地方性立法与道德法律关系论——从"不让座罚款"和"精神赡养"规定谈起

地方性立法涉及道德与法律的关系,审慎、科学地认识道德与法律的关系在地方性立法中具有十分重要的实践意义,地方性立法应注意区分不同类型的道德,并审慎量度道德立法的必要性与可行性同题.     

论法律道德化——兼析法律与道德之间的价值秩序

辨析法律与道德之间的关系问题,几乎是讨论法律道德化、法律伦理学这样的话题的前置条件。默认并预设法律与道德彼此不同,是引出法律道德化问题的逻辑要求。正是因为法律与道德彼此不同,才需要用法律道德化、法律伦理学这样的概念将法律与道德关联起来,并对法律展开道德批判。然而,法律与道德之间的区别又不可以扩大化,法律与道德处于一个关系链条中,彼此只有一条看不见的分界线。也正是在这个关系链条中,可以见出道德相比于法律,具有明显的价值优先性。因此,法律应该道德化,而不是道德应该法律化。     

道德的法律强制探析

由于存在着道德仅靠自身力量所无法解决的问题 ,而这些问题因其对社会秩序和社会生活的重要性又必须获得解决 ,使得道德的法律强制成为必要。多元背景下道德共识的存在 ,道德与法律共同的问题域以及现代社会的立法民主化机制 ,为道德的法律强制提供了可能。道德法律强制的合理性 ,只有通过对于应当予以法律强制的道德的性质、可强制的道德的范围以及道德法律强制的立法和司法程序的学理分析 ,方可予以证成。     

道德与法律之和谐解——道德与法律关系的三维解读

在历史维度上,中西方在道德与法律关系上经历了不同模式,中国表现出德法合于礼、以德为主、强德弱法,而西方则体现为德法分设、以法为主、强法弱德。在逻辑维度上,道德与法律同时存在,但作用于人的行为方式却有明显界分,两者之间是对立统一的辩证关系,道德构成了法律正当性的基础,法律是实现道德之治的必由之途。在规范维度上,道德和法律交替至上,在立法阶段道德为上,法律服从于道德。在执法和司法阶段法律为上,法律成为首要的判断标准,道德仅是法律的辅助。在立法、执法及司法之后阶段,道德取得最终的评价地位。道德与法律是可以互相协调的,通过制度建设使二者达到平衡与和谐,在道德涵养法律的同时,以法律促进道德的普适。     

孔子"父子互隐"与孟子论舜三个案例的再辨析——邓晓芒《再议"亲亲相隐"的腐败倾向》一文简评

邓晓芒对儒家亲情道德的批评主要在于他尚未充分理解儒家的“仁”及其从我做起、从亲爱起的道理,所以总是从“路人”的立场和法律的视角对亲情道德进行外在的仲裁;而在具体分析中,他又往往略过道德主题本身,将亲情道德的案例扭曲为法律和利益的案例,这样,他就既可以“私”来理解儒家的“爱”,又可以“私亲”来定位儒家的“爱亲”,从而将圣贤的行为扭曲为罪犯的行为。从历史的角度看,这种理解与“一父而载(再)取名”的直躬之“直”以及墨子对儒家“不揣其本,而齐其末”的反向批评有类似之处,但又完全服从于其对传统进行攻讦的需要。所以,这样的研究既无助于历史文本的澄清,也无益于传统文化的现代转化。     

试论哈特法律与道德划界限度的思想

自然法学派认为法律和道德之间有必然的联系,法律存在的依据和检验的标准是道德,因此二者之间不能分离。实证法学派认为法律和道德之间没有必然的联系,道德不能成为法律存在的依据,更不能成为审视法律是否有效的判准。传统的实证法学否认法律和道德之间的任何联系,主张绝对划界,以哈特为首的新分析主义实证法学认为法律和道德尽管没有必然联系,但有偶然联系的事实,因此主张相对划界,并承认最低限度内容的自然法。哈特提出法律和道德之间的相对划界既有历史遗传的因素,又是对其所处现实的理性选择。     

法律道德化,抑或道德法律化

建基于中外"法律优先论"与"德法独立论"的基础上,道德走向法律化将不可避免陷入诸多困局。所以,在强调法治与德治紧密结合之时,在逻辑层次上应把道德置于法律之上,从法律走向道德即法律道德化,而不是从道德走向法律即道德法律化。     

道德法律化的途径、方式和表现形态

法律中包含了伦理性内容和技术性内容,从内容上看,绝大多数法律都有着伦理道德的基础.道德法律化是立法中的普遍现象,它经历了从伦理、物理再到法理,最后成为法律的过程.道德法律化的具体方式包括道德向法律的直接转化和间接转化,法律最后拥有了技术性和国家强制性的特征.从道德法律化的表现形态上看,它包括道德义务的法律化和道德权利的法律化,以及道德的公法化和道德的私法化.在道德法律化的过程中,道德直接或间接地构成了法律的价值基础,演变成一种制度性的伦理形态,并对人类生活产生深远影响.     

