Tool characteristics in imagery of tool actions

Are tool characteristics represented in imagined tool actions? In two experiments participants imagined and executed coloring rectangles with a thick and a thin pen. In Experiment 2, an additional execution condition without visual feedback of coloring allowed us to dissociate between the relevance of kinesthetic and visual feedback. Pen thickness influenced coloring durations in all conditions, indicating that characteristics of a simple tool are represented during imagery. Imagination was shorter than execution, indicating that imagination may be less detailed than execution. Execution without visual feedback was even shorter than imagination, indicating that vision is more important than kinesthesis for differences between imagination and execution, and that either imagining the movement, inhibiting movement execution or imagining the progress of the action is effortful during imagery. In conclusion, characteristics of simple tools are represented in imagined tool actions but the representation of tools’ effects may not always be adequate.     

Eye movements disrupt episodic future thinking

Remembering the past and imagining the future both rely on complex mental imagery. We considered the possibility that constructing a future scene might tap a component of mental imagery that is not as critical for remembering past scenes. Whereas visual imagery plays an important role in remembering the past, we predicted that spatial imagery plays a crucial role in imagining the future. For the purpose of teasing apart the different components underpinning scene construction in the two experiences of recalling episodic memories and shaping novel future events, we used a paradigm that might selectively affect one of these components (i.e., the spatial). Participants performed concurrent eye movements while remembering the past and imagining the future. These concurrent eye movements selectively interfere with spatial imagery, while sparing visual imagery. Eye movements prevented participants from imagining complex and detailed future scenes, but had no comparable effect on the recollection of past scenes. Similarities between remembering the past and imagining the future are coupled with some differences. The present findings uncover another fundamental divergence between the two processes.     

Sensory features of mental images in the framework of human actions

What determines the sensory impression of a self-generated motor image? Motor imagery is a process in which subjects imagine executing a body movement with a strong kinesthetic and/or visual component from a first-person perspective. Both sensory modalities can be combined flexibly to form a motor image. 90 participants of varying ages had to freely generate motor images from a large set of movements. They were asked to rate their kinesthetic as well as their visual impression, the perceived vividness, and their personal experience with the imagined movement. Data were subjected to correlational analyses, linear regressions, and representation similarity analyses. Results showed that both action characteristics and experience drove the sensory impression of motor images with a strong individual component. We conclude that imagining actions that impose varying demands can be considered as reexperiencing actions by using one’s own sensorimotor representations that represent not only individual experience but also action demands.     

Incongruent imagery interferes with action initiation

It has been suggested that representing an action through observation and imagery share neural processes with action execution. In support of this view, motor-priming research has shown that observing an action can influence action initiation. However, there is little motor-priming research showing that imagining an action can modulate action initiation. The current study examined whether action imagery could prime subsequent execution of a reach and grasp action. Across two motion analysis tracking experiments, 40 participants grasped an object following congruent or incongruent action imagery. In Experiment 1, movement initiation was faster following congruent compared to incongruent imagery, demonstrating that imagery can prime the initiation of grasping. In Experiment 2, incongruent imagery resulted in slower movement initiation compared to a no-imagery control. These data show that imagining a different action to that which is performed can interfere with action production. We propose that the most likely neural correlates of this interference effect are brain regions that code imagined and executed actions. Further, we outline a plausible mechanistic account of how priming in these brain regions through imagery could play a role in action cognition.     

Interference effects demonstrate distinct roles for visual and motor imagery during the mental representation of human action

Four experiments were completed to characterize the utilization of visual imagery and motor imagery during the mental representation of human action. In Experiment 1, movement time functions for a motor imagery human locomotion task conformed to a speed-accuracy trade-off similar to Fitts' Law, whereas those for a visual imagery object motion task did not. However, modality-specific interference effects in Experiment 2 demonstrate visual and motor imagery as cooperative processes when the action represented is tied to visual coordinates in space. Biomechanic-specific motor interference effects found in Experiment 3 suggest one basis for separation of processing channels within motor imagery. Finally, in Experiment 4 representations of motor actions were found to be generated using only visual imagery under certain circumstances: namely, when the imaginer represented the motor action of another individual while placed at an opposing viewpoint. These results suggest that the modality of representation recruited to generate images of human action is dependent on the dynamic relationship between the individual, movement, and environment.     

Memory for goal-directed sequences of actions: Is doing better than seeing?

