Delayed rule following

Although the elements of a fully stated rule (discriminative stimulus [S(D)], some behavior, and a consequence) can occur nearly contemporaneously with the statement of the rule, there is often a delay between the rule statement and the S(D). The effects of this delay on rule following have not been studied in behavior analysis, but they have been investigated in rule-like settings in the areas of prospective memory (remembering to do something in the future) and goal pursuit. Discriminative events for some behavior can be event based (a specific setting stimulus) or time based. The latter are more demanding with respect to intention following and show age-related deficits. Studies suggest that the specificity with which the components of a rule (termed intention) are stated has a substantial effect on intention following, with more detailed specifications increasing following. Reminders of an intention, too, are most effective when they refer specifically to both the behavior and its occasion. Covert review and written notes are two effective strategies for remembering everyday intentions, but people who use notes appear not to be able to switch quickly to covert review. By focusing on aspects of the setting and rule structure, research on prospective memory and goal pursuit expands the agenda for a more complete explanation of rule effects.     

Wittgenstein on Description

Philosophical Studies -     

Wittgenstein on Essence

In the Investigations, #s 371 and 373, Wittgenstein said: “Essence is expressed by grammar” and “Grammar tells what kind of object anything is …”. Those passages, which commit Wittgenstein to holding that things have essences and which offer an account of what essences consist in, have been ignored by commentators, chiefly because it is thought that in #65ff (family resemblances) Wittgenstein rejected essentialism. The aim of this paper is to straighten out the story of Wittgenstein's thought on the subject of essence and to show that he produced (somewhat following in Kant's footsteps) a major change in the conception of an essence.     

Wittgenstein on Reading

The section on reading occupies quite a large amount of space in the Philosophical Investigations (PI) and Wittgenstein makes little changes to it in the course of composing the book. This shows that the section on reading is important. This paper analyzes Wittgenstein’s treatment of the philosophical problem of reading in detail. It shows that Wittgenstein rejects six philosophical ideas about what reading is and employs three different methods. This paper also shows that the section on reading is not only important for grasping Wittgenstein’s discussion on understanding, but also for comprehending the whole of PI.     

Wittgenstein on Understanding as a Mental State

In trying to make clear whether understanding is a mental state Wittgenstein asks a series of questions about the timing and duration of understanding. These questions are awkward, and they have posed a great challenge for commentators. In this paper I review the interpretations by Mole and by Baker and Hacker, and point out their problems. I then offer a new interpretation which shows (1) that a “mental state” in this context means a state of consciousness, (2) that Wittgenstein's questions are intended to elicit the grammars of the words “understand” and a “state of consciousness”, (3) that, in this way, he clearly shows that understanding is not a state of consciousness and (4) that he also provides a therapy to dissolve the problem.     

Wittgenstein as a Gricean Intentionalist

According to the dominant view, the later Wittgenstein identified the meaning of an expression with its use in the language and vehemently rejected any kind of mentalism or intentionalism about linguistic meaning. I argue that the dominant view is wrong. The textual evidence, which has either been misunderstood or overlooked, indicates that at least since the Blue Book Wittgenstein thought speaker's intentions determine the contents of linguistic utterances. His remarks on use are only intended to emphasize the heterogeneity of natural language. Taking into account remarks written after he finished the Investigations, I show how Wittgenstein anticipated the basic tenets of Gricean intention-based semantics. These are, in particular, the distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘non-natural’ meaning and the distinction between what a speaker means by an utterance and what the expression uttered means in the speaker's natural language. Importantly, Wittgenstein also believed that only the meaning of the speaker determined the content of ambiguous expressions, such as ‘bank’, on a particular occasion of utterance     

Wittgenstein on the Resurrection

Wittgenstein probably did not believe in Christ's Resurrection (as an historical event), but he may well have believed that if he had achieved a higher level of devoutness he would believe it. His view seems to have been that devout Christians are right in holding onto this belief tenaciously even though, in fact, it's false. It's historical falsity, is compatible with its religious validity, so to speak. So far as I can see, he did not think that devout Christians should believe that it doesn't really matter whether or not that alleged historical event occurred.     

The Early Wittgenstein on Living a Good Ethical Life

Philosophia - This paper offers a novel interpretation of Wittgenstein’s early conception of ethics and the good ethical life. Initially, it critically examines the widespread view according...     

Wittgenstein on The Standard Metre

In this paper I argue that Wittgenstein is correct when he says of the Standard Metre stick that we can neither say that it is or is not a metre in length – despite what our intuitions may tell us to the contrary. Specifically, the paper deals with Kripke's criticism of Wittgenstein's claim in Naming And Necessity and with Salmon's attempt to arbitrate between the two views. I conclude that, not only is Wittgenstein correct, but that both Kripke and Salmon (and possibly the majority of philosophers) simply do not understand the concept of measurement.     

Wittgenstein on Dreaming and Skepticism

In this paper I aim to elucidate Wittgenstein’s claim that the so-called dream argument is senseless. Unlike other interpreters, who understand the sentence “I am dreaming” as contradictory or self-defeating, I intend to elucidate in what sense one should understand it as senseless or, more precisely, as nonsensical. In this sense, I propose to understand the above-mentioned claim in light of Wittgenstein’s criticism of skepticism from the Tractatus logico-philosophicus to his last writings. I intend to show that the words “I am dreaming” are nonsensical in the same sense as the alleged proposition “There are physical objects” or the expression of doubt about the existence of external objects.