情绪对个体判断和决策影响研究概述

情绪对个体判断和决策影响已经成为目前的一个研究热点。情感启发式、决策情感理沦等为研究情绪对个体判断和决策的影响提供了一定的理论基础．而近期提出的“风险作为情感”假设为研究提供了较为全面的理沦框架。此外,个体差异比较、时间压力以及信息激起为研究情绪在个体判断和决策中的作用提供了很好的研究思路。     

理想情感及其影响的跨文化差异

理想情感是人们期望获得的情感状态。情感评估理论认为文化对理想情感的塑造有着重要影响, 主要的影响途径有文化体验、文化价值观和社会文化变化。理想情感对个体会产生具有文化特异性的影响, 主要会影响个体的偏好及选择行为、混合情绪体验、身心健康和社会认知决策。理想情感研究未来发展可以着眼于4个方向：使用纵向视角研究理想情感, 进一步探索理想情感的前因变量, 打造适合中国文化的心理健康标准和通过认识理想情感来消除文化隔阂。     

贝叶斯决策理论对复杂运动决策中运动预期的启发——以网球和足球为例

对运动决策的研究是认知运动心理学的一个重要领域。运动预期被认为是运动决策的核心, 受到运动学和非运动学信息的影响。其中, 对运动预期研究的一个关键问题是探讨不同信息源对运动结果预期的贡献以及两者之间的相互作用。研究者运用贝叶斯决策理论解释运动预期中不同信息的整合过程, 分析运动员在复杂的竞赛情景中如何做出最佳决策, 尤其是对该理论在网球和足球领域的潜在应用进行分析。在不确定的情况下, 竞技体育中并非所有的选择、结果或概率都是已知的, 故有研究者认为概率论和经典的决策理论不能有效解决此类问题。然而新近提出的启发式近似, 为运动员在贝叶斯框架下如何快速做出选择提供了理论依据：首先, 在复杂和有时间压力的竞赛情景中, 启发式近似假设运动员依据竞赛中不同信息源的不确定程度, 很可能选择在运动学信息和情境先验之间进行切换启发式, 提高运动预期的效率。其次, 判断效用通过卷积效应影响两种信息源的整合, 降低情境先验的影响程度。     

知觉流畅性对判断和决策的影响

流畅性是个体对加工信息难易程度的一种主观体验, 它分为知觉流畅性、概念流畅性、提取流畅性等。研究者通过操纵刺激与背景的颜色对比度、刺激的字体类型、清晰程度等因素来控制知觉流畅性, 发现知觉流畅性会影响一系列判断和决策任务, 如命题真实性、类别判断、偏好、熟悉性等。知觉流畅性既可以作为判断的直接线索也可以通过选择不同线索和认知策略来间接影响判断和决策。     

贝叶斯决策理论对复杂运动决策中运动预期的启发——以网球和足球为例

对运动决策的研究是认知运动心理学的一个重要领域。运动预期被认为是运动决策的核心,受到运动学和非运动学信息的影响。其中,对运动预期研究的一个关键问题是探讨不同信息源对运动结果预期的贡献以及两者之间的相互作用。研究者运用贝叶斯决策理论解释运动预期中不同信息的整合过程,分析运动员在复杂的竞赛情景中如何做出最佳决策,尤其是对该理论在网球和足球领域的潜在应用进行分析。在不确定的情况下,竞技体育中并非所有的选择、结果或概率都是已知的,故有研究者认为概率论和经典的决策理论不能有效解决此类问题。然而新近提出的启发式近似,为运动员在贝叶斯框架下如何快速做出选择提供了理论依据:首先,在复杂和有时间压力的竞赛情景中,启发式近似假设运动员依据竞赛中不同信息源的不确定程度,很可能选择在运动学信息和情境先验之间进行切换启发式,提高运动预期的效率。其次,判断效用通过卷积效应影响两种信息源的整合,降低情境先验的影响程度。     

