The development of object-permanence: Some studies of existence constancy

Object permanence or existence constancy was one of the phenomena which greatly exercised the philosophical fathers of experimental psychology. The topic has been little studied since. Michotte has described the psychophysics of existence constancy, while Piaget has studied its development. Michotte’s work was restricted to adults while Piaget’s notably lacked careful psychophysical control. The aim of the present study was to bridge the gap between the two, to study the psychophysics of existence constancy in infants. Results showed that there is remarkably little difference between infant and adult as far as psychophysical control is concerned. The major difference seems to be a rate of processing difference. However, changes in processing rate will not account for the development of the concept of object permanence. What seems to be learned is a rule which can override perceptual constancy and nonconstancy in some situations.     

SEEING CAUSINGS AND HEARING GESTURES

Can humans see causal interactions? Evidence on the visual perception of causal interactions, from Michotte to contemporary work, is best interpreted as showing that we can see some causal interactions in the same sense as that in which we can hear speech. Causal perception, like speech perception, is a form of categorical perception.     

Effects of grouping and attention on the perception of causality

Beyond perceiving patterns of motion in simple dynamic displays, we can also perceive higher level properties, such as causality, as when we see one object collide with another object. Although causality is a seemingly high-level property, its perception--like the perception of faces or speech--often appears to be automatic, irresistible, and driven by highly constrained and stimulus-driven rules. Here, in an exploration of such rules, we demonstrate that perceptual grouping and attention can influence the both perception of causality in ambiguous displays. We first report several types of grouping effects, based on connectedness, proximity, and common motion. We further suggest that such grouping effects are mediated by the allocation of attention, and we directly demonstrate that causal perception can be strengthened or attenuated on the basis of where observers are attending, independent of fixation. Like Michotte, we find that the perception of causality is mediated by strict visual rules. Beyond Michotte, we find that these rules operate not only over discrete objects, but also over perceptual groups, constrained by the allocation of attention.     

The perception of causality in infancy

Michotte proposed a rationalist theory of the origin of the human capacity to represent causal relations among events. He suggested that the input analyzer that underlies the causal perception in launching, entraining, and expulsion events is innate and is the ultimate source of all causal representations. We review the literature on infant causal representations, providing evidence that launching, entraining and expulsion events are interpreted causally by young infants. However, there is as of yet no good evidence that these representations are innate. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that these representations are not the sole source of the human capacity for causal representation.     

Perceived causality occurs with stroboscopic movement of one or both stimulus elements

It was shown by magnitude estimation that the perception of causality first described by Michotte (1946/1963) also occurs consistently and strongly with stroboscopic, ie apparent or phi, movement. This is so when the 'causal' movement is stroboscopic and the 'caused' movement real, when these movements are reversed, and when both movements are stroboscopic. The effect is not due to prior experience with Michotte-type displays.     

MEASUREMENT OF EYE MOVEMENTS DURING A MICHOTTE LAUNCHING EVENT

The verbal responses and the eye movements of subjects viewing a Michotte launching event were recorded. The subjects were divided into two main groups: those reporting launching on every exposure and those giving no launching response at all. These two groups were compared with regard to several eye movement variables. They did not differ on the first exposure but did so on repeated exposures, indicating that what a subject perceives on the first exposure influences his eye movements on the following exposures.     

Categorizing moving objects into film genres: The effect of animacy attribution,emotional response,and the deviation from non-fiction

The reported study follows the footsteps of Heider, and Simmel (1944) [Heider, F., & Simmel, M. (1944). An experimental study of apparent behavior. American Journal of Psychology, 57, 243–249] and Michotte (1946/1963) [Michotte, A. (1963). The perception of causality (T.R. Miles & E. Miles, Trans.). London: Methuen (Original work published 1946)] who demonstrated the role of object movement in attributions of life-likeness to figures. It goes one step further in studying the categorization of film scenes as to genre as a function of object movements.In an animated film scene portraying a chase, movements of the chasing object were systematically varied as to parameters: velocity, efficiency, fluency, detail, and deformation.The object movements were categorized by viewers into genres: non-fiction, comedy, drama, and action. Besides this categorization, viewers rated their animacy attribution and emotional response. Results showed that non-expert viewers were consistent in categorizing the genres according to object movement parameters. The size of its deviation from the unmanipulated movement scene determined the assignment of any target scene to one of the fiction genres: small and moderate deviations resulted in categorization as drama and action, and large deviations as comedy. The results suggest that genre classification is achieved by, at least, three distinct cognitive processes: (a) animacy attribution, which influences the fiction versus non-fiction classification; (b) emotional responses, which influences the classification of a specific fiction genre; and (c) the amount of deviation from reality, at least with regard to movements.     

