自闭症儿童的心理理论与中心信息整合的关系探讨

自闭症儿童的心理理论一直是儿童心理理论研究的重要领域,自闭症儿童身上心理理论缺失这一领域特殊性的加工缺损与弱的中心信息整合这一领域一般性的加工异常之问的关系研究逐渐受到了广泛关注。在阐述自闭症领域的心理理论研究,并介绍弱的中心信息整合理论的基本观点和实验证据之后,在此探讨了两者之间的关系,包括两者相互独立的观点、相互关联的观点以及其他的不同观点,并对今后的研究方向做出了展望。     

The development of executive functioning and theory of mind. A comparison of Chinese and U.S. preschoolers

Preschoolers' theory-of-mind development follows a similar age trajectory across many cultures. To determine whether these similarities are related to similar underlying ontogenetic processes, we examined whether the relation between theory of mind and executive function commonly found among U.S. preschoolers is also present among Chinese preschoolers. Preschoolers from Beijing, China (N= 109), were administered theory-of-mind and executive-functioning tasks, and their performance was compared with that of a previously studied sample of U.S. preschoolers (N= 107). The Chinese preschoolers outperformed their U.S. counterparts on all measures of executive functioning, but were not similarly advanced in theory-of-mind reasoning. Nonetheless, individual differences in executive functioning predicted theory of mind for children in both cultures. Thus, the relation between executive functioning and theory of mind is robust across two disparate cultures. These findings shed light on why executive functioning is important for theory-of-mind development.     

Weak central coherence,poor joint attention,and low verbal ability: independent deficits in early autism

C. Jarrold, W. Butler, E. M. Cottington, and F. Jiminez (2000) proposed that weak central coherence is a primary cognitive deficit in autism and speculated that it may even account for theory of mind impairments. The current study investigated whether weak central coherence could account for deficits in 2 behaviors purported to tap capabilities fundamental to a theory of mind: joint attention and pretend play. Twenty-one children (ages 3-5 years) with autism spectrum disorders were matched to 21 control children on chronological age, nonverbal ability, and gender. Pretend play did not differentiate the groups. Weak central coherence, poor joint attention, and low verbal ability contributed significantly and independently to the prediction of autism group membership, a finding consistent with 3 independent cognitive deficits underlying autism.     

Evaluating the Theory-of-Mind Hypothesis of Autism

ABSTRACT— Two decades ago, the theory-of-mind hypothesis of autism was introduced by Baron-Cohen and his colleagues; this theory provided a unified cognitive explanation for the key social and communication symptoms in that disorder. I evaluate the theory-of-mind hypothesis in light of studies that have addressed several key questions: Do children with autism develop theory-of-mind concepts? How can we explain why some children with autism pass theory-of-mind tasks? Do deficits in theory of mind account for the major impairments that characterize autistic disorder? Current research supports the view that autism involves delays and deficits not only in the development of a theory of mind but also in additional aspects of social-affective information processing that extend beyond the traditional boundaries of theory of mind.     

Scaling of theory-of-mind understandings in Chinese children

Prior research demonstrates that understanding of theory of mind develops at different paces in children raised in different cultures. Are these differences simply differences in timing, or do they represent different patterns of cultural learning? That is, to what extent are sequences of theory-of-mind understanding universal, and to what extent are they culture-specific? We addressed these questions by using a theory-of-mind scale to examine performance of 140 Chinese children living in Beijing and to compare their performance with that of 135 English-speaking children living in the United States and Australia. Results reveal a common sequence of understanding, as well as sociocultural differences in children's developing theories of mind.     