认知闭合需要、框架效应与决策偏好

在带有模糊性的决策情境中,决策者个人的认知特征会对其判断决策产生重要影响。通过实验的方法,考察了认知闭合需要和特征框架效应对个体决策偏好的影响。93名工商管理硕士（MBA）参与了实验,研究的结果支持了本研究的3个假设,即认知闭合需要与特征框架效应不仅对被试的决策偏好存在显著的影响,而且二者还存在显著的交互作用。具体来说,研究发现,在模糊情境中：高认知闭合需要的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而低认知闭合需要的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;接收到正向框架信息的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而接收到负向框架信息的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;认知闭合需要与特征框架对被试的决策偏好还存在显著的交互作用。研究结论为根据个体认知闭合需要的水平来选拔决策者、利用框架效应来影响个体的信息加工方式进而提高决策质量提供了理论依据     

数字效应对消费者行为的影响及其心理机制

经济学理性人假说判定, 个体对同一个事物的认知和需求不会随事物表征方式以及个体信息处理方式的改变而改变。同时, 消费者旨在运用最低成本获得最大收益, 实现经济效用最大化。然而消费者行为领域的学者对此提出了相反的主张。他们指出, 当个体解读刺激物数量化属性时, 不仅会对用不同数字和单位表征的同一数量判断出现偏差, 还会受到数字启动的影响, 对用不同数字表示的同一商品产生不同的需求, 甚至做出违反经济效用最大化的决策, 产生了数字效应。不同的心理机制对数字效应如何导致消费者非理性行为进行了解释。在此基础上, 对数字效应在消费者行为领域的未来研究方向进行了展望。     

动态系统累积变量判断中的关联启发式

关联启发式是指在累积变量判断中, 将存量与流量建立正相关关系, 认为存量变化特征与流量变化特征具有相似性而导致判断偏差的思维模式。在多特征交互及简单动态系统任务判断中, 关联启发式偏差以不同形式的S-F错误表现出来。作为一种内生性的、顽固的思维模式, 对于关联启发式的心理机制提出了客体偏差、特征替代、不充分调整等多种观点解释。影响关联启发式的个体因素和情境因素的研究结果不尽一致。由于关联启发式偏差直接影响人对复杂系统的可持续性决策和行动, 减少偏差策略的研究也已实现起步。本文系统总结和分析了关联启发式研究的发展脉络, 针对澄清关联启发式的发生机制、系统考察关联启发式的影响因素及其相互作用、丰富和深化关联启发式的研究范式、开发减少关联启发式的有效途径等方面, 提出了深化研究的方向和思路。     

心理账户的作用机制与儿童认知发展

心理账户是普遍存在于个体心理中的一套或者多套记账体系。这种体系往往是以非预期的形式存在,并对个体的行为决策产生潜在的影响。由于心理账户的存在,使得个体在行为决策时往往无意识地偏离正常的价值判断或者计算法则,从而做出非理性的决策。心理账户的非替代性作用机制可以解释儿童心理理论、价值判断、情感决策以及自我控制等认知能力的发展。     

情感启发式对风险选择的影响

本研究旨在考察情感启发式对风险选择的影响。研究1采用线上和线下结合的方式对687名大学生进行问卷施测,修订并检验中文版情感启发式问卷的信效度,以该问卷测试的风险−收益相关系数作为衡量情感启发式倾向的指标。研究2采用极端被试法,在103名大学生完成问卷后,将风险−收益相关系数绝对值前20%和后20%的被试分为高、低情感启发式组,完成风险选择任务。结果发现：（1）中文版情感启发式问卷具有较好的信度与效度,可以作为情感启发式倾向的测试问卷。（2）风险选择任务激活负性情绪时,相比于低情感启发式倾向,高情感启发式倾向的被试更容易受负性情绪的影响,其风险判断的主观值更高。研究揭示了情感启发式对风险选择的影响,为情感启发式作为个体进行风险判断的重要依据提供了实证支持。     

Can cognitive psychological research on reasoning enhance the discussion around moral judgments?

