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1.
One of the most popular paradigms to use for studying human reasoning involves the Wason card selection task. In this task,
the participant is presented with four cards and a conditional rule (e.g., “If there is an A on one side of the card, there is always a 2 on the other side”). Participants are asked which cards should be turned to
verify whether or not the rule holds. In this simple task, participants consistently provide answers that are incorrect according
to formal logic. To account for these errors, several models have been proposed, one of the most prominent being the information
gain model (Oaksford & Chater, Psychological Review, 101, 608–631, 1994). This model is based on the assumption that people independently select cards based on the expected information gain of
turning a particular card. In this article, we present two estimation methods to fit the information gain model: a maximum
likelihood procedure (programmed in R) and a Bayesian procedure (programmed in WinBUGS). We compare the two procedures and
illustrate the flexibility of the Bayesian hierarchical procedure by applying it to data from a meta-analysis of the Wason
task (Oaksford & Chater, Psychological Review, 101, 608–631, 1994). We also show that the goodness of fit of the information gain model can be assessed by inspecting the posterior predictives
of the model. These Bayesian procedures make it easy to apply the information gain model to empirical data. Supplemental materials
may be downloaded along with this article from . 相似文献
2.
Quantum logic as a dynamic logic 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We address the old question whether a logical understanding of Quantum Mechanics requires abandoning some of the principles
of classical logic. Against Putnam and others (Among whom we may count or not E. W. Beth, depending on how we interpret some
of his statements), our answer is a clear “no”. Philosophically, our argument is based on combining a formal semantic approach, in the spirit of E. W. Beth’s proposal of applying Tarski’s semantical methods to the analysis of physical theories,
with an empirical–experimental approach to Logic, as advocated by both Beth and Putnam, but understood by us in the view of the operational- realistic tradition of Jauch and Piron, i.e. as an investigation of “the logic of yes–no experiments” (or “questions”). Technically, we use the
recently-developed setting of Quantum Dynamic Logic (Baltag and Smets 2005, 2008) to make explicit the operational meaning of quantum-mechanical concepts in our formal semantics. Based on our recent results
(Baltag and Smets 2005), we show that the correct interpretation of quantum-logical connectives is dynamical, rather than purely propositional. We conclude that there is no contradiction between classical logic and (our dynamic reinterpretation
of) quantum logic. Moreover, we argue that the Dynamic-Logical perspective leads to a better and deeper understanding of the
“non-classicality” of quantum behavior than any perspective based on static Propositional Logic. 相似文献
3.
Tyrus Fisher 《Philosophia》2011,39(1):51-59
Some of Quine’s critics charge that he arrives at a behavioristic account of linguistic meaning by starting from inappropriately
behavioristic assumptions (Kripke 1982, 14; Searle 1987, 123). Quine has even written that this account of linguistic meaning is a consequence of his behaviorism (Quine 1992, 37). I take it that the above charges amount to the assertion that Quine assumes the denial of one or more of the following
claims: (1) Language-users associate mental ideas with their linguistic expressions. (2) A language-user can have a private
theory of linguistic meaning which guides his or her use of language. (3) Language learning relies on innate mechanisms. Call
an antecedent denial of one or more of these claims illicit behaviorism. In this paper I show that Quine is prepared to grant, if only for the sake of argument, all three of the above claims. I
argue that his claim that “there is nothing in linguistic meaning beyond what is to be gleaned from overt behavior in observable
circumstances” is unscathed by these allowances (Quine 1992, 38). And I show that the behaviorism which Quine does assume should be viewed as a largely uncontroversial aspect of his
evidential empiricism. I conclude that if one sets out to dismiss Quine’s arguments for internal-meaning skepticism, this dismissal should not
be motivated by the charge that his conclusions rely on the illicitly behavioristic assumptions that some have suggested that
they do. 相似文献
4.
The change detection paradigm has become an important tool for researchers studying working memory. Change detection is especially
useful for studying visual working memory, because recall paradigms are difficult to employ in the visual modality. Pashler
(Perception & Psychophysics, 44, 369–378, 1988) and Cowan (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 87–114, 2001) suggested formulas for estimating working memory capacity from change detection data. Although these formulas have become
widely used, Morey (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 55, 8–24, 2011) showed that the formulas suffer from a number of issues, including inefficient use of information, bias, volatility, uninterpretable
parameter estimates, and violation of ANOVA assumptions. Morey presented a hierarchical Bayesian extension of Pashler’s and
Cowan’s basic models that mitigates these issues. Here, we present WoMMBAT (Working Memory Modeling using Bayesian Analysis
Techniques) software for fitting Morey’s model to data. WoMMBAT has a graphical user interface, is freely available, and is
cross-platform, running on Windows, Linux, and Mac operating systems. 相似文献
5.