试论慎到法思想中的道德因素

慎到法思想中对"公"的追求与西方自然法思想相类似。他认为道德与法律在一定程度上并不冲突,如果违反了道德,成文法就不具有法律效力,即恶法非法。从肯定道德的角度分析,慎到认为"法虽不善,犹愈于无法"的实质应该是现实法律虽然与道德相违背和对立,但是也比无法可依的状态要好,也就是不善之法即"恶法犹愈于无法"。虽然是恶法,但因其也是"法",不能因为其不符合道德就否定其有效性,这与其所展现的在一定程度上肯定道德的自然法倾向并不矛盾,他是为了确立法律的至上性。另一方面慎到认为法律制度的建构应以自为之心作为其人性论基础,将制度建构在美好道德之上是不切实际的幻想。虽然未彻底否定道德的价值,但认为法律同道德相比具有客观性和公平性,这其实也是对道德持怀疑和不信任态度。他认为如果二者冲突,法律要高于道德,道德让位于法律。慎到法思想为我们今日制定法律时应如何更好地处理道德与法律的关系,避免步入泛道德主义和道德虚无主义的错误提供了有益的参考和借鉴。     

富勒论法律的道德性

法治一般分为实质性的法治和程序性的法治,前者强调善法、良法,后者则更注重形式正义.新自然法学派代表人物朗·L.富勒的学说即为程序法治论的一种.富勒认为法律与道德密不可分,并将道德区分为愿望的道德与义务的道德,而义务的道德与法律相似.他提出法律具有内在的道德性,将法律的道德性分为外在道德和内在道德两个方面,而他主要阐述的是法律的内在道德,也称为"程序自然法",并将法律的这一道德定位于八项"法治原则"和达致法律的"目的性事业"的手段.     

Genealogy of Morality and Law

In order to clarify the relationship between morality and law, it is necessary to define both concepts precisely. Cultural realities refer to concepts which are more specifically defined if we focus towards the genealogy of those realities, that is to say, their motivation, function and aim. Should we start from legal anthropology, comparative law and history of law, law arises as a social technique which coactively imposes ways of solving conflicts, protecting fundamental values for a society's co-existence. Values subject to being protected are proposed by morality, the latter making subordination of law to morality inevitable. This explains that a great number of modern constitutions include a reference to fundamental moral values, that is to say, they have explicitly positivised moral contents. Legal reasoning, at all levels and expressions, needs to appeal to the aforementioned values. Constitutional reasoning, international law, legislative activity and judicial practice are studied to verify the latter. This subordination of law to morality sets out a serious problem: moralities are cultural realities which are only valid for a specific society. In order for law not to fall in a not very rational legal relativism, law should not be subordinated to morality, but to ethics, the latter understood as cross-cultural morality. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a step forward in this sense.     

德与法有机结合--论和谐医患关系之建设

建设和谐的医患关系有赖于道德与法律的有机结合.既要发挥道德在法治建设中的作用,又要发挥法律在道德建设中的作用.在和谐的医患关系的建设中,道德与法律相互作用,但道德是统帅.     

德法次序:一种现代政治伦理学叙事

道德和法律的关系,是体现现代性本质的一个核心问题。“德法次序”概念,可以将日常德治和法治关系的探讨,纳入到具有普遍性的政治哲学框架中来,实现一种现代政治哲学叙事。     

从手术签字审视医疗活动中道德与法律之冲突

手术签字不应成为实施手术的必要条件,手术治疗及其他医疗活动中道德与法律之冲突有其产生的理论和现实根源,其实质是利益冲突。合情不合法与合法不合情是道德与法律冲突的两种具体情形。单纯的道德谴责或责任追究无助于,中突的解决,完善法律、提升道德、调适利益是避免及减少冲突的有效途径。     

公德建设要超越伦理本位传统

公德是公共行为的道德规范.公德建设能够推动法治建设.在中国,由于长期伦理本位传统的影响,公德建设滞后,影响了中国道德建设,也遏制了中国法治建设的发展.推动中国公德建设必须超越伦理本位传统,将公德建设纳入法治轨道.     