In this article we will demonstrate how cognitive psychological research on reasoning and decision making could enhance discussions and theories of moral judgments. In the first part, we will present recent dual-process models of moral judgments and describe selected studies which support these approaches. However, we will also present data that contradict the model predictions, suggesting that approaches to moral judgment might be more complex. In the second part, we will show how cognitive psychological research on reasoning might be helpful in understanding moral judgments. Specifically, we will highlight approaches addressing the interaction between intuition and reflection. Our data suggest that a sequential model of engaging in deliberation might have to be revised. Therefore, we will present an approach based on Signal Detection Theory and on intuitive conflict detection. We predict that individuals arrive at the moral decisions by comparing potential action outcomes (e.g., harm caused and utilitarian gain) simultaneously. The response criterion can be influenced by intuitive processes, such as heuristic moral value processing, or considerations of harm caused.     

How do people judge risks: Availability heuristic, affect heuristic, or both?

How does the public reckon which risks to be concerned about? The availability heuristic and the affect heuristic are key accounts of how laypeople judge risks. Yet, these two accounts have never been systematically tested against each other, nor have their predictive powers been examined across different measures of the public's risk perception. In two studies, we gauged risk perception in student samples by employing three measures (frequency, value of a statistical life, and perceived risk) and by using a homogeneous (cancer) and a classic set of heterogeneous causes of death. Based on these judgments of risk, we tested precise models of the availability heuristic and the affect heuristic and different definitions of availability and affect. Overall, availability-by-recall, a heuristic that exploits people's direct experience of occurrences of risks in their social network, conformed to people's responses best. We also found direct experience to carry a high degree of ecological validity (and one that clearly surpasses that of affective information). However, the relative impact of affective information (as compared to availability) proved more pronounced in value-of-a-statistical-life and perceived-risk judgments than in risk-frequency judgments. Encounters with risks in the media, in contrast, played a negligible role in people's judgments. Going beyond the assumption of exclusive reliance on either availability or affect, we also found evidence for mechanisms that combine both, either sequentially or in a composite fashion. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications of our results, including how to foster people's risk calibration and the success of education campaigns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

专业背景、主观印象和情绪对量刑决策的影响

为了考察司法决策者对案件当事人的主观印象如何影响刑罚决策及情绪在其中的作用,本研究要求法律与非法律专业被试对案情相同但对案件当事人的主观印象不同的刑事案件进行刑罚强度决策,并要求被试对犯罪行为所引发的情绪强度进行评定。研究结果发现,被试对施害人的消极印象比积极印象条件下产生更强的愤怒和厌恶情绪,更少的同情情绪,同时,给予的刑罚更重;被试对受害人的积极印象比消极印象条件下,低年级组被试对施害人给予的刑罚更重,但在高年级组被试中不存在显著差异,两组被试在情绪强度上也没有显著差异。法律专业比非法律专业被试对犯罪行为所产生的情绪强度更低。被试的专业背景对量刑决策没有显著影响。中介效应检验发现,在施害人的主观印象对刑罚决策的影响过程中,愤怒和同情表现出部分中介效应,厌恶情绪表现出完全中介效应。     

The impact of domain-specific beliefs on decisions and causal judgments

Extensive evidence suggests that people often rely on their causal beliefs in their decisions and causal judgments. To date, however, there is a dearth of research comparing the impact of causal beliefs in different domains. We conducted two experiments to map the influence of domain-specific causal beliefs on the evaluation of empirical evidence when making decisions and subsequent causal judgments. Participants made 120 decisions in a two-alternative forced-choice task, framed in either a medical or a financial domain. Before each decision, participants could actively search for information about the outcome (“occurrence of a disease” or “decrease in a company's share price”) on the basis of four cues. To analyze the strength of causal beliefs, we set two cues to have a generative relation to the outcome and two to have a preventive relation to the outcome. To examine the influence of empirical evidence, we manipulated the predictive power (i.e., cue validities) of the cues. Both experiments included a validity switch, where the four selectable cues switched from high to low validity or vice versa. Participants had to make a causal judgment about each cue before and after the validity switch. In the medical domain, participants stuck to the causal information in causal judgments, even when evidence was contradictory, while decisions showed an effect of both empirical and causal information. In contrast, in the financial domain, participants mainly adapted their decisions and judgments to the cue validities. We conclude that the strength of causal beliefs (1) is shaped by the domain, and (2) has a differential influence on the degree to which empirical evidence is taken into account in causal judgments and decision making.     