Perceptual causality and animacy

Certain simple visual displays consisting of moving 2-D geometric shapes can give rise to percepts with high-level properties such as causality and animacy. This article reviews recent research on such phenomena, which began with the classic work of Michotte and of Heider and Simmel. The importance of such phenomena stems in part from the fact that these interpretations seem to be largely perceptual in nature - to be fairly fast, automatic, irresistible and highly stimulus driven - despite the fact that they involve impressions typically associated with higher-level cognitive processing. This research suggests that just as the visual system works to recover the physical structure of the world by inferring properties such as 3-D shape, so too does it work to recover the causal and social structure of the world by inferring properties such as causality and animacy.     

Pigeons' discrimination of Michotte's launching effect

We trained four pigeons to discriminate a Michotte launching animation from three other animations using a go/no-go task. The pigeons received food for pecking at one of the animations, but not for pecking at the others. The four animations featured two types of interactions among objects: causal (direct launching) and noncausal (delayed, distal, and distal & delayed). Two pigeons were reinforced for pecking at the causal interaction, but not at the noncausal interactions; two other pigeons were reinforced for pecking at the distal & delayed interaction, but not at the other interactions. Both discriminations proved difficult for the pigeons to master; later tests suggested that the pigeons often learned the discriminations by attending to subtle stimulus properties other than the intended ones.     

Modal completion: critical variables in apparent transparency

Conditions for perceptual modal completion are investigated using a stimulation pattern consisting of a figure moving behind a black opaque strip. This configuration leads, depending on conditions, either to the amodal Michotte tunnel effect, or to modal completion, ie the apparent transparency phenomenon. Four experiments are reported in which an attempt was made to define the critical variables of this latter effect. The results show that modal completion is not typically related to luminance interactions, ie to assimilation, but depends on the figural dominance of the filled-in object, this being determined by structural factors such as figure-ground relationship and stimulation change. The effect also depends strongly on the complexity of the spatiotemporal integration needed to maintain phenomenal identity of the object. No significant effect was found for the two other variables investigated, ie formal complexity of the figure and depth between the figure and the strip. The data are discussed in relation to those on moving visual phantoms.     

Phenomenal causation at a distance

The aim of this research was to study the finding by Michotte, that a moving object A can apparently produce movement in a projectile B without making contact with it.

The experiments confirm the existence of a causal impression of “pushing at a distance,” but they demonstrate that the greater the distance the smaller the chance that this impression will occur.

When it does, in fact, occur, it has the same characteristics, and is associated with the same experimental conditions, as the impression of “pushing with contact.”

Temporal continuity must obtain between the stopping of the moving object and the starting of the projectile; this refutes any theory positing that there is a “passage” of movement from one object to the other. The effects of differences in speed of movement, whether absolute or relative, are similar in both instances.

In general, however, it appears that distance slightly accentuates the segregation of the movements and that the temporal and kinematic conditions of integration require to be more favourable in the case of distance, if an impression of pushing is to be given which is as satisfying as that found in the case of direct contact.

The size of the Radius of Action, that is, the extent of the passive phase of the projectile, is of the same order in the two cases.

The results bring out the fundamentally temporal-kinematic nature of the perceptual pattern of pushing. They appear difficult to reconcile with an interpretation based on past experience, but tally with the theory of “Ampliation of Movement” put forward by Michotte. According to this theory the essential point lies in the phenomenal transitory belonging to A (the moving object) of the movement performed by B (the projectile).     

Children's Unusual Responses to Observed Movement

Olum discovered that seven-year-old children give unusual responses to observed movement, presented on a Michotte apparatus, in contrast to that of adults. We made the following changes in Olum's procedures: (a) stimuli were presented without repetition, (b) neutral instructions were used, (c) different and more complicated stimuli were used, (d) 20 seven-year-old and 20 ten-year-old children were used. The unusual responses remained. They cannot be explained as an effect of repetition, particular stimuli, or procedure. The younger children's responses were less accurate and more variable. This accords with Piaget's perceptual theory, as it relates to stages of cognitive development.     

A contribution to the study of phenomenal causation

In his studies of the perception of causality, Michotte describes a number of “impressions” concomitant with precisely defined experimental conditions, of which “Launching” and “Triggering” are two of the most important. Two major factors influencing the nature of the impressions are the relative speeds of the two rectangles representing objects participating in dynamic inter-relationships, and the length of path of the more passive of the two objects. This investigation was an attempt to discover the quantitative relationships obtaining between these two independent variables and the dependent variable of the subjects' responses to the experimental conditions.     