自闭症儿童的中心信息整合及其与心理理论的关系

研究用积木测验和镶嵌图形测验测量中心信息整合,用5个信念任务测量心理理论能力,比较了12名自闭症儿童和同等言语能力的28名正常儿童的表现,并分析了心理理论和中心信息整合的相关。结果表明:(1)中心信息整合的测量指标积木测验和镶嵌图形测验成绩保持中高度相关;(2)自闭症儿童中心信息整合显著弱于正常儿童;(3)心理理论和中心信息整合成绩相互独立。     

Generativity and imagination in autism spectrum disorder: Evidence from individual differences in children's impossible entity drawings

This study examined the cognitive underpinnings of spontaneous imagination in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) by way of individual differences. Children with ASD (N=27) and matched typically developing (TD) children were administered Karmiloff‐Smith's (1990) imaginative drawing task, along with measures that tapped specific executive functions (generativity, visuospatial planning, and central coherence processing style) and false belief theory of mind (ToM) understanding. The ASD group drawings displayed deficits in imaginative content and a piecemeal pictorial style. ASD participants also showed group deficits in generativity, planning and ToM, and exhibited weak coherence. Individual differences in generativity were related to imaginative drawing content in the ASD group, and the association was mediated through planning ability. Variations in weak coherence were separately related to a piecemeal drawing style in the ASD group. Variations in generativity were also linked with imaginative drawing content in the TD group; the connection unfolded when it received pooled variance from receptive language ability, and thereupon mediated through false belief reasoning to cue imaginative content. Results are discussed in terms of how generativity plays a broad and important role for imagination in ASD and typical development, albeit in different ways.     

Theory-of-mind development influences suggestibility and source monitoring

According to the mental-state reasoning model of suggestibility, 2 components of theory of mind mediate reductions in suggestibility across the preschool years. The authors examined whether theory-of-mind performance may be legitimately separated into 2 components and explored the memory processes underlying the associations between theory of mind and suggestibility, independent of verbal ability. Children 3 to 6 years old completed 6 theory-of-mind tasks and a postevent misinformation procedure. Contrary to the model's prediction, a single latent theory-of-mind factor emerged, suggesting a single-component rather than a dual-component conceptualization of theory-of-mind performance. This factor provided statistical justification for computing a single composite theory-of-mind score. Improvements in theory of mind predicted reductions in suggestibility, independent of verbal ability (Study 1, n = 72). Furthermore, once attribution biases were controlled (Study 2, n = 45), there was also a positive relationship between theory of mind and source memory, but not recognition performance. The findings suggest a substantial, and possibly causal, association between theory-of-mind development and resistance to suggestion, driven specifically by improvements in source monitoring.     

Theory of mind and rule-based reasoning

The hypothesis is tested that during the preschool period a particular form of reasoning is applied to theory of mind and a set of problems that do not require the understanding of mental states. Three experiments each provided a different piece of support for this hypothesis. Experiment 1 found similar age-related changes between three standard theory-of-mind tasks (false belief, appearance-reality and representational change) and two specially designed nonmental state tasks (rule-based card sorting and physical causality). Experiment 2 demonstrated that 3-year-olds' poor performance on card sorting occurred across different pairs of dimensions (color-size, shape-number, size-number, color-shape) just as it does across different pairs of perspectives in the theory-of-mind tasks (self-other, looks like-is, before-after), and that sorting performance was related to theory of mind with age partialled. Experiment 3 showed that theory of mind was related to a specific complexity of sorting—sorting by one of two dimensions and not sorting by one dimension or two dimensions simultaneously. The results indicate that advances in theory of mind, card sorting, and causality between 3 and 5 years of age depend on being able to switch judgments across conditions and that reasoning by embedded rules could account for these changes.     

“Hunting with a knife and … fork”: Examining central coherence in autism,attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder,and typical development with a linguistic task

A local processing bias, referred to as “weak central coherence,” has been postulated to underlie key aspects of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Little research has examined whether individual differences in this cognitive style can be found in typical development, independent of intelligence, and how local processing relates to executive control. We present a brief and easy-to-administer test of coherence requiring global sentence completions. We report results from three studies assessing (a) 176 typically developing (TD) 8- to 25-year-olds, (b) individuals with ASD and matched controls, and (c) matched groups with ASD or attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The results suggest that the Sentence Completion Task can reveal individual differences in cognitive style unrelated to IQ in typical development, that most (but not all) people with ASD show weak coherence on this task, and that performance is not related to inhibitory control. The Sentence Completion Task was found to be a useful test instrument, capable of tapping local processing bias in a range of populations.     