Donald Capps 《Pastoral Psychology》2007,55(5):571-591
This article, companion to my article, “Augustine’s Confessions: The Story of a Divided Self and the Process of Its Unification” (Capps, 2007), focuses on psychoanalytic studies of Augustine’s Confessions, giving particular attention to his tendency to engage in self-reproach. The psychodynamic meanings of such self-reproach
are explored, and the proposal is made that his Confessions reveal both narcissistic personality trends (in which shame plays a major role) and a melancholy self (in which the mother-son
relationship is central). 相似文献
6.
Frank Zenker 《Argumentation》2006,20(2):227-236
A proposal by Ferguson [2003, Argumentation
17, 335–346] for a fully monotonic argument form allowing for the expression of defeasible generalizations is critically examined and rejected as a general solution. It is argued that (i) his proposal reaches less than the default-logician’s solution allows, e.g., the monotonously derived conclusion is one-sided and itself not defeasible. (ii) when applied to a suitable example, his proposal derives the wrong conclusion. Unsuccessful remedies are discussed. 相似文献
7.
This note explains an error in Restall’s ‘Simplified Semantics for Relevant Logics (and some of their rivals)’ (Restall, J
Philos Logic 22(5):481–511, 1993) concerning the modelling conditions for the axioms of assertion A → ((A → B) → B) (there called c6) and permutation (A → (B → C)) → (B → (A → C)) (there called c7). We show that the modelling conditions for assertion and permutation proposed in ‘Simplified Semantics’ overgenerate. In
fact, they overgenerate so badly that the proposed semantics for the relevant logic R validate the rule of disjunctive syllogism.
The semantics provides for no models of R in which the “base point” is inconsistent. This problem is not restricted to ‘Simplified Semantics.’ The techniques
of that paper are used in Graham Priest’s textbook An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic (Priest, 2001), which is in wide circulation: it is important to find a solution. In this article, we explain this result, diagnose the
mistake in ‘Simplified Semantics’ and propose two different corrections. 相似文献
8.
Franz Huber 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2007,36(5):511-538
This paper starts by indicating the analysis of Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel,
1945) as presented in Huber (submitted). There I argue contra Carnap (1962, Section 87) that Hempel felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at plausible theories and another aiming
at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of
confirmation aiming at informative theories. The main part of the paper consists in working out the claim that one can have
Hempel’s cake and eat it too — in the sense that there is a logic of theory assessment that takes into account both of the
two conflicting aspects of plausibility and informativeness. According to the semantics of this logic, α is an acceptable theory for evidence β if and only if α is both sufficiently plausible given β and sufficiently informative about β. This is spelt out in terms of ranking functions (Spohn, 1988) and shown to represent the syntactically specified notion of an assessment relation. The paper then compares these acceptability
relations to explanatory and confirmatory consequence relations (Flach, 2000) as well as to nonmonotonic consequence relations (Kraus et al., 1990). It concludes by relating the plausibility-informativeness approach to Carnap’s positive relevance account, thereby shedding
new light on Carnap’s analysis as well as solving another problem of confirmation theory.
A precursor of this paper has appeared as “The Logic of Confirmation and Theory Assessment” in L. Běhounek & M. Bílková (eds.),
The Logica Yearbook 2004, Prague: Filosofia, 2005, 161–176. 相似文献
9.
We make a proposal for formalizing simultaneous games at the abstraction level of player’s powers, combining ideas from dynamic
logic of sequential games and concurrent dynamic logic. We prove completeness for a new system of ‘concurrent game logic’
CDGL with respect to finite non-determined games. We also show how this system raises new mathematical issues, and throws light
on branching quantifiers and independence-friendly evaluation games for first-order logic. 相似文献
10.
Michael Wolff 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(2):359-371
In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 341–355) I have compared Aristotle’s syllogistic with Kant’s theory
of “pure ratiocination”. “Ratiocinia pura” („reine Vernunftschlüsse“) is Kant’s designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called ‘perfect’. In Kant’s view
they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant’s view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant’s view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle’s view concerning
perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only
the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant’s logical theory.
As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article
published in J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357–365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 199–213 (cf. Ebert’s answer
in the same issue pp. 215–231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published
in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 365–372). I shall argue, that Kant’s principle ‘nota notae est nota rei ipsius’ and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant’s logical
theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations. 相似文献
11.
