discussed.      

Experience with malleable objects influences shape-based object individuation by infants

Infants’ ability to accurately represent and later recognize previously viewed objects, and conversely, to discriminate novel objects from those previously seen improves remarkably over the first two years of life. During this time, infants acquire extensive experience viewing and manipulating objects and these experiences influence their physical reasoning. Here we posited that infants’ observations of object feature stability (rigid versus malleable) can influence the use of those features to individuate two successively viewed objects. We showed 8.5-month-olds a series of objects that could or could not change shape, then assessed their use of shape as a basis for object individuation. Infants who explored rigid objects later used shape differences to individuate objects; however, infants who explored malleable objects did not. This outcome suggests that the latter infants did not take into account shape differences during the physical reasoning task and provides further evidence that infants’ attention to object features can be readily modified based on recent experiences.     

Objects are individuals but stuff doesn't count: perceived rigidity and cohesiveness influence infants' representations of small groups of discrete entities

Young infants construct models of the world composed of objects tracked through time and occlusion. To date little is known about the degree to which these models are sensitive to the material make-up of the represented individuals. Two experiments probed 8-month-olds' ability to represent different kinds of entities: rigid, cohesive objects, flexible, cohesive objects, and non-rigid, non-cohesive portions of sand. In Experiment 1, infants represented an array of two rigid, cohesive objects hidden behind a single screen, but failed to represent hidden arrays of two flexible objects or two portions of sand. In Experiment 2, entities were hidden behind two screens instead of one, thereby reducing the information processing demands of the task. In that case, infants succeeded in representing arrays of both types of object stimuli, but again failed to represent the portions of sand. It is argued that (1) the processes by which infants individuate and track entities are sensitive to material kind, (2) rigid cohesive objects occupy a privileged status in this system, and (3) early knowledge about objects and substances has a quantificational aspect.     

Cause or effect: What matters? How 12‐month‐old infants learn to categorize artifacts

This paper investigates the role of cause and effect relations for infants' learning about artifacts. Two experiments tested whether 12‐month‐olds categorized a given set of unfamiliar artifacts according to overall similarity and/or according to part similarity, depending on what kind of video demonstration was presented before the start of the categorization task. In both experiments, the actions performed with objects were accompanied by interesting effects but the causal relation between object‐structure and effects was teased apart. In one video demonstration (Expt 1), the experimenter used the object part to produce some kind of effect in a causally plausible way. In another video demonstration (Expt 2), the experimenter performed similar actions with the same objects as in Expt 1, followed by the same effects as before. Importantly, however, no plausible cause–effect relation was provided this time. Only infants participating in Expt 1 categorized the set of unfamiliar objects according to part similarity. This finding suggests that 12‐month‐olds attend to the causal relation between specific object parts and their functional use when categorizing artifacts, rather than merely associating form‐characteristics with an interesting effect.     

Categorization of two-dimensional and three-dimensional stimuli by 18-month-old infants

In two experiments, 18-month-old infants’ categorization of 3D replicas and 2D photographs of the same animals and vehicles were compared to explore infants’ flexibility in categorization across different object representations. Using a sequential touching procedure, infants completed one superordinate and two basic-level categorization tasks with 3D replicas, 2D cut out photographs, or 2D images on photo cubes (“2D cubes”). For superordinate sets, 3D replicas elicited longer mean run lengths than 2D cut outs, and 3D replicas elicited equivalent mean run lengths as 2D cubes. For basic-level sets, infants categorized high-contrast animal sets when presented with 3D replicas, but they failed to categorize any of the 2D photograph sets. Categorization processes appear to differ for 3D and 2D stimuli, and infants’ discovery of object properties over time while manipulating objects may facilitate categorization, as least at the superordinate level. These findings are discussed in the context of infants’ representation abilities and the integration of perception and action.     

The shielding function of task rules in the context of task switching

There is increasing evidence that task rules help shield the response against distractor interference. Here, the authors investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying this assumed shielding function of task rules and how it is adjusted to changing task demands. In two experiments, participants switched between a noun categorization and an adjective categorization task. Target words were superimposed on distractor pictures. These pictures were always irrelevant and depicted either objects also used as target words in the noun task (noun distractors) or objects that were not part of the noun target-set but could be categorized according to the noun task (noun-related distractors). Results show that (a) on task repetitions shielding prevents interference from any distractors associated with a competing task; this is indicated by the lack of interference on adjective task repetitions; and (b) shielding is reduced on task switches. In the noun task, this reduction resulted in attenuated interference by noun-related distractors. In the adjective task, spatial distractors did not interfere despite the reduction. This result suggests that shielding is supported by a processing advantage for task-related information and not by distractor suppression.     