Processing of compound visual stimuli by children with autism and Asperger syndrome

A typical modes of visual processing are common in individuals with autism. In particular, and unlike typically developing children, children with autism tend to process the parts of a complex object as a priority, rather than attending to the object as a whole. This bias for local processing is likely to be due to difficulties in assembling subparts into a coherent whole, as proposed by Frith ( 10 1989) using the term “weak central coherence” or WCC. This study was aimed to better characterize the processing of complex visual stimuli by children with autism. Thirteen children with autistic spectrum disorders were individually paired with children of two control groups, one matched on verbal mental age (VMA) and one matched on chronological age (CA). Participants from the three groups were tested in two tasks. The first task involved hierarchical global/local stimuli, inspired by Navon ( 30 1977). The second task employed compound face‐like or geometrical stimuli. This task emphasized the processing of configural properties of the stimuli (i.e., spatial relationships). Children from the three groups showed a perceptual bias favouring the global dimension of the stimuli in the first task. By contrast, children with autism were deficient compared to normal children for the processing of the configural dimensions of the stimuli in the second task. These results suggest that visual cognition of children with autism is characterized by a dissociation between global and configural processing, with global processing being preserved and configural processing being altered in these children, therefore delineating the extents and limits of the WCC theory (Frith, 10 1989).     

Why we need cognitive explanations of autism

In the 70 years since autism was described and named there have been huge changes in the conceptualization of this enigmatic condition. This review takes a personal perspective on the history of autism research. The origins of the first cognitive theories of autism, theory of mind and weak central coherence, are discussed and updated to inform future developments. Selected experimental findings are interpreted in the historical context of changes that have been brought about by advances in methodology. A three-level framework graphically illustrates a causal chain between brain, mind, and behaviour to facilitate the identification of phenotypes in neurodevelopmental disorders. Cognition is placed at the centre of the diagram to reveal that it can link together brain and behaviour, when there are complex multiple mappings between the different levels.     

Autism: beyond “theory of mind”

The theory of mind account of autism has been remarkably successful in making specific predictions about the impairments in socialization, imagination and communication shown by people with autism. It cannot, however, explain either the non-triad features of autism, or earlier experimental findings of abnormal assets and deficits on non-social tasks. These unexplained aspects of autism, and the existence of autistic individuals who consistently pass false belief tasks, suggest that it may be necessary to postulate an additional cognitive abnormality. One possible abnormality - weak central coherence - is discussed, and preliminary evidence for this theory is presented.     

Theory of mind development in Chinese children: a meta-analysis of false-belief understanding across cultures and languages

Theory of mind is claimed to develop universally among humans across cultures with vastly different folk psychologies. However, in the attempt to test and confirm a claim of universality, individual studies have been limited by small sample sizes, sample specificities, and an overwhelming focus on Anglo- European children. The current meta-analysis of children's false-belief performance provides the most comprehensive examination to date of theory-of-mind development in a population of non-Western children speaking non-Indo-European languages (i.e., Mandarin and Cantonese). The meta-analysis consisted of 196 Chinese conditions (127 from mainland China and 69 from Hong Kong), representing responses from more than 3,000 children, compared with 155 similar North American conditions (83 conditions from the United States and 72 conditions from Canada). The findings show parallel developmental trajectories of false-belief understanding for children in China and North America coupled with significant differences in the timing of development across communities-children's false-belief performance varied across different locales by as much as 2 or more years. These data support the importance of both universal trajectories and specific experiential factors in the development of theory of mind.     