Sex Talk: Discourses About Female Bodies in Hong Kong Media

Sex and Chinese culture appear to be at odds with one another. Sex talk, however, has been on constant supply in Hong Kong media in the past decade. Considering that Chinese culture prefers to conceal, rather than reveal, sexual matters, this study probes into the phenomenon which sees the proliferation of sex-related debates and controversies in news media in this predominantly Chinese society. Two cases about photobooks of female models were used to illuminate the dominant discourses regarding female bodies in Hong Kong media. Since 2009, photobooks featuring teenage models in sexy poses have become standard provisions in the annual Hong Kong Book Fair. In 2015, a 6-year old girl participated in the production of a photobook. It soon caught the attention of critics who questioned the sexual connotations of a few pictures. Despite the decision to recall all copies, the incident provoked debates on child pornography and a rare discussion about sexual agency. This study has identified various discourses in mainstream news media and social media. It was found that morality and money are two keywords that best summarize how Hong Kong responds to sex matters, while changing media technologies are opening up space for alternative views.     

Paternalism and the Criminal Law

ABSTRACT If it could be shown that law is, in some sense, a moral system the apparent contradiction between (moral) autonomy and (legal) heteronomy might be challenged. In order to prepare for such a challenge this paper questions the prevailing view that law is not in the business of enforcing morals. That is done primarily by using decisions of the criminal courts to show that the law does not always criminalise conduct merely to prevent harm to others. Paternalism is distinguished from the harm principle in order to show that the law (rightly or wrongly) sometimes seeks to secure that which is (thought to be) morally good, irrespective of the prevention of harm, at least overall harm.
If such an insight is well founded there are consequences for legal theory in that neither of the ruling paradigms (naturalism and positivism) seems able adequately to accommodate the view of law which emerges. Consequently, an attempt is made in the essay to develop a middle theory of law, between naturalism and positivism, which is referred to as 'normative positivism'. The theory presented has, in turn, consequences for political practice. If law can be seen as community morality rather than as merely the morality of officials, then everyone has a stake in the moral content of law and there may be good moral reasons for disobeying official laws. Civil disobedience is the citizen's ultimate resort against the official morality that has appropriated to itself the eulogistic name of 'law'. That law may be seen as community morality also calls into question some ruling paradigms as to the nature of morality but, if the claim can be sustained, then the legal system may be seen as applied moral philosophy in action.     

On Why There is a Problem of Supererogation

How can it be that some acts of very high moral value are not morally required? This is the problem of supererogation. I do not argue in favor of a particular answer. Instead, I analyze two opposing moral intuitions the problem involves. First, that one should always do one’s best. Second, that sometimes we are morally allowed not to do our best. To think that one always has to do one’s best is less plausible, as it makes every morally best act obligatory. I argue that, despite its implausibility, this is the main ingredient in a traditional outlook I call ‘morality of law,’ which conceives of morality as impartial, impersonal, rule-based and obligation-based. My main point is that supererogation will always be seen as problematic if the background theory is a morality of law. This is because supererogation encapsulates a view of morality-outside-obligation, whereas morality of law centers upon obligation as its main instrument of curbing a supposedly natural human selfishness.

     

Taking Law Seriously: Starting Points of the Hart/Devlin Debate*

The famous mid-20th century debate between Patrick Devlin and Herbert Hart about the relationship between law and morality addressed the limits of the criminal law in the context of a proposal by the Wolfenden Committee to decriminalize male homosexual activity in private. The original exchanges and subsequent contributions to the debate have been significantly constrained by the terms in which the debate was framed: a focus on criminal law in general and sexual offences in particular; a preoccupation with the so-called “harm principle,” a sharp delineation of the realms of law and morality, and a static conception of the relationship between them. This article explores the limitations imposed by these various starting-points and argues for a holistic and symbiotic understanding of the relationship between law and morality. * Thanks to Tony Connolly, Leighton McDonald and Niki Lacey for penetrating and suggestive comments on previous versions.     

Common Law Approaches to the Relationship Between Law and Morality

How are general relations of law and morality typically conceived in an environment of Anglo-saxon common law? This paper considers some classical common law methods and traditions as these have confronted and been overlaid with modern ideas of legal positivism. While classical common law treated a community and its morality as the cultural foundation of law, legal positivism's analytical separation of law and morals, allied with liberal approaches to legal regulation, have made the relationship of legal and moral principles more complex and contested. Using ideas from Durkheim's and Weber's sociology, I argue that the traditional common law emphasis on an inductive, empirical treatment of moral practices has continuing merit, but in contemporary conditions the vague idea of community embedded in classical common law thought must be replaced with a much more precise conceptualisation of coexisting communities, whose moral bonds are diverse and require a corresponding diversity of forms of legal recognition or protection.