Peter Vanderschraaf 《Philosophical Studies》2010,147(1):37-58
I review the classic skeptical challenges of Foole in Leviathan and the Lydian Shepherd in Republic against the prudential rationality of justice. Attempts to meet these challenges contribute to the reconciliation project (Kavka in Hobbesian moral and political theory, 1986) that tries to establish that morality is compatible with rational prudence. I present a new Invisible Foole challenge against the prudential rationality of justice. Like the Lydian Shepherd, the Invisible Foole can violate justice offensively (Kavka, Hobbesian moral and political theory, 1986; Law and Philosophy, 14:5–34, 1995) without harming his reputation for justice. And like the Foole, the Invisible Foole dismisses the possibility that being
just preserves goods intrinsic to justice, and will be just only if he fears that others will punish his injustice by withholding
the external goods like labor and material goods that he would otherwise receive for their performance in covenants. I argue
that given a plausible folk-theorem interpretation, Hobbes’ response to the Foole’s challenge is inconclusive, and depends crucially upon common knowledge assumptions that
may or may not obtain in actual societies. I present two analogous folk-theorem arguments in response to the Invisible Foole’s
challenge, one using the idea that the Invisible Foole’s power of concealment might be transitory, and the other using the
idea that members of society might stop performing in covenants with anyone, thus punishing the Invisible Foole indirectly,
if the Invisible Foole commits sufficiently many injustices. 相似文献
12.
P. Schlenker 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2007,36(3):251-307
Although it was traditionally thought that self-reference is a crucial ingredient of semantic paradoxes, Yablo (1993, 2004) showed that this was not so by displaying an infinite series of sentences none of which is self-referential but which, taken
together, are paradoxical. Yablo’s paradox consists of a countable series of linearly ordered sentences s(0), s(1), s(2),... , where each s(i) says: For each k >
i, s(k) is false (or equivalently: For no k >
i is s(k) true). We generalize Yablo’s results along two dimensions. First, we study the behavior of generalized Yablo-series in which each
sentence s(i) has the form: For Q k >
i, s(k) is true, where Q is a generalized quantifier (e.g., no, every, infinitely many, etc). We show that under broad conditions all the sentences in the series must have the same truth value, and we derive a characterization of those values of Q for which the series is paradoxical. Second, we show that in the Strong Kleene trivalent logic Yablo’s results are a special case of a more general fact: under
certain conditions, any semantic phenomenon that involves self-reference can be emulated without self-reference. Various translation procedures that eliminate self-reference from a non-quantificational language are defined and characterized.
An Appendix sketches an extension to quantificational languages, as well as a new argument that Yablo’s paradox and the translations
we offer do not involve self-reference. 相似文献
13.
Donald Capps 《Journal of religion and health》2008,47(4):560-576
In four earlier articles, I focused on the theme of the relationship of melancholia and the mother, and suggested that the
melancholic self may experience humor (Capps, 2007a), play (Capps, 2008a), dreams (Capps, 2007c), and art (Capps, 2008b) as restorative resources. I argued that Erik H. Erikson found these resources to be valuable remedies for his own melancholic
condition, which had its origins in the fact that he was illegitimate and was raised solely by his mother until he was three years
old, when she remarried. In this article, I focus on two themes in Freud’s Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood (1964): Leonardo’s relationship with his mother in early childhood and his inhibitions as an artist. I relate these two themes
to Erikson’s own early childhood and his failure to achieve his goal as an aspiring artist in his early twenties. The article
concludes with a discussion of Erikson’s frustrated aspirations to become an artist and his emphasis, in his psychoanalytic
work, on children’s play.
Donald Capps is Professor of Pastoral Psychology at Princeton Theological Seminary. His books include Men, Religion, and
Melancholia (1997), Freud and Freudians on Religion (2001), and Men and Their Religion: Honor, Hope, and Humor 相似文献
14.
A formula is a contingent logical truth when it is true in every model M but, for some model M, false at some world of M. We argue that there are such truths, given the logic of actuality. Our argument turns on defending Tarski’s definition of
truth and logical truth, extended so as to apply to modal languages with an actuality operator. We argue that this extension
is the philosophically proper account of validity. We counter recent arguments to the contrary presented in Hanson’s ‘Actuality,
Necessity, and Logical Truth’ (Philos Stud 130:437–459, 2006). 相似文献
15.
Mirja Hartimo 《Axiomathes》2012,22(1):121-133
In his 1896 lecture course on logic–reportedly a blueprint for the Prolegomena to Pure Logic–Husserl develops an explicit account of logic as an independent and purely theoretical discipline. According to Husserl,
such a theory is needed for the foundations of logic (in a more general sense) to avoid psychologism in logic. The present
paper shows that Husserl’s conception of logic (in a strict sense) belongs to the algebra of logic tradition. Husserl’s conception
is modeled after arithmetic, and respectively logical inferences are viewed as analogical to arithmetical calculation. The
paper ends with an examination of Husserl’s involvement with the key characters of the algebra of logic tradition. It is concluded
that Ernst Schr?der, but presumably also Hermann and Robert Grassmann influenced Husserl most in his turn away from psychologism. 相似文献
16.