Links between theory of mind and executive function in young children with autism: clues to developmental primacy

There has been much theoretical discussion of a functional link between theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF) in autism. This study sought to establish the relationship between ToM and EF in young children with autism (M = 5 years, 6 months) and to examine issues of developmental primacy. Thirty children with autism and 40 typically developing children, matched on age and ability, were assessed on a battery of tasks measuring ToM (1st- and 2nd-order false belief) and components of EF (planning, set shifting, inhibition). A significant correlation emerged between ToM and EF variables in the autism group, independent of age and ability, while ToM and higher order planning ability remained significantly related in the comparison group. Examination of the pattern of ToM-EF impairments in the autism group revealed dissociations in 1 direction only: impaired ToM with intact EF. These findings support the view that EF may be 1 important factor in the advancement of ToM understanding in autism. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

‘I Won't Trust You if I Think You're Trying to Deceive Me': Relations Between Selective Trust,Theory of Mind,and Imitation in Early Childhood

This study explores connections between 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds’ performance in theory-of-mind tasks, their performance on an assessment of selective trust, and their decisions to (not) imitate the questionable tool choices of an adult model. The prediction was that all the tasks would be related, with improvements in theory of mind and selective trust leading children to be less likely to imitate a model who could be construed as deceptive or unreliable. Controlling for age, we found a positive correlation between false-belief understanding and selective trust but no relation between theory of mind and tool choices. Unexpectedly, children who were more discriminatory in their trust were more likely to imitate. Possible explanations for children's reasoning are discussed.     

Representing Inner Worlds: Theory of Mind in Autistic, Deaf, and Normal Hearing Children

The purpose of the study reported here was to examine the degree to which delays or deficits in developing a theory of mind are specific to children with autism or extend to other groups of atypical children with varying conversational experience and awareness. The performance of deaf children from a variety of conversational backgrounds was compared with that of autistic and normal hearing children on a range of tasks requiring representation of others' mental states. Native signers, oral deaf children, and normal hearing children scored similarly, and their performance exceeded that shown by signing deaf children from hearing families and children with autism. The latter two groups did not differ significantly from each other. These results point to an interplay among biology, conversation, and culture in the development of a theory of mind.     

Effects of early sensorimotor disorder on contextual learning in autism

Cognitive explanations of autism often involve higher order cognitive functions developing late in childhood, such as theory of mind, executive functions or central coherence. In home videos of infants later diagnosed with autism, children display early signs of developmental disorders, for example impaired sensorimotor functions, attention to social and non-social stimuli and a lack of circadian regulation. We propose that these early signs need to be understood using a framework of context learning. It is also important to understand the role for context understanding in guiding the maturation of behavior. The role for inhibition in context learning as understood within learning theory provides us with helpful tools for this analysis. Our research aim is not to identify and explain early markers for autism, but to understand the cognitive developmental pathway set into rolling by an early impairment. This will help us understand the seemingly unrelated symptoms that define the complex syndrome of autism.     

A longitudinal study of the relation between language and theory-of-mind development.

Fifty-nine 3-year-olds were tested 3 times over a period of 7 months in order to assess the contribution of theory of mind to language development and of language to theory-of-mind development (including the independent contributions of syntax and semantics). Language competence was assessed with a standardized measure of reception and production of syntax and semantics (the Test of Early Language Development). Theory of mind was assessed with false-belief tasks and appearance-reality tasks. Earlier language abilities predicted later theory-of-mind test performance (controlling for earlier theory of mind), but earlier theory of mind did not predict later language test performance (controlling for earlier language). These findings are consistent with the argument that language is fundamental to theory-of-mind development.     

社会动机理论视角下自闭症谱系障碍者的社交缺陷

社交缺陷是自闭症谱系障碍的核心症状。以往研究更多从社会认知的角度指出该症状是心理理论损伤所致, 但自闭症谱系障碍个体在获得心理理论之前已表现出社会动机不足的特质, 且部分能通过心理理论测试的个体依旧表现出社会动机不足的特点。社会动机理论指出社会动机是促进人类进化、激发和维持个体社会性活动的重要内部动力, 自闭症谱系障碍者的社交缺陷是由于社会动机不足所致。该理论从行为表现、神经科学和生物学三个方面对自闭症谱系障碍者的社交缺陷进行解释。未来应进一步完善自闭症谱系障碍个体社会动机的神经机制研究, 明确社会动机理论在自闭症谱系障碍群体中的适用范围, 探究社会动机理论在评估诊断和临床康复中的应用价值。