Color change as a causal agent revisited

Michotte (1946/1963, p. 235) concluded that color "has no bearing whatever on the question of qualitative causality". Surprisingly, this claim has received little empirical investigation in the 60 years since its publication. In 2 experiments, 2 balls struck a cylinder and changed color (either continuously or in a stepped progression) for 2 s. After the 2-s interval, the cylinder disgorged a purple substance. Participants chose which of the 2 balls was most likely to have caused the disgorging effect. An object that changed color was favored as the cause much more often than one that did not, and participants generally preferred an object that reached its terminal color immediately before the effect over objects that reached their terminal colors earlier. When participants performed a causal ratings task, color change produced moderate judgments of causation, with little response differentiation as a function of color dynamics.     

Goal attribution to schematic animals: do 6‐month‐olds perceive biological motion as animate?

Infants are sensitive to biological motion, but do they recognize it as animate? As a first step towards answering this question, two experiments investigated whether 6‐month‐olds selectively attribute goals to shapes moving like animals. We habituated infants to a square moving towards one of two targets. When target locations were switched, infants reacted more to movement towards a new goal than a new location – but only if the square moved non‐rigidly and rhythmically, in a schematic version of bio‐mechanical movement older observers describe as animal‐like ( Michotte, 1963 ). Goal attribution was specific to schematic animal motion: It did not occur if the square moved rigidly with the same rhythm as the animate stimulus, or if the square had the same amount of non‐rigid deformation, but in an inanimate configuration. The data would seem to show that perception of schematic animal motion is linked to a system for psychological reasoning from infancy. This in turn suggests that 6‐month‐olds may already interpret biological motion as animate.     

Visual impressions of causality: Effects of manipulating the direction of the target object's motion in a collision event

Stimuli in which a moving object (A) contacts a stationary one (B) and the latter then moves off tend to give rise to visual impressions of causality. In two experiments the angle of Object B's path of motion to that of Object A was manipulated, and in one of these the point of contact of Object A with Object B was also manipulated. The ampliation hypothesis (Michotte, 1963) predicts that the causal impression should be strongest when Object B continues Object A's direction of motion, regardless of point of contact. In fact the causal impression was strongest when the angle of Object B's motion matched the angle that would actually occur for the point of contact in the stimulus. This supports a hypothesis that the causal impression is a product of experience with real object collisions.     

Prior stimulation and the perception of causality

An attempt was made to discover whether, in conditions similar to those of Michotte, the number of causal responses given by subjects was influenced by stimulation during the period just before the main experiment. Time-intervals between the arrival of object A and the departure of object B were systematically varied within the range 60 to 390 msec. Those who had earlier been exposed to shorter time-intervals (60 to 210 msec.) gave fewer causal responses than those who had been exposed to longer ones (150 to 300 msec. and 240 to 390 msec.). A possible explanation is offered in terms of the modification of existing “schemata.”     

Causal agency and the perception of force

In the Michotte task, a ball (X) moves toward a resting ball (Y). In the moment of contact, X stops und Y starts moving. Previous studies have shown that subjects tend to view X as the causal agent (“X launches Y”) rather than Y (“Y stops X”). Moreover, X tends to be attributed more force than Y (force asymmetry), which contradicts the laws of Newtonian mechanics. Recent theories of force asymmetry try to explain these findings as the result of an asymmetrical identification with either the (stronger) agent or the (weaker) patient of the causal interaction. We directly tested this assumption by manipulating attributions of causal agency while holding the properties of the causal interaction constant across conditions. In contrast to previous accounts, we found that force judgments stayed invariant across conditions in which assignments of causal agency shifted from X to Y and that even those subjects who chose Y as the causal agent gave invariantly higher force ratings to X. These results suggest that causal agency and the perception of force are conceptually independent of each other. Different possible explanations are discussed.     

Launching, Entraining, and Representational Momentum: Evidence Consistent with an Impetus Heuristic in Perception of Causality

Displacements in the remembered location of stimuli in displays based on Michotte’s (1946/1963) launching effect and entraining effect were examined. A moving object contacted an initially stationary target, and the target began moving. After contacting the target, the mover became stationary (launching trials) or continued moving in the same direction and remained adjacent to the target (entraining trials). In launching trials, forward displacement was smaller for targets than for movers; in entraining trials, forward displacement was smaller for movers than for targets. Also, forward displacement was smaller for targets in launching trials than for targets in entraining trials. Data are consistent with a hypothesis that the launching effect involves an attribution that the mover imparted to the target a dissipating impetus that was responsible for target motion. Introspective experience of a perception of physical causality in the launching effect might result because behavior of movers and targets is consistent with that predicted by an impetus heuristic.