Elaborating a simpler theory of anchoring

Within the classic anchoring paradigm, in which respondents are forced to consider provided numbers as possible responses to a target judgment, Wegener et al. (2008) proposed that cognitive load affects the psychological mechanism by which these anchors influence judgments. We propose, instead, that level of cognitive resources does not fundamentally affect how anchoring works, but only whether respondents can access other considerations that bear on the target judgment. Though we share the authors' view that environmental circumstances can influence the relative contribution of associative and deliberative inputs in judgments, we contend that cognitive load primarily affects the types of information that respondents consider, not the manner by which a focal element is processed.     

Not so fast! (and not so frugal!): rethinking the recognition heuristic

The 'fast and frugal' approach to reasoning (Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart. New York: Oxford University Press) claims that individuals use non-compensatory strategies in judgment--the idea that only one cue is taken into account in reasoning. The simplest and most important of these heuristics postulates that judgment sometimes relies solely on recognition. However, the studies that have investigated usage of the recognition heuristic have confounded recognition with other cues that could also lead to similar judgments. This paper tests whether mere recognition is actually driving the findings in support of the recognition heuristic. Two studies provide evidence that judgments do not conform to the recognition heuristic when these confounds are accounted for. Implications for the study of simple heuristics are discussed.     

压力下一搏：压力如何影响个体风险寻求

压力促使个体风险寻求已得到许多研究的验证和支持, 但对于该现象背后的根本机制缺乏深入探讨和整合。模型指出, 压力诱发认知资源损耗和心理需要失衡, 导致个体执行控制功能减弱, 奖赏寻求增加, 这两者引起对风险选项价值的高估、风险感知的降低和启发式决策策略的使用, 最终导致风险寻求。期望效用论、预期理论、双系统理论和风险敏感理论的视角能各有侧重地解析模型中的路径。最后, 基于模型梳理了边界条件, 并提出未来可关注压力下执行功能、认知和情绪的交互以及慢性压力的影响和调控。     

Normative and Descriptive Models of Military Decisions to Deploy Precision Strike Capabilities

Precision strike capabilities represent a significant and highly controversial part of present day military operations. And yet, there is a surprising dearth of empirical research on military decision making in this domain. In this article, we therefore review different psychological perspectives on how these decisions can be made. Specifically, we compare the application of normative models of judgment and choice against the empirical research on human decision making, which suggests that people are more likely to employ heuristic strategies. We suggest that several features of decision tasks in the precision strike domain evoke the use of intuitive (heuristic) decision making whereas other features such as the sometimes unfamiliar (or novel) nature of the decision task requires analytic strategies to generate good solutions. Therefore, decisions about precision strike capabilities are best made with a mixture of intuitive and analytic thought, a mode of thinking known as quasirationality.     

Metacognitive monitoring during criterion learning: When and why are judgments accurate?

Research on metacognitive judgment accuracy during retrieval practice has increased in recent years. However, prior work had not systematically evaluated item-level judgment accuracy and the underlying bases of judgment accuracy in a criterion-learning paradigm (in which items are practiced until correctly recalled during encoding). Understanding these relationships during criterion learning has important theoretical implications for self-regulated learning frameworks, and also has applied implications for student learning: If the factors that influence metacognitive judgments are not predictive of subsequent test performance, students may make poor decisions during self-regulated learning. In the present experiments, participants engaged in test–restudy practice until items were recalled correctly. Once a given item reached criterion, participants made an immediate or delayed judgment of learning (JOL) for the item. A final cued-recall test occurred 30 min later. We examined judgment accuracy (the relationship between JOLs and test performance) and the underlying bases of judgment accuracy by evaluating cue utilization (the relationship between cues and JOLs) and cue diagnosticity (the relationship between cues and test performance). Immediate JOLs were only modestly related to subsequent test performance, and further analyses revealed that the cues related to JOLs were only weakly predictive of test accuracy. However, delaying JOLs improved both the accuracy of the JOLs and the diagnosticity of the cues that influenced judgments.