Discouraging unethicality versus encouraging ethicality: Unraveling the differential effects of prevention‐ and promotion‐focused ethical leadership

Theory on the impact of ethical leadership has traditionally been based on a deontological approach to morality. Underlying this perspective is the assumption that all leader behaviors that encourage “normatively appropriate conduct” will influence followers in a similar fashion. Put differently, the current consensus seems to suggest that actions that focus on preventing unethical behavior—attending to “the wrong”—will have the same impact as actions that focus on promoting ethical behavior—attending to “the right.” Taking a within‐person approach, we draw upon social exchange theory to challenge this consensus and build theory that suggests a follower's felt trust from their leader will be differentially impacted by prevention‐ versus promotion‐focused ethical leadership. We also explore how these different types of ethical leadership may indirectly, through felt trust, impact citizenship behavior and counterproductive work behavior. Finally, we consider how the role of the “moral manager” may interact with the “moral person” by identifying leader moral hypocrisy as an important between‐person moderator of these effects. Given the importance of ethical decision‐making in organizations and the calls for increased ethical leadership, our findings have important implications for both theory and practice.     

Not practicing what they preached! Exploring negative spillover effects of news about ex-politicians’ hypocrisy on party attitudes,voting intentions,and political trust

ABSTRACT

Political hypocrisy – a frequent feature of contemporary politics – oftentimes occurs when politicians resign from office and then engage in behavior that is in fundamental opposition to the standpoints they originally campaigned for as incumbents. Previous research has neglected to examine negative spillover effects of news about ex-politicians’ hypocritical behavior. Drawing from the inclusion/exclusion model and the feelings-as-information model, we conducted two experiments in two different countries and used different stimuli to increase external validity. Results suggest a dual process account of scandal spillover effects (an attitudinal and emotional mechanism) revealing that hypocrisy negatively affected both attitudes and emotions toward an ex-politician. Mediation analysis further showed that evaluations in turn negatively affected attitudes and voting intentions for the party the hypocritical politician used to belong to (attitudinal spillover process). No effects on general political trust emerged. In contrast, negative emotions had no effect on party attitudes and voting intentions but decreased political trust toward politicians in general (emotional spillover process). In line with the inclusion/exclusion model, the results help to explain inconsistent findings in previous studies that did not account for the suggested dual process account of spillover effects and underline the eroding effects of hypocrisy.     

The claims of reflective equilibrium

In On Certainty, the emphasis is on the solitary individual as subject of knowledge. The importance of our dependence on others, however, is brought out in Wittgenstein's remarks about trust. In this paper, the role and nature of trust are discussed, the grammar of trust being contrasted with that of reliance. It is shown that to speak of trust is to speak of a fundamental attitude of one person towards others, an attitude which, unlike reliance, is not to be explained, or assessed, by an appeal to reasons. It is, rather, because we have such a fundamental readiness to accept what we are taught by others that we can come to develop an understanding of reasons. The idea that believing something without evidence is always a weakness is shown to be a philosophical prejudice. Trust is always for something we can rightfully demand from others: misplaced trust, accordingly, is not a shortcoming on the part of the trustful person, but of the person in whom the trust was placed. The destruction of trust is a tragedy of life; in Culture and Value, Wittgenstein suggests a connection between distrust and madness.     

Trust and belief: a preemptive reasons account

According to doxastic accounts of trust, trusting a person to \(\varPhi \) involves, among other things, holding a belief about the trusted person: either the belief that the trusted person is trustworthy or the belief that she actually will \(\varPhi \) . In recent years, several philosophers have argued against doxastic accounts of trust. They have claimed that the phenomenology of trust suggests that rather than such a belief, trust involves some kind of non-doxastic mental attitude towards the trusted person, or a non-doxastic disposition to rely upon her. This paper offers a new account of reasons for trust and employs the account to defend a doxastic account of trust. The paper argues that reasons for trust are preemptive reasons for action or belief. Thus the Razian concept of preemptive reasons, which arguably plays a key role in our understanding of relations of authority, is also central to our understanding of relations of trust. Furthermore, the paper argues that acceptance of a preemptive account of reasons for trust supports the adoption of a doxastic account of trust, for acceptance of such an account both neutralizes central objections to doxastic accounts of trust and provides independent reasons supporting a doxastic account.     