Ken Daley 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(3):349-372
Jerry Fodor (Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) famously argued that lexical concepts are unstructured. After examining the advantages and disadvantages of both the classical
approach to concepts and Fodor’s conceptual atomism, I argue that some lexical concepts are, in fact, structured. Roughly
stated, I argue that structured lexical concepts bear a necessary biconditional entailment relation to their structural constituents. I develop this account of the structure of lexical concepts within the framework
of Pavel Tichy’s (The foundations of Frege’s logic. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 1988) theory of constructions. I argue that concepts are constructions which can be combined by way of Tichy’s construction-forming
operations of composition and closure and an additional operation, simplification, which I propose in section 6. The last of these construction-forming operations plays a central role in my account of lexical
concept structure. Stated generally, structured lexical concepts are a result of simplifying their structural constituents. 相似文献
17.
Kenneth G. Ferguson 《Argumentation》2003,17(3):335-346
Classic deductive logic entails that once a conclusion is sustained by a valid argument, the argument can never be invalidated, no matter how many new premises are added. This derived property of deductive reasoning is known as monotonicity. Monotonicity is thought to conflict with the defeasibility of reasoning in natural language, where the discovery of new information often leads us to reject conclusions that we once accepted. This perceived failure of monotonic reasoning to observe the defeasibility of natural-language arguments has led some philosophers to abandon deduction itself (!), often in favor of new, non-monotonic systems of inference known as `default logics'. But these radical logics (e.g., Ray Reiter's default logic) introduce their desired defeasibility at the expense of other, equally important intuitions about natural-language reasoning. And, as a matter of fact, if we recognize that monotonicity is a property of the form of a deductive argument and not its content (i.e., the claims in the premise(s) and conclusion), we can see how the common-sense notion of defeasibility can actually be captured by a purely deductive system. 相似文献
18.
Jason Ford 《Philosophical Studies》2011,156(2):267-281
Michael Tye’s considered position on visual experience combines representationalism with externalism about color, so when
considering spectrum inversion, he needs a principled reason to claim that a person with inverted color vision is seeing things
incorrectly. Tye’s responses to the problem of the inverted spectrum (2000, in: Consciousness, color, and content, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and 2002a, in: Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of mind: classical and contemporary readings, Oxford University Press, Oxford) rely on a teleological
approach to the evolution of vision to secure the grounds upon which people with normal color vision can be justly called
‘right’ and those with inverted color vision can be called ‘wrong’. I demonstrate that since the inverted spectrum thought
experiment requires that both sorts of vision be behaviorally indistinguishable, no biologically acceptable concept of teleology
will allow Tye to draw the distinction he needs. 相似文献
19.
Donald Capps 《Pastoral Psychology》2009,58(4):325-335
This article focuses on Erik H. Erikson’s case of a theological student on the borderline of psychosis. The case, presented
in a lecture published in Insight and Responsibility (1964, pp. 47–80), was important to Erikson for two important reasons: It enabled him to gain confidence in his capacity to help
young adults and convinced him that he was not being disloyal to Freud by focusing on patients’ religious experiences. His
presentation of the case focuses on an enigmatic dream image that caused the patient to believe that he was losing his mind
but that, when interpreted, led to a breakthrough in his therapy and eventual recovery of his mental health. The springboard
for his study of Martin Luther, this case illustrates the three primary religious images that Erikson identifies in Young Man Luther (1958): the maternal matrix, the paternal voice, and the pure self. It also illustrates how the timely appearance of a new person
in one’s life may have enormous therapeutic value. 相似文献
20.
J. Ritola 《Argumentation》2006,20(2):237-244
In a recent article, D. A. Truncellito (2004, ‘Running in Circles about Begging the Question’, Argumentation
18, 325–329) argues that the discussion between Robinson (1971, ‘Begging the Question’, Analysis
31, 113–117), Sorensen (1996, ‘Unbeggable Questions’, Analysis
56, 51–55) and Teng (1997, ‘Sorensen on Begging the Question’, Analysis
57, 220–222) shows that we need to distinguish between logical fallacies, which are mistakes in the form of the argument, and rhetorical fallacies, which are mistakes committed by the arguer. While I basically agree with Truncellito’s line of thinking, I believe this distinction is not tenable and offer a different view. In addition, I will argue that the conclusion to draw from the abovementioned discussion is that validity is not a sufficient criterion of begging the question, and that we should be wary of the containment-metaphor of a deductive argument. 相似文献