自由意志是道德责任的必要条件吗?——对一个否定论证的考察

通过被称为法氏例子的思想实验,法兰克福否定了自由意志是道德责任的必要条件,这意味着决定论与道德责任相容.法兰克福的论证对不相容论者造成了巨大的挑战.魏德克以及其他一些不相容论者发展出一种主要的反驳策略,但未能切中肯綮.本文区分了本体论上的可取舍的可能性与经验上的可取舍的可能性.法氏例子实际上只涉及经验上的可取舍的可能性,而自由意志陈述的却是本体论上的可取舍的可能性.由于没有做出这样的区分,法兰克福在概念层次间做了不恰当的跨越,将由法氏例子得出的结论看作是对本体论层次上的可取舍的可能性原则的否定.因此法兰克福并未能通过法氏例子否定自由意志是道德责任的必要条件,法氏例子也不能表明决定论与道德责任相容.     

霍耐特思想的前奏:纽曼之自由观

霍耐特真正的学术关怀在于如何实现自由,自由才是其思想的关键词。霍耐特的自由理论主要认为,法定自由、道德自由和社会自由对真正实现自由都是不可或缺的,并且,保障自由的机制至关重要。霍耐特的前辈,法兰克福第一代思想家弗朗兹·纽曼主张自由概念应当包含三个向度,即法律自由、认知自由和意志自由不可分割。霍耐特的自由思想与纽曼的自由观在内容上都强调全面的自由观,而更为重要的是,他们的研究方式都注重社会分析,并且或明或暗地笃信黑格尔思想。另外,第二代法兰克福学派学者哈贝马斯,实际上发展的是关于正义的康德式论证。由此,笼统地说,三代法兰克福学派学者在学术形态呈现了黑格尔——康德——黑格尔的发展模式,纽曼的自由观因而可谓霍耐特思想的前奏。     

论自由意志的相容性：卡尔纳普与康德

自由意志与决定论的问题历来是哲学史上一个争议不断的问题。在相容论与非相容论的主张之间存在绵延的张力。在自由意志的问题上,康德论述颇丰。他拒斥了对自由的经验性理解,而去其超越性的维度,将自由等同于自由意志并归结到超验物自体的领域。确保了自由意志不被经验沾染的纯洁和崇高,但也造成了人类理智的困境,即自由意志作为超验物自体而言的不可知性。卡尔纳普以逻辑角度经由因果关系的分析力图建构自由意志与决定论的统一。一定程度上是对康德哲学的一种补充。本文试图对康德与卡尔纳普关于自由的问题做一个比较研究。     

道德行为归责的可能性——评聂敏里《意志的缺席——对古典希腊道德心理学的批评》

本文审视了聂敏里《意志的缺席——对古典希腊道德心理学的批评》一文中提出的几个基本观点,即古希腊意志概念的缺席、康德意志概念的优越性、行为之道德属性应归责于意志以及赖尔对意志概念的消解之无效性,并对其各自做了回应。通过进一步的分析和考量,本文提出如下观点:(一)与狄勒"古希腊无意志"一说中所发现的、在古希腊哲学中缺席的意志概念,对应的是康德的自由抉择(Willkür)概念,而非其意志(Wille)概念——康德将道德的善恶归责于自由抉择,而非作为实践理性的意志;(二)康德也认识到了赖尔所批评的身心间因果作用的问题,而重视赖尔所提出的问题,有助于进一步理解康德将意志限制到道德领域的做法。     

自由意志:实证心理学的视角

自由意志是哲学史上最古老、最持久和最艰难的问题之一,并且一直是哲学,包括实证主义哲学和人文主义哲学关注的问题.近年来,心理学家开始尝试用实证科学的方法探索自由意志的心理机制、影响及表达.研究发现虽然自由意志是一种错觉,但人们仍然相信它的存在,并受到它的影响.自由意志与道德责任、道德行为、创造力、自尊和幸福等概念有密切关系.未来研究应在自由意志的概念界定、产生机制、作用功能等方面进行更深入的探索,并从实证、理论和常识三种水平上综合考察、理解自由意志问题.     

二阶意欲与欲望的冲突

在《意志的自由与人的概念》这篇文章中,哈里·法兰克福提出了人的本质在于二阶意欲的理论,二阶意欲为我们理解欲望的冲突提供了关键的概念工具。我们运用二阶意欲这一概念表明,欲望的冲突并非是出现在人们心中一阶欲望之间的冲突,而是关于一阶欲望的二阶意欲的冲突。基于这一论断,我们论证,由于误解了欲望冲突的本性,使得法兰克福提出的人的本质在于二阶意欲这一理论所依据的对于不自愿的瘾君子和所谓放浪者的分析是错误的,进一步,法兰克福在深化上述文章所提出的观点时,对涉及欲望冲突的现象做出了错误的描述。     