Verb-object phrases are usually remembered better if they have been enacted during study than if theyhave been learned verbally or if one has observed another person enact the phrases. Researchers have explained this well-established enactment effect by assuming that enactment leaves an additional motor code enhancing memory. We assume instead that enactment provokes excellentitem-specific processing at t he expense of processing relations between items. Thus, if recall were to depend on this relational processing that is hindered by enactment, enactment should not be a more effective encoding strategy than observation. We tested this hypothesis by analyzing the recall of sequences of related actions. In two experiments, we found no recall advantage of enactment over observing another person perform, though both encoding tasks were superior to verbal learning. Organization was best after observation. These findings imply that learning by viewing is not inferior to learning by doing.     

The handedness of imagined bodies in action and the role of perspective taking

Past research at the nexus of motor control and perception investigated the role of perspective taking in many behavioral and neuroimaging studies. Some investigators addressed the issue of one's own vs. others' action imagination, but the possible effects of a front or a back view in imagining others' actions have so far been neglected. We report two 'single trial' experiments in which a total of 640 participants were asked to imagine a person performing a manual action - either in a front or in a back view - and then to indicate the hand used by the imagined person during movement execution. In such a task, we assume the existence of two distinct biases: a perceptual-mnemonic bias due to subjects' visual experience of others' actions, encouraging them to imagine right-handed movements, and a motor bias due to subjects' experience of self-made actions, encouraging them to imagine movements performed with the same hand as their dominant hand. We hypothesized that a greater involvement of motor representations in the back view compared to the front view could result in an increased correspondence between one's own manual preference and the hand used by the imagined agent in the former condition. The results of both experiments were consistent with this hypothesis, suggesting that while imagining others' actions we employ motor simulations in different degrees according to the perspective adopted.     

Signing enhances memory like performing actions

In three experiments, we investigated the influence of the overt performance of signs on memory. Deaf and hearing participants studied lists of action phrases (Experiment 1) or nouns (Experiment 2) under standard verbal instruction, under the instructions to sign the verbal phrase, to symbolically perform the denoted action, or to carry out a prototypical action corresponding to each noun. Higher recall and recognition performances were observed when actions were performed than in the verbal encoding condition, and signing was as effective for memory as was enactment. Thus, overt signing can induce an enactment effect. In contrast, Experiment 3 demonstrated that performing an unrelated action did not. A unique but unrelated action was not memory efficient.     

The emulation theory of representation: motor control, imagery, and perception

The emulation theory of representation is developed and explored as a framework that can revealingly synthesize a wide variety of representational functions of the brain. The framework is based on constructs from control theory (forward models) and signal processing (Kalman filters). The idea is that in addition to simply engaging with the body and environment, the brain constructs neural circuits that act as models of the body and environment. During overt sensorimotor engagement, these models are driven by efference copies in parallel with the body and environment, in order to provide expectations of the sensory feedback, and to enhance and process sensory information. These models can also be run off-line in order to produce imagery, estimate outcomes of different actions, and evaluate and develop motor plans. The framework is initially developed within the context of motor control, where it has been shown that inner models running in parallel with the body can reduce the effects of feedback delay problems. The same mechanisms can account for motor imagery as the off-line driving of the emulator via efference copies. The framework is extended to account for visual imagery as the off-line driving of an emulator of the motor-visual loop. I also show how such systems can provide for amodal spatial imagery. Perception, including visual perception, results from such models being used to form expectations of, and to interpret, sensory input. I close by briefly outlining other cognitive functions that might also be synthesized within this framework, including reasoning, theory of mind phenomena, and language.     

动作记忆SPT优势效应的理论探讨

操作条件下的记忆效果好于语词条件下记忆效果的现象被称为动作记忆SPT效应。以往研究先后提出非策略加工、多通道加工、动作编码及情景整合理论来解释SPT效应,但这些理论解释仍存在矛盾和分歧,并阻碍了当前动作记忆领域的研究进展。为了解决目前的理论困境,本文详细地阐述了各理论的核心内容、发展历程及其存在矛盾和分歧的原因,并提出应以加工过程与加工对象相结合的视角来建立新的理论模型,以进一步促进实证研究的展开。     

Can we correctly perceive the reaching range of others?