Trust in the medical profession and patient attachment style

Attachment style is a person’s approach to interpersonal relationships, which develops from early experiences with primary caregivers and can remain stable into adulthood. Depending on a person’s attachment style, the amount of trust one has in others can vary when forming relationships, and trust is important in formation of the patient–physician relationship. The purpose of this study was to see if there is an association between attachment style and trust in physicians in general. Participants were recruited from an emergency department (ED) and an online university participant pool, and completed short questionnaires assessing attachment style and trust in the medical profession. Results revealed that individuals with a fearful attachment style reported significantly lower levels of trust in the medical profession than those with a secure attachment style. ED participants also reported higher levels of trust in the medical profession in comparison to student participants. This study provides a better understanding of trust in the medical profession, and insight into future care for patients who have low trust.     

Other voices,other minds

I argue to a conclusion I find at once surprising and intuitive: although many considerations show trust useful, valuable, important, or required, these are not the reasons for which one trusts a particular person to do a particular thing. The reasons for which one trusts a particular person on a particular occasion concern, not the value, importance, or necessity of trust itself, but rather the trustworthiness of the person in question in the matter at hand. In fact, I will suggest that the degree to which you trust a particular person to do a particular thing will vary inversely with the degree to which you must rely, for the motivation or justification of your trusting response, on reasons that concern the importance, or value, or necessity of having such a response.     

殊化信任与泛化信任在人际信任行为路径模型中的作用

该研究探讨不同社会情景下,泛化信任、殊化信任以及可信任性知觉等对信任行为起作用的理论模型。223名工人被试平均年龄24岁。用结构方程模型中的路径分析验证该模型,结果表明,各种拟合指标十分理想。三种交往情景下的人际信任路径模型之间的异同主要表现在：（1）殊化信任在所有情景下对信任行为都有直接而显著的作用;（2）泛化信任则只在与熟人和陌生人交往时才起作用;（3）与目标人物的关系越疏远,对他们作出信任行为时所需要的心理资源也越多。     

Asymmetries in perceptions of self and others' hypocrisy: Rethinking the meaning and perception of the construct

This article examines how people recall and describe instances of hypocrisy in their own and others' behavior. Participants (N = 302) provided two written examples. The first example recalled a time when someone called the participant a hypocrite, whereas the other recalled an instance when the participant perceived someone else's behavior as hypocritical. The first goal of the study was to discover if real‐world examples of hypocrisy reflect only mere inconsistency, consistent with the construct's narrow use in psychology, or if they contain other distinctive defining features. A typology was used to code the examples, based loosely on Crisp and Cowton's philosophical distinction between four forms of hypocrisy: direct inconsistency, pretense, blame, and complacency. The second goal was to uncover reliable actor–observer differences in perceptions of hypocrisy. Results indicated that the four forms occur in real‐world examples of both self and others' hypocrisy. Interestingly, a new fifth form, indirect inconsistency, emerged from the data, adding nuance to the initial hypothesis. Finally, several actor–observer differences in perceptions of hypocrisy arose and are discussed. The results indicate that hypocrisy is a much more complicated phenomenon than previously considered and provide the impetus for new areas of research. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of incidental experiences of regulatory fit on trust

Two experiments provide support for the hypothesis that when people assess how much they trust another person, feelings of rightness from an initial, brief experience of regulatory fit (consistency between prevention or promotion regulatory focus of goals and strategic means) can suggest the other person is trustworthy, relative to feelings of wrongness from regulatory nonfit. This regulatory-fit effect on trust was stronger for acquaintances than for individuals participants knew well (Experiment 1) and was eliminated by drawing participants' attention to how right the earlier, trust judgment-irrelevant event made them feel (Experiment 2). Implications are discussed for regulatory-fit theory, possible applications to applied settings and to other populations, and possible effects of other types of regulatory fit.     

It's not you,it's them: Social influences on trust propensity and trust dynamics

Scholars agree that trust primarily has two bases: trustworthiness—the extent to which a trustee is competent, honest, and has goodwill toward the trustor—and trust propensity—a stable trait reflecting the trustor's generalized belief that others can be trusted. Due to this trait characterization, the literature has largely reached a consensus that trust propensity is only an important base of trust in the earliest stage of a relationship—before information on trustworthiness has been gathered. Additionally, the trait conceptualization of trust propensity inhibits it from being modeled as an explanatory mechanism. Drawing on accessibility theory, a theory of trait activation, we argue that trust propensity has state‐like characteristics that are “activated” by the daily treatment an employee receives from coworkers. Our model highlights that the social context—predominantly ignored in prior trust research because of its lack of relevance to dyadic perceptions of trustworthiness—can have a substantial impact on dyadic trust. Across two multisource experience sampling methodology studies, we provide evidence that state trust propensity transmits the effects of citizenship and deviance received to trust in a focal coworker, whether that focal coworker is a source of that treatment or not. We also address how general levels of workplace unfairness—a between‐person construct—influence these dynamics. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these within‐person dynamics for fostering trust within organizations.     