阿奎那自由意志论的理智转向及其效应

自由意志问题是一个鲜有的由中世纪神学哲学家们正式提出并加以深入探究的纯粹哲学问题,也是一个重大的、备受争议的和影响深远的问题。中世纪几乎每一个重要的神学哲学家都探讨过自由意志问题,阿奎那则是其中最具转折性、综合性、开拓性和创新性的人物。在阿奎那之前,中世纪思想家们的自由意志论主要是在道德视域下、与道德善恶和道德归责等问题联系在一起。阿奎那在继承奥古斯丁主义自由意志论的基础上,综合了亚里士多德的理智选择和波埃修的理智自由意志论等观点,创立了一种完备的理智主义自由意志论,实现了中世纪自由意志论从道德主义向理智主义的转向。这种转向在经院哲学晚期和近代引发了深远效应。     

民众自由意志观及其与决定论相容性的研究

早期心理学家们主要采用量表法对自由意志观的构成及其与责任归因、惩罚态度、控制点之间的关系进行了一系列研究。近年来,学者们开始采用另一种方法考察民众的自由意志观及其形成,以及在自由意志与决定论是否相容的问题上民众持何态度。已有研究表明,自由意志问题的相关心理过程要比预先的设想更为复杂,很可能在不同条件下发挥作用的几种心理机制分别存在。今后的研究需要针对具有不同教育程度、文化背景或社会特点的人群,采取更多样的研究方法,引入更多心理变量,进一步考察该问题的内部心理机制。     

论意志与法则——卢梭与康德在道德领域的突破

自奥古斯丁提出自由意志概念并将其确立为行为归责的最终根据后,便在西方哲学史上开启了意志与行为法则之间关系问题的讨论。在卢梭之前,外在关系说主导着对于这一问题的思考。但是无论是把法则视作来自意志之上的神,还是视作来自意志之外的理性或情感,都会使得自由意志成为一个自相矛盾的概念。而卢梭对"普遍意志"及其与法则的关系的发现,则使得意志成为了万法之源,从而与法则内在地关联在了一起。卢梭的这一开创性工作,为康德进一步完成道德领域的三大突破奠定了基础。     

行动者因与主体对基本动机的自由执取

在自由意志问题的语境中引入“行动者因”,是为了说明自由意志的根源以及道德责任的依据。但是,行动者因理论并不能提供自由意志和道德责任所需要的行动者对其活动的“最终控制”。这一困境反映的是理性与意志关系的恒久争论：独立于理性的意志将陷于武断或随机;受理性制约的意志则被理由的逻辑链条所决定。主体生存的基本动机是不能够被任何具体理由所掣肘和取消的“生存理由”,主体对于基本动机的自由执取构成着自由意志的原初经验。     

Modified Frankfurt-type counterexamples and flickers of freedom

A great deal of attention has been paid recently to the claim that traditional Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), which depend for their success on the presence of a perfectly reliable indicator (or prior sign) of what an agent will freely do if left to act on his own, are guilty of begging the question against incompatibilists, since such indicators seem to presuppose a deterministic relation between an agent’s free action and its causal antecedents. Objections of this sort have given rise to considerable efforts to construct alternative Frankfurt-type counterexamples that do not rely on prior signs of this kind and so do not presuppose determinism in a way that incompatibilists should find objectionable. One consequence of this shift in the way Frankfurt-type counterexamples are formulated is that it provides an opportunity for the forceful resurgence of certain versions of the so-called flicker defense of PAP. In this paper I develop two versions of the flicker defense, indicate their advantages over other versions of this strategy, and defend them against objections. Insofar as either of these is successful, it will show not only that PAP has yet to be falsified by any of the modified Frankfurt-type counterexamples currently on offer but that cases of this sort are in principle incapable of falsifying PAP.     

Free will and probability

The chance objection to incompatibilist accounts of free action maintains that undetermined actions are not under the agent's control. Some attempts to circumvent this objection locate chance in events posterior to the action. Indeterministic-causation theories locate chance in events prior to the action. However, neither type of response gives an account of free action which avoids the chance objection. Chance must be located at the act of will if actions are to be both undetermined and under the agent's control. This dissolves the apparent paradox of Frankfurt-type cases as well as the chance objection to incompatibilist free will.     

Frankfurt versus Frankfurt: a new anti-causalist dawn

There is an important anomaly to the causalist/compatibilist paradigm in the philosophy of action and free will. This anomaly, which to my knowledge has gone unnoticed so far, can be found in the philosophy of Harry Frankfurt. Two of his most important contributions to the field – his influential counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities and his ‘guidance’ view of action – are incompatible. Frankfurt's counterexample to the Principle works only if we do not understand action as Frankfurt does in his guidance account. If, on the other hand, we understand agency in terms of the agent's guidance, then his counterexample to the Principle fails because, then, counterfactual scenarios of Frankfurt-type counterexamples are such that what happens does not count as the relevant agent's action. So Frankfurt-type counterexamples do not show that the agent could not have avoided acting as she did: so they fail to offer a scenario in which the agent is intuitively responsible even though she could not have avoided acting as she did. Therefore, Frankfurt-type counterexamples do not challenge the Principle, according to which ‘a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise’. The importance of this inconsistency goes far beyond the issue of coherence within Frankfurt's philosophy. I shall argue that this inconsistency represents an important anomaly within the causalist/compatibilist framework; so that we should start to seriously consider having to move on from the established paradigm.     