Little is known about our ability to predict the motor capacities of other people. This study explored how observers perceive the reaching range of another person by asking them to judge the reachability of a moving object. Experiments 1 and 2 found that observers overestimated the reaching ranges of both short and tall people. Estimates were larger when objects moved towards rather than away from the person. Experiment 3 showed that perceived reaching range depended on the observer's viewing perspective. Compared with previous findings, these results suggest that observers use different cognitive operations to mentally simulate actions for themselves vs. others. They also inform the current debate about motor imagery and action understanding.     

Memory for action events: findings in neurological patients

Encoding action phrases by enacting leads normally to better memory performance than verbal encoding. In order to gain additional insight into the representational basis of the enactment effect, neurological patients are contrasted with healthy participants. Persons suffering from Parkinson's disease, which primarily impairs the motor system, and patients suffering from Frontal Lobe Syndrome, which primarily affects action-related planning processes, were involved. We investigated whether the enactment effect would be differentially affected by these disorders. In addition, the characteristics of information processing after encoding by enacting was analyzed by varying memory material (unrelated versus clusterable actions) and by adding an encoding condition that included obligatory action planning (director condition). The findings indicate that the impact of motor information for the enactment effect is not dominant compared to the role of action-related cognitive and motivational processes, in particular planning processes. The findings of the two experiments are explained within traditional conceptual memory theories.     

A question of intention in motor imagery

We examined the question—is the intention of completing a simulated motor action the same as the intention used in processing overt actions? Participants used motor imagery to estimate distance reachability in two conditions: Imagery-Only (IO) and Imagery-Execution (IE). With IO (red target) only a verbal estimate using imagery was given. With IE (green target) participants knew that they would actually reach after giving a verbal estimate and be judged on accuracy. After measuring actual maximum reach, used for the comparison, imagery targets were randomly presented across peripersonal- (within reach) and extrapersonal (beyond reach) space. Results indicated no difference in overall accuracy by condition, however, there was a significant distinction by space; participants were more accurate in peripersonal space. Although more research is needed, these findings support an increasing body of evidence suggesting that the neurocognitive processes (in this case, intention) driving motor imagery and overt actions are similar.     

The potentiation of two components of the reach-to-grasp action during object categorisation in visual memory

Stimulus-Response Compatibility Effects have been reported for several components of the reach-to-grasp action during visual object recognition [Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (1998). On the relations between seen objects and components of potential actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 24, 830-846; Ellis, R., & Tucker, M. (2000). Micro-affordance: The potentiation of actions by seen objects. British Journal of Psychology, 91, 451-471; Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (2001). The potentiation of grasp types during visual object categorization. Visual Cognition, 8, 769-800; Creem, S. H., & Proffitt, D. R. (2001). Grasping objects by their handles: A necessary interaction between cognition and action. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27, 218-228; Craighero, L. Bello, A. Fadiga, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (2002). Hand action preparation influences the responses to hand pictures. Neuropsychologia, 40, 492-502]. The present study investigates compatibility effects for two elements of reach-to-grasp action during the visual mental imagery of objects-the compatibility of an object for grasping with a power and precision grasp, and the orientation of an object (left/right) for grasping by a particular hand (left/right). Experiment 1 provides further evidence for compatibility effects of a 'seen' object for grasping with a power and precision grasp. The experiment shows that compatibility effects are obtainable when an object is presented in an array of four objects and not just on its own. Experiment 2 provides evidence that compatibility effects of an object for grasping with a power and precision grasp can also be observed when participants make an action response to an object 700 ms after it has been removed from view. Experiment 3 investigates compatibility effects for the orientation of an object for grasping by a particular hand during visual mental imagery, but finds no evidence for such effects. The findings are discussed in relation to two arguments put forward to reconcile ecological and representational theories of visual object recognition.     

The differential contributions of visual imagery constructs on autobiographical thinking

There is a growing theoretical and empirical consensus on the central role of visual imagery in autobiographical memory. However, findings from studies that explore how individual differences in visual imagery are reflected on autobiographical thinking do not present a coherent story. One reason for the mixed findings was suggested to be the treatment of visual imagery as an undifferentiated construct while evidence shows that there is more than one type of visual imagery. The present study investigates the relative contributions of different imagery constructs; namely, object and spatial imagery, on autobiographical memory processes. Additionally, it explores whether a similar relation extends to imagining the future. The results indicate that while object imagery was significantly correlated with several phenomenological characteristics, such as the level of sensory and perceptual details for past events – but not for future events – spatial imagery predicted the level of episodic specificity for both past and future events. We interpret these findings as object imagery being recruited in tasks of autobiographical memory that employ reflective processes while spatial imagery is engaged during direct retrieval of event details. Implications for the role of visual imagery in autobiographical thinking processes are discussed.     