Blind to Object Changes: When Learning the Same Object at Different Levels of Categorization Modifies Its Perception

The perceptual features people extract from objects depend on how they typically categorize them. It is now commonly acknowledged that the human perceiver can interact with the objects of his or her world at different, hierarchically organized levels of categorization. People who have learned to categorize an object as general or specific may therefore perceive different features in this object. We report two experiments that examined the hypothesis that the nature of categorization (general vs. specific) can influence the perceived properties of an identical distal object.     

Roles of function, reminding, and variability in categorization by 3-month-old infants

The roles of function, reminding, and exemplar variability in categorization of a physically dissimilar object were studied with 3-month-old infants trained to move a crib mobile by kicking. Performance on a transfer test with a motionless novel object provided evidence of categorization. In Experiments 1 and 2, infants, like adults, initially categorized novel objects on the basis of physical appearance, but only if trained with multiple exemplars, after delays of 1 and 7 days. In Experiment 3, prior knowledge of an object's functional properties overrode physical dissimilarity as the basis for categorization and enabled reminding of the classification response 2 weeks later. In Experiment 4, postevent contingency information overrode physical and functional properties as the basis for categorization. These findings indicate that expectations and goals influence infants' category decisions and raise the possibility that infants of 3 months respond by analogy.     

The emergence of kind-based object individuation in infancy

Four experiments investigated whether 12-month-old infants use perceptual property information in a complex object individuation task, using the violation-of-expectancy looking time method (Xu, 2002; Xu & Carey, 1996). Infants were shown two objects with different properties emerge and return behind an occluder, one at a time. The occluder was then removed, revealing either two objects (expected outcome, if property differences support individuation) or one object (unexpected outcome). In Experiments 1-3, infants failed to use color, size, or a combination of color, size, and pattern differences to establish a representation of two distinct objects behind an occluder. In Experiment 4, infants succeeded in using cross-basic-level-kind shape differences to establish a representation of two objects but failed to do so using within-basic-level-kind shape differences. Control conditions found that the methods were sensitive. Infants succeeded when provided unambiguous spatiotemporal information for two objects, and they encoded the property differences during these experiments. These findings suggest that by 12 months, different properties play different roles in a complex object individuation task. Certain salient shape differences enter into the computation of numerical distinctness of objects before other property differences such as color or size. Since shape differences are often correlated with object kind differences, these results converge with others in the literature that suggest that by the end of the first year of life, infants' representational systems begin to distinguish kinds and properties.     

Hand movements reveal the time-course of shape and pigmentation processing in face categorization

Although the roles of shape and pigmentation cues in face categorization have been studied in detail, the time-course of their processing has remained elusive. We measured participants’ hand movements via the computer mouse en route to male or female responses (gender task) or young or old responses (age task) on the screen. Participants were presented with male and female faces (gender task) or with young and old faces (age task) that were typical, shape-atypical, or pigmentation-atypical. Before settling into correct categorizations, the processing of atypical cues led hand trajectories to deviate toward the opposite gender or age category. A temporal analysis of these trajectory deviations revealed dissociable dynamics in shape and pigmentation processing. Pigmentation had a privileged, early role during gender categorization, preceding shape effects by approximately 50 ms and preceding pigmentation effects in age categorization by 100 ms. In age categorization, however, pigmentation had a simultaneous onset of influence as shape. It also had a more dominant influence than shape throughout the gender and age categorization process. The results reveal the time-course of shape and pigmentation processing in gender and age categorization.     

The role of motion in children's categorization of objects.

Perceptual cues play a fundamental role in early categorization of objects. What is meant by perceptual cues in the literature, however, is not always clear. It is fair to say that they are typically understood to be static shape cues. A number of recent studies have suggested that dynamic perceptual cues, such as motion, may also be important in early categorization. The study presented here explored the role that motion plays in children's categorization of animal and non-animal kinds, such as geometric figures. Motion was directly pitted against shape as a cue for categorization. Results showed that 4-year-old children, confronted with a choice between shape and motion, significantly used motion cues over shape cues to categorize objects, regardless of whether they were animals or geometric figures. Seven-year-olds also tended to use motion more often to categorize animals but not when dealing with geometric figures. Older children, who have been found to have a clearer natural kind/artifact distinction, seem to appreciate the uniqueness of movement to animals and see motion as more relevant to their categorization but relatively less so to categorize geometric figures. This developmental shift in the categorization of animals and geometric figures based on motion was further confirmed by testing adults on the same tasks. Adults were found to base their judgements significantly more often on motion for animals but not for geometric figures. These findings support the view that children are initially guided by motion in object categorization, suggesting that motion plays an overriding role that is central in the process of concept acquisition and in the mechanisms by which concepts are later structured.