Fast acquisition of cooperation and trust: A two-stage view of trusting behavior

Trustful behavior was defined in terms of the consecutive numbers of matching-to-sample problems worth money that each subject worked during sessions that ended in an equitable distribution. Two stages of acquisition are inherent in this definition; the first stage requires acquisition of an equitable method of distributing reinforcers (cooperation) to show that the within-session deviations (trust) from equity that develop during the second stage are temporary and are not part of an inequitable method of distributing reinforcers. Previous research has indicated that a contingency to trust is necessary to override the aversiveness of the inequity inherent in trusting and to produce consistent and maximal trust (half of the problems worked consecutively by each subject). The present experiment examined such a contingency. The trust contingency was an increased requirement for changing the direction of problem allocation. Only the subject who had been allocated a problem could change that allocation, by pulling a lever 45 or more times. On the other hand, no separate responses were required to allow the person who worked the last problem to also work the next one (passive trust). Hence, giving a problem was the only way to increase the distribution of problems to the other person and hence prevent oneself from receiving all of the reinforcers. All eight pairs of subjects cooperated from the outset. Trusting behavior developed for all four pairs exposed to the contingency to trust and expanded to maximal levels by the second session for three of the four pairs.     

On the Emotional Character of Trust

Trustful interaction serves the interests of those involved. Thus, one could reason that trust itself may be analyzed as part of rational, goaloriented action. In contrast, common sense tells us that trust is an emotion and is, therefore, independent of rational deliberation to some extent. I will argue that we are right in trusting our common sense. My argument is conceptual in nature, referring to the common distinction between trust and pure reliance. An emotional attitude may be understood as some general pattern in the way the world or some part of the world is perceived by an individual. Trust may be characterized by such a pattern. I shall focus on two central features of a trusting attitude. First, trust involves a participant attitude (Strawson) toward the person being trusted. Second, a situation of trust is perceived by a trusting person as one in which shared values or norms motivate both his own actions as well as those of the person being trusted. As an emotional attitude, trust is, to some extent, independent of objective information. It determines what a trusting person will believe and how various outcomes are evaluated. Hence, trust is quite different from rational belief and the problem with trust is not adequately met in minimizing risk by supplying extensive information or some mechanism of sanctioning. Trust is an attitude that enables us to cope with risk in a certain way. If we want to promote trustful interaction, we must form our institutions in ways that allow individuals to experience their interest and values as shared and, thus, to develop a trusting attitude.     

道德虚伪：一种机会主义的适应策略

道德虚伪在个体层面是指人们言行不一, 在人际层面是指人们持有双重标准。心理学家通常从道德动机、认知失调以及精神分析的角度考察道德虚伪。诱发道德虚伪通常会促使个体做出跟他们公开承诺相一致的行为。作为一种机会主义的适应策略, 道德虚伪可能起源于群体适应情境下的自我谋利需要, 带有欺骗他人和自欺的特点。除了情绪、权力等因素之外, 未来研究需要考察自恋、羞耻、社会操纵能力、情商、文化因素对道德虚伪的影响。     

自恋与道德虚伪:权谋术和辩证思维的作用

探讨自恋影响道德虚伪的内在机制和边际条件。通过对200名金融行业员工的问卷调查,发现个体的自恋倾向能正向预测道德虚伪水平,是权谋术而不是印象管理在自恋与道德虚伪之间起中介作用。进一步的分析还发现辩证思维调节着自恋与道德虚伪之间的关系——对辩证思维水平低的人而言,自恋正向影响道德虚伪; 而对辩证思维水平高的人而言,自恋不影响道德虚伪。结果对理解当代中国人自恋人格与道德特性的关系有重要意义。     