Looking back with regret: Visual perspective in memory images differentially affects regret for actions and inactions

People can regret things they've done and things they've failed to do. However, the experience of a regrettable action tends to be painful, while regrettable inactions tend to be painful only when one considers the inaction's impact in the broader context of one's life as a whole (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). Three experiments manipulated the visual perspective (own first-person vs. observer's third-person) that participants used to picture regretted actions or inactions from their lives. Imagery perspective influences the degree to which people's understanding of events is determined by features of the event itself (first-person) or by the integration of the event with broader self-knowledge (third-person) (Libby & Eibach, in press-b). As predicted, relative to first-person imagery, third-person imagery reduced regret for actions but increased regret for inactions. Results provide new insight into the relationship between imagery perspective, meaning-making, and emotion, and suggest ways to strategically increase or decrease regret.     

The effect of level of construal on the temporal distance of activity enactment

A series of four studies demonstrates that, across different operationalizations of level of construal, different types of activities, and for both the self and another person as targets, construing activities in high-level terms fosters perception of the more distal future as appropriate for their enactment. Specifically, the studies show that thinking about superordinate “why” (rather than subordinate “how”) aspects of actions, about the implications of actions for one’s personality (rather than the objects that would be used in performing the action), and about abstract (rather than concrete) aspects of actions leads people to expect the actions to be performed in the more distant future. These results suggest that the association of level of construal and time perspective is bi-directional, in that time perspective affects level of construal and, in addition, level of construal affects time perspective.     

Vicarious action preparation does not result in sensory attenuation of auditory action effects

The perception of sensory effects generated by one’s own actions is typically attenuated compared to the same effects generated externally. However, it is unclear whether this specifically relates to self-generation. Recent studies showed that sensory attenuation mainly relies on action preparation, not actual action execution. Hence, an attenuation of sensory effects generated by another person might occur if these actions can be anticipated and thus be prepared for.Here, we compared the perceived loudness of sounds generated by one’s own actions and actions of another person that either could or could not be anticipated. We found an attenuation of the perceived loudness for self- as compared to other-generated sounds. This difference was independent of whether the sound-eliciting actions of the other person could be anticipated or not. Thus, sensory attenuation seems to be specifically tied to self-generation instead of being a secondary effect of agent-independent preparation for an upcoming action.     

You see, the ends don't justify the means: visual imagery and moral judgment

We conducted three experiments indicating that characteristically deontological judgments-here, disapproving of sacrificing one person for the greater good of others-are preferentially supported by visual imagery. Experiment 1 used two matched working memory tasks-one visual, one verbal-to identify individuals with relatively visual cognitive styles and individuals with relatively verbal cognitive styles. Individuals with more visual cognitive styles made more deontological judgments. Experiment 2 showed that visual interference, relative to verbal interference and no interference, decreases deontological judgment. Experiment 3 indicated that these effects are due to people's tendency to visualize the harmful means (sacrificing one person) more than the beneficial end (saving others). These results suggest a specific role for visual imagery in moral judgment: When people consider sacrificing someone as a means to an end, visual imagery preferentially supports the judgment that the ends do not justify the means. These results suggest an integration of the dual-process theory of moral judgment with construal-level theory.     

Are things that are hard to physically move also hard to imagine moving?

Are objects that are more difficult to physically manipulate also more difficult to mentally manipulate? In our study, participants interacted with wooden objects modeled after the figures from Shepard and Metzler’s (1971) classic mental rotation experiment. One pair of objects was easy to physically rotate while another pair was difficult. They then completed a standard mental rotation task on images of these objects. Participants were slower to mentally rotate objects that were harder to physically rotate when they engaged in motor imagery. Further, this cost accrued with increasing angles of rotation. We verified this was the result of motor imagery by showing that the costs can be eliminated by using a strictly visual imagery strategy (imagining the objects moving on their own). These results reveal a striking constraint imposed by our real-world motor experiences on mental imagery, and also demonstrate a way that we can overcome such constraints.