Praise and prevention

I argue that it is possible to prevent (and to be praiseworthy for preventing) an unwelcome outcome that had no chance of occurring. I motivate this position by constructing examples in which it makes sense to explain the non-occurrence of a certain outcome by referring to a particular agent's intentional and willing behavior, and yet the non-occurrence of the outcome in question was ensured by factors external to the agent. I conclude that even if the non-occurrence of an unwelcome outcome is ensured, the agent whose action explains this non-occurrence is praiseworthy for preventing the outcome. My examples are similar in important respects to Frankfurt-type cases. In the second half of the paper, I discuss the relationship between my examples and Frankfurt-type cases involving both actions and omissions. I conclude that while I may be responsible for the consequences of an action even if those consequences are unavoidable, this is not necessarily so for the consequences of omissions.     

Moral Responsibility and the Metaphysics of Free Will: Reply to van Inwagen

In The Philosophical Quarterly , 47 (1997), pp. 373–81, van Inwagen argues in a critical notice of my book The Metaphysics of Free Will that the impression that Frankfurt-type examples show that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities results from insufficient analytical precision. He suggests various precise principles which imply that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities. In reply, I seek to defend the conclusion I have drawn from Frankfurt-type examples: moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities. I contend that van Inwagen's principles — the principle of possible prevention and the no-matter-what principle — are invalid, and I suggest that their plausibility comes from thinking about a proper subset of the relevant cases.     

Free will in context: a contemporary philosophical perspective

Philosophical work on free will is inevitably framed by the problem of free will and determinism. This paper offers an overview of the current state of the philosophical art. Early sections focus on quantum indeterminism, an outline of the most influential logical argument for incompatibilism between free will and determinism, and telling problems that face incompatibilism. A major portion of the paper focuses on the compatiblist alternative, favored by many working philosophers. The conditional account of free will offered by classical compatibilism can be shown to be inadequate. A number of compatibilist options remain open, however, and seem promising for future research. These include "hierarchical" or "mesh" accounts of free will, normative perspectives and an approach to free will in terms of an emphasis on context. Final sections draw out the implications of contemporary compatibilism for the brain and behavioral sciences and for the law.     

Luck,Control, and Contrastive Explanation

This paper is aimed to show how the libertarian conception of free choice is mistaken or misleading by focusing on Robert Kane’s attempt to solve the problem of luck, which arguably constitutes the most serious challenge to libertarianism about free will. I will argue that either Kane’s solution to the problem of luck falls into some inconsistency or he must introduce the requirement of contrastive explanation into his account of plural voluntary control. Either way, Kane fails to show how his emphasis on the requirement of plural voluntary control is made consistent with his unswerving commitment to the requirement of the libertarian free will for a metaphysical indeterminism.     

Deterministic Frankfurt cases

According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), people are morally responsible for what they do only if they could have done otherwise. Over the last few decades, this principle has dominated discussions of free will and moral responsibility. One important strand of this discussion concerns the Frankfurt-type cases or Frankfurt cases, originally developed by Frankfurt (J Philos 66:829–839, 1969), which are alleged counterexamples to PAP. One way in which proponents of PAP have responded to these purported counterexamples is by arguing that they fall prey to a dilemma, both horns of which undermine their cogency. Recently, Fischer (Philos Rev 119: 315–336, 2010) has defended the Frankfurt cases against one horn of this dilemma. In this essay, I criticize Fischer’s defense of the Frankfurt cases and argue that he does not successfully show how the cases can avoid this horn of the dilemma. If I am right, then, despite Fischer’s claims to the contrary, the original dilemma plaguing the cases still stands.     

Source incompatibilism and the foreknowledge dilemma

The problem that divine foreknowledge poses for free will is one that is notoriously difficult to solve. If God believes in advance how an agent will act, this fact about the past eradicates all alternatives for the actor, given the infallibility of God’s beliefs. And if we assume, with many theists, that free will requires alternatives possibilities, then it looks as if God’s omniscience is incompatible with our free will. One solution to this problem, introduced and defended by David Hunt, draws on the source incompatibilist position in the secular free debate. According to source incompatibilists, free will does not require alternative possibilities but is also not compatible with causal determinism. Hunt argues that because God’s foreknowledge does not eliminate future alternatives through causal means, it is compatible with free will. In this paper, I challenge Hunt’s position using Kevin Timpe’s distinction between “wide” and “narrow” source incompatibilists. I argue that if one wishes to be an incompatibilist concerning free will and causal determinism, one must accept that alternatives are required for free will. And if one must accept that alternatives are a necessary condition for free will, then Hunt’s solution to the foreknowledge dilemma will not succeed.     

A Rejoinder to Fischer and Tognazzini

In Otsuka (1998), I endorse an incompatibilist Principle of Avoidable Blame. In this rejoinder to Fischer and Tognazzini (2009), I defend this principle against their charge that it is vulnerable to Frankfurt-type counterexample.