Acquisition and maintenance of trusting behavior

This study determined whether a two-person exchange situation contained natural contingencies for trusting behavior or whether external contingencies were necessary. Pairs of college students worked matching-to-sample problems for money. On each trial there was one problem and the subjects determined which of them would solve it. Trusting behavior was defined as an increase in the number of consecutive problems each subject allowed his partner to work during sessions that also ended with an equitable distribution. Simply, trust was a temporary deviation from equity. A subject could give the problem to the other person (cooperate), or not respond and let the other person take the problem (share). Other possibilities were for both subjects to try to take the problem (complete), or for neither subject to respond and thereby let the person who worked the last problem also work the next one (passive trust). When only four lever pulls were required to distribute a problem (no external contingencies to reach either equity or trust) subjects reached equity, but only minimal trust (strict alternation of single problems) developed in 18 sessions. When 30 or 60 lever pulls were required to distribute a problem (smaller response requirement for passive trust and therefore a contingency for trust), trusting behavior developed after a few sessions (fixed ratio 30) or after several trials of the first session (fixed ratio 60) and it ordinarily expanded gradually to 10 to 15 consecutive problems through passive trust. The aversiveness of the inequity involved in trusting appears to necessitate a contingency for acquisition. Once trust develops, however, this aversiveness is reduced as subjects learn the inequity is only temporary (e.g., once trust was acquired at fixed ratio 60 it was maintained at fixed ratio 4, which would not initially produce it), and the direction of the inequity appears to become of questionable importance (e.g., being behind was alternated over rather than within sessions and usually not in a systematic manner).     

Self-esteem differences in the effects of hypocrisy induction on behavioral intentions in the health domain

Two studies investigated whether individuals with varying levels of self-esteem respond differently in the hypocrisy paradigm. In the first study, all participants were regular smokers. Those in the hypocrisy condition delivered a speech in front of a camera on the dangers of smoking. The principal dependent measure was the intention to stop smoking. In the second study, participants in the hypocrisy condition wrote a public (personally identifiable) passage about the importance of a healthy lifestyle. The principal dependent measure was the intention to improve one's health behaviors. In both studies, self-esteem scores were positively related to intentions to change behavior in the hypocrisy condition but not in a control condition. The implications of these findings for conceptions of self-esteem and for dissonance theory are discussed.     

On delineating and integrating the study of variability and stability in personality psychology: Interpersonal trust as illustration

Although the person–situation debate is coming to an end, it is not yet clear how to integrate the two perspectives on personality nor what an integration would look like. The density distributions approach is proposed as a way to integrate the two perspectives while maintaining and delineating their respective contributions. Four requirements of an integration are proposed and the density distributions approach is shown to meet all four. This integration is illustrated with an experience-sampling study of interpersonal trust. Each individual varied his or her trust level considerably from interaction to interaction (sizeable intraindividual variability), yet maintained a stable average level of trust over many interactions (sizeable consistency). Manifestation of trust in daily life was predicted by the type of relationship and strongly positively predicted interaction quality.     

Hypocrisy as Either Deception or Akrasia

The intuitive, folk concept of hypocrisy is not a unified moral category. While many theorists hold that all cases of hypocrisy involve some form of deception, I argue that this is not the case. Instead, I argue for a disjunctive account of hypocrisy whereby all cases of “hypocrisy” involve either the deceiving of others about the sincerity of an agent's beliefs or the lack of will to carry through with the demands of an agent's sincere beliefs. Thus, all cases of hypocrisy can be described either as cases of deception or as cases of akrasia. If this analysis correct, then I suggest further that the moral status of all instances of hypocrisy must be reduced either to the moral blameworthiness of deception or to the moral blameworthiness of akrasia. There can be no unified account of the moral wrongness of “hypocrisy” that holds across the disjunction.     

Trust and trustworthiness in a sequential bargaining game

We use a two‐person extensive form bargaining game to explore individuals' trusting and reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keeping with prior research, we find that the ‘self‐interested’ outcome is rejected by a majority of individuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are also trustworthy, in that they reciprocate others' trust. But people with low‐trust scores often exhibit trust but are not trustworthy. These ‘inconsistent trusters’ seem to be interested in exploiting the trust and trustworthiness of others in increasing their own payoff. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Punishing hypocrisy: The roles of hypocrisy and moral emotions in deciding culpability and punishment of criminal and civil moral transgressors

Three experiments explored how hypocrisy affects attributions of criminal guilt and the desire to punish hypocritical criminals. Study 1 established that via perceived hypocrisy, a hypocritical criminal was seen as more culpable and was punished more than a non-hypocritical criminal who committed an identical crime. Study 2 expanded on this, showing that negative moral emotions (anger and disgust) mediated the relationships between perceived hypocrisy, criminal guilt, and punishment. Study 3 replicated the emotion finding from Study 2 using new scenarios where group agents were clearly aware of the hypocrisy of their actions, yet acted anyway. Again, perceived hypocrisy worked through moral emotions to affect criminal guilt and punishment. The current studies provide empirical support for theories relating hypocrisy and moral transgressions to moral emotions, also informing the literature on the role of moral emotions in moral reasoning and legal decision making.